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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Alan Preston Reynolds
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
June 2015
Title: The Perils of Pluralism: An Exploration of the Nature of Political Disagreements 
about Economic Justice
Much of contemporary mainstream political philosophy operates under the 
assumption that if reasonable people deliberate about matters of basic justice in the right 
conditions, agreement will emerge.  This assumption implies that although reasonable 
people will likely disagree about private matters concerning the nature of the good life, 
they will nonetheless agree about public matters of justice.  I reject this assumption, and 
in this dissertation I argue that reasonable people are likely to experience deep and 
persistent disagreements about matters of basic justice.  I concede that there are some 
domains of justice where broad agreement has been achieved in modern democratic 
societies, namely those concerning the scope and content of civil and political liberties.  
However, when it comes to the scope and content of economic liberties, there is little 
agreement to be had.  This is because reasonable people can be committed to radically 
different premises about matters of basic justice as well as the fact that basic agreed-upon
concepts can be interpreted and interconnected in significantly different ways.  Even in 
ideal theory, then, where we restrict ourselves to idealized reasonable people, rational 
consensus is not a feasible goal on certain core matters of justice.  From here, I turn to the
realm of non-ideal deliberation about justice and explore the difficult problem of rational 
political ignorance.  I further discuss the effects of the Internet on non-ideal political 
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deliberation, and I look at the ways in which online deliberation can fuel normal 
cognitive biases and deepen political polarization.  I argue that matters of economic 
justice are characterized by both moral pluralism and epistemic complexity, both of which
tend to be downplayed within the deliberative enclaves that proliferate on the Internet.  
How are we to deal with these problems of political disagreement and polarization?  To 
help answer this question, I turn to the tradition of American pragmatism, and especially 
the writings of William James, to suggest a re-orientation of political philosophy away 
from the assumption of rational consensus and toward a more humble, but more 
constructive, vision in which the philosopher attempts to fashion new ideals that might 
help overcome currently entrenched disagreements.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The nature of political disagreement over economic issues is front and center in 
American political consciousness today, with “Tea Partiers” pitted against “Occupiers” 
over basic issues of taxation, redistribution, regulation, cronyism, outsourcing, the debt 
and deficit, the financial sector, housing markets, health care markets, labor policy, trade 
policy, capitalism and the environment, etc.   A casual observer of American politics is 
likely to note two things about these debates: (1) the competing sides seem to hold 
sharply opposed philosophical views about the nature of society and self, ownership and 
entitlement, property and justice, etc., and (2) the philosophical ideas underlying these 
debates are very confused and unclear (even to those who regularly invoke them).  
My project, then, is a philosophical intervention that aims to make these 
underlying ideas explicit and to explore the nature of these disagreements about 
economic justice.  Are these competing ideas actually much closer together than it seems 
when they are wielded in the heat of everyday politics?  I will show that they are not – 
the competing philosophical views are, in fact, incommensurable and hopelessly at odds. 
Does one of the sides adhere to ideas that are confused, contradictory, morally abhorrent, 
or wrong?  I will argue that this is not the case – the competing sides are both committed 
to philosophical views that are in fact reasonable.  My conclusion is thus a tragic one, as I
cast doubt on the very possibility of consensus around any single conception of economic
justice, even among reasonable people.  From here, though, I suggest ways in which we 
can productively think about a politics without the hope of rational consensus, in which 
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we can peaceably live together while continuing to disagree deeply and indefinitely about
important issues of justice.
My intervention aims to make the philosophical ideas underlying our political 
discourse explicit and clear, so I therefore turn to that tradition of thought where we find 
our political intuitions most clearly and fully articulated and systematized: political 
philosophy.  In particular, I engage the tradition of “political liberalism,” which stretches 
back to the classical social contract thinkers of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, and comes up through John Rawls, Jonathan 
Quong, and Gerald Gaus (and many others).  As I explain in chapter II, this tradition of 
thinkers is committed to the project of articulating a conception of justice that can be the 
object of consensus, while at the same time respecting the reality that there exists, and 
always will exist, a pluralism of philosophical, moral, and religious views among 
reasonable people.  The ideal of consensus comes, in part, from the Enlightenment, and 
embodies the democratic hope that reasonable people in a political community can arrive 
at mutually agreeable principles and rules to govern their shared social life.  The fact of 
pluralism becomes clear, in part, during and after the Reformation, and reflects an 
appreciation for the inescapable pluralism of values and ideals that is produced by 
practical reason operating under free institutions.  
On the surface, however, the ideal of consensus and the fact of pluralism pull in 
opposite directions – one embodies our aspiration for agreement, the other signals our 
recognition of disagreement.  How, then, can consensus and pluralism be reconciled, if at 
all?  This is the problem that political liberalism tries to address.  The response from 
political liberals, which I explain in detail in chapter II, is the claim that reasonable 
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people are bound to agree about public principles of justice (at least in their broad 
outlines), even while they are bound to deeply disagree about private matters of the good 
life.  Thus, the liberal public/private split accommodates the consensus/pluralism split 
perfectly.  Our shared public life is characterized by consensus, while our separate private
lives are characterized by pluralism.
I challenge this optimistic assumption at the heart of political liberalism – namely 
the assumption that reasonable people will agree about the basic contours of justice.  
Now, in modern democratic societies, reasonable people do agree about many justice-
related issues.  The liberties secured by a liberal democratic state can be divided into 
three categories: civil liberties (freedom of speech, association, press, etc.), political 
liberties (freedom to vote, run for office, etc.), and economic liberties (freedom to own 
and exchange goods and services, etc.).  I agree with political liberals that there exists, in 
modern liberal democracies, widespread agreement (or an “overlapping consensus”) on 
the nature and scope of civil and political liberties (in their broad outlines, with some 
notable exceptions).  For example, there is a broad consensus in modern liberal 
democracies concerning the nature and importance of free speech, even while there are 
disagreements around the periphery of this basic right, such as debates concerning the 
regulation of hate speech.  However, I argue that political liberals are wrong to assume 
the existence of an overlapping consensus on the nature and scope of economic liberties.  
In the debates between right-libertarians, left-libertarians, classical liberals, left-liberals, 
and liberal socialists, as well as between sufficientarians, prioritarians, and egalitarians, 
the disagreements over economic justice are indeed as deep and persistent as are the 
disagreements we experience about matters of the good life.  Political liberalism is not 
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equipped to deal with the fact of our deep yet reasonable disagreements about the nature 
and scope of economic liberty.
In chapter III, then, I explore the various attempts of political philosophers to 
articulate a conception of economic justice that could be acceptable to all reasonable 
people, and I explain how and why they fail.  Two political philosophers especially of 
interest are John Rawls and Robert Nozick, with Rawls articulating a conception of 
economic justice attractive to those on the egalitarian left, and Nozick articulating a 
conception of economic justice attractive to those on the libertarian right.  To explore the 
nature of their disagreement, I dig down to the core question that divides them: Do people
have an entitlement to their unearned natural assets (natural ability, intelligence, work 
ethic, etc.), and thus to the economic assets that flow from them?  Rawls develops the 
“argument from arbitrariness” to argue that since people do not earn their natural assets, 
they have no entitlement over them, from which he concludes that natural assets are a 
“common asset,” held collectively by the larger political community.  This justifies 
sharply limiting economic liberty and redistributing income from the lucky to the 
unlucky.  This defense of luck egalitarianism provides a powerful philosophical defense 
of Rawls' economic egalitarianism.  Nozick, on the other hand, agrees with Rawls that 
people do not earn their natural assets, but Nozick (rightly) points out that Rawls does not
sufficiently explain how this fact itself transfers the entitlement over natural assets to the 
larger political community.  So, even though people do not earn their natural assets, 
Nozick argues that each individual should be entitled to her own natural assets and the 
economic assets that flow from them.  This argument thus justifies maximal economic 
liberty and a minimal state that protects basic rights (including, importantly, private 
property rights).  This defense of self-ownership provides a powerful philosophical 
defense of Nozick's inegalitarian historical entitlement theory of justice.  I will argue that 
neither Rawls nor Nozick has made a fully persuasive case for his theory of entitlement 
and justice, and neither Rawls nor Nozick has made a fully persuasive critique of his 
counterpart.  As such, both positions are reasonable, and at the same time both positions 
are reasonably rejectable.  Reasonable people can, indeed, radically disagree about 
matters of economic justice.  
Nozick's critique of Rawls represents an external critique of political liberalism, 
since Nozick attacks Rawls' very premises.  However, I am also interested in developing 
an internal critique of Rawls' version of political liberalism.  From here, then, I explore 
some of the debates within political liberalism, and show that even those who accept 
many of the same premises can develop them in radically different ways.  This is the case
because basic agreed-upon concepts can be interpreted and interconnected in significantly
different ways, which I document in the debate over the relationship between economic 
liberty and moral personhood that divides Samuel Freeman from John Tomasi, and the 
debate over the nature of liberty and coercion that divides Gerald Gaus from Andrew 
Lister.  Even in ideal theory, then, where we restrict ourselves to idealized reasonable 
people who shared the basic project of political liberalism, rational consensus is not a 
feasible goal for certain core matters of justice because of the wide plurality of reasonable
yet irreconcilable views.
In chapter IV, I turn away from ideal theory and turn toward the non-ideal world 
of political deliberation.  One of the most important problems for non-ideal deliberation 
is the problem of rational political ignorance.  That is, individuals do not have strong 
5
incentives to develop justified beliefs about complex political issues.  This is especially 
the case for issues of economic justice.  I argue that what makes economic issues 
especially challenging is the degree of both moral pluralism and empirical complexity 
inherent in them.  Unlike other political disagreements (such as cultural issues like same-
sex marriage or abortion), which are almost entirely debates over normative 
commitments (or, as we usually say, values), disagreements about economic issues also 
involve complicated and subtle debates about empirical questions (or, as we usually say, 
facts), such that even experts frequently disagree about the desirability of any given 
economic policy.  For example, evaluating the issue of abortion depends primarily on 
one's religious worldview, and requires comprehension of only the most basic empirical 
matters.  Evaluating competing views about the merits of Keynesian stimulus, or 
competing views about monetary policy, requires some heavy-duty training in economics.
Many people are capable of developing a coherent set of values, which means that most 
people are competent to pass judgment on value-heavy cultural issues.  However, only 
the exceptionally well-informed are capable of grasping the complex empirical issues 
underlying economic policies related to trade or healthcare.
In chapter IV, I also reflect on one of the most important and interesting arenas in 
which real-world, non-ideal political deliberation takes place today: the Internet.  Here I 
investigate the effects of our new media landscape on the quality of our political 
disagreements about economic issues.  Increasingly, political activism and debate in the 
United States (and elsewhere) is conducted in, or somehow connected to, online media 
environments, as participation shifts from the passive consumption of the nightly news to 
the active participation of online political forums such as comments sections, blogs, 
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Facebook, and Twitter.  So how does this new media environment affect our political 
lives?  I suggest some reasons to be pessimistic about the implications of our new media 
environment on the quality of our political deliberation.
The upshot of all this is somewhat troubling: the epistemically closed 
communities of deliberation that too often arise on the Internet have, as one negative 
effect, a tendency for all sides to downplay the moral pluralism and empirical complexity 
of economic issues.  Thus, the Internet enables the creation of large communities of 
people who are like-minded not only in their values, but also in their empirical 
assumptions about the world – however uninformed or flawed these assumptions may be.
To fill out this story I will draw on existing empirical studies of online polarization and 
connect these empirical findings to the structural tendencies toward disagreement rooted 
in the work of moral psychology.  This chapter deepens the pessimism regarding the 
possibility of consensus about economic justice: chapters II and III point toward the 
likelihood of deep and persistent disagreement about normative issues in ideal 
deliberation, while chapter IV points toward the likelihood of hopeless confusion and 
disagreement about empirical issues in non-ideal deliberation.
Finally, in chapter V, I propose ways of more seriously incorporating deep value 
pluralism into political philosophy by drawing on the (largely marginalized) traditions of 
political thought that are not corrupted by the assumption of the eventuality of rational 
consensus.  Most notably I develop some insights from the pragmatist political 
philosophy of William James.  Ultimately, I argue that political philosophers should seek 
out hitherto unseen or unappreciated nodes of convergence beneath our sedimented 
debates, and develop these points of convergence into new ideals that might capture the 
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imaginations of the opposing parties to the disagreement.  James exemplifies this practice
in his article “The Moral Equivalent of War,” and I try to draw out lessons from this 
example for contemporary political philosophy.  Thus, I propose a vision of political 
philosophy that is more modest, and in some ways more difficult, but better oriented to 
directly and productively engage with the ongoing controversies of society.
The structure of this dissertation can be described in the following way: chapters II-
IV are diagnostic, while chapter V is reconstructive.  Chapters II-IV successively narrow 
in on a diagnosis, going from very broad and theoretical in chapter II (in which I 
diagnose the challenge of deep pluralism for the tradition of political liberalism), to a 
focused example of this problem (the deep yet reasonable disagreements we experience 
concerning the nature and scope of economic liberty), to an even more focused case (how
this disagreement is altered and deepened in the context of online deliberation).  Finally, 
chapter V provides a possible way forward, in which I propose an altered conception of 
the nature and role of political philosophy, one that is more attuned to our current 
political conditions.
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CHAPTER II
THE PROJECT AND PARADOXES OF POLITICAL
LIBERALISM
1. Introduction: The Fundamental Problem
According to liberal political philosophy, political authority is legitimate only if 
all of those subject to its power consent to the principles of justice that guide its exercise. 
However, it is an undeniable fact that reasonable people disagree with each other about 
basic matters of philosophy, religion, and morality.  How, then, can consensus be 
achieved in the midst of a wide-ranging pluralism of values?  The tradition within 
political philosophy that most directly addresses this question is often referred to as 
“political liberalism”1 (most systematically articulated by John Rawls in his book of that 
name).  This tradition has its origin in the classical social contract thinkers of Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant.2  The optimistic 
assumption at the heart of political liberalism is that reasonable people are likely to 
disagree deeply and indefinitely about private matters of the good life, but nonetheless 
will be able to agree about the basic principles of justice that govern public life (at least 
1 I use the label “political liberalism” to signify the whole subset of the social contract tradition according
to which agreement about justice takes place between equally situated and morally motivated 
bargainers.  My use of the term does arguably blur over some meaningful distinctions in the literature, 
such as the distinction between political liberalism and epistemic (or justificatory) liberalism 
(articulated most systematically by Gerald Gaus).  The distinction between political liberalism and 
epistemic liberalism has not fully crystallized in the literature, and the distinction is not especially 
meaningful in this dissertation.  Thus, I use the term “political liberalism” as the broad category of those
committed to a moralized social contract.  This distinguishes the moralized political liberal social 
contractarianism from the amoral modus vivendi social contractarianism that begins with Thomas 
Hobbes' Leviathan (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2010) and comes up through (most notably) 
David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986).
2 The continuity of the classical social contract tradition with the contemporary project of political 
liberalism is demonstrated convincingly in Gerald Gaus, “Public Reason Liberalism,” accessed 9 
February 2013, http://www.gaus.biz/PublicReasonLiberalism.pdf. 
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in their broad outlines).  If this assumption is correct, then political liberalism has a 
helpful and satisfying solution to the apparent tension between the ideal of consensus and
the fact of pluralism.  The political liberal solution to this tension is that our reasonable 
disagreements about the good life are to be defused by privatizing (or devolving) 
decisions about the good life into the private sphere (where they can govern our personal 
lives and structure our freely chosen private associations).  This move leaves the public 
sphere free of deep disagreement, thus helping to enable the achievement of consensus 
about public matters of justice.  
However, the assumption that reasonable people are bound to agree about justice 
is, I will argue, only true within particular domains of justice.  The liberties secured in a 
liberal democratic state can be divided into three categories: civil liberties (freedom of 
speech, association, press, etc.), political liberties (freedom to vote, run for office, etc.), 
and economic liberties (freedom to own and exchange goods and services, etc.).3  I agree 
with political liberals that there exists, in modern liberal democracies, widespread 
agreement (or an “overlapping consensus”4) on the nature and scope of civil and political 
liberties (in their broad outlines).5  However, I argue that political liberals are wrong to 
3 This division of liberal justice into three categories of liberties is found in the work of Rawls, but made 
explicit in Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007); James Nickel, “Economic Liberties,” in 
The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, ed. Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000); and John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2012).  Rawls describes the individual has having “higher order interests” in advancing 
their “moral powers,” which include the ability to form and act upon a conception of the good and the 
ability to form and act upon a conception of justice (Political Liberalism, expanded ed. [New York: 
Columbia UP, 1993], 74-75).  Rawls goes on to argue that strong civil liberties enable the formation and
pursuit of a conception of the good, while strong political liberties enable the formation and pursuit of a 
conception of justice.  The importance of economic liberty in the tradition of political liberalism is now 
an important object of debate, and one that will be dealt with at length in chapter III.
4 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 15.
5 For example, there is a broad consensus in modern liberal democracies on the nature and importance of 
free speech, but there are disagreements around the periphery of this basic civil liberty, evidenced by the
debates concerning the regulation of hate speech.  For an overview of the debate on this particular issue,
see Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2012); and Anthony 
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assume the existence of an overlapping consensus on the nature and scope of economic 
liberties.6  In the debates between right-libertarians, left-libertarians, classical liberals, 
and left-liberals, as well as between prioritarians, sufficientarians, and egalitarians, the 
disagreements are indeed as deep and persistent as are the disagreements we experience 
about matters of the good life.  Political liberalism is not equipped to deal with the fact of
our deep yet reasonable disagreements about the nature and scope of economic liberty.
In this chapter, I explore and critique some of the most influential accounts of how
the general issue of pluralism has been dealt with in the tradition of political liberalism.  I
engage with the tradition of political liberalism because it takes seriously both the ideal of
consensus as well as the fact of reasonable pluralism.  I begin by giving an account of the
meaning and significance of both of these themes in the liberal tradition, and pointing out
their apparent tension.  I then reconstruct and critique the main attempts to reconcile 
these two commitments within the paradigm of political liberalism.  I will focus on the 
strategies developed by two strands of political liberalism: the “shared reasons” model 
(articulated by John Rawls, Charles Larmore, Jonathan Quong, and Thomas Nagel), and 
Lewis, Freedom for the Thought We Hate (New York: Basic Books, 2007).  However, as I note in 
Chapter IV, the contemporary “Culture War” in the United States features a great deal of foundational 
disagreement concerning civil liberties in those areas where religious and secular values continue to 
clash, such as same-sex marriage and abortion.  Arguably issues related to money in politics and 
campaign finance reform reflect foundational disagreement concerning political liberties.  In all, these 
examples show how thin is the overlapping consensus about justice in a modern liberal democracy like 
the United States.  Nonetheless, I still maintain that the domain of economic justice embodies some of 
the most persistent and intractable disagreements we face.
6 A similar sentiment is expressed by Gerald Gaus, when he writes, “it is plausible to suppose that a 
major change between the seventeenth and twenty-first centuries was what we might call the general 
liberalization of conceptions of the good in western democracies.  The basic tenets of liberalism, 
including freedom of speech and thought, representative institutions, wide scope for freedom of action 
and life styles, privacy and the market order, are very widely embraced and embedded in a wide variety 
of worldviews.  Yet, while we may suppose that there is such a convergence on these essential features 
of liberal democracy, it is doubtful that... there is agreement of specific property rights, principles of 
distributive justice, or laws concerning abortion, health care or, say, gay marriage” (“Public Reason 
Liberalism,” 17-18).  My major departure from Gaus is that I try to demonstrate the existence of a much
deeper and more radical disagreement about issues of property rights and economic distribution than 
Gaus admits.  I deal with this issue in chapter III.
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the “convergent reasons” model (articulated by Gerald Gaus, Kevin Vallier, and Jeffrey 
Stout).7  I will argue that both models are only able to secure consensus about justice by 
unjustifiably over-narrowing the range of reasonable pluralism.  In other words, both 
models fail on their own terms, as they ultimately fail to respect the depth of the 
reasonable pluralism that we witness in modern democratic societies.
2. The Project of Political Liberalism: Basic Overview
Both consensus and pluralism are central issues for political philosophy, today as 
much as ever.  Citizens of liberal democracies still aspire to consensus as a condition of 
political legitimacy – indeed, our democratic ethos has only deepened over time, as more 
groups and classes of people have been included into the group of people to whom public
justification of state power must be given.  At the same time, people continue to deeply 
disagree about any number of important philosophical, moral, and religious issues – 
indeed, our pluralism has only deepened, as new forms of disagreement have emerged, 
some of which are just as deep and intractable as religious disagreements were in 
sixteenth century Europe.  We live in a world of deep, and deepening, pluralism.  Large 
patterns of global migration have created conditions of greater cultural, ethnic, and 
religious diversity within many liberal democratic societies.  As the public debate is 
expanded to include new voices (from racial, gender, and sexual minorities) or new topics
(abortion, gay marriage, animals rights, environmental issues), new social, moral, and 
political divisions emerge that challenge the cherished ideal of consensus.  Given this 
clear (and growing) tension between consensus and pluralism, the project of forging 
7 These phrases are my own, but they correspond to a division common in the literature.  For example, 
Kevin Vallier refers to the distinction between “consensus” and “convergence,” in his “Convergence 
and Consensus in Public Reason,” Public Affairs Quarterly 25, no. 4 (October 2011).
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consensus in the midst of pluralism remains an important task for political philosophy.  
The tradition within political philosophy that has given this problem the most sustained 
attention is political liberalism.
Political liberalism is a tradition in political philosophy that is often associated 
with the later work of Rawls.  However, political liberalism is ultimately an extension 
and culmination of a tradition of thought that has its roots in the classical social contract 
tradition.  Despite the many disagreements within this long tradition, each of its adherents
shares a common set of concerns.  The whole tradition is an extended attempt at 
developing an account of legitimate political authority starting from two fundamental 
commitments: (1) the principle of public justification, and (2) the fact of reasonable 
pluralism.8  Put more simply, political liberalism hopes to reconcile consensus with 
pluralism.  Consensus about justice is viewed as a necessary condition of political 
legitimacy, while reasonable pluralism about values is viewed as an unchangeable fact of 
the social world to be accommodated and not resisted, since it is assumed that the free 
exercise of practical reason itself leads to a bounded pluralism of values.
On the face of it these commitments pull in opposite directions.  Consensus 
requires agreement, while pluralism reflects disagreement.  Consensus is a stabilizing 
force, while pluralism is a destabilizing force.9  Robert Talisse states the apparent 
inconsistency: “If liberals really stress reasonable pluralism, they will be unable to find 
any consensus on which to build political legitimacy; if they allow for enough agreement 
8 Indeed, Fred D'Agostino argues that “public justification” and “evaluative pluralism” are the 
fundamental commitments in all of liberal political thought.  See D'Agostino, Free Public Reason 
(Oxford: Oxford UP: 1996), 6-7.
9 Fred D'Agostino argues that this tension between consensus and pluralism is constitutive of and 
inescapable for the liberal tradition.  See D'Agostino, Free Public Reason, 7.
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to justify the state, pluralism is qualified.”10  Can political liberalism provide an account 
of justice that is able to achieve the consent of people who continue to reasonably 
disagree about important issues?  As Rawls canonically states the problem, “How is it 
possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens 
who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines?”11  Before addressing this difficult topic of reconciling consensus and 
pluralism, I will briefly explain why these two commitments are so central to this long 
tradition in political philosophy.
3. The Project of Political Liberalism: Consensus and the “Liberal Faith”
Perhaps the central feature of all liberal political philosophy is the conviction that 
political legitimacy rests on the consent of the governed.  Every member of society 
deserves an adequate justification for the political authority she is subjected to if she is to 
be expected to willingly comply with its demands.  Political liberals have come to name 
this commitment the “principle of public justification.”  As Jeremy Waldron puts it in his 
articulation of the “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” “a social and political order 
is illegitimate unless it is rooted in the consent of all those who have to live under it; the 
consent or agreement of these people is a condition of its being morally permissible to 
enforce that order against them.”12  Nagel echoes, “The task of discovering the conditions
of legitimacy is traditionally conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political 
10 Robert Talisse, Democracy after Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 37.
11 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxvii.
12 Jeremy Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 147 
(April 1987): 140.
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system to everyone who is required to live under it.”13  Finally, Fred D’Agostino writes, 
“No regime is legitimate unless it is reasonable from every point of view.”14  Some 
articulation of this commitment can be found in the writings of all contemporary political 
liberals.  Indeed, some variant of this commitment can be found in the writings of most 
contemporary political philosophers, even those not identified with the tradition of 
political liberalism.15
In its commitment to consensus (or public justification), political liberalism traces
its roots back to the Enlightenment.  Waldron notes, “The relationship between liberal 
thought and the legacy of the Enlightenment cannot be stressed too strongly.”16  He 
explains, “After millenia of ignorance, terror, and superstition, cowering before forces it 
could neither understand nor control, mankind faced the prospect of being able at last to 
build a human world, a world in which it might feel safely and securely at home.”17  This 
desire for a rational, human world was motivated by “an impatience with tradition, 
mystery, awe and superstition as the basis of order, and of a determination to make 
authority answer at the tribunal of reason and convince us that it is entitled to respect.”18  
For a citizenry with this new conception of political legitimacy, the principles governing 
13 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford UP, 1991), 3.
14 D’Agostino, Free Public Reason, 30.
15 For example, in the public choice tradition, in The Calculus of Consent James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock argue that basic constitutional rules require the unanimous approval of suitably idealized 
citizens (they call this the “unanimity rule”).  See James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus 
of Consent. The Collected Works of James Buchanan vol. 3 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc, 1999), 6.  
To see how these ideas are developed in another important strand of the liberal tradition, see Jürgen 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
(Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1996).
16 Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” 134.
17 Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” 134.
18 Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” 134.
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the political order “must be amenable to explanation and understanding, and the rules and
restraints that are necessary must be capable of being justified to the people who are to 
live under them.”19  Waldron summarizes, “The social world, even more than the natural 
world, must be thought of as a world for us.”20  The Enlightenment thinkers proposed a 
radically new relationship between the citizen and the state.  Political authority could no 
longer be assumed to be legitimate simply because it was connected with tradition, or a 
traditional authority like the Church.  Instead, political authority has to earn its legitimacy
by justifying its coercive rule to each member of society, using reasons that are 
intelligible and acceptable to the citizens.  Only in this way could political authority be 
truly self-imposed authority – the only kind of authority acceptable for many 
Enlightenment thinkers.21
This Enlightenment heritage gives liberalism its rationalist core.  Notice 
Waldron’s injunction that we must “make authority answer at the tribunal of reason and 
convince us that it is entitled to respect.”22  Rawls’ famous original position device is 
intended to model this form of unencumbered rationality.23  We find an analogous device 
in Jürgen Habermas’ idealized speech situation.24  And this is what Nagel is gesturing at 
19 Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” 134.
20 Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” 134-35.
21 For the canonical defense of this new self-conception of the citizen as both subject and author of law, 
see Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”, trans. Mary C. Smith, 1784, accessed 8 June 2013, 
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html.
22 Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” 134; my italics.
23 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1971), chapter 3.
24 See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization
of Society (Boston: Beacon, 1981).
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when he identifies liberalism with the “highest-order impartiality,”25 and as a “highest-
order framework of moral reasoning … which takes us outside ourselves to a standpoint 
that is independent of who we are.”26  William Galston notes that for political liberalism, 
“reason is understood as the prime source of authority,”27 and moral and political norms 
are “immanently derived from the fact and form of moral rationality itself.”28  This 
connects up contemporary political liberalism with Kant (the paradigmatic Enlightenment
rationalist), who insists that “the moral law is imposed by reason itself.”29  Beneath these 
invocations of the authority of reason emerges the assumption that the exercise of human 
reason, liberated from mysticism, tradition, and ignorance, will converge on the basic 
principles of liberalism.30  Later, political liberals would argue that the proper exercise of 
25 Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 16, no. 3 
(Summer 1987): 216.
26 Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 229.
27 William Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105, no. 3 (April 1995): 525.
28 William Galston, “Moral Personality and Liberal Theory: John Rawls’ ‘Dewey Lectures,’” Political 
Theory 10, no. 4 (November 1982): 492.
29 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington, 2nd ed. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), vi; my italics.
30 This hyper-rationalism puts political liberalism, a child of the Continental Enlightenment, at odds with 
the classical liberalism developed by figures associated with (and influenced by) the Scottish 
Enlightenment, such as David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and later F.A. Hayek.  This latter 
tradition tends to view justice not as the product of human reason, but instead as an emergent 
convention arising and evolving over time through mostly invisible hand processes.  It also 
distinguishes political liberalism from modern conservatism, the latter of which is summarized by 
Irving Kristol: “Modern conservatism found it necessary to argue what had always been previously 
assumed by all reasonable men: that institutions which have existed over a long period of time have a 
reason and a purpose inherent in them, a collective wisdom incarnate in them, and the fact that we don't 
perfectly understand or cannot perfectly explain why they 'work' is not a defect in them but merely a 
limitation in us” (Two Cheers for Capitalism [New York: Basic Books, 1978], 161).  This conservative 
tradition reaches back to Edmund Burke and includes the contemporary thinker Michael Oakeshott.  
Hume challenges the central political liberal ideal of consensus as the basis of political legitimacy in 
“Of the Original Contract,” Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2006), 
arguing that we instead evaluate the legitimacy of political regimes based on the criterion of utility – 
whether or not the political regime enables its citizens to realize their goals better than alternative 
feasible regimes.  He writes, “The general obligation, which binds us to government, is the interests and
necessities of society; and this obligation is very strong” (II.XII.45).  On the contrast between modern 
conservatism and modern liberalism, see Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (Indianapolis: 
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reason would have reasonable citizens converge on the principles of a strongly 
egalitarian liberalism.31
I call this assumption the “Liberal Faith” – the faith that reason itself compels 
reasonable people to accept the basic tenants of liberalism.  If reason is a common human
faculty, and it issues in determinate judgments about moral truths, then reasonable people
are bound to agree about the nature of justice.  The Enlightenment assumptions about 
human reason give support to the Liberal Faith, the faith in the possibility of consensus 
about justice.  However, the Enlightenment hope for consensus clashed, historically, with 
the fact of profound religious pluralism made evident by the Reformation.  The 
Reformation and the Wars of Religion exposed deep divides in Europe that cast doubt 
upon the Liberal Faith.  
4. The Project of Political Liberalism: Pluralism and the “Liberal Nightmare”
It appears as a historical fact that the free exercise of human reason does not issue 
in identical judgments on all issues of religion, morality, and philosophy, but rather it 
issues in a rich diversity of such judgments.  In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that “a
plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of 
the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a 
Liberty Fund, Inc, 1991); and Thomas Sowell, A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political 
Struggles (New York: Basic Books, 2007).  For a conservative critique of Rawls, see Allan Bloom, 
“Justice: John Rawls Vs. The Tradition of Political Philosophy,” The American Political Science Review
69, no. 2 (June 1975).  For a conservative defense of meritocracy against Rawls' egalitarianism, see 
Daniel Bell, “On Meritocracy and Equality,” Public Interest 29 (Fall 1972).  For a conservative take on 
the topic of chapter III (economic justice), see Irving Kristol, “'When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness': 
Some Reflections on Capitalism and 'The Free Society,'” The Public Interest 21 (1970).
31 This assumption – that reasonable people can be expected to converge on an egalitarian view of 
property rights and wealth distribution – will be explored and critiqued at length in chapter III.
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constitutional democratic regime.”32  Rawls puts the point more strongly when he argues 
that pluralism regarding moral worldviews (or, more generally, “comprehensive 
doctrines”) is the “inevitable outcome of free human reason.”33  Rawls refers to the cause 
of this reasonable pluralism as “the burdens of judgment,” which refers to the fact that 
people reasoning in good faith are beset by so many cognitive complexities and 
difficulties that disagreement is to be expected (and thus respected) even in epistemically 
ideal conditions.34   Galston likewise notes, “Modern liberal-democratic societies are 
characterized by an irreversible pluralism, that is, by conflicting and incommensurable 
conceptions of the human good.”35  Reason itself, it seems, breeds a pluralism of values.36
If the French Revolution and the Enlightenment were the noteworthy events that 
contributed to liberalism’s commitment to rational consensus, then the Reformation and 
32 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii.
33 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 37; my italics.
34 Rawls lists some of the leading contributing factors to the burdens of judgment: 
“(a) The evidence – empirical and scientific – bearing on the case is conflicting and complex, and thus 
hard to assess and evaluate.
(b) Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may disagree 
about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments.
(c) To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts, are vague and subject to 
hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgments and interpretation (and on 
judgments about interpretations) within some range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons 
may differ.
(d) To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weight moral and 
political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total 
experiences must always differ… 
(e) Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both sides of an 
issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment.
(f) Finally … any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection
must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized” (Political 
Liberalism, 56-57).
35 William Galston, “Pluralism and Social Unity,” Ethics 99, no. 4 (July 1989): 711; my italics.
36 After mentioning the intractable, millennia-long disputes in epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics, 
Michael Huemer convincingly notes, “It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the human 
mind is subject to sources of differing judgment apart from irrationality, ignorance, and person bias” 
(The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey [New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013], 49).
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the Wars of Religion were the events that contributed to liberalism’s commitment to 
accommodating (some degree of) pluralism.  As Galston puts it, the Reformation required
liberals to “deal with the political consequences of religious differences in the wake of 
divisions within Christendom.”37  It might seem strange to think of religious disagreement
as the “outcome of free human reason,” since on some accounts, religious belief is a 
paradigmatic case of irrationality (a common view of certain Enlightenment thinkers38).  
Nonetheless, liberals came to accept religious pluralism as a fact to be accommodated by 
a just political community, not a defect to be overcome.  Coming to accept religious 
pluralism as a fact stemmed in part from a realization that the division within 
Christendom between Catholicism and Protestantism was going to be a permanent feature
of European culture.39  
In addition, the overthrow of religious and political absolutism in Europe revealed
a sprawling diversity of forms of life and moral worldviews, including, eventually, a 
diversity of highly systematized and compelling secular comprehensive moral doctrines 
37 Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” 525.  Indeed, Galston is aware that liberalism has these two 
very different legacies, and he argues that these two legacies issue in two distinct traditions within 
liberal thought: Enlightenment-based liberalism and Reformation-based liberalism.  However, it is clear 
that thinkers like Rawls (in his later work) are trying to articulate a unified account of liberalism that is 
committed to the Enlightenment-inspired ideal of rational consensus as well as the Reformation-
inspired fact of pluralism.
38 See David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 2nd ed., ed. Kemp Smith (Edinburgh: 
Nelson & Sons, 1947).  The claim that religious belief is straightforwardly irrational has been taken up 
forcefully by the so-called New Atheists today.  See Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2006); Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything 
(New York: Hachette, 2007); Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon 
(New York: Penguin, 2006); and Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of 
Reason (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).
39 For an interesting counter-narrative to this typical liberal narrative about the overcoming of religious 
antagonisms through liberalism, see William Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2009).  Cavanaugh argues that rhetoric about “religious violence” became a rationalization 
for violence caused not by religious disagreements by instead by the formation and consolidation of the 
liberal nation-state in Europe: “The myth of religious violence should finally be seen for what it is: an 
important part of the folklore of Western societies.  It does not identify any facts about the world, but 
rather authorizes certain arrangements of power in the modern West.  It is a story of salvation from 
mortal peril by the creation of the secular nation-state” (226). 
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(e.g. utilitarianism, deontological ethics, and virtue-based moral worldviews).  It now 
seemed clear that the free exercise of practical reason does not always lead to a 
convergence on a single true view, but instead often leads to a pluralism of reasonable 
views.  This acceptance of the inevitability of pluralism creates some important 
difficulties for the principle of public justification.  If legitimate political authority has to 
be reasonable from every point of view, it is now clear that there are a large number of 
such points of view.  Since each and every (reasonable) citizen must consent to the 
principles underlying political authority, it follows that, in a sense, each and every 
reasonable citizen wields a veto power over any proposed principle of justice, creating the
worry that perhaps no form of political authority will be deemed legitimate.  If all it takes 
to de-legitimize political authority is for one reasonable citizen to withhold consent, then 
can we really expect any form of political authority to pass the stringent liberal test?  
Perhaps the Liberal Faith in rational consensus is unfounded.
The fear that the liberal faith in the eventuality of rational consensus is unfounded 
lurks in the background of most liberal political philosophy, and liberal thinkers often 
give voice to this fear at some point in their writing.  Charles Larmore offers a typical 
example: 
It has been the conviction that we can agree on a core morality while 
continuing to disagree about what makes life worth living.  In the end, this
conviction may turn out to be baseless.  Liberalism may necessarily be just
one more partisan ideal.  But if that is so, then unless the modern 
experience is to dissolve in the light of the one irresistible, all-
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encompassing Good, our political future will indeed be one “where 
ignorant armies clash by night.”40
Nagel voices this concern when he points out how many of our disagreements about 
justice come down to “a pure confrontation between personal moral convictions,” as 
opposed to disagreements “in judgment over the preponderant weight of reasons bearing 
on an issue.”41  Because, he recognizes, “the justifications on opposite sides of an issue 
may come to an end with moral instincts which are simply internal to the points of view 
of the opposed parties – and this makes them more like conflicts of personal religious 
conviction.”42  If our disagreements about justice closely resemble our disagreements 
about matters of religion (the paradigmatic case of deep and persistent disagreement), 
then the very possibility for consensus about justice is threatened.  No one expects our 
disagreements over the claims of religion to be overcome anytime soon.  But that is no 
longer a serious political problem, since liberalism has (for the most part) successfully  
transitioned religious claims into the private sphere.  But what if the same phenomenon 
of deep and persistent disagreement holds for disagreements over justice itself?   Liberals 
have come to accept, as a fact to be accommodated, deep and persistent disagreements 
about private values concerning the good life.  But what are the implications of 
accepting, as a fact to be accommodated, deep and persistent disagreements about public 
values concerning justice?
This fear – that no form of political authority is capable of being justified in the 
context of reasonable pluralism – I will call (borrowing a phrase from Gaus) the “Liberal 
40 Charles Larmore, “Political Liberalism,” Political Theory 18, no. 3 (August 1990): 357.
41 Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 233.
42 Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 233.
22
Nightmare.”  In this scenario, the twin liberal commitments to consensus and pluralism 
cannot be jointly honored.  As Gaus puts it, the Liberal Nightmare is the situation in 
which “nothing at all will be justified, because someone will exercise her veto for every 
proposal.”43  Perhaps the liberal commitment to respecting pluralism leads to an 
invalidation of all forms of state power, since disagreement about moral and political 
issues are so deep that they infect our core disagreements about justice.  
Enzo Rossi gestures at the possibility of the Liberal Nightmare when he suggests 
that perhaps “consensus theorists set themselves an impossible task, given the persistent 
ethical diversity that characterizes liberal polities.”44  If so, he suggests, perhaps political 
liberalism belongs to a previous and less pluralistic era, not the present one: “on the 
consensus theorists’ own account of the connection between liberal institutions and 
persistent diversity, those conditions seem unlikely to obtain in modern liberal 
democracies.”45  He goes on, “[T]he consensus view may owe its deficiencies to its 
historical roots, in the sense that it is only designed to accommodate the relatively low 
level of diversity found in early modern European societies.”46  Chandran Kukathas 
echoes this sentiment, arguing that the modern “condition of diversity” should make 
political philosophers give up entirely on the project of articulating a conception of 
justice capable of achieving consensus.47  He explains, 
43 Gaus, “Public Reason Liberalism,” 25.
44 Enzo Rossi, “Modus Vivendi, Consensus, and (Realist) Political Legitimacy,” Public Reason: Journal 
of Political and Moral Philosophy 2, no. 2 (2010): 37.
45 Rossi, “Modus Vivendi, Consensus, and (Realist) Political Legitimacy,” 37.
46 Rossi, “Modus Vivendi, Consensus, and (Realist) Political Legitimacy,” 37; my italics.
47 Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 6.
23
In a world of moral and cultural diversity one of the subjects over which 
there is dispute and even conflict, is the subject of justice.  Different 
peoples, or groups, or communities, have different views or conceptions of
justice.  In these circumstances, the question is: how can people live 
together freely when there is this sort of moral diversity?  One kind of 
answer suggests that the solution is to articulate a conception of justice 
that is capable of commanding widespread, if not universal, assent.  But 
the problem with this move is that, in order to secure that assent, it is 
necessary to strip the conception of justice of much of its substantive 
content or run the risk of having a theory which commands the loyalty of 
only a small subset of its audience.  Yet stripped of too much of its 
substantive content it ceases to be a theory of justice at all.48
Perhaps reasonable people disagree deeply not only about the good life, but also, and 
with equal force, about justice.49  Indeed, Gaus points out how strange it is for political 
liberals to assume that “while our reasoning about religion, morality and metaphysics [is] 
deeply pluralistic, our reasoning about our moral and/or political constitution [is] 
homogeneous.”50  Instead, it seems more reasonable to assume that “the very burdens of 
judgment that produce disagreement in the former leads to pluralism in the latter.”51  
48 Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 6.
49 Others have described the troubled place of pluralism in the liberal tradition, and the possibility that a 
genuine commitment to pluralism is incompatible with a commitment to consensus.  See John Kekes, 
“The Incompatibility of Liberalism and Pluralism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 2 (April 
1992); John Gray, “Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 6 no. 1 (1998); and Nicolas Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for 
Consensus (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995).
50 Gaus, “Public Reason Liberalism,” 23.
51 Gaus, “Public Reason Liberalism,” 23.
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Once we take this insight seriously, and “once we abandon this implausible bifurcation of
our normative reasoning,”52 we are left to wonder whether any conception of justice can 
achieve consensus given our condition of deep pluralism.
If the Liberal Nightmare turned out to be a reality, we would be forced to either 
accept that some set of liberal principles must be oppressively imposed against the 
objections of certain reasonable citizens, or else accept that no form of political authority 
is publicly justifiable at all, thus embracing a kind of anarchism.  This perhaps explains 
why anarchism often seems to linger in the background of much liberal theorizing.  As 
Gaus notes, “Liberalism is at the edge of anarchy, in the sense that liberal principles, if 
carried to their extreme, appear to lead to anarchism.  If liberty is so fundamental, 
justifying any limitation on it may be a real challenge.”53  Then what, if anything, keeps 
liberalism from either spilling over into anarchism (that is, the illegitimization of political
authority as such54) or accepting some form of oppression (that is, the imposition of 
52 Gaus, “Public Reason Liberalism,” 24.
53 Gerald Gaus, “Liberal Neutrality,” accessed 12 January 2013, 
http://www.gaus.biz/GausOnNeutrality.pdf, 20.
54 I do not want to rule out the possibility that political authority, as such, is in fact unjustified.  For a 
compelling recent argument against the very possibility of legitimate political authority, see Huemer, 
The Problem of Political Authority.  For an example of how a liberal vision can sound quasi-anarchistic,
see Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, which articulates a political vision quite similar to that offered 
in part 3 of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1977).  Kukathas 
admits to sympathies both “libertarian and anarchistic” (The Liberal Archipelago, x).  If the anarchist 
critique of statism is correct, then all forms of political authority are illegitimate.  This, in a sense, 
would represent the ultimate triumph of pluralism over consensus.  In chapter V, I try to lay out a way 
of thinking about liberalism that does not rely upon the flawed assumption of the eventuality of rational 
consensus, but also does not give up on political authority altogether.  
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illegitimate political authority55)?  Is there any way out of this impasse?  Is there any 
hope of forging a consensus in the midst of deep pluralism?
In response to this threat of the Liberal Nightmare, political liberals all share some
version of the Liberal Faith: the faith that while the free exercise of human reason may 
produce entrenched and deep disagreement about any number of issues, it will also 
produce broad agreement about justice.  If this is true, it would reconcile the two 
commitments of political liberalism, since consensus would be secured vis-à-vis justice, 
while pluralism would be respected vis-à-vis comprehensive conceptions of the good.  
But, I will argue, the familiar strategies of reconciliation all fail.
In what follows, I will describe and critique two specific attempts at reconciliation
within the tradition of political liberalism.  I will focus on the strategies developed by two
strands of political liberalism: the “shared reasons” model (exemplified by Rawls, 
Larmore, Quong, and Nagel), and the “convergent reasons” model (exemplified by Gaus. 
Vallier, and Stout).  I will argue that both models fail to respect the depth of the pluralism 
that we witness in modern democratic societies.
55 In this case, if no account of justice can be publicly justified, a modus vivendi arrangement is the 
second-best alternative.  Some Rawls-inspired contemporary political philosophers have explored the 
positive dimensions of modus vivendi, such as Claudia Mills, “'Not a Mere Modus Vivendi': The Bases 
for Allegiance to the Just State,” in The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, ed. Victoria 
Davion and Clark Wolf (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000); Bernard 
Dauenhauer, “A Good Word for a Modus Vivendi”, in The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on 
Rawls, ed. Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2000); and Scott Hershovitz, “A Mere Modus Vivendi?”, in The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays 
on Rawls, ed. Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2000).  Some anti-Rawlsians have done similar work, most notably John Gray, The Two Faces of 
Liberalism (New York: New Press, 2000).  This topic will be dealt with more extensively in chapter V. 
Historically, the view that political authority should be imposed despite lacking public justification is 
arguably defended in Niccolo Machiavelli's The Prince (New York: Dover, 1992), when he suggests 
that the prince must be guided by virtues that are not shared by the citizens if the prince is to ensure 
stability and the common good.  On this topic, also see Isaiah Berlin, “The Originality of Machiavelli” 
in The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, ed. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1949).
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5. Theoretical Strategy for Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus: The “Shared 
Reasons” Model
The primary way that political liberals have attempted to reconcile pluralism and 
consensus can be described as the “shared reasons” model.  The basic idea is that all 
citizens are obligated to bracket their non-shared “private” reasons and only deploy 
“shared” reasons in public deliberation about matters of justice.56  As Galston puts it, the 
idea is that if we can “devise a strategy for excluding from public discourse the matters 
on which we fundamentally disagree and for reflecting collectively on the beliefs we 
share, we can be led to workable agreements on the content of just principles and 
institutions.”57  If only shared reasons are used in public justifications, then the outcome 
of public deliberation will be acceptable to all, since the reasons employed are shared by 
all.  The deep disagreements that exist in society about religion, for example, are dealt 
with by “privatizing” those religious reasons, allowing them to structure private 
associations (i.e. the internal operations of a church, family, or other private association), 
but not allowing them to influence public deliberation.  This is because if sectarian 
religious reasons are used to justify state policy (thus privileging one religion at the 
expense of others), this would be a violation of the freedom and equality of those 
disadvantaged citizens who object to such policies.  Common reasons are used to agree 
upon a public conception of justice, while private reasons are used to decide upon a 
private conception of the good life.  This shared reasons model is the dominant paradigm 
56 Gerald Gaus refers to this as the “bracketing” or “insulation” strategy, and identifies it as the essence of 
the shared reasons model of political liberalism.  See Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reasons (New 
York: Cambridge UP, 2011), 40.
57 Galston, “Pluralism and Social Unity,” 711; my italics.
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in the classical social contract tradition, going back to Locke, Rousseau, and Kant58, and 
coming up through Rawls, Nagel, Larmore, and Quong.  In the following section, I will 
first describe how the shared reasons model was developed by Rawls, I will then 
highlight some of the problems that emerged in his later work with regards to this issue, 
and I will finally show how these problems were worked out by a contemporary political 
liberal, Quong.
5.1. The “Shared Reasons” Model in Early Rawls
In any shared reasons account of liberalism, there needs to be a compelling story 
about how we determine exactly which reasons qualify as “public” reasons.  Historically, 
liberalism emerged (in part) in reaction to the Wars of Religion, and offered a vision of 
politics in which divisive religious concerns would not occupy public debate, but instead 
the state would maintain a stance of neutrality vis-a-vis the competing religious 
worldviews.  So religious reasons became paradigmatic private reasons.  But beyond this 
seemingly easy case, what criteria can be used to determine which reasons are 
permissible in public deliberation?  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that public 
reasons are only those reasons that would be offered by a person behind the “veil of 
ignorance” - that is, an idealized person who is forced into a stance of impartiality by 
reasoning without knowledge of her class, race, gender, natural endowments, character, 
work ethic, social position, etc.  Behind the veil of ignorance, people would be unable to 
58 For example, Kant clearly adheres to a “shared reasons” model of public justification in his description 
of the “realm of ends,” where public reasons are strictly shared reasons: “By 'realm' I understand the 
systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.  Because laws determine ends with 
regard to their universal validity, if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings and this
from all content of their private ends, we can think of the whole of all ends in systematic connection, a 
whole of rational beings in themselves as well as of the particular ends which each man may set 
himself.  This is the realm of ends” (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 51-52; my italics).
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bargain for advantages for their particular group, and thus they would be forced to select 
principles of justice that confer a fair distribution of benefits and burdens on all members 
of society.  This constrained and idealized form of reasoning, which values all positions 
equally, comes to define what is “reasonable,” and ensures that whatever principles are 
chosen under such conditions will be fair principles.59  Rawls notes that there will be no 
dialogue or deliberation behind the veil of ignorance, since there will essentially be just 
one single idealized chooser.60  This single chooser will have a list of values and concerns
that she will use in choosing principles of justice, and these are called the “social primary
goods.”61  The principles of justice will be evaluated based on how well they secure social
primary goods for each member of society.  This highlights exactly how Rawls is giving a
“shared reasons” account of liberalism: anyone who is appropriately reflecting on the 
nature of justice will share the same values (the social primary goods) and concerns (get 
as many social primary goods as possible).
59 Gauthier helpfully distinguishes between two kinds of reasoning: universalizing reasoning, and 
maximizing reasoning.  The former is the Kantian reasoning that places no special value on oneself, but 
reasons impartially, while the latter is the Hobbesian reasoning that is decidedly partial and egoistic. 
Rawls' original position is occupied by a maximizing reasoner, but the information constraints of the 
veil of ignorance ensure that the reasoner (out of self-interest) will reason impartially.  See the 
introduction of David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement for a discussion of this distinction.
60 Rawls notes: “To begin with, it is clear that since the differences among the parties are unknown to 
them, and everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments. 
Therefore we can view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at 
random.  If anyone after due reflection prefers a conception of justice to another, then they all do, and a 
unanimous agreement can be reached... Thus there follows the very important consequence that the 
parties have no basis for bargaining in the usual sense” (A Theory of Justice, 139).  Many have 
criticized Rawls for the absence of the possibility of dialogue in his original position (and thus its 
“monological” character), including Habermas.  Rawls replies to this charge in Political Liberalism, 
“Reply to Habermas.”
61 The social primary goods include rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and
self-respect.  These are “things that every rational man is presumed to want,” regardless of his private 
ends (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 62).  These seemingly universal and shared concerns constitute a 
“thin” conception of the good, in contrast to a particular and controversial “thick” conception of the 
good, which Rawls came to call a “comprehensive doctrine.”
29
Rawls' account in A Theory of Justice was quickly attacked by Michael Sandel for 
presupposing an objectionably atomistic individual as the chooser of justice.  For Sandel, 
Rawls models the reasonable individual as someone who chooses (and can thus choose to
alienate) the basic features of her identity and her deepest values.62  Indeed, the idealized 
chooser behind Rawls' veil of ignorance is an abstraction of the “rational choice” 
economists – a non-other-regarding maximizer, hoping to secure for herself as many 
social primary goods as possible.  While the informational constraints imposed by the 
veil of ignorance guarantee the impartiality and “reasonableness” of the decision, the 
chooser is otherwise a rational maximizer, uninterested in the welfare of others.63  
Additionally, Rawls' idealized chooser cares only to maximize her share of social primary
goods, and cares nothing about traditional values and communitarian concerns.64  
Does this model of the self accurately capture our ideal of “reasonableness”?  Or 
does it ask citizens to alienate parts of their identity and values that they are unable to 
alienate, because certain values are constitutive of their identity, not just accidental 
features of it?  Although Rawls is hoping to model a chooser with minimal controversial 
features, Sandel argues that Rawls relies upon a metaphysics of the self that is quite 
historically specific, and quite problematic from the point of view of many citizens in 
62 See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998).  
For another well-known articulation of this position, see Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in 
Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1992).
63 The chooser behind the veil of ignorance is characterized by “mutually disinterested rationality” 
(Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 144).
64 In their paper “Disagreement Behind the Veil of Ignorance,” Ryan Muldoon et al argue that “there is a 
kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance,” namely, “while a veil of 
ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to 
eliminate deeper sources of disagreement” concerning moral values (“Disagreement Behind the Veil of 
Ignorance,” Philosophical Studies 170, no. 3 [September 2014]: 377).  This basic concern resonates 
with the critique of political liberalism that I develop in this chapter and the next.  Also see Ryan 
Muldoon, “Justice without Agreement,” accessed 5 February 2015, 
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~rmuldoon/papers/JusticeWithoutAgreement.pdf.
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modern liberal democracies.  While Rawls was hoping to describe justice for all 
reasonable people, Sandel argues that Rawls is describing justice merely for modern 
liberals who already operate with an atomistic view of the individual, who privilege 
impartiality as the form of justice, and who have mainly secular liberal values.  This line 
of critique helped motivate Rawls to make some important changes to his thinking 
between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.  
5.2. The “Shared Reasons” Model in Later Rawls
Starting in his Dewey Lectures, Rawls began articulating a conception of justice 
that claimed to be “political not metaphysical.”65  By this, Rawls meant that  political 
philosophy should not aspire to articulate a conception of justice from the “perspective of
eternity”66 (the goal in A Theory of Justice), but instead should start by “looking to the 
public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and 
principles,”67 and try to articulate and systematize these principles into a coherent 
conception of justice.  That is, the political philosopher should not take sides in deep 
metaphysical debates, but should instead articulate a conception of justice that meshes 
with the many existing metaphysical views held by democratic citizens.68  Galston nicely 
65 See John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no.
3 (Summer 1985).
66 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 587.  Just before this, Rawls writes, “Thus to see our place in society 
from the perspective of this position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human 
situation not only from all social but also all temporal points of view” (A Theory of Justice, 587).
67 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8.
68 Rawls helpfully summarizes the methodology of his later work: “What justifies a conception of justice 
is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper 
understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the 
traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us” (“Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory,” The Journal of Philosophy. 77, no. 9 [September 1980]: 519; my 
italics).
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describes this as a shift from “Kantian” to “Hegelian” political philosophy.69  In other 
words, the early Rawls of A Theory of Justice tries to describe the conception of justice 
dictated by reason itself, while the later Rawls of Political Liberalism tries to describe a 
conception of justice worked up from our (historically specific) deepest and considered 
convictions.70  As a result of this important metaphilosophical move, Rawls admits that 
69 Yet, while Galston notes that Rawls' transition marks a general shift from Kant to Hegel, he insightfully 
points out that Rawls is actually quite ambivalent in his later work about his metaphilosophical stance: 
“The problem with Rawls’ revised Kantian doctrine [in Political Liberalism] is … that it prescribes, as 
valid for all, a single, substantive, eminently debatable ideal of moral personality” while at the same 
time insisting that he is appealing only to “the principles latent in the common sense” of our culture 
(“Moral Personality and Liberal Theory,” 504, 511).  Later Rawls seems to both prescribe as uniquely 
reasonable a clearly controversial conception of justice while at the same time insisting that he is merely
drawing his values from within our political culture itself.  Galston casts this ambiguity as a tension 
between the Kantian and Hegelian elements of Rawls’ thought: “Rawls’s reconstructed theory is divided
against itself.  It is explicitly Kantian, but implicitly Hegelian” (“Moral Personality and Liberal 
Theory,” 512).  Donald Beggs describes the shift in somewhat different terms: “The later pluralism of 
Political Liberalism enacts a move from the moral and comprehensive pluralism of A Theory of Justice 
to an allegedly freestanding pluralism.  It is a move from modernist liberalism to postmodern 
liberalism” (“Rawls' Political Postmodernism,” Continental Philosophy Review 32 [1999]: 123).  On 
Rawls' metaphilosophical shift, also see Fred D'Agostino, “The Legacies of John Rawls,” Journal of 
Moral Philosophy 1, no. 3 (2004).  The justificatory framework of “reflective equilibrium” is present in 
A Theory of Justice, but becomes more central in Political Liberalism.  For a discussion of how the 
method of reflective equilibrium avoids foundationalism without falling prey to relativism, see Fred 
D'agostino, “Relativism and Reflective Equilibrium,” The Monist 71, no. 3 (July 1988); and (more 
tangentially) Fred D'agostino, “Transcendence and Conversation: Two Conceptions of Objectivity,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 30, no. 2 (April 1993).  On some of the problems with shifting from 
a “metaphysical” to a “political” conception of justice, see Ryan Davis, “Justice: Metaphysical, After 
All?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2011); as well as David Estlund, “The Insularity of the 
Reasonable: Why Political Liberalism Must Admit the Truth,” Ethics 108, no. 2 (January 1998); and 
David Estlund, “The Truth in Political Liberalism,” in Truth and Democratic Politics, ed. Andrew 
Norris and Jeremy Elkins (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).
70 One of the major critics of this metaphilosophical shift from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism 
is Robert S. Taylor (coming from Rawls' left) in his book Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian 
Foundations of Justice as Fairness (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State UP, 2011). 
Taylor argues that if Rawls wants to confine himself to the values implicit in American political culture,
then the radical left-wing vision of justice articulated in A Theory of Justice will invariably be watered 
down, as Rawls will be forced to accommodate certain entrenched right-wing ideals about society (as 
mainly wealth-maximizing) and the individual (as competitively individualistic) into his conception of 
justice.  Coming from Rawls' right, Allan Bloom argues that Rawls' metaphilosophical commitment 
against finding Truth and opting to instead articulate our deepest intuitions does in fact fall prey to 
relativism: “Rawls thinks that his procedure is Socratic.  Socrates, however, did not begin from 
sentiments or intuitions but from opinions; all opinions are understood by Socrates to be inadequate 
perceptions of being; the examination of opinions proves them to be self-contradictory and points 
toward a noncontradictory view which is adequate to being and can be called knowledge.  If opinion 
cannot be converted into knowledge, then the rational examination of opinions about justice, let alone 
of senses about justice, is of no avail in establishing principles according to which we should live.  It is 
even questionable whether such examination is of any use at all.  Rawls begins with our moral sense, 
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his account in A Theory of Justice did not adequately deal with the problem of 
“stability”—that is, the problem of actual, diverse citizens voluntarily accepting, 
internalizing, and acting on the principles of justice developed behind the veil of 
ignorance.71  Making a concession to Sandel's critique, Rawls recognizes that a satisfying 
conception of justice must be congruent with the actual deeply held values of those 
citizens who are subject to it.  If people would choose a particular conception of justice 
from behind the veil of ignorance (with all the attendant information constraints), but 
then would strongly object to that conception of justice when the veil of ignorance is 
lifted (and the information constraints are removed), then that conception of justice 
would be unstable.  In other words, the “private” values of citizens, which are bracketed 
by the veil of ignorance, should have some justificatory role for questions of basic justice 
in the work of later Rawls.  As Gaus puts it, this re-incorporation of the justificatory 
importance of private reasons is, in some sense, internal to Rawls' project, since it is 
rooted in his commitment to the fact of reasonable pluralism: “Rawls' commitment to the 
importance of evaluative pluralism prevents him from simply dismissing different 
develops the principles which accord with it, and then sees whether we are satisfied with the results; the
principles depend on our moral sense and that moral sense on the principles.  We are not forced to leave 
our conventional lives nor compelled, by the very power of being, to move toward a true and natural 
life.  We start from what we are now and end there, since there is nothing beyond us.  At best Rawls will
help us to be more consistent, if that is an advantage.  The distinctions between opinion and knowledge, 
and between appearance and reality, which made philosophy possible and needful, disappear.  Rawls 
speaks to an audience of the persuaded, excluding not only those who have different sentiments but 
those who cannot be satisfied by sentiment alone” (“Justice: John Rawls Vs. The Tradition of Political 
Philosophy,” 649).  A defense of Rawls' metaphilosophical shift can be found in Richard Rorty, “The 
Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in Objectivity, relativism, and truth: Philosophical papers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991); Richard Rorty, “Justice as a Larger Loyalty,” Ethical Perspectives 
4, no. 3 (1997); and Andrew Altman, “Rawls’ Pragmatic Turn,” Journal of Social Philosophy 14, no. 3 
(1983).
71 The most detailed account of this transition in Rawls' thought is Paul Weithman, Why Political 
Liberalism?: On John Rawls's Political Turn (New York: Oxford UP, 2010).  Also see Gerald Gaus, 
“The Turn to a Political Liberalism,” in A Companion to Rawls, ed. Jon Mandle and David Reidy 
(Malden. MA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014).
33
conceptions of the good as irrelevant to moral justification.”72  So in his early work, 
Rawls hoped to fully separate the “right” (or justice) from the “good,” by relegating one's
conception of the good life to the private sphere, where it is to have no bearing on public 
deliberation about justice.  But in his later work, Rawls came to believe that justice must 
be congruent with the many reasonable “comprehensive conceptions of the good” found 
in modern democratic society, including religious conceptions and communitarian 
concerns.73
In order to give justificatory power to the private conceptions of the good without 
abandoning the shared reasons model, Rawls develops a two-stage process of 
justification.  The first stage (called the “freestanding” stage) looks quite similar to the 
original position of A Theory of Justice.  Principles of justice are chosen by parties 
equally situated, such that no party has bargaining power over the others (Rawls now 
calls this the “criteria of reciprocity”74).  This requires that the parties lack information 
that would enable them to bargain on behalf of a particular segment of society.  The 
parties still share certain common values and concerns – namely, securing and 
maximizing the social primary goods: “the values of equal political and civil liberty; fair 
equality of opportunity; the values of economic reciprocity; [and] the social bases of 
mutual respect between citizens.”75  Rawls assumes, then, that “justice as fairness” would
be a likely candidate for selection, but he recognizes that other similar conceptions of 
72 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 40.
73 See Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, especially the chapter “Stability and Congruence.”  Also see 
Samuel Freeman, “Congruence and the Good of Justice,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. 
Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002).
74 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 16.
75 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 139.
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justice may emerge from this (somewhat) reformed original position as well.  Rawls 
refers to these as the “family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice”76).  
Then, in response to the concern for stability, Rawls introduces a second stage of 
justification (called the “overlapping consensus” stage), where the parties to the 
agreement from the first stage are given full information (i.e. they are re-encumbered 
with their full array of values), and they are then invited to accept or reject the conception
of justice that was chosen in the freestanding stage.  Ideally, the conception of justice will
be congruent with the deepest values of those subject to it, and will not be overturned in 
this second stage.  Ideally, citizens can find reasons internal to their comprehensive 
conception of the good to support the freestanding conception of justice.  Thus, while the 
freestanding conception of justice is articulated by shared public reasons at the first stage,
the overlapping consensus features (hopefully) a convergence of private reasons at the 
second stage.
A question immediately presents itself: why are we to assume that the 
freestanding conception of justice is stable in the second stage of justification?  This is 
where problems emerge in later Rawls' account of justification.  While most liberal 
citizens will consent to one of the conceptions of justice in the “family of reasonable 
liberal conceptions of justice,” some illiberal citizens are likely to reject any liberal 
conception of justice (e.g. a religious fundamentalist will reject any conception of justice 
that fully relegates religious values to the private sphere).  So if Rawls allows illiberal 
citizens to overturn a liberal conception of justice in the second stage of justification, then
an overlapping consensus on any member of the family of liberal conceptions will be 
impossible, and any agreed-upon conception of justice will have to make concessions to 
76 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlviii.
35
illiberal subgroups of the political community.  Going this route may result in policies 
that violate the freedom and equality of certain citizens.
To prevent this, Rawls allows only “reasonable” citizens the chance to veto the 
conception of justice in the second stage.  This move immediately triggers the question: 
who counts as “reasonable” here?  Reasonable persons are idealized in two ways: morally
and epistemologically.  Morally, reasonable citizens accept the freedom and equality of 
persons, which means an acceptance that no person has “natural” moral authority over 
any other person.  Epistemologically, reasonable citizens accept the “burdens of 
judgment,” which entails an acceptance that human reason under free institutions leads to
a pluralism of values and views.77  Together, these definitions pick out liberal citizens as 
reasonable, and illiberal citizens as unreasonable.  Reasonable conceptions of the good 
are thus by definition congruent with a liberal conception of justice.  Given Rawls' 
definition of reasonableness, in the second stage of justification, reasonable citizens will 
necessarily accept the outcome of the first stage of justification.  This seems to make the 
second stage of justification superfluous.
5.3. The “Shared Reasons” Model in Quong
Recognizing the messiness and confusion of later Rawls' two-stage process of 
justification, Quong corrects and updates political liberalism.  Quong warns political 
liberals that if their conception of justice is subject to the veto of actually existing citizens
of modern democracies, it will surely be overturned by illiberal citizens.  Quong concurs 
with Rawls' intuition that justice should not simply bend around the contours of an unjust 
77 Rawls writes, “comprehensive doctrines that cannot support such a democratic society are not 
reasonable” (Political Liberalism, 483; my italics).
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world, but should be the articulation of our most deeply held and cherished values.  
Quong thus advocates eliminating the two stages of justification and instead just starting 
with an overlapping consensus around the core values featured within liberal democratic 
societies: individuals as free and equal, and society as a fair system of social 
cooperation.78  Reasonable people are defined as those committed to the values of 
freedom, equality, and fairness.  Justice, then, is the coherent interpretation and fitting-
together of these values.  Reasonable people are defined as those willing to bracket and 
privatize their particular and controversial comprehensive moral, religious, and 
philosophical commitments (all of which Quong denotes as “perfectionist” 
commitments).  The political philosopher, then, should systematize and articulate the 
shared liberal values of freedom, equality, and fairness, giving us a “liberalism without 
perfectionism.”  This represents a return to a strict shared reasons model, and a rejection 
of the convergent reasons supplement in later Rawls' second stage of justification.  
Quong recognizes that even if all citizens share the same set of political values in 
their public deliberations about justice, there will nonetheless be disagreements about 
how these values fit together, how they are interpreted, how they are implemented, etc.  
But these disagreements are constrained by an underlying agreement about the values 
themselves, so Quong refers to these as “justificatory disagreements.”  This mirrors the 
assumption in later Rawls that reasonable people will have some range of reasonable 
disagreement about principles of justice, but such disagreement will be confined to a 
78 Quong argues against what he calls an “external” account of political liberalism, whereby the views of 
actual citizens (liberal and illiberal alike) represent an external check on the success of the liberal 
project.  Quong does not try to justify political liberalism to those he views as unreasonable.  Instead, he
begins with liberal premises, and tries to unfold a series of liberal conclusions.  Thus, he wants to give 
an “internal” account of political liberalism, which is simply to elaborate and extend basic liberal ideas. 
Quong worries that Rawls, in his concern with stability, is tempted to give an external account of 
political liberalism, which is doomed to fail.  See Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), chapter 5.
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narrow set or “family” of liberal conceptions of justice.79  Disagreements about the nature
of the good life, on the other hand, are often not constrained by agreement on an 
underlying normative framework, and Quong refers to these as “foundational 
disagreements.”  Thus, the exclusion of all conceptions of the good life from public 
deliberation about justice ensures that all reasonable disagreements about justice remain, 
by definition, merely “justificatory.” 
Quong offers the following helpful example.  Two reasonable people disagree 
about the justice or injustice of the Catholic Church discriminating on the basis of gender 
when hiring priests.  However, Quong maintains, both interlocutors (if they are 
reasonable) share a commitment to the following two basic liberal values: on the one 
hand, religious liberty, and on the other, a prohibition against gender discrimination in 
employment (that is, equality of opportunity in employment).  So while they disagree 
about which value should be given priority in this particular case, they both accept the 
same basic political values.  Quong writes, “The key … is that they share the same basic 
normative framework despite the disagreement.  Put another way, they share the same 
view of what counts as a good reason in debating the principles of justice.”80  Thus, it is 
assumed, regardless of which policy is chosen (that is, permitting or prohibiting the 
church’s policy of gender discrimination), both parties to the disagreement will accept the
79 For Quong, this family of liberal conceptions will include sufficientarians as well as egalitarians, contra 
early Rawls (who only accommodated egalitarians), but it excludes libertarians, consistent with early 
and later Rawls.  On Quong's inclusion of sufficientarianism in his family of liberal conceptions, see 
Liberalism Without Perfection, 184.  For Rawls' (disappointingly brief) argument for the exclusion of 
libertarianism from his family of liberal conceptions, see Political Liberalism, 262-65.  For a much 
more detailed argument on behalf of the exclusion of libertarianism from the liberal tradition, see 
Samuel Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 30, no. 2 (2001): 105–151.  I will argue against this presumed unreasonableness of 
libertarianism in chapter III.
80 Jonathan Quong, “Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Political Legitimacy,” Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics 4, no. 3 (October 2005): 313.  Also see Quong, Liberalism without Perfection.
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outcome as legitimate, since they both accept the validity of the values and reasons 
offered on behalf of both possible outcomes.  Each person will feel reconciled to the 
political community because of this shared underlying set of values.
Importantly, for Quong, the idea that reasonable people will only experience 
justificatory and not foundational disagreements about justice is not an empirical 
assertion, but simply true by definition.  He writes, 
[R]easonable disagreements about justice are justificatory by definition. 
The truth of this claim does not rest on any empirical assertion about 
substantive agreement between actual citizens on principles of justice at 
any level of abstraction.  Rather, reasonable disagreements about justice 
are justificatory by definition because they must always involve citizens 
who share a commitment to the justificatory framework of public reason.81
So, for Quong, citizens who agree about the basic normative framework of liberalism are 
reasonable by definition, while those who disagree are by definition unreasonable.  This 
nicely systematizes the shared reasons model of political liberalism: our shared reasons 
are capable of generating agreement on abstract principles, even if we disagree about 
their priority and interpretation; our non-shared reasons are relegated to the private realm,
thus eliminating the possibility of deep disagreement about matters of justice.
6. Critiques of the “Shared Reasons” Model of Political Liberalism
The revised shared reasons model developed by Quong helps eliminate some of 
the confusions of later Rawls, but it reintroduces the problem of stability that later Rawls 
hoped to address.  The problem is that Rawls and Quong are demanding that citizens 
81 Quong, “Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Political Legitimacy,” 319-20.
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restrict themselves to a narrow set of “shared values” in public deliberations about 
justice.  The question to be asked is whether or not this demand is itself sectarian and 
unreasonable.  Returning to Sandel's communitarian critique of early Rawls, it appears 
that the shared reasons branch of liberalism privileges a particular conception of the 
individual and a particular set of values that simply are not shared by all citizens.  For 
many people, then, the model of “reasonableness” found in the shared reasons model 
looks quite exclusionary.82  And although shared reasons liberals are committed to a non-
sectarian “political not metaphysical” view of justice which will “stay on the surface, 
philosophically speaking,”83 it seems clear that Rawls and Quong are, indeed, relying 
upon controversial metaphysical assumptions that are not universally shared by all 
(seemingly) reasonable citizens of liberal democracies.  In a memorable footnote in 
“Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Rawls notes, 
If we look at the presentation of justice as fairness and note how it is set 
up, and note the ideas and conceptions it uses, no particular metaphysical 
doctrine about the nature of persons, distinctive and opposed to other 
metaphysical doctrines, appears among its premises, or seems required by 
its argument.  If metaphysical presuppositions are involved, perhaps they 
82 There are many critics of Rawls who level this critique.  One of the most incisive critics on this point is 
Chantal Mouffe, who pointedly asks, “But who decides what is and what is not ‘reasonable’?  In politics
the very distinction between ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ is already the drawing of a frontier; it has a
political character and is always the expression of a given hegemony” (The Return of the Political 
[Brooklyn: Verso, 2006]: 142-143).  Also see Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Brooklyn: Verso, 
2005).  For a related critique of these liberal assumptions, see William Connolly, The Ethos of 
Pluralization (Indianapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).  Mouffe's critique of political 
liberalism is mostly an external critique, arguing against the very vocabulary of “reasonableness” in 
political philosophy.  While her critique is quite convincing in many ways, it will likely not convince 
committed political liberals.  For an internal critique of the role of reasonableness in political 
liberalism, see Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique,” Ethics 106, no. 1 (October 
1995).  Also see Gaus, “Public Reason Liberalism”; and Shaun Young, “Rawlsian Reasonableness: A 
Problematic Assumption?”, Canadian Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2001).
83 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” 230.
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are so general that they would not distinguish between the distinctive 
metaphysical views—Cartesian, Leibnizian, or Kantian; realist, idealist, or
materialist—with which philosophy traditionally has been concerned.  In 
this case, they would not appear to be relevant for the structure and 
content of a political conception of justice one way or the other.84  
The concern, then, is that the pledge to “stay on the surface, philosophically speaking” is 
violated every time that Rawls or Quong invokes a distinctively Kantian interpretation of 
“free and equal persons” to justify their conception of justice.85  Even if some people are 
likely to be unsatisfied with the policy implications of communitarianism,86 the 
communitarian critique of the shared reasons branch of political liberalism helps make 
evident the controversial metaphysical assumptions that are implicit in its conceptions of 
“reasonableness,” personhood, and justice.
Seen from this perspective, it does not appear that the shared reasons model really
takes seriously the pluralism that it aspires to respect.  Instead of trying to forge 
consensus in the midst of pluralism, it now appears that the shared reasons liberals simply
posit consensus (which does not in fact exist) and ignore pluralism (which does in fact 
exist).  In other words, the shared reasons liberals solve the problem of pluralism by 
simply avoiding it.  While political liberalism is characterized by the two commitments of
84 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” 240n22.
85 Again, later Rawls is committed to the starting point that “the conception of the person [presupposed 
when theorizing about justice] is a moral conception, one that begins from our everyday conception of 
persons” (“Justice as Fairness,” 232n15; my italics).  As Robert Taylor correctly notes, the everyday 
conception of the person implicit in American culture is quite different than that implicit in Rawls' 
thought.  See Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls.
86 For one influential development of the policy implications of comunitarianism, see Michael Sandel, 
What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).  For
a classical liberal critique of Sandel's prescriptions, see Richard Epstein, “Michael Sandel is Wrong on 
Markets,” 15 May 2012, accessed 8 March 2013, http://www.hoover.org/research/michael-sandel-
wrong-markets.
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consensus and pluralism, the shared reasons liberals have insisted on securing consensus 
even if it requires dramatic and unconvincing restrictions on the scope of reasonable 
pluralism.  As Gaus puts it, “What started out as a collective legislation problem under 
conditions of disagreement became an account in which everyone cares about the same 
things and reasons about them in the same way.”87  Gaus goes on, “Even though Rawls 
continued to describe his account as requiring 'unanimous choice,' the essence of the 
unanimity requirement was lost,” since we “simply stipulate the correct single motivation
to get the result we want, so that the unanimity requirement becomes otiose.”88
The shared reasons model does not seem up to the task of guiding us through our 
condition of reasonable pluralism.  Indeed, the shared reasons liberals seem to be 
working with conceptions of “reasonableness,” personhood, and justice that many well-
intentioned and well-informed (and thus seemingly reasonable) people will reject when 
encumbered by their full range of values.  Seen in this light, the shared reasons model 
seems, against all its intentions, to be sectarian.89  As Gaus starkly puts it in a critique of 
Quong, “Quong’s political liberalism is not an opponent of sectarianism,” since Quong is 
essentially only replacing one kind of sectarianism (namely, “perfectionism”) with 
87 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 528.
88 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 528.  Relatedly, Gaus notes, “it is hard to see how we can make 
progress in understanding how people who disagree can live together by assuming that, in justificatory 
contexts, we are identical” (The Order of Public Reason, 285).
89 For example, religious citizens will view the demand to entirely “bracket” their religious values from 
public deliberations about justice as unacceptable.  Gaus notes, “Citizens of faith insist that they could 
not possibly evaluate moral rules without knowledge of their religious convictions and are certainly not 
willing to accord others a veto over whether they may do so” (The Order of Public Reason, 286).
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another form of sectarianism -  “a Rawlsian sectarianism.”90  If this critique is at all 
convincing, it strikes a fatal blow to the shared reasons model of political liberalism.
7. The Theoretical Strategy for Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus: The 
“Convergent Reasons” Model
This critique of the shared reasons model has inspired a new branch of political 
liberalism: the convergent reasons model.  This tradition of political liberalism is smaller 
and less developed than the shared reasons branch (which reaches back to the classical 
social contract liberals).  Its primary proponents are Gaus, Vallier, and Stout.91  In an 
attempt to genuinely respect the deep pluralism characteristic of modern liberal 
democracies, these thinkers insist that citizens should have the right to draw on their full 
array of values in public deliberations about justice.  Vallier summarizes the aspiration of 
the convergent reasons model: “For only by embracing convergence can public reason 
liberals truly respect reasonable pluralism and individual liberty.  By restricting the set of 
permissible reasons, [shared reasons] liberals inevitably discriminate against some 
reasonable individuals by privileging the reasoning of others.  These individuals are 
thereby partly excluded from being recognized as reasonable.”92  Those genuinely 
committed to pluralism should, Gaus argues, “wish to expand the range of admissible 
90 Gerald Gaus, “Sectarianism without Perfection? Quong’s Political Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public 
Issues 2, no. 1 (2012): 9.  Gaus asks, “Isn’t the Church of Perfection simply replaced with that of High 
Rawlsianism?” (“Sectarianism without Perfection?”, 9).  For a helpful back-and-forth between Gaus 
and Quong which highlights their points of agreement and disagreement, see the symposium entitled 
“Political Liberalism vs. Liberal Perfectionism,” Philosophy and Public Issues 2, no. 1 (2012).
91 I will mainly focus here on the work of Gaus, because his political philosophy is most systematically 
worked out, especially in his recent book The Order of Public Reason.  Vallier defends the convergent 
reasons model in “Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,” and Jeffrey Stout defends the 
convergent reasons model in “Religious Reasons in Political Argument,” in The Ethics of Citizenship: 
Liberal Democracy and Religious Conviction, ed. Caleb Clanton (Waco, TX: Baylor UP, 2009).
92 Vallier, “Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,” 262.
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evaluative standards as far as possible.”93  In other words, a genuine respect for pluralism 
requires that people be allowed to draw upon their full range of values when evaluating 
justice, since only this will sufficiently capture “the idea of pluralistic reasoning.”94  
In relation to the two-step justificatory process in later Rawls, convergent reasons 
liberals eliminate the first step (where information is restricted and only shared values are
considered) and instead begin with the second step (where citizens are encumbered with 
their full range of values).  The strength of political liberalism, Gaus claims, ought to be 
in its ability to draw on (and not exclude) the rich diversity of values found in modern 
liberal democracies.  Gaus insists, “the future of public reason liberalism is not to develop
a controversial ideological position that seeks to exclude large parts of our society as 
‘unreasonable,’” but instead to “press the bounds of inclusiveness as far as possible — 
and in so doing, showing that the deep strength of liberalism is its unique ability to not 
only accommodate, but draw upon, our deep diversity.”95
For shared reasons liberals, allowing “private” reasons into public deliberation is 
bound to corrupt the content of justice by accommodating the views of people who are 
blatantly unreasonable.  Surely, Rawls and Quong insist, we do not want justice to be 
held hostage by people who are ill-willed (such as committed racists, sexists, theocrats, 
sadists, etc.), or by people who are ill-informed (such as ignorant citizens, or “low-
information voters”96).  These arguments on behalf of restricting certain people and 
93 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 283.
94 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 284.  Gaus quips, “It is especially striking that Rawlsians such as 
Quong, who have so impressed upon us the importance of reasonable pluralism, seem so perplexed by 
pluralistic reasoning” (The Order of Public Reason, 292).
95 Gaus, “Public Reason Liberalism,” 28.
96 For a compelling (and frightening) account of the systematic biases and misconceptions among 
American voters, see Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008), 
chapter 2.  He identifies four systematic misconceptions about economics among American voters: (1) 
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certain views from public deliberation about justice seem to address a serious and 
necessary concern, even if shared reasons liberals do not present a compelling solution.  
How then do convergent reasons liberals respond to this concern?  
The basic conviction of the convergent reasons liberals is that the shared reasons 
model excludes not only the ill-willed and ill-informed (who, convergent reasons liberals 
agree, should be excluded), but it also excludes a large swath of well-intentioned and 
well-informed citizens (who should not be excluded).  As Gaus puts it, shared reasons 
liberals exclude as unreasonable not only “the most extreme sorts of evaluative 
perspectives (say, fanatics who have no interest in mutually acceptable terms for our 
common life),” but also many “good-willed moral agents.”97  This is a crucial part of 
Gaus' critique of the shared reasons liberals: while they are right to exclude certain 
clearly abhorrent values and reasons from consideration, their elaboration of justice 
reveals that they have excluded values and reasons from consideration that many 
seemingly reasonable people do not consider unreasonable.  If this is the case, then it 
exposes the project of the shared reasons liberals to be a failure.  Shared reasons 
liberalism does not show us which principles of justice would be agreed upon by 
reasonable people, but instead it tautologically shows us which principles of justice 
would be agreed upon by a group of people (who only represent a subset of all reasonable
people) who already share a common set of justice-related values.  This would destroy 
anti-market bias, (2) anti-foreign bias, (3) make-work bias, and (4) pessimistic bias.  Since they reflect 
ignorance about the empirical world, these biases would presumably be filtered out through epistemic 
idealization for the sake of public justification, both in the shared and convergent reasons models.  For a
similar argument documenting the harmful political effects of rational ignorance among American 
citizens, see Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government is Smarter 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2013). For a counterargument to these pessimistic accounts of democratic 
institutions, see Donald Wittman, The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are 
Efficient (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).  This issue is taken up at greater length in 
chapter IV.
97 Gaus, “Sectarianism without Perfection?”, 10.
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the claim of the shared reasons liberals that their conception of justice can legitimately be
imposed upon all.  Remember: if some set of reasonable people would choose to 
withhold consent from a particular conception of justice, then, by the standards of 
political liberalism, that conception of justice is without legitimate authority.  This 
critique exposes the shared reasons approach as circular in its justification, and 
sectarianism in its effect.
Gaus makes his critique more specific, arguing that the shared reasons liberals 
bias their conception of justice in favor of left-leaning secular citizens at the expense of 
right-leaning religious citizens.98  Gaus insists, “Quong’s liberal exclusionary view 
systematically favors the moral attitudes of those on the left while discriminating against 
those on the right.”99  To make this point, Gaus draws on the “moral foundations theory” 
documented by Jonathan Haidt in his recent book The Righteous Mind: Why Good 
People are Divided by Politics and Religion.  Drawing on extensive survey data from 
American citizens, Haidt identifies six moral foundations that ordinary people draw upon 
when evaluating moral and political issues: liberty/oppression, fairness/anti-cheating, 
care/harm, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation.100  What 
Haidt finds is that left-liberals draw primarily upon the liberty/oppression, fairness/anti-
cheating, and care/harm foundations in their thinking about justice,101 while conservatives
98 The debate about the place of religious conviction in political liberalism is wide-ranging.  For a good 
overview of the debate, see Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Sphere: The 
Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 1997), which features a debate on the subject between Audi and Wolterstorff.
99 Gerald Gaus, “Sectarianism without Perfection?”, 12.
100 To see a chart organizing and summarizing these six moral foundations, see Appendix A.
101 Haidt calls this liberal morality “WEIRD” morality, found primarily among Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic citizens.  The “WEIRD” acronym gestures to the cultural and 
historical uniqueness (or weirdness) of the left-liberal morality.  Most people, in most places, in most 
times, have drawn upon a larger array of the moral foundations than modern liberals do.  This finding 
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draw upon all six.102  In the particular way that they restrict the set of reasons and values 
admissible in public deliberation, Rawls and Quong implicitly privilege the intuitions of 
left-liberals at the expense of conservatives.  Gaus rightly points out that Rawls and 
Quong are implicitly committed to the idea that “morality is really only about treating all 
as free and equal, avoiding harm and ensuring that needs are met,” implying that “all 
other foundations are irrelevant.”103  So we must ask: is this bias against conservative and 
religious citizens justified?
In response to Gaus' critique of the biases of the shared reasons model, Quong 
continues to insist that the uniquely conservative moral foundations are in fact irrelevant 
to public deliberation.  The implication of Quong's stance is that a huge plurality of (well-
helps weaken the illusion that the liberal morality is a universal feature of normal human moral 
reasoning.  See Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and 
Religion (New York: Pantheon, 2012), chapter 5.  For a recent critique of moral foundations theory, see 
Kurt Gray, Chelsea Schein, and Adrian Ward, “The Myth of Harmless Wrongs in Moral Cognition: 
Automatic Dyadic Completion From Sin to Suffering,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 
143, no. 4 (2014).  For an influential (albeit very controversial) discussion of the deep pluralism of 
values, moralities, and identities witnessed at the international level, see Samuel Huntington, The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996).
102 A note on Haidt's methodology.  Haidt presented ordinary people with stories like the following: “Julie 
and Mark, who are sister and brother, are traveling together in France.  They are both on summer 
vacation from college.  One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach.  They decide it 
would be interesting and fun if they tried making love.  At the very least it would be a new experience 
for each of them.  Julie is taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe.  They 
both enjoy it, but they decide not to do it again.  They keep that night as a special secret between them, 
which makes them feel even closer to each other.  So what do you think about this?  Was it wrong for 
them to have sex?” (The Righteous Mind, 38).  Haidt then asks his interviewees for their reactions to the
story, and then for a response to the question (Was it wrong for them to have sex?).  Although the vast 
majority of respondents intuitively feel that it was wrong for the siblings to have sex, the left-leaning 
liberals were unable to offer good reasons for their intuitive response.  Haidt argues that the reason for 
this is that liberals do not draw on the sanctity/degradation moral foundation in their justifications, and 
are unable to give good reasons for their intuition by drawing primarily from the foundations of 
liberty/oppression, fairness/anti-cheating, and care/harm.  This causes liberals to be “morally 
dumbfounded.”  Conservatives, on the other hand, are able to offer reasons for their intuitive 
disapproval of the siblings because conservatives draw on the sanctity/degradation moral foundation, 
and they view sex as a sacred act that is only proper within the confines of marriage.
103 Gaus, “Sectarianism without Perfection?”, 14.  Some political philosophers, no doubt, will have no 
problem dismissing the actual intuitions and views of most people. On a helpful discussion of why such 
a move is mistaken, see David Miller, Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013); as well as Joshua Cohen, “Taking People as They Are?” Philosophy
& Public Affairs 30, no. 4 (Fall 2001).
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intentioned and well-informed) American citizens are excluded from public deliberation 
about justice in the shared reasons model of political liberalism.  This seems troubling, 
especially since Haidt's research shows that conservatives do not reject the left-liberal 
foundations, but instead merely draw upon others as well.  For those who are unwilling 
to exclude conservatives (and their values) from public deliberation, Gaus' accusation that
Quong's account of liberalism is sectarian is compelling.  While everyone agrees that 
certain clearly abhorrent views should be excluded from public deliberation, the shared 
reasons liberals exclude too many seemingly reasonable views, and thus offer an overly 
narrow view of reasonableness.  
We might say that Rawls (and his followers, like Quong) is committed to a strong 
moral idealization while Gaus is committed to a weak moral idealization.  That is, Rawls 
models his choice-situation of the original position (or, later, his criteria of reciprocity) 
such that only the left-liberal moral foundations (as described by Haidt) have justificatory
relevance, thus guaranteeing a left-liberal outcome, which threatens to have his principles
of justice overturned in the second stage of justification by people (and for reasons) that 
we tend to view as reasonable.  Gaus, instead, envisions public deliberation about matters
of basic justice as featuring justifications that incorporate mixtures of some or all of 
Haidt's six moral foundations.  For Gaus, then, the notion of “reasonableness” should not 
embody controversial assumptions so as to privilege left-liberals, but it should instead be 
recast to refer simply to those people who are seen as generally well-informed and well-
intentioned (using uncontroversial standards of “well-”).  Given this strong and 
compelling critique of the shared reasons model, an alternative model that permits a 
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convergence of reasons (from a plurality of values, identities, and worldviews) seems 
quite appealing.104
But the convergent reasons model is not without its own problems.  The shared 
reasons liberals rightfully ask convergence reasons liberals the following question: is 
there, in fact, a conception of justice that could feasibly be the object of an overlapping 
consensus for this expanded set of reasoners and reasons?  Or does this more expansive 
view of pluralism (espoused by the convergent reasons model) make consensus simply 
impossible, triggering the Liberal Nightmare?  In response to this query, Gaus agrees that 
a more expansive view of pluralism does make consensus more difficult.  But he insists 
that this problem should lead political liberals to give up on the goal of a determinate 
conception of justice being publicly justified.  In other words, perhaps we cannot hope for
a deep plurality of reasoners to agree upon a single, determinate conception of justice.  
But, Gaus argues, we have reason to believe that they can converge upon a set of 
conceptions of justice, each of which is preferable (to every reasoner) to the default 
position of no agreement (and no gains from social cooperation).105  Gaus works this 
104 Gaus makes a more forceful argument for the positive contributions of conservatism to the maintenance 
of a just society in his unpublished piece “The Role of Conservatism in Securing and Maintaining Just 
Moral Constitutions: Toward a Theory of Complex Normative Systems,” accessed 7 July 2013, 
http://www.gaus.biz/Gaus-PoliticalTheoryOfComplexSystems.pdf.  Gaus and Vallier make the case in 
more detail for the permissibility of religious reasons in the public sphere in “The Roles of Religious 
Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political 
Institutions,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, no. 1-2 (January 2009).
105 I should note that Gaus' conviction here is not at all obvious.  Gaus seems to be assuming that all those 
deliberating about justice will be willing to accept principles of justice other than their own highest-
ranked preference.  It is undoubtedly true that many people are willing to accept (without protest) an 
nth-best conception of justice to govern their political community, but this is surely not the case with 
everyone.  Many people are, we might say, fundamentalists when it comes to their views of justice.  
Gregory Liggett elaborates the point: “Gaus argues that the set of acceptable theories of justice is 
relatively wide.  His epistemic commitments bring him to the wide-set conclusion because the threshold
for rejecting a MOP's [deliberating Member of the Public's] preferred conception of justice is very high 
since there exists a wide range of reasonable evaluative systems distributed among the MoPs.  
Therefore, according to Gaus, as long as the MoPs each individually affirm Gaus’s evaluative pluralism 
thesis, these MoPs have no reason to cry “INJUSTICE!” just because their own preferred conception is 
not selected by society.  As long as the conception that has been selected is inside the eligible set, the 
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argument out in detail in The Order of Public Reason,106 but there is no need to go into 
the details of it here.  In many ways, it is not much different than the position Rawls 
adopts in Political Liberalism that the overlapping consensus will not contain merely 
“justice as fairness” (as articulated in A Theory of Justice), but will include a broader 
“family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice.”
MoPs should be content: disappointed that their own preferred conception wasn’t selected, yes, but 
satisfied that one of the eligible options was in fact selected.  Gaus thereby keeps the set as wide as 
possible without including (a) conceptions that would violate the agency principle; and (b) conceptions 
that rely upon a false understanding of economics.  But there’s a twist.  The vast majority of individuals
—from their own respective individual evaluative systems—don’t actually affirm Gaus’s epistemic 
commitment according to which there is a wide range of reasonable/acceptable evaluative systems and 
therefore a correspondingly wide range of reasonable/acceptable conceptions of justice in the first place.
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, for instance, Nozick says that no system other than the minimal state is 
justifiable.  Period.  Huemer, in The Problem of Political Authority, argues that no state at all is 
justifiable.  Period.  Gaus expects MoPs to be second-order pluralists (and accommodationists) about 
their first-order political beliefs, but, I’d venture to say... that the vast majority of people are second-
order fundamentalists about their first-order beliefs.  Actually, a better way of saying this is that most 
people don’t distinguish between their first- and second-order beliefs.  Most people, like Nozick, have 
certain beliefs about justice and want the state to enforce them (or refuse to enforce them, depending on 
the belief).  The irony, I think, is that Gaus’s argument would create an empty set of eligible options 
once MoPs transition away from the pro tanto into the freestanding phase of construction (once all the 
information is again made available to the MoPs).  The only way around this is to claim that MoPs must
be conceptualized to hold certain idealized moral and epistemic features, by which Gaus means that the 
MoPs, among other idealized characteristics, will be second-order pluralists about their first-order 
justice-related beliefs.  I get the motivation, but what could possibly justify this sort of self-serving and 
circular idealization choice made by Gaus?” (email correspondence).  Gaus' rejoinder is, simply, to 
exclude these fundamentalists as “sectarian” and “immature.”  Gaus writes, “There is no reason to think
that a person only has reason to adopt these sentiments and attitudes towards the rule she thinks best.  
As rules of social and political morality, the rules of justice are generally a great good, ordering our 
social life so as to provide the framework for cooperation and mutual benefit... The first impulse of the 
political philosopher is to optimize—to demand the best, the ideal, the perfect according to his own 
reflections.  To be sure if (and only if) his sectual preference is within the eligible set, he may press for 
it in the public forum on disputed issues.  But he must abjure all claim that his is the uniquely just view, 
the others being merely impostors or, worse, disguised evils... The morally mature citizen and 
philosopher knows that a diverse society will never come to share a conception of the best, and that 
means that she must reconcile herself to living under principles and practices that she does not think are 
the best, or in fact anything very close to it.  Only this mature attitude allows widespread reconciliation 
to a social world of diversity, which includes diversity of political views” (“The Range of Justice [Or, 
How to Retrieve Liberal Sectual Tolerance],” 10 October 2012, accessed 25 October 2012, 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/10/10/gerald-gaus/range-justice-or-how-retrieve-liberal-sectual-
tolerance).  This exclusionary move is highly problematic, and exposes the limits of Gaus' “expanded” 
pluralism.  The argument I develop below (drawing on the concerns of Quong) further troubles the 
convergent reasons model and exposes its own biases and exclusions.
106 Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 261-333.
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But there is an important challenge that Quong issues to Gaus at this point.  
Quong points out that if we allow “private” reasons into public deliberation, by 
permitting the more conservative moral foundations to have some justificatory force in 
deliberations about matters of basic justice, then there is no guarantee that the agreed-
upon set of conceptions of justice will be liberal (in the broad sense of the term).  For 
example, if the conservative moral foundation of sanctity/degradation is permitted a place
in public deliberation, then illiberal laws that discriminate against sexual minorities very 
well may be institutionalized.  Indeed, the basic liberties of liberalism may be held 
hostage to illiberal moral intuitions.  Quong insightfully notes, “We can have a theory of 
public reason that won’t be sectarian [including the sense in which Gaus accuses Quong 
of being a Rawlsian sectarian], but then we can’t be sure it will be a liberal theory.”107  
The tension between the shared reasons model and the convergent reasons model seems 
to offer two equally but differently problematic routes: either (1) narrow the range of 
pluralism so as to secure a liberal consensus, or (2) expand the range of pluralism and 
accept the possibility of an illiberal compromise.  This is exactly the tension between 
consensus and pluralism that, as I noted earlier in this chapter, has been persistent in the 
history of liberalism.
Gaus, however, insists that his convergent reasons account will remain liberal.  To
show this, Gaus needs to make a move that is structurally identical to the shared reasons 
model: he needs to demarcate the boundaries of the reasonable so as to exclude certain 
obviously undesirable kinds of moral reasons.  However, since Gaus wants to remain 
“non-sectarian,” he needs to show how this boundary is implied in the moral 
commitments and attitudes of all those moral reasoners (left-liberal and conservative and
107 Jonathan Quong, “Reply to Gaus,” Philosophy and Public Issues 2, no. 1 (2012): 58.
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libertarian, etc.) who are well-intentioned and well-informed.  Gaus thus needs to avoid 
the Kantian starting point of Rawls and Quong, since “the Kantian tradition has itself 
proven to be a controversial starting point,” and Gaus instead vows to commit himself to 
a non-sectarian conception of the reasonable that is “internal to our practice of social 
morality.”108  Even though Gaus wants to begin his account with non-controversial 
starting points so as not to unfairly exclude certain persons and values, he recognizes that 
even a convergent reasons model of political liberalism requires some “significant but 
realistic level of idealization” so as to filter out citizens who have obviously unacceptable
views.109  Even weak moral idealization is idealization, and it requires demarcation and 
exclusion of the unreasonable.
To this end, Gaus argues that each normal moral reasoner, from left to right, is 
implicitly committed to the notion that she is an “agent,” and because of this she will (in 
public deliberation about justice) insist  upon securing a set of “agency rights.”  Gaus 
notes that even conservatives and religious traditionalists see themselves, in the modern 
world, as fundamentally active choosers of their commitments: “In pluralistic orders, in 
which identities and roles are constantly challenged and open to revision, even those who
endorse tradition cannot help but see this as a choice of theirs—an exercise of their 
agency.  We employ roles not as an alternative to agency but as a way to express and 
manage our presentation to others.”110  It is crucial to Gaus' argument that this quasi-
individualistic self-conception is shared by virtually all members modern societies: “The 
perspective of agency forces itself on us, and we are unable not to see ourselves as 
108 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 21.
109 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 276.
110 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 337; my italics.
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agents, whose actions are properly determined by our own deliberations.”111  If this is an 
accurate description of our self-understandings, then deploying and extending the concept
of “agency rights” would not be viewed as inappropriately sectarian, and it would help 
guarantee that the converged-upon set of conceptions of justice be broadly liberal (in so 
far as liberalism is fundamentally a political philosophy committed to securing individual
liberties, i.e. “agency rights”).  Gaus hopes that this common commitment to agency 
rights can serve to “narrow the maximal set over core questions of social morality,” thus 
giving us “a much better idea of the contours of the set [of feasible conceptions of 
justice].”112  
Is Gaus right that all people in the modern world inescapably view themselves as 
agents in the ways he describes?  In some very weak sense, Gaus is correct.  Given the 
many identities and values that flourish in modern liberal democracies, each person will 
recognize that she could change her own identity and values, and thus both changing or 
preserving one's identity and values is recognized to be, at some level, a choice.  But if 
we understand agency in a stronger sense, in which each person is seen as first and 
foremost an unencumbered chooser of identities and values that can be selected and 
rejected at will, then Gaus is surely wrong.  Returning again to Sandel's critique of Rawls'
early work, not all citizens view themselves as separable from and antecedent to their 
identity and values, but instead some (even most) citizens view themselves as constituted 
by the identify and values given to them through their socialization in a particular 
community.  Now, Gaus insists that he is not relying upon a controversial Millian or 
Kantian conception of autonomy (here echoing later Rawls' commitment to being 
111 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 337; my italics.
112 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 335.
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“political not metaphysical”), but rather that his view of agency is uncontroversial across 
a large spectrum of religious, moral, and philosophical commitments.  However, Gaus 
needs his weak conception of agency to entail a whole series of liberal rights if he is to 
adequately respond to Quong's challenge (and secure a liberal outcome from a convergent
reasons model).  Indeed, in The Order of Public Reason, Gaus argues that a common 
commitment to agency rights entails convergence upon politically institutionalizing 
freedom of thought,113 rights against harm,114 a right to assistance,115 privacy rights 
(including freedom of association),116 and, finally, rights to private property.117  
The trouble with Gaus' argument is that it is unclear whether his slate of 
traditional liberal rights is strictly entailed by his uncontroversial and weak notion of 
agency, or if it requires a more controversial and strong notion of agency.  If Gaus needs 
the stronger notion of agency to guarantee that his convergent reasons account will 
remain liberal, then he seems to be guilty of the same kind of sectarianism found in the 
shared reasons model, since he will be excluding citizens who do not hold an 
individualistic self-conception.118  Indeed, it seems hard to envision how a weak 
113 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 353.
114 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 357.
115 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 359.
116 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 381.
117 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 375.  Gaus’ insistence that all reasonable views of justice will 
include strong private property rights will be critically evaluated in chapter III.
118 This language of understanding agency in a “weak” and “strong” sense is influenced by Michael 
Walzer's language of “thin” and “thick” versions of concepts in Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at 
Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), especially the chapter 
“Moral Minimalism.”  Thinness refers to the presentation of a concept stripped of its concrete, detailed 
content, while thickness refers to the concept fully filled out.  The lesson is that even if we achieve 
agreement about a “thin” understanding of “agency,” there is no guarantee that we will agree about 
“thick” interpretations of it.  So even if Gaus is right that people view themselves as agents in some 
vague and thin sense, that does not necessarily entail that they view, for example, private property as 
entailed by that agency.  In other words, thick conclusions cannot emerge from thin premises, and Gaus 
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conception of agency (necessarily held by all modern people) entails private property 
rights.  Gaus seems to be quietly smuggling in controversial conclusions through 
uncontroversial premises.  Michael Huemer similarly sees Gaus' project as falling prey to
the same problems that Rawls' project does: “Gaus argues that political legitimacy 
requires agreement among all reasonable persons on general principles, though 
disagreements on the interpretation of those principles may remain.  He mistakenly 
assumes that agreement on general principles is common.”119  Some modern and 
reasonable people do not hold an individualistic self-conception, and do not see private 
property rights as a requirement of justice.
That is, the convergent reasons model shares with the shared reasons model two 
problematic features: the unjustified assumption of consensus and the unjustified 
narrowing of pluralism.  Insofar as we are convinced by Gaus' critique of the shared 
reasons model, we will be unsatisfied with Gaus' articulation of the convergent reasons 
model as well.
8. The Historical Strategy for Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus: The Telos of 
Tolerance
The problems identified with the shared reasons and convergent reasons models 
suggests the possibility that the forging of consensus in the midst of deep pluralism is not 
a task that can satisfactorily be achieved by the work of ideal theory.  That is, when a 
modern democratic society features foundational disagreements about justice, the 
political philosopher generally cannot convincingly show how a consensus in fact exists 
tries to do exactly that.
119 Huemer, The Problem of Political Authority, 42n12.
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between the “reasonable” citizens without first invoking a controversial and contested 
demarcation between the “reasonable” and “unreasonable” citizens.  Instead, these 
foundational disagreements about justice may require the development of a modus 
vivendi arrangement, whereby society achieves stability, even if the political arrangement
does not achieve consensus.  However, even if liberals cannot always work out the 
problem of pluralism in “theory,” liberalism has a solid track record of working out the 
problem of pluralism in “practice.”  
To return to an earlier point, liberalism emerged in response to the pluralism of 
religious faiths in the wake of the Reformation, and offered a very promising strategy for 
dealing with religious conflict: privatize religious belief, encourage religious tolerance, 
and rely on common (non-religious) values in public deliberation.  As was pointed out in 
the last section, the strict privatization of religious values has been seen as oppressive and
unacceptable by a number of modern religious citizens, so the liberal model (in its 
“shared reasons” version) has not been entirely successful.  Nonetheless, the liberal 
values of religious tolerance and freedom of conscience have been widely embraced by 
religious and non-religious citizens alike, and most modern religious citizens accept that 
they cannot only rely on their religious values when making public arguments.  In other 
words, the liberal response (combining elements from the shared and convergent reasons 
models) to the problem of religious pluralism was largely successful, and certainly 
contributed to the defusing of religious violence and the widespread acceptance of the 
freedom of worship and conscience.
This particular historical example offers some insight into the general historical 
trajectory of the liberal project and it is worth making more explicit.  The Wars of 
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Religion broke out in Europe because matters of justice were decided based on sectarian 
religious values.  The private beliefs of individual citizens were widely understood to be a
public concern, such that it was considered legitimate for state coercion to be exercised to
the end of encouraging religious observance and belief in the citizenry.  The unstable 
peace that emerged after the Wars of Religion was a modus vivendi between parties of 
relatively equal power, each side hoping to take more ground if the opportunity presented
itself.  Then, slowly, the liberal alternative caught on, and the modus vivendi evolved into 
an overlapping consensus.  
The liberal alternative was to see religious beliefs as having relatively little to do 
with justice, but instead as speaking to questions about the good life.  In other words, 
religious beliefs were reinterpreted and re-framed as private, not public.120  In his 
influential pamphlet Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke argues that churches 
should care about the soul and otherworldly matters while states should worry about the 
body (namely, its rights against interference and aggression by others) and this-worldly 
matters.  He insists that religious beliefs are essentially private by their very nature, since 
genuine belief cannot be coerced by external authorities.  Furthermore, Locke argues for 
the then-counterintuitive position that allowing for a diversity of private religious views 
is actually more conducive to social harmony than trying to enforce consensus on 
religious questions.  These arguments were eventually found to be convincing by most 
people.  More and more religious citizens came to embrace the virtue of religious 
120 As John Locke argues, “I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil
government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other.  If 
this is not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between those 
that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment [sic] for the interest of men's souls,
and, on the other side, a care of the commonwealth” (Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James Tully 
[Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983], 9-10).
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tolerance,121 and thus the cold war of modus vivendi was transformed, over time, into the 
genuine peace of an overlapping consensus.122
The general liberal strategy, then, is something like the following: if an object of 
public disagreement about justice can coherently be reinterpreted and re-framed as a 
private concern about the good life, and this transitioning of the object from public to 
private will facilitate social harmony, then that object should be privatized.123  This 
strategy is insightfully explored by Nagel in his important essay “Moral Conflict and 
Political Legitimacy.”  For Nagel, if an issue generates foundational disagreement (in 
Quong's sense), and the state does not need to be involved, then the issue is a candidate 
for “liberal toleration”124 – that is, privatization.  Nagel points out that this same strategy 
has been deployed quite successfully in the twentieth century regarding the issue of 
sexual practices.  Like religious beliefs, for centuries the sexual activities of individual 
citizens were understood to be a public concern subject to political regulation.  However, 
throughout the twentieth century a number of issues surrounding sexuality were 
politicized (such as abortion, contraceptive usage, homosexual sex, same-sex marriage), 
and this phenomenon created social disharmony.  The liberal response to these 
controversies about sexual activity is to point out that sexual activity can coherently be 
121 It should be noted that in his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke advocated tolerance towards the 
pluralism of Protestant sects; he did not extend full tolerance towards atheists or Catholics, who Locke 
believed were incapable of being trustworthy liberal citizens.
122 This typical account of the rise of religious liberty ascribes great power to the liberal ideas developed by
figures like Locke and Spinoza.  However, it is clear that religious liberty caught on also because it 
enabled economic progress and political stability.  For this more “materialistic” account of the rise of 
religious liberty, see Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty (New York: Cambridge 
UP, 2008).
123 For a discussion of the role of “redescription” in shifting the historical boundary between the public and
private, see Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge UP, 1989), 
chapter 3.
124 Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 233.
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seen as a private concern about the good life, and that such a privatization would 
facilitate social harmony.  Sexual practices are thus a perfect candidate for “liberal 
toleration.”125
Again, this historical liberal strategy has not been entirely accepted by certain 
citizens.  Many religious citizens, for example, do not accept that their religious values 
have no place in public deliberation, and this partly fuels the debate between shared 
reasons liberals and convergent reasons liberals (and critics of liberalism).  Thus, issues 
surrounding sexuality continue to be a matter of heated public debate in the United States
(and elsewhere).  My point is simply that the liberal paradigm has a generally successful, 
although imperfect, solution to the problem of foundational disagreement about issues 
that can coherently be reinterpreted and re-framed as private concerns about the good life.
Gaus notes this important historical fact: “it is plausible to suppose that a major change 
between the seventeenth and twenty-first centuries was what we might call the general 
liberalization of conceptions of the good in western democracies.”126  In other words, the 
last few centuries illustrate a slow change in how democratic citizens view their 
conceptions of the good.  Namely, they recognize and accept the need to make room for 
the values of others, even if that requires privatizing (or partially privatizing) their 
conception of the good, or at least downgrading its justificatory importance for questions 
of justice in a pluralistic society.  Thus, the last few centuries demonstrate a movement in 
the direction of liberal tolerance, lending support to the hope that such a movement will 
continue as societies become increasingly pluralistic.
125 Nagel also includes the topic of “the killing of animals for food” as a candidate for liberal toleration, 
since it is a decision that can be devolved to individuals (“Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 
233).
126 Gaus, “Public Reason Liberalism,” 17.
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I can now return to the original question that provoked this inquiry: what to do 
when a modern democratic society features a foundational disagreement about justice.  
Even if the political theorist cannot convincingly argue what solution the “reasonable” 
citizens would agree upon, western political history suggests that with the continued 
pluralization of values, social cooperation will be most successfully secured by 
privatizing those issues that can coherently be understood as matters of the good life.  
This largely vindicates the theory of the shared reasons model, wherein public 
deliberation takes place with mainly those values that are shared, while non-shared 
reasons are deemed mostly private.  No doubt, however, there will always be political 
debates about which values, exactly, should be pushed off into the private sphere and 
which values should continue to have justificatory force in the public sphere.  This 
continued tension (unlikely to cease anytime soon) vindicates the continued relevance of 
the convergent reasons model.
In both cases, though, the liberal paradigm seems to have a blind spot: what is to 
be done when a modern democratic society features a foundational disagreement about an
issue that cannot coherently be reinterpreted and re-framed as a private concern about 
the good life?  For issues fitting this category, Nagel offers the examples of the death 
penalty and nuclear policy (or foreign policy more generally): “these issues are poor 
candidates for liberal toleration because they are not matters of individual conduct, which
the state may or may not decide to regulate,”127 since in these cases “the state must 
decide.”128  Unlike religious belief or sexual conduct, it is not feasible to devolve 
127 Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 233.
128 Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 234.
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decisions about military strategy to private citizens and their private associations.129  
When the Cold War pitted foreign policy hawks against advocates of nuclear 
disarmament in the United States, American citizens were locked in a foundational 
disagreement about matters of justice.  For these cases of actually existing foundational 
disagreement about justice, the liberal privatization strategy cannot be straightforwardly 
applied.  When the political culture is deeply divided about matters of basic justice on 
these inherently public questions, we have neither theory nor history to turn to in order to 
help us overcome such a divide.
9. Conclusion: The Blind Spot of Political Liberalism
I have argued that political liberalism, both in its shared reasons and convergent 
reasons models, has an unjustified faith that while reasonable people will likely disagree 
deeply and persistently about matters of the good life, they will nonetheless surely agree 
about the basic principles of justice (at least in their broad outlines).  The history of 
liberalism seems to lend credence to this optimism by featuring impressive cases in 
which issues that once generated socially disruptive foundational public disagreement 
were successfully (semi-)privatized, thus eliminating deep disagreement from the public 
sphere.  However, political liberalism does not have an adequate solution (in either theory
or practice) to situations in which there exists well-intentioned and well-informed (and 
129 Of course, there is a tradition of political philosophy that does insist that all issues can coherently be 
privatized: anarchism.  Indeed, anarchists take great pleasure in trying to demonstrate how every last 
function of government could be taken over by private voluntary entities, including roads, defense, law, 
courts, etc.  For interesting and compelling attempts to defend the anarchist vision, see Murray 
Rothbard's For a New Liberty (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006); David Friedman's 
Machinery of Freedom, 2nd ed. (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989); part 2 of Linda and Morris Tannehill's 
The Market for Liberty (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007); and part 2 of Huemer's The 
Problem of Political Authority. It strikes me that these texts help show the “reasonableness” of 
anarchism – a claim that, if accepted, has serious implications for the project of egalitarian political 
liberalism (and even for non-egalitarian but still statist political liberalism).
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thus “reasonable”) citizens who find themselves locked in foundational disagreements 
about issues that cannot be privatized, and thus require a public decision. 
I have already mentioned the case of foreign policy, which is an inherently public 
concern that cannot be privatized.  There is another case which arguably falls in this 
category that will be the subject of the next chapter: property rights and economic 
distributions.  Nagel makes note of this issue in passing, recognizing it as a difficult case 
for political liberalism.130  In the United States, questions about property rights and 
economic distributions divide reasonable people into right-libertarians, left-libertarians, 
classical liberals, left-liberals, and liberal socialists, as well as libertarians, prioritarians, 
and egalitarians, and these disagreements are often foundational.  The liberal privatization
strategy can, in principle, apply in the domain of economic justice, by permitting 
ownership of private property and then allowing individuals to freely influence the 
overall economic distribution through private choices (private charities, gifts, consumer 
behavior, etc.).131  However, to deploy this privatization strategy is already to essentially 
130 That is, Nagel recognizes that decisions about the distribution of property can technically be devolved 
and privatized, but he does not count this as a decisive argument in favor of libertarianism: “The same 
question [about whether the state must decide about the matter or whether it can privatize the decision] 
might also be raised about fundamental issues of social justice—the conflicts of economic liberals with 
radical libertarians, or with radical collectivists who regard individualism as an evil.  Here I would give 
a more complex answer.  I do not believe these moral oppositions are as 'personal' as the others: even 
radical disagreements about freedom and distributive justice are usually part of some recognizable 
public argument.  On the other hand, social provision is not so essentially the function of the state as is 
warfare: voluntary collective action is certainly possible.  So to the extent that some of these 
disagreements are like religious disagreements, there would be a place for liberal toleration in the 
economic sphere—for example, toleration of private ownership even by those who think it is an evil” 
(“Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 234).
131 This privatization strategy for dealing with disagreements about property rights is defended in part 3 of 
Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, where he argues that in a libertarian state, each private association 
would have the freedom to choose the principles that govern its internal life, including those principles 
that affect the distribution of property and the nature of property rights.  People would be encouraged to 
be tolerant toward other views about economic distribution, and the state would permit the existence of 
a pluralism of communities organized around different conceptions of economic justice (e.g. socialist 
communes, free enterprise zones, etc.).  The appeal and problems with this proposal will be discussed in
chapter III.
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take sides in the disagreement in favor of libertarianism to the detriment of left-liberals, 
since egalitarian goals are virtually impossible without state-enforced regulation and 
redistribution.  How likely is it that people would voluntarily, in coordination with others,
transfer their wealth so as to achieve and maintain over time an egalitarian pattern?  It is 
theoretically possible, but highly unlikely.
What, then, is to be done when we disagree deeply and persistently about issues of
economic justice?  In the next chapter, I will detail some of the attempts of liberal 
political philosophers to offer solutions to this dilemma.  I will argue there, as I have 
here, that political liberals can only secure a consensus about justice by sacrificing their 
commitment to respecting pluralism.  If the political philosopher remains committed to 
accommodating the views of justice of all well-intentioned and well-informed citizens,  
then in certain cases the disagreements will be so deep that consensus is impossible.  As I 
will argue, in the case of economic justice, the Liberal Nightmare is a reality.
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CHAPTER III
POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF
PROPERTY
1. Introduction: The Fundamental Problem
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the tradition of political liberalism attempts
to articulate a conception of justice while at the same time respecting reasonable 
pluralism.  That is, political liberals assume that people with diverse views about 
philosophy, morality, and religion can nonetheless agree about justice (at least in its broad
outlines).  I attempted to show that this optimistic assumption is unjustified.  Political 
liberals are only able to secure consensus about justice by positing a consensus (that does 
not obtain) and by restricting the range of reasonable pluralism (more so than is justified).
In this chapter, I further elucidate this general critique by focusing on a specific example 
of political disagreement: matters of economic justice.  I will argue that reasonable 
people – defined broadly as people who are considered neither morally nor epistemically 
deficient, using uncontroversial criteria for “deficiency” – can arrive at radically 
divergent views about the nature and scope of economic justice.  That is, the scope of 
reasonable pluralism on this issue admits of the possibility of deep and foundational 
disagreement.  This demonstrates a serious flaw in the political liberal project, which 
relies upon the assumption of the eventuality of rational consensus around the principles 
of justice.  
In the first section, I briefly explain what all is meant by “economic liberty,” since
it is (in part) the nature and scope of economic liberty that is (I will claim) subject to deep
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disagreement within the liberal tradition.  Next, I present an external critique of political 
liberalism, by returning to the unresolved core of the debate between John Rawls and 
Robert Nozick, which deals with the question: do people have entitlement to their 
unearned natural assets (IQ, looks, natural talents, character, level of motivation, work 
ethic, etc.) – and thus to the economic assets that flow from them?  Rawls develops the 
“argument from arbitrariness”132 to argue that since people do not earn their natural 
assets, they have no entitlement over them, from which he concludes that the natural 
assets of individual citizens should be viewed as a “common asset”133 under the control of
the larger political community.  This defense of luck egalitarianism provides a powerful 
philosophical defense of Rawls' economic egalitarianism.  Nozick, on the other hand, 
agrees with Rawls that people do not earn their natural assets, but then Nozick rightly 
points out that Rawls does not explain how this fact alone transfers their entitlement to 
the larger political community.  So, even though people do not earn their natural assets, 
Nozick argues that each individual should be entitled to her own stock of unearned 
natural assets.  This defense of self-ownership provides a powerful philosophical defense 
of Nozick's inegalitarian historical entitlement theory of justice.  I will argue that neither 
Rawls nor Nozick have made a fully persuasive case for either theory of entitlement.  As 
it stands, both positions are reasonable, and yet both positions are reasonably rejectable.  
Thus, I conclude that the dominant view of economic justice within political liberalism 
(the economic egalitarianism of Rawls) is vulnerable in its very opening premises to 
reasonable external critics.
132 This phrase comes from Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 96.
133 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 101.
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Next, I present an internal critique of political liberalism.  I take political 
liberalism to be grounded in two basic commitments: the principle of public justification 
and the fact of reasonable pluralism.  I will show that these premises can be part of a 
coherent argument for economic egalitarianism (as developed by “high liberals” like 
Rawls, Samuel Freeman, or Thomas Nagel) or for limited government and strong 
property rights (as developed by classical liberals like John Tomasi, Gerald Gaus, and 
Jason Brennan).134  Both the high liberals and classical liberals need to incorporate 
additional controversial assumptions (in addition to the basic two) into their arguments to
achieve their desired conceptions of economic justice.  The high liberals assume a model 
of moral personhood according to which economic activity is relatively unimportant for 
one's moral development, while classical liberals assume a model of moral personhood 
according to which economic activity is deeply significant.  Both positions are 
reasonable, and yet both positions are reasonably rejectable.
The high liberals additionally argue that strong property rights and free markets 
undermine the fair value of political liberty by leading to political corruption and 
domination, but the classical liberals point out that the empirical data suggest otherwise.  
At the very least, the empirical argument by high liberals is not fully persuasive on this 
point.  The classical liberals then argue that strong property rights are part of the liberal 
privatization strategy (as discussed in chapter II) which allows for individualized spheres 
of moral control as a way to avoid social conflict.  This solution, the high liberals are 
right to point out, cannot be expected to achieve universal consensus, since it forecloses 
certain reasonable egalitarian goals.  By highlighting these internal debates within the 
134 I leave aside debates about the relationship between classical liberalism and what is now called 
“neoliberalism.”  For a fair treatment of this contentious topic, see Stedman Jones, Masters of the 
Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2012), 
especially p. 100-110.
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paradigm of political liberalism, I hope to show that the dominant egalitarian view of 
economic justice within political liberalism is not uniquely entailed by its basic premises. 
Indeed, political liberals are wrong when they conclude that reasonable people 
will agree upon the proper nature and scope of economic liberty.  The range of reasonable
disagreement here is vast.135  I argue that this range of reasonable disagreement is so vast 
that political philosophers should give up hope that consensus around a single conception
(or around a narrow family of similar conceptions) of economic justice is possible.  
2. Defining the Economic Liberties
Before going on to outline and evaluate the main debates about economic liberty 
and economic justice within the liberal tradition, it is important to first explain what the 
category “economic liberty” includes.  It will be most helpful to articulate what we would
consider a complete set of economic liberties (or absolute economic liberty).
In his article “Economic Liberties,” James Nickel breaks down economic liberty 
into four categories: liberty of (1) working, (2) transacting, (3) holding, and (4) using.  
Robust liberty in the realm of working includes the liberty to buy, sell, and donate one’s 
labor on whatever conditions one voluntarily chooses.  Robust liberty in the realm of 
transacting encompasses all forms of independent economic activity – the right to buy 
and sell, to create things, to engage in market competition, to earn a profit from one’s 
resources; also, the right to start, run, or close down any kind of commercial enterprise 
(e.g. a business, factory, or farm).  Robust liberty in the realm of holding includes the 
right to hold both personal non-productive and personal productive property (i.e. capital 
135 For a chart depicting the range of views about economic justice within the liberal tradition, see 
Appendix B.
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assets), which includes creating goods for commercial purposes, and the legal guarantee 
that these goods are free from expropriation without due process.  Robust liberty in the 
realm of using includes the right to buy, sell, use, and consume goods and services.136
We get a similar picture from Gaus in his article “The Idea and Ideal of 
Capitalism.”  Gaus explains that absolute economic liberty (which characterizes an 
idealized capitalist economic regime) is characterized by maximally extensive feasible 
property rights, in which property rights are maximized along two axes: (x) the extent of 
the bundle of one’s rights over one’s property, and (y) the range of objects over which 
one can legally hold as property.137  Regarding the first (x) axis, in order for me to enjoy 
the full extent of the bundle of property rights over commodity P, I would enjoy the 
following economic liberties: 
• The right to use P as I wish so long as this is not harmful to others or their 
property;
• The right to exclude others from using P;
• The right to manage: I may give permission to any others I wish to use P, and 
determine how it may be used by them;
• The right to compensation: if someone damages or uses P without my consent, I 
have a right to compensation for the loss of P’s value from that person;
• The rights to destroy, waste, or modify: I may destroy P, waste it, or change it;
• The right to income: I have a right to the financial benefits of forgoing my own 
use of P and letting someone else use it;
136 James Nickel, “Economic Liberties,” in The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, ed. 
Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 156-157.
137 To see a visual of this graph, see Appendix C.
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• Immunity from expropriation: P (or any part of P) may not be made the property 
of another or the government without my consent, with a few exceptions such as 
taxation;
• Liability to execution: P may be taken away from me by authorized persons for 
repayment of a debt;
• Absence of term: my rights over P are of indefinite duration;
• Rights to rent and sale (transfer rights): I may temporarily or permanently transfer
all or some of my rights over P to anyone I choose.138
Regarding the second (y) axis, absolute economic liberty would include the widest 
feasible range of objects over which one can legally hold as property.  This would include
consumer goods, productive assets, financial instruments, ideas, natural resources, land, 
and one’s labor.  As Gaus notes, all actually existing political regimes restrict and/or 
regulate economic liberty along both axes of property rights to some extent.  In the 
United States, for example, the range of objects over which one can hold as property is 
restricted (e.g. the regulation of drugs, organ sales, and parental rights over children), and
the extent of the bundle of property rights is restricted (e.g. licensing laws, environmental
regulations, and health and safety requirements).139
Thus, libertarians (like Nozick and Eric Mack) endorse a conception of absolute 
economic liberty, classical liberals (like Gaus and Tomasi) endorse a conception of thick 
but not absolute economic liberty, and high liberals (like Rawls and Freeman) endorse a 
conception of thin economic liberty.  This chapter seeks to demonstrate that this whole 
138 Gerald Gaus, “The Idea and Ideal of Capitalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics, ed. 
George G. Brenkert and Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010), also 
http://www.gaus.biz/Gaus-Capitalism.pdf, 3.
139 Gaus, “The Idea and Ideal of Capitalism,” 6.
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range of views about economic liberty is reasonable.  Reasonable pluralism admits of 
deep and foundational disagreement on this important set of justice-related issues.  Thus, 
liberalism does not resolve our fundamental disagreement in at least one crucial sphere of
justice.
3. External Critique: Luck Egalitarianism vs. Self-ownership
Liberals (in the broadest sense of the term), from John Locke through Rawls and 
Nozick, are united in their commitment to (some version of) the following two normative
principles:
• The principle of public justification: a coercive policy is justified if and only if 
every reasonable citizen consents to it (by accepting the reasons offered on its 
behalf).
• The fact of reasonable pluralism: reasonable people are expected to disagree 
deeply and indefinitely about matters of philosophy, morality, and religion.
An important feature of the principle of public justification is that it is coercion that 
requires special justification, while non-coercion (or “liberty”) is the assumed baseline 
that itself needs no justification.140  This can be called the “presumption in favor of 
liberty”: liberty is the norm, while state coercion requires special justification (the 
“consent of the people”).  No coercion (of any kind) against persons or their property is 
140 This presumption in favor of liberty goes back (at least) to John Locke, who argues, “the natural liberty 
of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative 
authority of man, but to have only the law of Nature as his rule” (Second Treatise of Government, ed. 
C.B. Macpherson [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980], section 21).  Thomas Hobbes refers to the “blameless 
liberty” we enjoy in the absence of compelling justification to restrict it (The Elements of Law, Natural 
and Politic [London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., 1889], 71).  More recently, Joel Feinberg describes 
this presumption as “a standing presumption against all proposals to criminalize conduct” (Rights, 
Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty [Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980], 36).  Similar descriptions of the 
presumption in favor of liberty are found in the writings of all social contract thinkers, classical liberals,
and political liberals.
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legitimate in the absence of sufficient justification.  If a certain coercive policy is unable 
to achieve sufficient agreement, then there is a return to the status quo ante of non-
coercion.
Many of the debates within the liberal tradition concern the general question: 
which coercive policies can be justified to a pluralistic citizenry?  One of the most heated 
debates within the liberal tradition is defining the state's legitimate role in protecting 
property and redistributing property.  For libertarians and classical liberals, the state 
should be limited to protecting private property rights and, perhaps, providing public 
goods (goods that are under-provided by the market but which are in the interests of all, 
e.g. national defense and highways).141  For left-liberals and liberal socialists, the state 
should tax, regulate, and redistribute property so as to guarantee a relatively equal 
distribution of resources to all.  One of the core disagreements between the two camps 
concerns the problem: “What is the default baseline for property rights?”  In other words, 
in the absence of agreement about the issue, what is the default situation with regard to 
property rights, economic liberty, and the distribution of wealth?  How one answers this 
question has significant consequences.
Libertarians assume that a welfare state committed to enforcing and maintaining 
economic egalitarianism is unjustified, because undoubtedly some citizens reasonably 
object to certain redistributive measures.  These people object to the use of state coercion 
to tax some citizens in order to transfer wealth to others.  Thus, it is claimed, policies of 
redistribution are defeated, and state-imposed economic egalitarianism is illegitimate.  
141 Of course, some libertarians reject the state altogether.  See Rothbard, For a New Liberty; and Huemer, 
The Problem of Political Authority.  For a recent discussion of the important issue of the public 
justification of the provision of public goods, see Jonathan Anomaly, “Public Goods and Government 
Action,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 14, no. 2 (2015).
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For libertarians, the default baseline for property rights is the emergent patterns of 
inequality that arise through voluntary transactions.  
Left-liberals assume that severe economic inequality is unjustified because such a 
state of affairs would be rejected by all appropriately situated deliberators – namely, by 
those who are situated in the original position behind the veil of ignorance (or some 
similar device that enforces impartial reasoning).  That is, if people do not know their 
place in society (they are ignorant of their place of birth, their IQ, their talents, etc.), they 
will surely play it safe and opt for an roughly egalitarian distribution of wealth (knowing 
that they may end up in the least-advantaged group).  For left-liberals, the default 
baseline for property rights is a strictly equal distribution of wealth.
The deep disagreements about economic justice between libertarians and left-
liberals are thus the result of more fundamental philosophical disagreements.  The 
libertarian assumes that actual citizens (with full knowledge of their identity and 
situation) have a right to approve or reject proposals regarding economic justice on the 
basis of their moral intuitions and self-interest, while the left-liberal assumes that only 
hypothetical citizens (with no knowledge of their place in society) have a right to approve
or reject proposals regarding matters of economic justice on the basis of a delineated set 
of political values.  What lies at the heart of this difference in approach?  The difference 
has to do with a complicated debate about desert and entitlement that takes place between
luck egalitarian liberals and self-ownership liberals.  I will summarize both positions 
(through Rawls and Nozick) before drawing some implications.
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3.1. The Luck Egalitarian Thesis
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls develops an argument for luck egalitarianism that 
can be reconstructed into five steps:
• 1. No one earns their “natural assets,” which includes: the family into which they 
are born, their IQ, their looks, their natural talents, their character, their level of 
motivation, their work ethic, etc.  One’s stock of natural assets is a matter of luck.
• 2. No one deserves any of the advantages that come from unearned good luck, and
no one deserves any of the disadvantages that come from unearned bad luck.
• 3. No one deserves any of the advantages (including but not limited to the 
economic advantages) that derive from their natural assets.
• 4. No one has a legitimate ownership claim to their natural assets (and the 
economic assets that flow from them).
• 5. One’s political community as a whole has a legitimate ownership claim on one's
natural assets (and the economic assets that flow from them).
Claims (1)-(3) are relatively uncontroversial.   No one goes out and earns the right to be 
born into a middle class family, or the right to have a high IQ.  These are not earned, and 
thus are not deserved.142  Claims (4) and (5) are much more controversial.  But there does 
seem to be some loose connection between (1)-(3) and (4)-(5).  If I do not earn (and thus 
deserve) my natural assets, then why should I have a special claim to them and the 
advantages that flow from them?  If natural assets are randomly distributed across a 
population through the lottery of birth, and thus my stock of natural assets is merely a 
142 Rawls considers this to be a widespread and common intuition: “It seems to be one of the fixed points 
of our considered judgments that no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, 
any more than one deserves one's initial starting place in society.  The assertion that a man deserves the 
superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for
his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can 
claim no credit.  The notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases” (A Theory of Justice, 104).
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matter of luck, then perhaps we should view the total stock of natural assets (and the 
economic assets it produces) as a common asset.143
Thus, (1)-(5) produces a powerful philosophical defense of economic 
egalitarianism.  Much of our personal wealth flows from our individual stock of natural 
assets.  Natural assets are what enable people to make money through interacting with 
others.  In the absence of egalitarian redistribution, differences in natural assets would 
correlate strongly with differences in economic success.  Those who get lucky in the 
natural lottery (enjoying a desirable bundle of natural assets) will on average do much 
better economically than those who are not so lucky.  This outcome is deemed unjust by 
the luck egalitarian, who insists that these inequalities must be corrected by the state in 
the name of economic justice.  Those who are unlucky thus have a partial ownership 
claim on the wealth of those who are lucky.  The totality of natural assets in a society is 
something akin to “manna from heaven”144 – a gift from above, to all of us, to which no 
one in particular has a special claim.
This assumption in favor of equal distribution (with deviation from strict equality 
requiring justification) is embodied in Rawls’ famous “difference principle”: “The 
difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of 
natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution 
whatever it turns out to be.”145  Equality is thus the baseline.  Inequality (that is, any 
143 I focus here on Rawls, but there are many other defenders of luck egalitarianism.  See G.A. Cohen, “On 
the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99, no. 4 (1989); G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009); Richard Arneson, “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism,” Ethics 
110, no. 2 (2000); and Ronald Dworkin, “Equality, Luck and Hierarchy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
31, no. 2 (Spring 2003).
144 This analogy between valuable economic goods and “manna from heaven” is developed and criticized 
in Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 198.
145 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 101; my italics.
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deviations from equality) requires justification.  If it is possible to move from a state of 
equal shares to a state of unequal shares in which everyone, even the least well off, has 
more shares, then the move is justified.146  But this inequality is only permitted because 
everyone benefits from it.  As Rawls explains, 
Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from
their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who 
have lost out.  The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because 
they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education 
and for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as 
well.  No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more 
favorable starting place in society.147  
As Nozick accurately describes Rawls' position, “everyone has some entitlement or claim
on the totality of natural assets (viewed as a pool), with no one having differential 
146 G.A. Cohen famously argues that Rawls is mistaken to bend his conception of justice around the 
incentive-following self-interest of people.  For Cohen, the difference principle does not embody the 
nature of justice, but instead represents a mere “rule of regulation” for non-ideal conditions.  Ideally, 
people would voluntarily develop their talents for the sake of others without economic incentives 
motivating them to do so.  See G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 2008), chapter 4.  The point is incidental to the discussion here – both Rawls and Cohen are luck 
egalitarians, and they are both committed to the idea that individuals are not privately entitled to their 
natural assets and the economic assets that flow from them.  For an interesting critique of Cohen's 
position, see Jason Brennan, Why Not Capitalism? (New York: Routledge, 2014), and James Otteston, 
The End of Socialism (New York: Cambridge UP, 2014).  For a compelling critique of Cohen's critique 
of Rawls (and for a defense of prioritarianism against egalitarianism), see Steven Wall, “Rescuing 
Justice from Equality,” Social Philosophy and Policy 29, no. 1 (January 2012); also Luca Ferrero, “The 
Difference Principle: Incentives or Equality?”, accessed 8 November 2015, 
https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/ferrero/www/pubs/ferrero-difference-principle.pdf.
147 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 101-2.
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claims.”148  While this might run counter to some of our intuitions about desert, Rawls 
insists that it will be found most reasonable upon reflection.149
Recall the core liberal commitments: liberty is the baseline, coercion requires 
justification.  Given points (4) and (5), taxing away wealth from the lucky and 
redistributing it to the unlucky is not a form of coercion that stands in need of special 
justification since the lucky do not have legitimate ownership claims to the wealth that 
flows from their natural assets in the first place.  Coercive policies designed to guarantee 
egalitarian distributions of wealth are not in need of special justification, because 
economic egalitarianism is assumed to be the baseline – deviation from which requires 
special justification.150  This is the basic argument for luck egalitarianism, and it 
underpins the views of most Rawlsian political liberals on questions of economic justice. 
However, I will argue, these assumptions are not universally shared by all 
reasonable people.  Furthermore, there are alternative reasonable assumptions that lead to
radically different conceptions of economic justice.  To show this, I now turn to examine 
the self-ownership thesis.
148 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 228.
149 Rawls recognizes, “There is a natural inclination to object that those better situated deserve their greater
advantages whether or not they are to the benefit of others” (A Theory of Justice, 103).  However, Rawls
is convinced that this “natural inclination” is defeated by reflecting on our other considered convictions 
regarding racial and gender equality.  If someone should not be privileged because of the color of their 
skin, why should they be privileged because of something equally arbitrary – their unearned natural 
assets?  For a defense of the meritocratic ideal contra Rawls, see Bell, “On Meritocracy and Equality.”
150 For an insightful critique of the luck egalitarian position, see Susan Hurley, Justice, Luck, and 
Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003).  She develops the following claim: “Equalities can be
just as much a matter of luck as inequalities.  The fact that people are not responsible for a difference 
does not entail that they are responsible for nondifference.  There is no more a priori reason to assume 
that equalities are not a matter of luck than there is to assume that differences are not a matter of luck; 
people may not be responsible for either” (151-152).  For a well-known critique of the luck egalitarian 
position coming from another angle, see Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 
109, no. 2 (January 1999).
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3.2. The Self-ownership Thesis
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick develops an argument that cuts to the very 
core of Rawls' conception of economic justice.  Returning to the five step argument for 
luck egalitarianism, Nozick argues that (4)-(5) do not obviously and necessarily follow 
from (1)-(3).  Nozick agrees that, indeed, I do not earn my stock of natural assets, and 
thus, in some metaphysical sense, I do not deserve it.  It is mostly a matter of luck what 
particular stock of natural assets that I come to enjoy.  However, Nozick inquires, how 
does this uncontroversial observation lead to the view that my stock of natural assets is a 
common asset owned by the entire political community?  If I do not have a special 
ownership claim to my natural assets, then on what basis is that ownership claim 
transferred to the other members of my political community?  I may not have earned my 
natural assets, but certainly the other members of my political community did not earn 
them either.151  As Sandel nicely summarizes Nozick's argument, 
151 I focus here on Nozick, but there are other defenders of the self-ownership thesis.  See Eric Mack, 
“Self-ownership and the Right of Property,” The Monist 73, no. 4 (October 1990); Murray Rothbard, 
The Ethics of Liberty (New York: NYU Press, 2003); and Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New 
York: Signet, 1961).  The self-ownership thesis is often associated with either the Kantian moral 
tradition or the natural rights tradition.  The natural rights tradition, in turn, has been associated with 
religious Medieval moral philosophy as well as secular Aristotelian moral philosophy.  There are also 
some recent attempts to situate natural rights (and the natural right to private property) in the field of 
evolutionary biology and psychology – see John Hasnas, “Toward a Theory of Empirical Natural 
Rights,” Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 1 (January 2005); and Will Wilkinson, “Capitalism and 
Human Nature,” Cato Policy Report 27, no. 1 (January/February 2005).  Wilkinson, for example, 
argues, “Property rights are prefigured in nature.  Evolutionary psychology can help us to understand 
that property rights are not created simply by strokes of the legislator’s pen” (13).  For an internal 
critique of the self-ownership thesis which tries to reconstruct libertarian property rights on a different 
foundation, see Jan Narveson, “Property and Rights,” Social Philosophy and Policy 27, no. 1 (January 
2010).  Some of the most influential critics of self-ownership and its connection with a libertarian 
theory of justice are G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (New York, Cambridge UP, 
2005); Carol Pateman, “Self-Ownership and Property in the Person,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 10, no 1 (2002); Peter Singer, “The Right to be Rich or Poor,” The New York Review of 
Books (6 March 1975); Cheyney Ryan, “Yours, Mine, and Ours: Property Rights and Individual 
Liberty,” Ethics 87, no. 2 (January 1977); and Attracta Ingram, A Political Theory of Rights (New York: 
Oxford UP, 1994).
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To show that individuals, as individuals, do not deserve or possess “their” 
assets is not necessarily to show that society as a whole does deserve or 
possess them.  Simply because the attributes accidentally located in me are
not my assets, why must it follow, as Rawls seems to think, that they are 
common assets, rather than nobody's assets?  If they cannot properly be 
said to belong to me, why assume automatically that they belong to the 
community?  Is their location in the community's province any less 
accidental, any less arbitrary from a moral point of view?152  
This line of questioning exposes the hidden and undefended assumption in Rawls' 
argument that my lack of entitlement over my natural assets and subsequent economic 
assets automatically transfers such entitlement to my political community.
Thus, Nozick draws a different conclusion about the nature of economic justice 
than Rawls does.  From points (1)-(3), Rawls posits an undefended presumption in favor 
of collective ownership of natural assets, which in turn justifies the egalitarian difference 
principle.  For Nozick, while I did not earn my natural assets, I also did not steal them 
from anyone else (nor commit any other clear moral violations to acquire them).  Thus, 
why not let natural assets lie where they fall?  Nozick insists, “Whether or not peoples' 
natural assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and to 
what flows from them.”153  This presumption in favor of self-ownership of natural assets 
does capture some of our deepest intuitions.  Indeed, I do stand in a unique relationship 
with my natural assets that other members of my political community do not: they resides
152 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 96.
153 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 98.
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in my person, they are part of me.  This feels somehow morally significant.  Nozick tries 
to draw on these moral intuitions in his critique of Rawls:
People will differ in how they view regarding natural talents as a common 
asset.  Some will complain, echoing Rawls against utilitarianism, that this 
“does not take seriously the distinction between persons”; and they will 
wonder whether any reconstruction of Kant that treats people's abilities 
and talents as resources for others can be adequate.  [Rawls writes in A 
Theory of Justice,] “The two principle of justice … rule out even the 
tendency to regard men as means to one another's welfare.”  Only if one 
presses very hard on the distinction between men and their talents, assets, 
abilities and special traits.154  
Nozick insists that I do not relate to my natural assets as a detached bundle of goods, 
equivalent to other such bundles residing in other people.  No, I have a special connection
with my own natural assets, regardless of the obvious fact that I did not ultimately earn 
them all.  For Rawls' argument to undermine self-ownership, Rawls must rely on a 
conception of an essential self as entirely detachable from its inessential attributes.155  
This particular version of the Kantian view of the self, for Nozick, runs counter to our 
154 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 228.
155 Nozick argues that Rawls' unencumbered self is an affront to our usual notions of human dignity: “This 
line of argument can succeed in blocking the introduction of a person's autonomous choices and 
activities (and their results) only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person completely to 
certain sorts of 'external' factors.  So denigrating a person's autonomy and prime responsibility for his 
action is a risky line to take for a theory that otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and self-respect of 
autonomous beings; especially for a theory that founds so much (including a theory of the good) upon a 
person's choices.  One doubts that the unexalted picture of human beings Rawls' theory presupposes and
rests upon can be made to fit together with the view of human dignity it is designed to lead to and 
embody” (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 214).  On this point, also see David Schmidtz, Elements of 
Justice (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), part 2.
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more commonsense notion of ourselves as essentially “thick with particular traits.”156  As 
Sandel puts it, “On Rawls' theory of the person, the self, strictly speaking, has nothing, 
nothing at least in the strong, constitutive sense necessary to desert.”157  As Sandel points 
out, this Kantian view of the unencumbered and non-deserving self is closely analogous 
to the “early Christian notion of property, in which man had what he had as the guardian 
of assets belonging truly to God.”158  But unless this controversial Kantian conception of 
the self is accepted, Rawls' argument against self-ownership is unsatisfying.
So, while Nozick agrees with points (1)-(3), he disagrees with points (4)-(5), and 
in their place he posits a presumption in favor of individual ownership of natural assets.  
He writes: “It is not true that a person earns Y (a right to keep a painting he’s made, 
praise for writing A Theory of Justice, and so on) only if he’s earned (or otherwise 
deserves) whatever he used (including natural assets) in the process of earning Y.”159  
Instead, “Some of the things he uses he just may have, not illegitimately.  It needn’t be 
that the foundations underlying desert are themselves deserved, all the way down.”160  I 
have my natural assets, not illegitimately; therefore I ought to have ownership claims 
over them.  For these reasons, Nozick rejects Rawls’ original position and veil of 
ignorance, since they require us to view the distribution of natural assets as a common 
asset, not as already attached to particular people who each have individualized 
entitlements to them.  Nozick wonders, “Do the people in the original position ever 
156 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 228.
157 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 85.
158 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 97.
159 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 225.
160 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 225.
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wonder whether they have the right to decide how everything is to be divided up?”161  
Nozick's assumptions undercut the legitimacy of a difference principle designed to 
“regulate” and “redistribute” the natural and economic assets of the community.162
The self-ownership thesis has radical political implications.  Natural assets are 
distributed randomly throughout any given political community, and even though no one 
fully deserves what they get, they should nonetheless be presumptive self-owners of their 
natural assets and the advantages that flow from them.  If I own my natural assets, I have 
a strong ownership claim over the wealth that I derive from them.  If I own my labor, it 
makes sense to assume that I own the fruits of my labor.163  Coercive egalitarian 
161 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 199n.
162 Some critics of libertarianism argue that property rights are purely conventional, as they are themselves 
products of state power, and therefore taxation is logically prior to property rights.  See Liam Murphy 
and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (New York: Oxford UP, 2002).  They use
this claim to argue that no citizen has an ownership claim on their pre-tax incomes, and thus the state 
can legitimately structure property rights and economic distributions according to an egalitarian 
conception of economic justice.  This argument misses the Lockean point that although property rights 
are insecure in the state of nature (and thus the need for a state to protect them), those rights are 
nonetheless pre-political and, in some sense, natural.  So pointing out that states are needed to protect 
these rights does not necessarily show that property rights can be designed in whatever way the state 
sees fit.  See Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 510n.
163 Nozick recognizes certain limits and constraints on ownership claims on the external world, especially 
in his discussion of the “Lockean Priviso” (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 178-182).  Furthermore, it is 
possible to radicalize the intuitions behind the Lockean Priviso and combine private self-ownership 
with collective world-ownership.  That is, one can hold to the self-ownership thesis but reject strong 
property rights in the external world.  This strange (yet coherent) position has been developed by a 
small group of recent “left-libertarians,” who I will not engage with at length here.  For a clear summary
of this position, see Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality (New York: Oxford UP, 2003).  
A number of critics argue that combining  private self-ownership with collective world-ownership is 
incoherent or otherwise unconvincing.  For an overview of the debate, see Left-Libertarianism and Its 
Critics: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
For a response to the main critics of left-libertarianism, see Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael
Otsuka, “Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried,”  
Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005).  An early defender of some of the core commitments of 
the left-libertarian view was John Stuart Mill, who writes, “When the 'sacredness of property' is talked 
of, it should always be remembered, that any such sacredness does not belong in the same degree to 
landed property.  No man made the land.  It is the original inheritance of the whole species.  Its 
appropriation is wholly a question of general expediency.  When private property in land is not 
expedient, it is unjust.  It is no hardship to any one to be excluded from what others have produced: they
were not bound to produce it for his use, and he loses nothing by not sharing in what otherwise would 
not have existed at all.  But it is some hardship to be born into the world and to find all nature's gifts 
previously engrossed, and no place left for the new-comer” (Principles of Political Economy with some 
of their Applications to Social Philosophy, ed. William J. Ashley [London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
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redistribution can be reasonably rejected, and assuming that some members of the 
political community object to coercive redistribution, those policies will be defeated.  
Thus, for Nozick, equality is not the default baseline.  The emergent inequalities in 
economic assets that flow from the unequal distribution of natural assets is the baseline 
from which deviations must be justified.164  As Nozick concludes, “If people have X, and 
their having X (whether or not they deserve to have it) does not violate anyone else's 
(Lockean) right or entitlement to X, and Y flows from (arises out of, as so on) X by a 
process that does not itself violate anyone's (Lockean) rights or entitlements, then the 
person is entitled to Y.”165  In other words, the self-ownership thesis justifies (or at least 
goes a long way towards justifying) a libertarian view of property rights and the state.
The political implications of this debate are quite serious.  If the self-ownership 
thesis is accepted, then it is still the case (for most self-ownership liberals) that social 
institutions need to be collectively designed, but the choice situation is importantly 
different.  Namely, for the self-ownership liberal, when bargaining about justice, each 
1909], II.2.26).  The policy implications of this view were later developed by Henry George, who 
proposed a very large single-tax on the unimproved value of land; see Henry George, Progress and 
Poverty (New York:  Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1940).  For a compelling critique of Georgism, 
see Bryan Caplan and Zachary Gochenour, “A Search-Theoretic Critique of Georgism,” 14 February 
2012, accessed 28 January 2015, http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/critique_of_george.pdf. 
164 Some critics deny even the conceptual coherence of such a baseline.  In The Myth of Ownership: Taxes 
and Justice, Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy argue that markets and property rights are conceptually 
dependent upon the enforcement of the state.  This is a dubious claim for a number of reasons.  First, the
existence of sophisticated global black markets (which thrive not only without state support but more 
importantly despite state disapproval) suggests that markets and property rights are at least feasible 
without states.  Also, numerous libertarian and anarchist theorists suggest that functioning markets and 
private property rights could be secured by private security firms.  I cannot resolve these issues here, 
but I note them in order to show that the Nozickean baseline is at least not conceptually incoherent.
165 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 225.  Nozick also notes, “Since things come into being already held
(or with agreements already made about how they are to be held), there is no need to search for some 
pattern for unheld holdings to fit … The situation is not an appropriate one for wondering, 'After all, 
what is to become of these things; what are we to do with them.'  In the non-manna-from-heaven world 
in which things have to be made or produced or transformed by people, there is no separate process of 
distribution for a theory of distribution to be a theory” (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 219).
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individual is permitted to know their stock of natural assets, and bargain accordingly.  
This contrasts with the luck egalitarian thesis, wherein those who bargain about justice 
are stripped of such knowledge.  What does this mean?  To simplify a bit: for the luck 
egalitarian liberal, the “unlucky” get a veto over the level of economic inequality that 
society permits, while for the self-ownership liberal, the “lucky” get a veto over the level 
of redistribution that society authorizes.  This is why luck egalitarian liberalism leads 
logically to something close to Rawls' difference principle, whereby the level of 
economic inequality is that which optimizes the well-being of the least well-off.166  And 
conversely, this is why self-ownership liberalism leads to either a minimal state lacking 
redistribution altogether, or a classical liberal state that provides minimal forms of social 
insurance (as would benefit all members of society, all of whom are subject to forms of 
bad luck within the course any person's lifetime).167
Thus, it is important to ask whether one of these views (luck egalitarianism or 
self-ownership) is uniquely reasonable, with the other view being unreasonable.  Absent 
this, the debate about economic justice will be foundationally deep and yet rationally 
undecidable.
166 As mentioned in footnote 146, there is a debate about how exactly the luck egalitarian thesis cashes out 
in terms of a conception of justice and institutional design.  Rawls cashes it out in terms of the 
difference principle, while G.A. Cohen cashes it out in terms of a more radical and uncompromising 
egalitarianism.  One could go even further than Cohen, and cash out the luck egalitarian thesis in terms 
of an equalization not only of wealth, but also of the distribution of pleasant and unpleasant work, a 
position defended in Michael Albert, Parecon: Life After Capitalism (London: Verso, 2003).  Albert 
refers to this institutional arrangement as “balanced job complexes” (Life After Capitalism, part 2).  I 
am unclear which of these positions best captures the implications of the luck egalitarian thesis, but 
addressing the question is unnecessary for the discussion in this chapter.
167 This classical liberal state with minimal redistribution is defended, for example, in Buchanan and 
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, chapter 13; and Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: 
Routledge Classics, 2001).  Also see Andreas Bergh, “Yes, There Are Hayekian Welfare States (At 
Least in Theory),” Econ Journal Watch 12, no. 1 (January 2015).
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3.3. The Rational Undecidability of Entitlement
I turn to the question about whether either of the views presented above are 
uniquely reasonable.  To start, I present two thought experiments which highlight the 
relevant intuitions underlying each position.  First, imagine a group of four friends at a 
restaurant.  The restaurant is closing, and an employee comes out and gives the group a 
full pizza that would have been thrown away.  There are four slices of pizza and four 
friends.  The principle of distribution here is clear and uncontroversial.  Because no one 
has a special ownership claim to the pizza (it was given to the whole group), the 
assumption is equal distribution.  Each person gets one slice.  The only legitimate 
deviations from equality are agreed-upon, Pareto-improving side deals.  For example, 
perhaps someone in the group does not like the particular kind of pizza, so they offer to 
give it to someone else, perhaps for free, perhaps in exchange for something else.  All 
that matters is that all deviations from equality require the consent of the relevant parties. 
In cases like this, equal distribution is seen to be the obvious and fair default.
Now, instead, let us suppose that the group of four friends is walking down the 
street and suddenly one of them spots a twenty-dollar bill, and picks it up.  This person 
did not earn the money, but just randomly came across it.  Should the friend go into the 
nearest store, break up the twenty-dollar bill into four five-dollar bills, and give five 
dollars to each friend, thus dividing up the money evenly?  This is not the obvious 
response.  When someone finds a twenty dollar bill on the sidewalk, we usually recognize
that even though the lucky friend did not earn the money, neither did the others, so we 
usually let the luck lie where it falls.  The lucky friend keeps the whole twenty-dollar bill.
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So one must ask: is my relationship to my unearned natural assets better illustrated by the
pizza example, or the twenty-dollar bill example?
It is not entirely clear.  In the same way that Rawls relies upon a controversial 
Kantian view of the self and ownership, Nozick relies upon a controversial Lockean view
of the self and ownership.  While Rawls offers a view of the self as separable from all of 
its attributes, Nozick offers a view of the self as possessing inviolable rights that cannot 
be overridden.  Neither view is universally shared, as both are somewhat appealing and 
yet controversial.  The self-ownership thesis might be intuitive in certain cases and 
situations, but it is counter-intuitive in other ways.  Thomas Nagel notes, 
Nozick's intuition is that each person is entitled to his talents and abilities, 
and to whatever he can make, get, or buy with his own efforts, with the 
help of others, or with plain luck.  He is entitled to keep it or do anything 
he wants with it, and whomever he gives it to is thereby equally entitled to
it.  Moreover, anyone is entitled to whatever he ends up with as a result of 
the indefinite repetition of this process, over however many generations.  I
assume that most readers of Nozick's book will find no echo of this 
intuition in themselves, and will feel instead that they can develop no 
opinion on the universal principles of entitlement, acquisition and transfer 
of property, or indeed whether there are any such universal principles, 
without considering the significance of such principles in their universal 
application ... Nozick's moral intuitions seem wrong.168  
168 Thomas Nagel, “Libertarianism without Foundations,” The Yale Law Journal 85, no. 1 (November 
1975): 141.
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Nagel is surely wrong that the readers of Nozick will “find no echo” of Nozick's 
intuitions in themselves, but he is right that Nozick seems to fail to capture all of the 
relevant intuitions of all of his readers.  Richard Arneson points out that Nozick seems to 
offer a false dichotomy, when he assumes that “individuals cannot be deemed to have no 
self-ownership, so they must have full self-ownership.”169  Arneson rejects this framing: 
“I deny the assumption that no middle-of-the-road position could correctly reflect the 
balance of opposed moral reasons.”170  Arneson is right to point out that Nozick is not 
capturing the full range of moral intuitions of all reasonable people, but he is wrong in 
suggesting that Nozick fails to articulate the moral intuitions of some reasonable 
people.171  Nozick's Lockean libertarianism is a reasonable view – but it is not the only 
reasonable view.  Neither the Kantian nor Lockean conception of the self and ownership 
169 Richard Arneson, “Side Constraints, Lockean Individual Rights, and the Moral Basis of 
Libertarianism,” 25.  Furthermore, “The argument against Nozick's conception of Lockean moral rights 
has to be that it massively offends deep-seated moral convictions that further critical reflection only 
entrenches and that some available rival moral view does better on this score” (“Side Constraints, 
Rights, and Libertarianism,” 25).
170 Richard Arneson, “Side Constraints, Rights, and Libertarianism,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Cambridge UP, 2011), 25.  Arneson argues that Nozick 
selectively pumps the reader's intuitions in order to bias the self-ownership thesis.  For another example 
of a philosopher arguably selectively intuition pumping in favor of self-ownership, see Huemer, The 
Problem of Political Authority.  For other related critiques of Nozick's Lockean libertarianism, see G.A. 
Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality (New York: Cambridge UP, 1995); and Freeman, 
“Illiberal Libertarians.”  For Nozick's own critique of his libertarian views articulated in Anarchy, State,
and Utopia, see “The Zigzag of Politics” in Robert Nozick, The Examined Life (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1989).  For an account of a Lockean view of self-ownership combined with economic 
egalitarianism, see Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality.
171 For a helpful look at the actual views of Americans on matters of distributive justice, see David Miller, 
“Distributive Justice: What the People Think,” Ethics 102, no. 3 (April 1992).  How these actual views 
should play into normative political philosophy is another matter.  While political liberals often invoke 
“our public political culture” as a source of common values, a cursory look at the legal and judicial 
history of the United States will reveal a long series of debates about property rights and property 
distributions that remain entirely unresolved, most prominently in the debates surrounding the “Lockner
Era” and the New Deal.  See Cass Sunstein, “Lochner's Legacy,” Columbia Law Review 87, no. 5 (June 
1987); and Matthew Lindsay, “In Search Of 'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,'” Harvard Law Review 
Forum 123, no. 5 (March 2010).
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capture the full scope of the intuitions of all reasonable people about these matters.172  
While both conceptions are reasonable, they are both reasonably rejectable.
This debate about desert and entitlement can be illuminated by a set of 
distinctions that Sandel develops.  In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Sandel 
distinguishes between three responses to this issue of ownership and natural assets.  
• a. Guardianship model (defended by Rawls): I am the guardian of the set of 
natural assets that I bear, which is owned by another subject on whose behalf I 
cultivate it.  There is a presumption in favor of regarding the distribution of 
natural assets as a common asset.
• b. Ownership model (defended by Nozick): I have extensive (maybe exclusive) 
rights with respect to my natural assets. There is a presumption in favor of letting 
natural assets lie where they fall.
• c. Repository model: I am a repository for natural assets that no one has an 
ownership claim over (neither myself nor anyone else).173
172 John Kekes sees this kind of disagreement as a symptom of deeper problems with ideal theory as such: 
“The problem with this approach is that ideal theorists are led by their political predilections—I do not 
say prejudices—to choose one (or perhaps a small number) of the many goods we value, and then 
ascribe overriding importance to it (or to them).  Then they make the justification of the right to private 
property depend on the supposedly overriding good(s).  Ronald Dworkin does this with equality, John 
Rawls with justice, Robert Nozick with rights, Friedrich Hayek with liberty, and there are, of course, 
others as well” (“The Right To Private Property: A Justification,” Social Philosophy and Policy 27, no. 
1 [2010]: 1-2).  Kekes thus rejects these “ideal-theorizing approaches” as hopelessly “vitiated by 
arbitrariness” (2).  His alternative: “I will start, then, with where we are, with the plurality of political 
goods we value.  The right to private property is one among them.  I am assuming that this right is 
conventional, conditional, and defeasible: conventional, because it is defined by conventions; 
conditional, because it depends on changing conditions; and defeasible, because it may conflict with 
other political goods we value and such conflicts may be reasonably resolved in a particular context in 
favor of a political good other than the right to private property.  I am assuming further that just as there 
is a plurality of political goods, there is a plurality of reasonable political principles, theories, and ideals.
This plurality is quite extensive.  It is also nonhierarchical, because the political goods, principles, 
theories, and ideals can be and often are ranked in a plurality of reasonable ways.” (3).  This alternative 
to ideal theorizing has many similarities with the view defended by Nozick in “The Zigzag of Politics,” 
discussed at length in section 5.2 of this chapter.
173 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 96-97.
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Given the arbitrariness of the distribution of natural assets, Rawls wants to assume social 
ownership while Nozick wants to assume private ownership.  However, as Sandel points 
out, neither of these conclusions logically follows from points (1)-(3).  If I do not earn and
thus do not deserve my natural assets, and neither do any members of my political 
community, then it is unclear how anyone, myself or my political community, secures a 
legitimate ownership claim over anything.  Both options seem equally arbitrary.  The 
argument that individuals do not deserve their natural assets does “not necessarily install 
a social [entitlement].”174  I did not earn my natural assets, but neither did anyone else.  
Who owns it and the wealth that flows from it?  It is unclear that this question has a fully 
satisfying answer.  Instead, points (1)-(3) logically lead to the “Repository model” – no 
one has a clear ownership claim over any natural assets.  Sandel concludes, “From the 
standpoint of desert, there would seem to be no grounds on which to choose between 
letting the assets lie where they fall, and trying to distribute them in some other way.”175  
How, then, can we “overcome the apparent moral stand-off created by the presumed 
absence of desert?”176
Sandel goes on to argue that if we accept the communitarian conception of the 
self, according to which community and sociality is constitutive of the self, then Rawls' 
presumption in favor of collective ownership of natural assets is justified.177  However, 
Sandel's response is not convincing because it misconstrues the relationship between 
ontology and politics for both Rawls and Nozick.  Rawls and Nozick are not grounding 
174 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 101.
175 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 98.
176 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 99.
177 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,  150.
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their principles of justice in a theory of human nature or an ontology of the self.  As 
Rawls would later put it, a liberal theory of justice should be “political not 
metaphysical.”178  Neither Rawls' egalitarianism nor Nozick's libertarianism rest upon an 
ontology of the self,179 but instead both are trying to capture certain sets of our deeply 
held moral intuitions.  The problem with both attempts is the same: our intuitions on 
matters of economic justice are widely divergent.  Different people have different 
intuitions, and some (perhaps many) people have internally inconsistent intuitions about 
these matters.  It is unlikely that philosophical reflection will bring our moral intuitions 
into harmony (either within or between individuals).
Even in the absence of shared intuitions (or “considered convictions”180), we need 
to make decisions about economic issues.  For all liberals, when we deliberate about 
coercive policies, we must have a baseline to which we default in the absence of consent. 
But, as I have shown, this baseline is itself controversial for issues of economic justice.  
We disagree about what counts as coercion-in-need-of-justification.  We not only debate 
about economic policies, but we have meta debates about which state of affairs should be 
resorted to in the absence of agreement about economic policies.  Indeed, the deep 
disagreements that animate our concrete debates follow us up into our meta debates.  
Andrew Lister summarizes the dilemma: “there are different ways to describe the set of 
possible policies, different ways to measure coercion, and so different ways to specify the
178 See Rawls, “Justice as Fairness.”
179 Nozick explicitly rejects the move from the communitarian view of the self to communitarian policies: 
“So the fact that we partially are 'social products' in that we benefit from current patterns and forms 
created by the multitudinous actions of a long string of long-forgotten people, forms which include 
institutions, ways of doing things, and language (whose social nature may involve our current use 
depending upon Wittgensteinian matching of the speech of others), does not create in us a general 
floating debt which the current society can collect and use as it will” (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 95).
180 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8.
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noncoercive default that obtains in the absence of conclusive justification.”181  As a result,
“no matter what we do, there will be reasonable objections to what is reasonably taken to 
be coercion.”182  As Fred D'Agostino argues in his book Free Public Reason, the very 
concept of “public justification” it itself subject to reasonable pluralism, which poses a 
serious challenge to the whole project of reaching consensus about matters of basic 
justice.183  Recognizing and accepting this point leads to a distressing conclusion: debates 
about justice, especially regarding issues of property rights and economic distributions, 
are not amenable to rational adjudication.  There are a wide plurality of reasonable views,
each of which offers coherent and persuasive arguments, each of which is also subject to 
reasonable rejection by its opponents.  Our disagreements are deep, and they are not 
resolved by moving up to meta-level debates about how our disagreements should be 
defused.
4. Internal Critique: High Liberalism vs. Classical Liberalism
The political liberalism of Rawls and his followers is thus vulnerable to 
reasonable external critique from self-ownership liberals like Nozick.  However, external 
critiques are always the least forceful and impressive form of critique, because external 
critics invoke premises that their adversaries simply reject.  Rawls (reasonably) disagrees 
with Nozick's (reasonable) opening premise that individuals are entitled to their unearned
181 Andrew Lister, “Public Justification and the Limits of State Action,” Politics Philosophy Economics 9, 
no. 2 (May 2010): 152.  For further discussion of this issue of whether or not the aggregated results of 
market transactions represent a prime facie legitimate default or baseline, see Fabienne Peter, “Choice, 
Consent, and the Legitimacy of Market Transactions,” Economics and Philosophy 20, no. 1 (April 
2004).
182 Lister, “Public Justification and the Limits of State Action,” 152.
183 D'Agostino, Free Public Reason, chapter 4.
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natural and economic assets, thus Rawls is free to ignore the rest of Nozick's argument.  
Additionally, then, in this section I present a more ambitious argument to the effect that 
the political liberalism of Rawls and his followers is vulnerable to reasonable internal 
critique from other political liberals who broadly share Rawls' premises (the principle of 
public justification and the fact of reasonable pluralism), but who arrive at very different 
conclusions about economic liberty and justice.  This will further undermine the 
optimistic assumption of political liberalism that reasonable people will agree about the 
basic contours of justice.
I will reconstruct and analyze the debate within political liberalism between high 
liberals and classical liberals.  The debate between high liberals (like Rawls, Freeman, 
and Nagel) and classical liberals (like Tomasi, Gaus, and Brennan184) over the nature and 
importance of economic liberty can be broken into two separate arguments.  The first 
argument concerns the nature of “moral personhood,” and whether or not economic 
activity has anything to do with enabling the pursuit of the good life.  High liberals argue 
that economic liberties are significantly less important than civil and political liberties in 
developing our moral personality, and this serves as their justification for downgrading 
the economic liberties to “non-basic” liberties.  Classical liberals argue that economic 
liberties are just as important as civil and political liberties in developing our moral 
184 Some of these classical liberal-inclined political liberals occasionally call themselves “neoclassical 
liberals,” but I find it an unhelpful term (and most classical liberal political liberals do not use it), so I 
stick with the usual term “classical liberalism” (although I retain the term in Appendix B).  For a basic 
overview of this new pro-market brand of political liberalism, see Jason Brennan and John Tomasi, 
“Classical Liberalism,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, ed. David Estlund (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2012).  They summarize, “Neoclassical liberals seek to provide a philosophically rigorous 
account of the traditional classical liberalism platform: thick economic liberty for all, limited 
government, a range of basic social service programs funded by taxation, and a foundational concern 
for the material well-being of the poor.  Neoclassical liberals embrace social justice, seeing it as a 
standard that enables them to capture and clarify the moral ideals that have long undergirded classical 
liberalism” (116).  Two founding texts of this new branch of political liberalism are John Tomasi's Free 
Market Fairness (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2012); and Gaus' The Order of Public Reason, both 
discussed at length below.
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personality, from which they insist that economic liberties be considered “basic” liberties.
Both sides invoke controversial premises in their arguments (in addition to the agreed-
upon basic premises of political liberalism), thus rendering both positions reasonable yet 
also reasonably rejectable.  
The second argument between high liberals and classical liberals concerns the 
relationship between economic liberty and political liberty.  High liberals argue that 
strong property rights and free markets are bound to lead to economic inequality, which 
in turn is bound to lead to political corruption and domination.  Classical liberals, on the 
other hand, argue that high liberals are wrong about the correlation between economic 
liberty and political domination, and draw on empirical work to demonstrate this.  
Leaving this empirical debate aside, classical liberals further argue that economic liberty 
should be privileged at least as highly as political liberty because economic liberty 
devolves decision making (whereas political decision making is centralized), which is the
proper response to reasonable pluralism about economic justice.  I will argue that this 
solution, although compelling in many ways, is itself reasonably rejectable.  I conclude 
that the basic premises of political liberalism (the principle of public justification and the 
fact of reasonable pluralism) can yield a wide range of positions regarding economic 
justice.
4.1. High Liberalism: The Moral Personality Argument
Rawls’ theory of justice (referred to as “justice as fairness”) is divided into the 
two principles of justice, with the first principle (which protects the “basic liberties”) 
lexically prior to the second principle (which guarantees equality).  While it is the second 
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principle of justice, with its difference principle, that has generated a great deal of 
controversy and criticism, my interest here concerns primarily how Rawls chooses to 
define and characterize the first principle.  It is here that the controversy really starts, 
because Rawls chooses to include only a thin set of economic liberties in the first 
principle (the freedom to choose one's occupation and the right to hold personal non-
productive property), thus leaving the remaining content of economic liberty 
(downgraded to “non-basic”) to be filled out in accordance with the distributive 
requirements of the second principle of justice.  This “remaining content” includes very 
important economic activities, such as whether people have the right to own productive 
property (capital assets), what they are able to do with such property, and the terms under 
which people are allowed to buy and sell labor.  It is because of this original choice to 
include only a thin set of economic liberties in the first principle that the second principle 
has been so controversial.
Why did Rawls make this choice to include only a thin set of economic liberties in
the first principle?  To answer this question, we need to first answer a prior question: how
does Rawls decide what should be included in the first principle?  That is, what is the 
criterion for determining which liberties should be basic liberties entrenched in the first 
principle and which liberties should be non-basic liberties to be filled in by the second 
principle?  For Rawls, basic liberties are those liberties that are required for the 
development and exercise of the two moral powers: (1) the capacity for a sense of justice 
(or, the capacity for social cooperation) and (2) the capacity for a conception of the good 
(or, the capacity for practical reason).  This reflects Rawls’ Kantian strategy of abstracting
away from actual persons with their divergent desires, preferences, and life plans, in 
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order to discover those characteristics that we all share.  These two moral powers are 
assumed to be fundamental to all citizens, and thus protecting them is assumed to 
command agreement even in a pluralistic society.  
This Kantian conception of the person is central to Rawls' account of the basic 
liberties.  Freeman argues that Rawls’ “ideal of the person and a person’s essential good 
grounds his principle of equal basic liberties and provides the standards for specifying 
which liberties are basic and have priority over other social values.”185  Samuel Arnold 
refers to the moral powers as the “filter” for the first principle: “Liberty L is a basic 
liberty if and only if L is necessary for the adequate development and/or exercise of either
a) the first moral power, the sense of justice or b) the second moral power, the capacity 
for a conception of the good.”186  As Arnold additionally points out, the job of the basic 
liberties vis-à-vis our moral personality is rather limited.  He explains, 
Basic liberties are not charged with maximizing moral personality—as if 
the goal were to produce moral sages, or rugged, self-authoring Millian 
individualists.  Rather, the role of the basic liberties is to enable people to 
deploy their two moral powers adequately and fully in what Rawls calls 
“the two fundamental cases”: first, judging the justice of the basic 
structure and of social policy; second, devising, revising, and following a 
conception of the good.  So long as people can accomplish these rather 
185 Samuel Freeman, “Capitalism in the Classical and High Liberal Traditions,” in Liberalism and 
Capitalism, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 
54.
186 Samuel Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty,” accessed 8 January 
2014, http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/workshop-materials/pt_arnold.pdf, 11.
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humble tasks, they possess moral personality to the required minimal 
degree.187  
If the basic liberties were charged with maximizing our moral personality, this would 
surely be too controversial to gain adherence in an overlapping consensus in a pluralistic 
society (because it would constitute a “comprehensive” liberal doctrine).  Instead, the 
basic liberties are charged with enabling the sufficient development and exercise of our 
moral powers.  It is important for citizens to have the capacity for social cooperation such
that the political regime under which they live can earn the genuine consent of its 
citizens.  Because of the principle of public justification, citizens need to have the 
capability to freely and voluntarily accept the principles of justice to which they are 
subject, and the basic liberties are required to secure and guarantee this capability.  
Additionally, the basic liberties are charged with enabling the sufficient development and 
exercise of our capacity for practical reason such that citizens can freely pursue their own
good in their own way (whatever that conception of the good happens to be).
Those liberties that are included in the first principle are considered basic 
liberties.  This means that they can only be regulated for the sake of maintaining other 
basic liberties, not for the sake of any other social goals (such as the distributional 
requirements of the second principle).  As Freeman puts it, basic liberties “are both 
fundamental and inalienable.”188  He elaborates, “To say certain rights or liberties are 
fundamental means they have absolute priority over other political values; they cannot be
sacrificed or weighed off against non-basic rights or other political values in ordinary 
187 Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty,” 11.
188 Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians,” 109.
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political procedures.”189  The basic liberties, then, “are to be infringed upon neither for the
sake of satisfying the preferences of democratic majorities, nor to improve economic 
efficiency, nor to achieve perfectionist values of cultural excellence.”190  The basic 
liberties are thought to be worthy of constitutional guarantees, and are permitted to be 
overridden only in exceptional circumstances.  Thus, the choice about which liberties to 
count as basic has great significance.
It is clear why Rawls includes a thick set of civil and political liberties in the first 
principle of justice.  A robust regime of civil liberties is required in order to form, revise, 
and pursue a personal conception of the good.  Without having the freedom to think, 
speak, and associate freely, people would be unable to adequately devise and pursue their 
own conceptions of the good.  Similarly, a robust regime of political liberties is required 
for the development and exercise of a conception of justice.  Without having the right to 
vote and run for office, people would have neither the incentive nor the ability to 
adequately judge, criticize, or alter the basic structure of their society.  Without robust 
civil and political liberties, citizens would not have the basic tools required to genuinely 
consent to their political regime and its principles of justice.  
On the other hand, a regime of robust economic liberties, Rawls argues, is not 
required for the development and exercise of either of the two moral powers.  Instead, all 
that is required (as far as economic liberties go) is the right to hold personal non-
productive property and the freedom to choose one's own occupation.  A political regime 
that did not recognize the right to hold personal non-productive property, or that dictated 
particular occupations for its citizens, would consequently be impeding the citizens' 
189 Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians,” 109.
190 Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians,” 109.
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pursuit of their own conception of the good.  As Rawls puts it, the justification of these 
thin economic liberties is “to allow a sufficient material basis for personal independence 
and a sense of self-respect, both of which are essential for the adequate development and 
exercise of the moral powers.”191  Having these rights and being able to exercise them “is 
one of the social bases of self-respect.  Thus this right is a general right: a right all 
citizens have in virtue of their fundamental interests.”192  
All other economic liberties (besides the right to hold personal non-productive 
property and the freedom to choose one's own occupation) are deemed “non-basic,” in the
sense that they can be restricted or regulated for the sake of the other social goals.193  As 
Gaus puts it, for Rawls and other high liberals the issue of private property in productive 
assets “is simply an instrumental question that has no intrinsic relevance to justice.”194  
Rawls explicitly rejects the possibility that a more robust set of economic liberties might 
serve our fundamental interests.  He rejects the libertarian idea that the right to unlimited 
acquisition or the right to unlimited bequest should be considered basic.  But he further 
rejects the classical liberal idea that the right to own productive property should be 
considered basic.  Rawls argues, 
191 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Belknap, 2001), 114; my 
italics.
192 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 114; my italics.
193 The two regime types that Rawls picks out as fulfilling justice as fairness are “liberal democratic 
socialism” and “property-owning democracy.”  Private property in productive assets is not legally 
permitted under liberal democratic socialism. Private property in productive assets is permitted, but 
heavily regulated, in a property-owning democracy: “While property in productive assets is permitted, 
that right is not a basic right, but subject to the requirement that, in existing conditions, it is the most 
effective way to meet the principles of justice” (John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political 
Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008], 321).
194 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 398.
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Two wider conceptions of the right of property as a basic liberty are to be 
avoided.  One conception extends this right to include certain rights of 
acquisition and bequest, as well as the right to own means of production 
and natural resources.  On the other conception, the right of property 
includes the equal right to participate in the control of means of production
and natural resources, which are to be socially owned.  These wider 
conceptions are not used because they cannot, I think, be accounted for as 
necessary for the development and exercise of the moral powers.  The 
merits of these and other conceptions of the right of property are decided 
at later stages when much more information about society’s circumstances 
and historical traditions is available.195
So what can be owned and what one can do with what one owns are largely questions to 
be decided according to the second principle of justice (that is, they are decided in light 
of the goal of realizing the difference principle and the fair equality of opportunity).196
195 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 298; my italics.
196 Rawls' normative commitments themselves do not strictly dictate either a capitalist or socialist 
economic system, or private or public ownership of the means of production – this choice is decided 
based on how each of these systems happens to fulfill the principles of justice (especially the difference 
principle).  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls insists that his account of justice “leaves open the question 
whether its principles are best realized by some form of property-owning democracy or by a liberal 
socialist regime” (xv; also see 242).  However, in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls argues that
capitalism, even if corrected by a welfare state, is incapable of realizing his conception of justice (136-
138).  In a letter to Philippe Van Parijs (which Van Parijs refers to as Rawls' “most openly 'anti-
capitalist' text”) about The Law of Peoples and the European Union, Rawls writes, “The large open 
market including all of Europe is the aim of the large banks and the capitalist business class whose main
goal is simply larger profit.  The idea of economic growth, with no specific end in sight, fits this class 
perfectly.  If they speak about distribution, it is most always in terms of trickle down.  The long-term 
result of this—which we already have in the United States—is a civil society awash in a meaningless 
consumerism of some kind.  I can’t believe that is what you want.  So you see that I am not happy about
globalization as the banks and business class are pushing it.  I accept Mill‘s idea of the stationary state 
as described by him in Bk. IV, Ch. 6 of his Principles of Political Economy (1848)... I am under no 
illusion that its time will ever come—certainly not soon—but it is possible, and hence it has a place in 
what I call the idea of realistic utopia” (“Three Letters on The Law of Peoples and the European Union,”
Revue de philosophie économique 7 [2003], accessed 19 March 2013, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-
institute/docs/VanParijs_Rawls3Letters.pdf).  It seems fair to say that Rawls' thoughts on capitalism 
evolved over the course of his career, and he became increasingly convinced that capitalism of any kind 
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So civil and political liberties are deemed basic liberties, but economic liberties 
are deemed non-basic.  This economic exceptionalism (as John Tomasi terms the 
downgrading of economic liberties below civil and political liberties197) is not new with 
Rawls.  It appears at the beginning of the split between classical liberalism and high 
liberalism.  At root, the high liberal vision does not recognize economic liberties (and 
economic activities generally) as basic to a flourishing human life.  John Meynard 
Keynes (a high liberal economist if there ever was one) yearned for a future when 
economic liberties could be discarded in favor of higher activities and pleasures: “Thus 
for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent 
problem—how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy his 
leisure, which science and compound interest have won for him, to live wisely and 
agreeably and well.”198  For Keynes, all those attitudes, values, and practices that are 
“tremendously useful in promoting the accumulation of capital,” we will one day (he 
hopes) “be free, at last, to discard.”199  As Tomasi notes, high liberals are fundamentally 
is incompatible with justice.  Many have argued that Rawls' normative commitments as developed in A 
Theory of Justice do, in fact, require a stance against capitalism – see, for example, Barry Clark and 
Herbert Gintis, “Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 7, no. 4 
(Summer 1978); and Gerald Doppelt, “Rawls' System of Justice: A Critique from the Left,” Noûs 15, 
no. 3 (September 1981).
197 Tomasi, Free Market Fairness.
198 John Maynard Keynes, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren,” 1930, accessed Novermber 8 
2012, http://www.econ.yale.edu/smith/econ116a/keynes1.pdf.
199 Keynes, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren.”  This vision lines up with Marxist thought 
according to which the end of economic necessity is the beginning of freedom: “For as soon as the 
distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is 
forced upon him and from which he cannot escape.  He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a 
critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in 
communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become 
accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it 
possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the 
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming 
hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.  This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we 
ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our 
expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development 
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“skeptical that independent economic activity would be a highly valued part of a just 
society.”200  But what justifies this skepticism on the part of high liberals?  I have already 
started to develop Rawls’ answer to this question: economic activity is not regarded as a 
core part of our moral personhood; economic activity is not regarded as a direct 
expression of our two moral powers.  This statement requires more elaboration.  
A longstanding critique of libertarianism and classical liberalism leveled by left-
liberals and liberal socialists is that by privileging economic liberty so highly, libertarians
and classical liberals ignore the material preconditions that are required for citizens to 
enjoy liberty in the first place.  If what we care about is the capacity of citizens to 
exercise their liberty in coordination with their peers as moral equals, then we cannot 
ignore issues of inequality, deprivation, and political domination.  If we entrench 
absolute economic liberties as basic liberties (thus adhering to a more-or-less maximally 
extensive feasible property rights regime along the two axes that Gaus lays out above), 
then we are unable to use state power to correct processes that might undermine the 
ability of citizens to adequately develop and exercise their two moral powers.  Taking 
economic liberty to its extreme, in the case of certain forms of libertarianism, the minimal
state might be obligated to enforce voluntary slave contracts made between desperately 
poor citizens and their wealthier peers.201  
up till now” (Karl Marx and Friedich Engels, “Private Property and Communism,” The German 
Ideology, ed. Christopher John Arthur [New York: International Publishers, 1970]).
200 Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, 181.  Also see John Tomasi, “Democratic Legitimacy and Economic 
Liberty,” Social Philosophy and Policy 29, no. 1 (2012).
201 For this reason, Freeman argues that libertarianism is not a form of liberalism at all, but more akin to 
feudalism.  See Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians.”  On this point, also see Mike Konczal, “We Already 
Tried Libertarianism - It Was Called Feudalism,” 11 June 2013, accessed 17 November 2014, 
http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/we-already-tried-libertarianism-it-was-called-feudalism. Nozick
briefly mentions the possibility that voluntary slave contracts would be enforceable in his libertarian 
minimal state in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 331.  For a libertarian critique of the legitimacy of 
voluntary slave contracts, see Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, especially the chapter “Property Rights 
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For high liberals, a commitment to absolute economic liberty would leave us 
unable to correct for processes that erode just background conditions over time, which 
fundamentally undermines the high liberal ideals of the person and society.  Freeman 
summarizes, “instituting the economic liberties as basic liberties would undermine the 
ability of many free and equal persons to achieve economic independence and enjoy 
income and wealth adequate to their leading a wide range of reasonable plans of life.”202  
Instituting thick economic liberties as basic would seemingly tie our hands politically, 
making unjust (or at least building high obstacles in the way of) many strategies that 
actually existing welfare state capitalist regimes use to combat inequality, deprivation, 
and political domination, such as tax-and-transfer programs (e.g. welfare programs), 
state-run health care programs (e.g. Medicare), and strong state support for unionization 
(e.g. the National Labor Relations Act).  The libertarian ideal could lead, reports 
Freeman, to “conditions in which a small minority might monopolize the means of 
production while large numbers of people are either destitute and unemployed, or have 
lost economic independence since they have no alternative to a wage relationship with 
those who own and control the means of production.”203
These conditions must be avoided for high liberals, and doing so very well may 
require regulations and restrictions of economic liberty.  As Arnold argues, “The effect of 
state interference on self-authorship is complex; local restrictions of self-authorship may 
lead to global gains in self-authorship. That is: by removing specific options from 
people’s choice sets, state interference potentially enlarges (and improves) their choice 
and the Theory of Contracts.”
202 Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007), 58.
203 Freeman, Rawls, 58.
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sets, all things considered.”204  Arnold offers the example of state-mandated retirement 
savings programs.  A program in which the state requires its citizens to save some portion
of their income in a retirement savings account is an infringement upon their economic 
liberty to use their income as they see fit.  Absolute economic liberty would include 
allowing citizens to consume their income early in their life and saving little of it for their
retirement, if they so chose.205  If a regime of thick economic liberty invalidated the 
legitimacy of a state-mandated retirement savings program and the result was that elderly
citizens found themselves impoverished and thus lacking the preconditions for autonomy 
(and the social bases of self respect) in their old age, then high liberals would deem the 
responsible economic liberties as non-basic and in need of regulation.  Again, this follows
from high liberalism because the basic liberties are those that serve Rawls’ ideal of the 
person as having two moral powers.  A thick set of economic liberties might enable a 
situation in which, over time, the material conditions necessary for the autonomy of all 
citizens are undermined.  Arnold criticizes the classical liberal position because it is 
“wrong to think that thick economic liberty is an essential precondition for maximizing 
self-authorship.”206  On the contrary, “thick economic liberty ties the state’s hands and 
prevents it from interfering with people’s options in ways that would, all things 
considered, yield richer, more satisfactory option sets for these same people.”207  
204 Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty,” 33.
205 As contemporary behavioral economics demonstrates, left to their own devices, most people would 
make such irrational choices.  See Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions 
about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: Penguin, 2009). 
206 Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty,” 33.
207 Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty,” 33.
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Thus, high liberals argue that economic liberty is not an important component to 
the development of the two moral powers.  Further, they argue that strong economic 
liberties would undermine the requisite material conditions for the development of the 
two moral powers.  While this argument was taken as decisive in the Rawlsian tradition 
of political liberalism for decades, it is now under attack by political liberals who endorse
classical liberal institutions.  These classical liberals argue for a different conception of 
the moral powers which recognizes the importance of thick economic liberty, leading to a
very different conception of economic justice.  It is to this classical liberal strand of 
political liberalism that we now turn.
4.2. Classical Liberalism: The Moral Personality Argument
Tomasi and Nickel argue that Rawls fails to grasp the importance of economic 
liberty for the development and exercise of the moral powers.  Again, the two moral 
powers are the capacity for a sense of justice (that is, the ability to accept and live by fair 
terms of social cooperation with one’s fellow citizens), and the ability to form, revise, and
pursue a personal conception of the good.  These two moral powers reflect three “higher-
order interests,” which are: (1) developing and exercising the capacity for a sense of 
justice, (2) developing and exercising the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a 
conception of the good, and (3) protecting and advancing one’s conception of the good 
(allowing for changes of mind) over one’s complete life.  In the Rawlsian system, we 
move from the two moral powers to the three higher-order interests to the list of social 
primary goods (which are bargained for in the original position), the latter of which are 
supposed to protect the moral powers and their higher-order interests.  For Tomasi and 
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Nickel, Rawls fails to recognize the connection between the third higher-order interest 
and economic liberty.  As Nickel argues, “the third higher-order interest, the interest in 
protecting and advancing one’s determinate conception of the good, is among other 
things an interest in production, an interest in changing or rearranging the world so that it 
will contain more goods or better conform to one’s life plan.”208  In order to fully equip 
citizens with the capacity to pursue their third higher-order interest, citizens should be 
guaranteed thick but not absolute economic liberty.
The ideal, then, is to allow for some range of economic liberty as basic that is 
more robust than Rawls is willing to allow, but less robust than that defended by Nozick.  
Tomasi refers to this range as the “range of self-authorship.”209  So, for example, for some
people owning a business is a deeply significant part of their lives, and is connected up to
their conception of the good in certain important ways.210  Gaus echoes this commitment 
to re-claiming the importance economic activity for our moral development:
Entrepreneurship is itself a form of human flourishing (in some ways, a 
thought more akin to Marx than to Rawls).  Start-ups, innovation, risk 
taking, organizing groups to solve problems and implement new ideas – 
all these are not simply ways to produce the stuff to be distributed 
208 Nickel, “Economic Liberties,” 167.
209
“Responsible self-authorship” is Tomasi’s term for the moral power and higher-order interests 
associated with pursuing one’s conception of the good.
210 Importantly, economic activity has not always been recognized as contributing to a meaningful life.  In 
earlier eras, economic activity was seen as vulgar and sinful, to be avoided if possible.  Deirdre 
McCloskey chronicles the “Bourgeois Revaluation” which preceded the Industrial Revolution, which 
featured a revaluation of the roles and meaning of the worker, trader, entrepreneur, and middleman: 
“After about 1700 in Britain, however, as earlier in Holland, the vulgarities of the economy and of 
money and of dealing, with their unsettling creativity, came gradually to be talked about as 
noncorrupting.  They began to be seen in theory as worthy of a certain respect, as not being hopelessly 
vulgar or sinful or underhanded or lower-caste.  In a word, they became dignified” (Bourgeois Dignity: 
Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World [Chicago: U Chicago Press, 2010], 22).  Also see 
Joyce Appleby, The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2010).
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according to “economic justice”: they are basic to the evaluative standards
of some Members of the Public.  To exclude all these personal ideals about
what is worth doing in life on the grounds that by adopting a socialist 
system we have the purported best means to arrive at an abstract theory of 
justice unacceptably constrains the ability of many to lead lives in which 
their fundamental values hold sway over some parts of their life.211
Thus, these classical liberals argue that for Rawlsian-style reasons, the right to own 
productive property should be recognized as a basic liberty.
However, the right to unlimited accumulation, or the right to unlimited bequest, 
are not necessary for the development or revision of a conception of the good, and thus 
should not be recognized as basic constitutionally guaranteed liberties.  Tomasi notes, 
“Economic liberties have a range of applications, and some parts of that range may be 
more essentially linked to self-authorship than other parts.”212  Those economic liberties 
that are essentially linked to self-authorship should be basic, while those that are not so 
linked should be understood as non-basic.  Political and economic institutions must aim 
to secure the capacity for self-authorship, and this range will “set principled limits on the 
redistributory ambitions of the state, while defining a threshold below which no class of 
citizens should fall.”213  In contrast to Rawls' egalitarianism (and other Rawlsians' 
prioritarianism), Tomasi defends sufficientarianism – according to which the state is 
211 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 379.  In a footnote, Gaus mentions an investor in the “Impossible 
Project” (a firm seeking to bring Polaroid film back into production) who tells the founder, “I have 
looked all your team in the eye and none of them is in here for the money.  They are in here to make it 
happen” (The Order of Public Reason, 379n). 
212 Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, 91.
213 Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, 94.
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required by justice to provide a sufficient basic minimum for all citizens, such that all are 
capable of developing, revising, and acting upon a conception of the good.  But the state 
is not required (or even permitted) to use coercion to achieve and maintain economic 
equality.214  
In Tomasi’s estimation, a political regime that recognizes as basic thick but not 
absolute economic liberties would still be able to legitimately regulate certain aspects of 
economic activity in ways that resonate with the considered convictions of many people 
in modern liberal democracies.  For example, economic liberty could be regulated in 
order to (1) prevent workers from being exploited, (2) protect consumers from fraud, (3) 
protect third parties from negative externalities (e.g. from pollution), and (4) maintain 
competitive markets (i.e. anti-monopoly laws).  So the “range of self-authorship” puts an 
upper and lower boundary on state action vis-à-vis the economic lives of its citizens.  A 
state that allows too much economic liberty as basic (and thus unjustly restrains its own 
activity) might leave a class of citizens suffering from poverty, lacking opportunities for 
education and employment, etc.  A state that allows too little economic liberty as basic 
(and thus unjustly overreaches in its own activity) might impose taxes and regulations so 
high as to impinge upon the self-authorship of its citizens as expressed through their 
economic activity.
214 For further defense of sufficientarianism, see Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics 98, 
no. 1 (October 1987); Harry Frankfurt, “Equality and Respect” Social Research 64 (1997); Harry 
Frankfurt, “The Moral Irrelevance of Equality,” Public Affairs Quarterly 14 (2000); Liam Shields, “The
Prospects for Sufficientarianism,” Utilitas 24, no. 1 (March 2012); Dale Dorsey, “Toward a Theory of 
the Basic Minimum,” Politics Philosophy Economics 7, no. 4 (November 2008); Roger Crisp, 
“Equality, Priority, and Compassion,” Ethics 113 (July 2003); Roger Crisp, “Egalitarianism and 
Compassion,” Ethics 114 (2004); Stephen Nathanson, “Equality, Sufficiency, Decency: Three Criteria 
Of Economic Justice,” in Ethical Issues for the Twenty-First Century, ed. F. Adams (Charlottesville: 
Philosophy Documentation Center, 2005).  For two well-know critiques of sufficientarianism, see Paula 
Casal, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough,” Ethics 117, no. 2 (January 2007); and Larry Temkin, 
“Egalitarianism Defended,” Ethics 113 (2003).
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Tomasi thus tries to turn Rawls’ arguments against him in an attempt to argue that 
a thick set of economic liberties ought to be considered basic.  Rawls argues that the 
freedom of occupational choice is required for the development of the moral powers, 
because freedom of occupation allows one to pursue one’s conception of the good most 
freely.  For Tomasi, thick economic liberty related to work is justified on similar grounds:
“the freedom to sell, trade, and donate one’s labor looks equally essential for the same 
reasons.”215  Thus, Tomasi’s favored regime types would likely have no minimum wage, 
minimal workplace regulation, and a prohibition on union security agreements (i.e. they 
would have right-to-work laws).  For both Tomasi and Rawls, if this lack of economic 
regulation and this abundance of economic liberty led to autonomy-undermining 
conditions, then these liberties (on the part of the worker and employer) would not count 
as basic.  Tomasi is confident that these labor freedoms (or lack of labor regulations) will 
lead to greater autonomy (or self-authorship) for all,216 while Rawls and Freeman are 
doubtful.  This debate concerns empirical issues and should thus be left to the 
economists.
215 Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, 77.
216 A number of other critics similarly try to argue that Rawls' normative framework should lead us to 
endorse capitalist and libertarian institutions by playing up the economic benefits (short- and especially 
long-term) to the least advantaged group from capitalism and voluntary charity.  Daniel Shapiro argues, 
“Egalitarianism does not mandate state redistribution of income and wealth.  Indeed, from an egalitarian
perspective, voluntary methods of aiding the involuntarily disadvantaged are at least as good as, and 
possibly superior to, state redistribution” (“Egalitarianism And Welfare-State Redistribution,” 
Philosophy and Social Policy 19, no 1 [2002]: 1).  Also see Daniel Shapiro, Is the Welfare State 
Justified? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  Jason Brennan likewise notes, “Further 
empirical investigation may show us that the solution is to abandon some of Rawls’ favored institutions 
even if we should keep his theory of justice” (“Rawls' Paradox,” Constitutional Political Economy 18 
[2007]: 298).  Finally, Tyler Cowen provocatively argues, “In general, the evidence indicates that 
current recipients of welfare benefit from the transfers... Nonetheless, the welfare state appears to harm 
the interests of future generations and foreign citizens, and in this regard it does not help the poor more 
generally” (“Does The Welfare State Help The Poor?” Social Philosophy and Policy 19, no. 1 [January 
2002]: 36).
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Secondly, Rawls argues that the right to own personal (nonproductive) property is 
required for the development of the moral powers, because it allows for independence 
and the social bases of self-respect.  For Tomasi, the same arguments justify the right to 
own forms of productive property (e.g. saving in the form of stocks and bonds) – that is, 
they allow for independence and self-authorship.217  Indeed, for Tomasi, “Permitting 
citizens to hoard cash, while denying them the right to purchase stocks or other securities,
would not be a significant concession to the freedom owed to such citizens.”218  Tomasi 
continues, 
A right to private ownership of productive property provides individuals 
with the right to affirm and to seek to participate in any of a wide variety 
of ownership configurations, including joint and collective forms of 
ownership.  Individuals with that right can select a life plan that includes 
their owning their own business, working in a business owned by others, 
joining with other workers in cooperative (democratically controlled) 
firms, and any of myriad intermediate forms.  Without that right, citizens 
are vulnerable to having others use state power to impose some ownership 
configuration upon them.  I claim that all citizens have a powers-
protecting interest in determining for themselves the form of productive 
ownership relation to which they aspire.219  
217 John Kekes likewise argues, “The importance of private property is that it enables us to control how we 
live.  A good society must be committed to the protection of the right to private property, because a 
society is made good by protecting the conditions on which the well-being of its members depends. 
Moreover, I am supposing that having control of one’s life is one of these conditions.  Private property, 
according to this view, is an indispensable means of control” (“The Right To Private Property: A 
Justification,” 5).
218 Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, 78.
219 John Tomasi, “Reply to Samuel Freeman: Thick Economic Liberty,” 18 June 2012, accessed 9 July 
2012, http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/06/reply-to-samuel-freeman/.  See Freeman’s critique 
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Independence and autonomy demand not just legal ownership in private non-productive 
property, but also, for Tomasi, legal ownership in private productive property.220
There have been two main objections leveled against Tomasi’s vision of classical 
liberalism.  One objection is that even thick economic liberties can lead to situations in 
which certain people lose the capacity to exercise liberty in any meaningful way.  Nickel 
states the concern: “Although economic liberties are good for the liberty and autonomy of
those who end up having money and property, perhaps these liberties are not good for the
overall liberty and autonomy of those who end up having little money and property.”221  
In response to this concern, it is important to remember the differences between classical 
liberals (who argue for thick but not absolute economic liberty as basic) and libertarians 
(who argue for absolute economic liberty as basic).  The classical liberal state may be a 
limited state, but it remains an active state, guaranteeing a basic minimum for all citizens.
Nickel offers a list of possible responses to this first objection: (1) regimes that 
defend thick economic liberty are generally good for the poor, (2) classical liberalism 
contains a requirement for a decent minimum, (3) classical liberalism contains a 
boundary at the top, so that accumulations of wealth are relatively contained (and are not 
bequeathed in their entirety to the next generation), (4) thick economic liberty actually 
helps protect other important liberties (such as civil and political liberties), (5) thick 
of Tomasi's position in “Can Economic Liberties be Basic Liberties?”, 13 June 2012, accessed 20 June 
2012, http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/06/can-economic-liberties-be-basic-liberties/.
220 For a similar argument about how economic liberty enables freedom and helps prevent domination from
a republican perspective, see Robert S. Taylor, “Market Freedom as Anti-Power,” American Political 
Science Review 7, no. 3 (August 2013).  In The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the 
West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000), Hernando de Soto makes the 
compelling case that the right to own productive property has been unjustly denied to many of the 
world's poor who live outside the legal framework of property rights, thus denying them the opportunity
for economic mobility.  For one of the more memorable graphic visualizations of de Soto's point from 
the book, see Appendix D.
221 Nickel, “Economic Liberties,” 167.
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economic liberty is consistent with measures to guarantee the fair value of political 
liberty (e.g. public financing of election campaigns), (6) a strong principle of equality of 
opportunity and free public education which helps weaken the connection between class 
origin and achievement, (7) even with thick economic liberty, tax-and-transfer programs 
can help guarantee distributive justice, and (8) classical liberalism endorses policies to 
help the unemployed and return them to employment.  This response seems like an 
adequate defense against the first objection.
A second objection to Tomasi’s position is more challenging.  Arnold argues that 
Tomasi’s moral personality argument relies upon a “deeply implausible empirical 
hypothesis” about the effects of economic liberty on our moral development and 
experience.222  Arnold makes the following case: 
Different aspects of economic liberty matter differently to moral 
personality.  Some economic liberties are absolutely crucial to the 
development and exercise of moral personality.  Others are less crucial.  
Still others aren’t crucial at all.  I submit that the thick economic liberties 
of working and owning defended by Tomasi fall into this “not crucial” 
category.  They lack what Rawls calls “significance”: they are not 
essential preconditions for the development and exercise of the two moral 
powers.223
So while Tomasi may be right that the exercise of some economic liberty is required for 
the development of moral personality, this claim does not get him to his preferred 
classical liberal regime type – it takes us no further than one of Rawls’ own preferred 
222 Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty,” 15.
223 Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty,” 18.
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regime types, the property-owning democracy.  As O’Neill and Williamson argue in their 
review of Free Market Fairness, “If [Tomasi] simply means that a just society should 
accept and promote the basic right of individuals to control productive property, such as a
small business, then high liberals can agree.  Protection of a general right to operate a 
small business is consistent with a Rawlsian property-owning democracy.”224  In the 
property-owning democracy, individuals can legally own productive resources, but the 
state is permitted to heavily regulate and continually redistribute access to the ownership 
of productive assets to ensure that most citizens have access to them.  
O’Neill and Williamson further argue that Tomasi does not make a crucial 
distinction between the moral powers of the entrepreneur and those of the worker.  
Perhaps we want to allow the entrepreneur the right to own (some) productive property, 
but we also need to have an activist state that regulates and disperses capital so that more 
people can enjoy the experience of entrepreneurship.  Without this activist state, some 
class of people may never get to enjoy the benefits of entrepreneurship, but instead might 
spend their lives taking orders from bosses.  For O’Neill and Williamson, Tomasi’s 
arguments about the moral powers speak more on behalf of the property-owing 
democracy than the small government classical liberal regime that Tomasi advocates.225  
O’Neill and Williamson write, “Tomasi is right that a just society should permit the 
private control of productive capital, but his further claim that this should lead us to 
224 Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson, “Free Market Fairness: Is There a Moral Case for Free 
Markets?”, Boston Review (November/December 2012), accessed 19 December 2012, 
http://www.bostonreview.net/books-ideas/free-market-fairness.
225 While Tomasi might be right about the ennobling effects of entrepreneurship, he does not seem to give 
equal consideration to the effects of non-entrepreneurial (and especially physically and mentally 
stultifying) work.  So one might object that Tomasi's preferred classical liberal institutions, which 
include policies that enable fluid labor markets (and discourage strong labor unions), would not secure 
proper dignity for workers in the workplace.  For a discussion of workplace justice, see Samuel Arnold, 
“The Difference Principle at Work,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2012); and Richard 
Arneson, “Meaningful Work and Market Socialism,” Ethics 97, no. 3 (April 1987).
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embrace deregulated capitalism is wrong. The moral goods of exercising freedom 
through market activities would be more widely realized under a regime of Rawlsian 
property-owning democracy than under the sort of minimally regulated capitalism that 
Tomasi celebrates.”226
Arnold nicely illustrates the weakness of Tomasi’s account by asking us to 
consider the following scenario: 
Think of a country that lacks the thick economic liberties favored by 
market democracy – say, Norway or France.  If Tomasi’s claim is correct, 
then the vast majority of citizens in such thick-economic-liberty-infringing
countries should find it difficult, even impossible, to develop the moral 
capacities required to meaningfully evaluate their social and political 
institutions.  A Norwegian can say “after deep reflection, I consent to be 
governed by the Norwegian state” but his words are just wind; they pack 
no normative punch, no legitimating force.  This is, I submit, an obviously
absurd result.  Yet it really does follow from Tomasi’s argument.  We have 
hit upon a reductio ad absurdum of the first market democratic argument 
for counting thick economic liberties as basic liberties.227  
For Arnold, it may be the case that limited property rights are required for the pursuit of 
some reasonable conceptions of the good, but this does not justify maximally extensive 
feasible property rights or anything close to it.  An argument about the importance of 
property for project-pursuit plays right into Rawls’ argument for the property-owning 
226 O’Neill and Williamson, “Free Market Fairness.”
227 Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty,” 16.
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democracy,228 which allows for the private ownership of productive property, but uses 
political force to redistribute and disperse productive property as widely as possible.229  In
other words, Tomasi’s deontological arguments (concerning the conditions for “self-
authorship”) seem to be in tension with his consequentialist arguments (about what 
institutions are required to achieve just economic distributions).  
Arnold convincingly makes the point that it is unwise to place too much 
normative burden on (empirically or philosophically) controversial or indeterminate 
notions like “responsible self-authorship.”  The problem is that in a pluralistic society 
people will have different interpretations about what belongs inside and outside the 
“range of self-authorship” that Tomasi describes, and thus what we really need is a non-
sectarian method for deciding this question.  It is unlikely that unanimity can be reached 
on these kinds of issues.230  However, this argument cuts both ways.231  Both Rawls and 
Tomasi find themselves needing to invoke controversial conceptions of human 
flourishing and the moral powers in order to arrive at their divergent conceptions of 
228 For a helpful collection of essays on Rawls’ idea of the property-owning democracy, see Martin O’Neill
and Thad Williamson, Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2012).  For an argument for a similar, “mixed-property,” regime, see Richard Krouse and Michael 
McPherson, “A ‘Mixed’-Property Regime: Equality and Liberty in a Market Economy,” Ethics 97, no. 1
(October 1986).
229 Gaus voices a similar skepticism about such arguments: “The crucial task for the agency justification is 
to move from a general argument that some property is necessary for agency to a defense of maximally 
extensive property rights.  The agency argument has an easier time than self-ownership accounts in 
showing that our rights of ownership should approximate full property rights (our first dimension of 
capitalist property rights): agency requires that one be able to control parts of the world as part of one’s 
projects, and full capitalist property maximizes control.  But can it also be shown that the agency 
justification leads to the desirability of maximal property rights over the other dimension — the things 
over which one can have property?  This looks more dubious” (“The Idea and Ideal of Capitalism,” 8).
230 It is telling that there are zero mentions of “pluralism” or “reasonable pluralism” in the index of 
Tomasi's book Free Market Fairness.
231 A number of recent articles make this same point: Tomasi's critique of Rawls is helpful not because it 
offers a fully satisfying alternative to Rawls' project, but because it highlights the weaknesses of Rawls' 
project.  See Arnold, “High Liberalism, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty”; and Jeppe von 
Platz, “Are Economic Liberties Basic Rights?”, Politics Philosophy Economics 13, no. 1 (2014); and 
the symposium for Free Market Fairness at the Bleeding Heart Libertarians website.
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economic justice.  Citizens can reasonably disagree with Tomasi’s interpretation of what 
counts as within the “range of self-authorship,” as they also can with Rawls' 
interpretation.  Therefore, if either Tomasi’s preferred capitalist democratic regime or 
Rawls' preferred property-owning democratic regime were enforced on the basis of either
particular interpretation about the moral powers, some subset of the citizens would 
experience the regime as oppressive.  Surely these matters admit of great (and 
reasonable) interpretive disagreement.232  In a slightly different context, Gaus argues, “the
aim is not to build all of [a theory of justice] into the very meaning of what it means to 
treat another as free and equal – as if all of morality was really a sort of conceptual 
analysis of the idea of ‘treating another as a free and equal moral person.’”233  Indeed, 
neither Tomasi's right-leaning sufficientarianism nor Rawls' left-leaning egalitarianism 
springs directly out of the basic premises of political liberalism, despite both of their 
attempts to make it seem so.
4.3. High Liberalism vs. Classical Liberalism: Economic Liberty and Political 
Liberty
There is an additional and separate argument that Freeman and others make 
against entrenching thick economic liberties as basic.  The argument is quite 
straightforward.  As I have mentioned, for high liberalism the basic liberties include the 
civil and political liberties.  The political liberties, however, have a special status in the 
232 In his review of Rawls' A Theory of Justice, James Buchanan states, “I should accept the hypothesis that
a socio-political-economic structure embodying the difference principle meets widely-accepted criteria 
of 'fairness.'  But I should not be prepared to elevate this principle into the ideal position accorded it by 
Rawls.  There may be many other distributional rules that qualify within the acceptable set, classified 
only by the minimal criteria for 'fairness' and 'goodness'” (“Rawls on Justice as Fairness,” Public 
Choice 13 [September 1972]: 125).
233 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 20.
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first principle of justice for high liberalism.  Not only must political liberties be 
guaranteed, but also the fair value of political liberties must be maintained.  That is, 
political liberties must not be merely formally enjoyed, but actually and effectively 
exercised by all citizens on an equal basis.  All citizens should be able to wield a roughly 
equal amount of political power.  This privileging of the political liberties is unique to 
high liberalism within the liberal tradition (although it unites high liberals with 
participatory democrats).  Furthermore, this privileging of the political liberties helps 
further justify the downgrading of the economic liberties within high liberalism.234  
The commitment to the fair value of political liberty makes high liberals 
especially concerned with economic inequality, since economic inequality can have the 
downstream consequence of political inequality and even political domination.235  
Importantly, the difference principle itself theoretically allows for any amount of 
economic inequality – its only mandate is to secure Pareto-optimality over time.  It is the 
commitment to guaranteeing the fair value of political liberty that leads high liberals to be
especially concerned with economic inequality itself (even economic inequality that 
might be permissible in the eyes of the difference principle).  As Freeman explains, the 
problem with classical liberalism and welfare-state capitalism is that “no effort is made to
limit the inequalities of wealth and economic influence that undermine the fair value of 
the political liberties.”236  Without these trends toward economic and political inequality 
234 Tomasi notes, “High liberalism has its roots in the Millian idea that economic liberties are less 
important to the moral development of individuals than their personal or political liberties” (Free 
Market Fairness, 60).
235 For a similar argument, see Thomas Christiano, “The Uneasy Relationship between Democracy and 
Capital,” Social Philosophy and Policy 27, no. 1 (January 2010).  Also see Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of 
Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers our Future (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2013).
236 Freeman, Rawls, 225.
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being continually corrected, “the wealthy and corporate interests effectively lobby and 
influence politicians and other government officials to enact legislation primarily 
benefiting the more advantaged.  They largely control the political agenda and use it to 
further their economic interests.”237  The protection of thick economic liberties would 
undermine the state’s ability to counteract these problems.238
The classical liberals do not find this line of argument entirely compelling.  Gaus 
accuses high liberals of arguing about the supposedly malevolent effects of economic 
liberty on political equality without sufficient empirical evidence.  Indeed, Gaus suggests 
that high liberals have the facts against them: countries with strong private property rights
and thick economic liberty tend to score better on measures of civil and political liberties.
Drawing on data from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World: 2008 
Annual Report,239 Gaus argues that “the protection of economic liberty and private 
property is associated with states that do a better job institutionalizing effective political 
rights (as well as civil rights),”240 concluding that there is “little ground for accepting a 
237 Freeman, Rawls, 225.
238 This topic – the relationship between economic liberty and political liberty – has important implications
for the contested issue of campaign financing, which has become a major public concern in the United 
States with the 2010 Supreme Court case Citizens United vs. Federal Elections Commission.  A problem
with adding robust economic liberty to the basic liberties of the first principle is that it creates more 
conditions in which basic liberties can clash with one another.  Again, basic liberties can only be 
regulated for the sake of maintaining other basic liberties, but what happens when basic liberties collide 
directly (as in the case of political speech, where there is a clash between the economic liberty to use 
one’s own resources in one’s own way and the fair value of political liberty)?
239 James D. Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and Seth Norton,  Economic Freedom of the World: 2008 Annual 
Report, accessed 12 December 2012, 
http://www.freetheworld.com/2008/EconomicFreedomoftheWorld2008.pdf.  For two helpful charts 
displaying the correlation between economic liberty and civil and political liberty in this study, see 
Appendix E.
240 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 515.  For other recent accounts that document the close connection 
between economic liberty and political freedom, see Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why 
Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012); and 
Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin, 
2011).
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strong relation between income inequality and lesser value of political rights.”241  Of 
course, however, Gaus' presentation and interpretation of the empirical data is contested 
by various high liberals.  I cannot sort out the complex empirical arguments here, as they 
should be decided instead by economists and social scientists. 
However, this empirical argument from Gaus opens up a different but related 
argument that the classical liberals develop in their defense of thick economic liberty.  
Namely, they argue that economic liberties are important because they are a better tool 
than political participation for dealing with social conflict.  Gaus, like many other 
classical liberals, believes that economic liberty helps secure social cooperation because 
it allows for a plurality of values to be acted upon in separate private domains, whereas 
political decision making requires everyone to abide by the same decisions.  That is, 
economic activity is decentralized decision making, while political activity is centralized 
decision making.  In a sense, then, economic liberty and private property are said to 
follow in the liberal strategy of privatization discussed in chapter II.  Classical liberals, 
like Gaus, favor robust economic liberties because they are (so the argument goes) well-
suited to the conditions of pluralism.  I will now explore and evaluate this response, and 
reveal its shortcomings.
241 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 517.  Gaus goes through the empirical data in more detail in pp. 
511-21.  Gaus' position is articulated in a similar way in Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), in the opening chapter entitled, “The Relation between 
Economic Freedom and Political Freedom.”  Friedman writes, “Viewed as a means to the end of 
political freedom, economic arrangements are essential because of the effect which they have on the 
concentration or the deconcentration of power.  A major thesis of the new liberal [that is, the classical 
liberal] is that the kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, 
organization of economic activities through a largely free market and private enterprise, in short through
competitive capitalism, is also a necessary though not a sufficient condition for political freedom.  The 
central reason why this is true is because such a form of economic organization separates economic 
power from political power and in this way enables the one to be an offset to the other.  Historical 
evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political and economic freedom.  I cannot 
think of a single example at any time or any place where there was a large measure of political freedom
without there also being something comparable to a private enterprise market form of economic 
organization for the bulk of economic activity” (9; my italics).
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4.4. Economic Liberty as a Decentralization Strategy
For Gaus, when we deliberate about justice in the context of deep pluralism, we 
must ask ourselves the question, “what devices can we employ to achieve some sort of 
agreed-upon social ordering or outcome when we are faced with irresolvable differences 
in the individual ordering of values?”242  There are two opposing kinds of responses to 
this question found within the broad liberal tradition.  The first response privileges what 
Benjamin Constant refers to as the “rights of the ancients,” which consists of an “active 
and constant participation in collective power.”243  It is a “centralizing response” that 
advocates “enlarging the scope of democratic decision making based on widespread 
public deliberation aimed at consensus.”244  Constant describes the ancient conception of 
liberty: “The share that in antiquity everyone held in national sovereignty was by no 
means an abstract presumption as it is in our own day.  The will of each individual had 
real influence: the exercise of this will was a vivid and repeated pleasure.”245  Political 
liberty is the most cherished dimension of liberty for the ancients (as it is, in some ways, 
for high liberals).  
242 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 372.
243 Benjamin Constant, “On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns,” 1816, 
accessed 19 March 2013, http://www.uark.edu/depts/comminfo/cambridge/ancients.html).  Constant 
further elaborates on the rights of the ancients: “The [ancient conception of liberty] consisted in 
exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of the complete sovereignty; in deliberating, in the 
public square, over war and peace; in forming alliances with foreign governments; in voting laws, in 
pronouncing judgments; in examining the accounts, the acts, the stewardship of the magistrates; in 
calling them to appear in front of the assembled people, in accusing, condemning or absolving them. 
But if this was what the ancients called liberty, they admitted as compatible with this collective freedom
the complete subjection of the individual to the authority of the community.  You find among them 
almost none of the enjoyments we have just seen form part of the liberty of the moderns.  All private 
actions were submitted to a severe surveillance.  No importance was given to individual independence, 
neither in relation to opinions, nor to labor, nor, above all, to religion.  The right to choose one's own 
religious affiliation, a right that we regard as one of the most precious, would have seemed to the 
ancients a crime and a sacrilege” (“On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns).
244 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 387.
245 Constant, “On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns.”
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On this view, we should rely primarily upon democratic deliberation to overcome 
the differences generated by pluralism.  The implicit assumption here, Gaus points out, is 
that our differences and disagreements are merely on the surface, and that deliberation 
will erase them, or at least reduce them sufficiently enough to authorize legitimate and 
authoritative social morality through collective decision making.  Gaus explains his 
concern with this method: 
The attempt to emulate in practice a romantic image of the past [the 
Athenian polis] can only lead to authoritarianism and oppression.  
Deliberative democracy supposes that our differences in evaluative 
standards are, as it were, only on the surface.  Once we reason together 
and talk things through, deliberative democrats hold that our value 
orderings will be transformed; the range of disagreement will so radically 
narrow that the problems of social commensuration will become fairly 
insignificant, if not vanish altogether … Once we accept that our 
disagreements are widespread and deep – that the range of possible value 
orderings is essentially unlimited – democratic procedures simply are not 
up to the task of collective commensuration.246  
For Gaus, then, the publicly deliberating Members of the Public, in the context of deep 
pluralism, will reject this centralizing response of the deliberative democrats.247  Because 
246 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 388.
247 Gaus’ indictment of deliberative democracy mirrors Constant’s indictment of Rousseau: “by transposing
into our modern age an extent of social power, of collective sovereignty, which belonged to other 
centuries, this sublime genius, animated by the purest love of liberty, has nevertheless furnished deadly 
pretexts for more than one kind of tyranny” (“On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the 
Moderns”).
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it underestimates the depth of our disagreement, it will tend to “lead to authoritarianism 
and oppression,” which is not in the interest of any Member of the Public.248
There is another way to respond to the condition of pluralism, and it privileges 
what Constant calls the “rights of the moderns,” which consist in “peaceful enjoyment 
and private independence.”249  While the ancients privileged political liberty above all 
else, the moderns – while recognizing the importance of political liberty – most highly 
prize civil and economic liberty: “The exercise of political rights, therefore, offers us but 
a part of the pleasures that the ancients found in it, while at the same time the progress of 
civilization, the commercial tendency of the age, the communication amongst peoples, 
248 Nozick makes a similar point.  He argues (echoing public choice theory) that the more that decisions are
centralized through the political process, the more incentive there is for powerful economic actors to try
to capture the state for their own benefit.  He argues, “Economically well-off persons desire greater 
political power, in a nonminimal state, because they can sue this power to give themselves differential 
economic benefits.  Where a locus of such power exists, it is not surprising that people attempt to use it 
for their own ends.  The illegitimate use of a state by economic interests for their own ends is based 
upon a preexisting illegitimate power of the state to enrich some persons at the expense of others. 
Eliminate that illegitimate power of giving differential economic benefits and you eliminate or 
drastically restrict the motive for wanting political influence.  True, some persons will thirst for political
power, finding intrinsic satisfaction in dominating others.  The minimal state best reduces the chances 
of such takeover or manipulation of the state by persons desiring power or economic benefits, especially
if combined with a reasonably alert citizenry, since it is the minimally desirable target for such takeover 
or manipulation.  Nothing much is to be gained by doing so; and the cost to the citizens if it occurs is 
minimized.  To strengthen the state and extend the range of its functions as a way of preventing it from 
being used by some portions of the populace makes it a more valuable prize and a more alluring target 
for corrupting by anyone able to offer an officeholder something desirable; it is, to put it gently, a poor 
strategy” (Anarchy, State, and Utopia 272).  This turns the high liberal argument for privileging political
liberty on its head.  Rawls argues that the existence of economic inequality triggers the need for a more 
interventionist state.  Nozick argues that the the existence of economic inequality is why an 
interventionist state is a terrible idea, since we have good reason to believe that it will be captured by 
powerful economic actors.
249 Constant further elaborates on the rights of the moderns: “For each of them it is the right to be subjected
only to the laws, and to be neither arrested, detained, put to death, or maltreated in any way by the 
arbitrary will of one or more individuals.  It is the right of everyone to express his opinion, choose a 
profession and practice it, to dispose of property, and even to abuse it; to come and go without 
permission, and without having to account for his motives or undertakings.  It is everyone's right to 
associate with other individuals, either to discuss their interests, or to profess the religion that he and his
associates prefer, or even simply to occupy their days or hours in a way that is most compatible with his
inclinations or whims.  Finally it is everyone's right to exercise some influence on the administration of 
the government, either by electing all or particular officials, or through representations, petitions, 
demands to which the authorities are more or less compelled to pay heed” (“On the Liberty of the 
Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns”).  Notice that the liberties of the moderns do include 
political liberties, but they are not central.
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have infinitely multiplied and varied the means of personal happiness.”250  This modern 
response devolves authority to individual members of society as private actors, allowing 
them to form private associations in which they can act upon their particular values with 
like-minded peers.  The decentralizing response thus allows for decisions to be resolved 
via private decision making, through private associations in civil society and the market.  
The decentralizing response is basically a choice to “agree to disagree.”  When 
confronted with disagreement, both parties disengage from the dispute, and each accepts 
that the other will continue to act and believe in her own ways in the private sphere in 
exchange for the freedom to do the same.  For the moderns, the pinnacle of human 
freedom is the freedom to believe, speak, act, and interact in the context of freely chosen 
private associations.  On the other hand, the centralizing response is basically a choice to 
lock ourselves into a room until a single choice is made.  When confronted with 
disagreement, both parties commit themselves to arriving at a joint decision about the 
dispute, through agreement if possible, through a vote if necessary.  The moderns want to 
minimize these kinds of centralized political transactions in favor of decentralized 
economic transactions.251  
250 Constant, “On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns.”
251 Milton Friedman has a nice quip about these two strategies for dealing with disagreement.  Democratic 
decision making requires “conformity without unanimity,” while private decision making permits 
“unanimity without conformity” (Capitalism and Freedom, 23).  That is, democratic decisions are 
binding on all (society-wide conformity), even on those who disagree with the final vote (no society-
wide unanimity).  Private decisions do not requires society-wide agreement – each is permitted to act on
her own values in private associations (association-wide unanimity), while others are permitted the 
same freedom in their own private associations (no society-wide conformity).  Some examples would 
be useful to illustrate the difference.  For centuries in Europe, matters of religious observance were 
considered public matters requiring society-wide conformity.  Religious dissent was punishable by law.  
After the Reformation and the Wars of Religion, it became clear that achieving and enforcing society-
wide conformity would be too costly (and possibly unjust), and thus matters of religious observance 
were eventually deemed subject to private decision making.  Freedom of conscience and worship was a 
decentralizing response to the problem of deep and persistent religious disagreement.  On the other 
hand, early American history was characterized by a (kind of) decentralizing response regarding the 
issue of slavery.  In was only with much struggle and agitation (and eventually a civil war) that the issue
became a public matter requiring society-wide conformity.  Indeed, in the twentieth century, progress on
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The modern response lends itself well to an appreciation for the role of strong 
private property rights.  With private property (and the liberty to use one’s property 
relatively freely), power is divided into different jurisdictions, thus avoiding the need for 
the different jurisdictions to converge on more substantive agreement.  For Gaus, “A 
regime of jurisdictional individual moral rights is thus a form of public justification – or 
perhaps it is better understood as a way to settle the problem of public justification in 
such a way that in the future it is no longer a collective problem.”252  And, furthermore, 
according to Gaus, “private property rights are quintessentially jurisdictional.  To own 
property is to have a sphere in which one’s evaluative standards have great authority for 
others.”253  With a political regime that respects private property and the economic liberty 
to use it freely, society can avoid certain kinds of debilitating disagreement and strife.  
For these reasons, the classical liberal position rejects high liberals' privileging of the 
political liberties above the economic liberties.254  If our political community contains a 
civil rights for African-Americans was resisted in the South by appeals to the quasi-decentralizing 
response of “states’ rights.”  Thus, we often see issues migrate across the liberal public/private split (at 
the moment, issues of health care are becoming more public and less private, while issues of drug 
selling and consumption are becoming less public and more private).  The decision about what belongs 
on either side of the split is a constant matter of political debate.  While the modern response privileges 
a robust private sphere, it also recognizes the place for the public political sphere.
252 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 373.
253 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 374.  John Gray chimes a similar note: “The importance of several 
property for civil society is that it acts as an enabling device whereby rival and possibly 
incommensurable conceptions of the good may be implemented and realized without any recourse to 
any collective decision-procedure … One may even say of civil society that it is a device for securing 
peace by reducing to a minimum the decisions on which recourse to collective choice – the political or 
public choice that is binding on all – is unavoidable” (John Gray, Post-Enlightenment Liberalism 
[London: Routledge, 1993], 314). The difference between Gray and Gaus is that Gray argues for private
property rights because they help secure stability in the face of pluralism (the “Reformation” question), 
while Gaus goes further in arguing that private property rights can be justified to all Members of the 
Public, and thus help them secure stability for the rights reasons in the face of pluralism (the 
“Enlightenment” question).  Gray is one of the most ardent defenders of “modus vivendi” liberalism; 
see Gray, The Two Faces of Liberalism.
254
 Gaus and Tomasi argue that economic liberties should be valued as equally important as civil and 
political liberties (that is, they should all be equally “basic”), but some classical liberals argue that 
economic liberties should be privileged above political liberties.  For the clearest example of this, see 
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wide diversity of values and preferences, and we want these values and preferences to be 
respected, then a method of “privatization” via economic liberty and property rights will 
be more stable and just than a method of “democratization” via political liberty.  Gaus 
summarizes this view:
By dividing social life into different jurisdictions, in which each person’s 
values, ends, and goals hold sway, the mutual respect of these jurisdictions
allows us to live together in partly cooperative, partly competitive, 
arrangements with a minimum of conflict about whose values are to hold 
sway where.  This, indeed, is the quintessential liberal response to the fact 
that our aims and values so often differ, and indeed conflict: the social 
recognition of jurisdictions in which one’s ends hold sway, and one may 
act on the basis of one’s own values and interests.  This is the sense in 
which property rights are the foundation of a social order among people 
Jason Brennan, “Political Liberty: Who Needs It?”, Social Philosophy and Policy 29, no. 1 (January 
2012).  Brennan writes, “Politics provides a weak outlet for social construction in part because there are
no niches.  Democratic political decisions apply to all equally, and if one dislikes the outcomes, there is 
usually no escape.  In trying to explain why the political liberties are valuable, [Thomas] Christiano … 
uses the metaphor of ‘being at home.’  The political liberties are supposed to help us feel at home.  But 
this is misleading.  Our homes are niches.  Most of us are at home in our homes because we may 
unilaterally shape our homes to reflect our preferences.  Our homes are governed by principles we 
endorse.  We do not have to deliberate in public and justify our furniture arrangements to others in 
society.  Many of us can shape our work environments to a significant extent as well, at the very least 
by choosing where we work.  And even if we do not feel completely at home in society, we can at least 
usually find niches within society where we do feel at home.  But in politics, there are no real niches.  I 
find the formulaic women’s movies on the Lifetime Channel bland and vapid, so I watch something 
else.  I find marijuana criminalization and farm subsidies stupid and unjust, but there is no niche to 
accommodate me (or it is prohibitively expensive for me to relocate to that niche)” (“Economic 
Liberty,” 16).  Also see Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011); and Jason 
Brennan, Against Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP, forthcoming).  Of course, libertarians tend to be 
even more skeptical of political liberties than classical liberals.  For a classic example of this 
skepticism, see Nozick's critique of the democratic state in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 276-295, 
which includes the well-know “Tale of the Slave.”  More recently, Caplan argues that political decision 
making is systematically biased and irrational in ways that economic decision making is not.  See 
Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter.  Also, Michael Huemer, “In Defense of Passivity,” Studia 
Humana 1, no. 2 (2012).
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who fundamentally disagree in their aims and values, as opposed to a 
social order premised on the devotion of all to a collective project.255
A just liberal state will thus allow its citizens extensive rights over how they use and 
exchange their labor and property.  For classical liberals, then, placing restrictions and 
conditions on the kinds of contracts that the state enforces, and placing regulations and 
limits on the kinds of activities allowable in the economic sphere, threaten to unjustly 
limit the range of pluralism that can be accommodated.
Importantly, for Gaus, a just private property equilibrium must be a “genuine 
moral equilibrium” as well.256  The property regime should not be experienced as 
oppressive by any class of society, and thus must track the reasonable interests of all 
citizens.  Imagine a libertarian society that adopted Nozick’s historical entitlement theory 
of distributive justice, one that could genuinely demonstrate to its citizens that all current 
property holdings are derived from a history of just acquisitions and transfers.  
Nevertheless, an impoverished class of citizens could develop in this society over time 
(perhaps based on the permissible choices of certain members of the previous generations
to consume, instead of invest and save and bequeath, their wealth).  Members of this class
would reasonably claim that the economic regime was not adequately tracking their 
reasonable interests relative to feasible alternative institutional arrangements.  Members 
of this class, like all members of society, must be provided with accessible and satisfying 
reasons to respect the social rules under which they live.  In this libertarian society, no 
such reasons would be acceptable to this impoverished class.  
255 Gerald Gaus, “The Property Equilibrium in a Liberal Social Order (Or How to Correct Our Moral 
Vision),” in Liberalism and Capitalism, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011), 92.
256 Gaus, “The Property Equilibrium in a Liberal Social Order” 96.
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For these reasons, Gaus (like Tomasi) rejects libertarianism in favor of the 
classical liberal vision: “Certainly, the classical liberal’s acceptable range must be based 
on recognition that there are many acceptable property practices, and that most (perhaps 
all) of these will include transfer payments.”257  Gaus continues, “Classical liberals are 
rightly impressed by market processes, and as citizens they appropriately urge employing 
them on a wide variety of fronts.  But they must also recognize that these are typically 
controversial claims, based both on a certain weighing of a specific set of values and 
uncertain empirical evidence.”258  The classical liberal framework will thus allow room 
for forms of redistribution in addition to securing thick economic liberty.  This is how 
Gaus blends the Rawslian normative framework with Hayekian-type classical liberal 
economic institutions.259
4.5. The Contestability of the Decentralizing Response
But when Gaus commits himself to finding a “moral equilibrium,” he commits 
himself to finding and articulating some set of moral principles that are shared in 
257 Gerald Gaus, “The Range of Justice (Or, How to Retrieve Liberal Sectual Tolerance),” 10 October 
2012, accessed 25 October 2012, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/10/10/gerald-gaus/range-justice-
or-how-retrieve-liberal-sectual-tolerance.
258 Gaus, “The Range of Justice.”
259 For a further elaboration of these views, also see Gerald Gaus and Loren Lomasky, “Are Property 
Rights Problematic?”, The Monist 73, no. 4 (October 1990).  Others have written on the connections 
between Rawls' high liberal normative framework and Hayek's classical liberal institutions.  See Robert 
Sugden, “Normative Judgments and Spontaneous Order: The Contractarian Elements in Hayek's 
Thought,”Constitutional Political Economy 4, no. 3 (Fall 1993); Will Wilkinson, “Market Democracy 
and Dirty Ideal Theory,” 15 June 2012, accessed 8 August 2013, 
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/06/market-democracy-and-dirty-ideal-theory/; Andrew Lister,
“The 'Mirage' of Social Justice: Hayek Against (and For) Rawls,” Critical Review 25, no. 3-4 (2013).  
For a debate about the compatibility of Rawls and Hayek, see Arthur DiQuattro, “Rawls and Left 
Criticism,” Political Theory 11, no. 1 (February 1983); Lawrence Connin, “On DiQuattro, 'Rawls and 
Left Criticism,'” Political Theory 13, no. 1 (February 1985); and Arthur DiQuattro, “Rawls versus 
Hayek,” Political Theory 14, no. 2 (May 1986).  Also see Hayek's own thoughts on his relationship to 
Rawls' thought in the preface to F.A. Hayek's The Mirage of Social Justice, vol. 2 of Law, Legislation, 
and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
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common.  I have tried to show that this common ground is lacking in the domain of 
economic justice.  So while Gaus hopes that his decentralizing response is an acceptable 
response to pluralism, it seems clear that our deep pluralism of views about economic 
justice will undermine the acceptability of Gaus' decentralizing response.  It is to this 
question to which I now turn: to what extent is Gaus' classical liberal vision a compelling 
internal critique of Rawls' high liberalism?  
First, I will evaluate Gaus' assessment of the centralizing response.  The 
centralizing response appeals to many people.  Deliberative democrats view democratic 
decision making as the appropriate strategy for securing social cooperation in a great 
many social and economic domains.  Many people are attracted to this more participatory
paradigm according to which most (possibly all) human associations are to be organized 
through participatory democratic deliberation and decision making.260  What are some of 
the problems with this view?
The centralizing approach indeed can often underestimate the depth and 
persistence of disagreement.  Deliberative democrats often assume that our beliefs are 
relatively malleable, and thus they assume that the process of deliberation can be reliably 
counted upon to convert our ex ante pluralism into ex post consensus.  This assumption is
not benign – it can have dangerous consequences.  In those areas where our disagreement
is deepest, and deliberation does not lead to consensus, then deliberation must end with a 
vote, after which the losing minority is forced to conform to the majority's decision.  In 
these cases, perhaps the decentralizing response would have been most appropriate, 
260 This sentiment is nicely captured by John Dewey’s notion of “democracy as a way of life.”  See John 
Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Athens, OH: Ohio UP, 1927).  For a well-known critique of 
Dewey's “democracy as a way of life,” see Robert Talisse, “A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy,” 
Political Studies 59, no. 3 (October 2011); and Robert Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy 
(New York: Routledge, 2007).  This issue is taken up in more detail in chapter V.
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defusing the deep disagreement by allowing all parties to retreat to the private sphere 
where they would be free to act on their preferences undisturbed by the preferences of the
majority.  Using the jargon of public choice theory, centralizing responses can have high 
“external costs,” namely, costs imposed on the losing minority, and the higher these costs 
are, the more likely that people will insist on decentralizing solutions.261
For these reasons, Gaus suggests that the problem of pluralism should lead us to 
be wary of the “liberty of the ancients,” and to instead be inclined to favor decentralizing 
responses.  This argument is convincing in many ways.  So what, then, are some of the 
concerns and problems with the decentralizing response?  I can image two possible kinds 
of objections.  On the one hand, some citizens in some cases may find the decentralizing 
response to be inherently morally objectionable.  Take the example of the school choice 
movement in the United States, which offers a decentralizing response to our 
disagreements about education.  For school choice advocates, all parents should be given 
a voucher that would allow them to choose the kind of school to send their children – 
public or private, secular or religious, etc.  This would help us de-politicize the 
curriculum by allowing different schools to teach different things.  Some schools can 
teach Howard Zinn’s Peoples’ History of the United States, while others can choose not 
to.  Some schools can teach progressive sex education, while others can choose to 
advocate more traditional messages about sex and marriage.  Some schools can include 
intelligent design in their science classes, while others can just teach Darwinian 
evolution.  Everyone gets to choose a school for their child that mirrors their own values. 
This classical liberal solution secures unanimity without conformity.262
261 See Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, 44-46.
262 This position is defended in Neal McCluskey, “Why We Fight: How Public Schools Cause Social 
Conflict,” Policy Analysis 587 (January 2007).  McCluskey points out seven controversial topics that 
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However, many people find school choice to be objectionable, because internal to 
their own value systems is a commitment to the idea that all American children be 
educated with similar content so as to produce adult citizens with common values, 
prepared for responsible citizenship.  The public-ness and society-wide conformity of the 
educational process is seen as inherently valuable.  Many people are not content with the 
thought that, for example, their own child is being taught good Darwinian science while 
their neighbor is being taught (in a different school) what is often considered religious 
dogma disguised as science.  Many people are not content with the thought, for example, 
that their child is being taught a certain kind of sex education while other children are 
not.  For some people, it is important that all children are taught material that mirrors 
some common set of values.  The fact that these values are contested and controversial is 
not sufficient to convince certain people of the merits of the decentralizing response.  
Is the insistence on a centralizing response for education necessarily authoritarian 
and oppressive?  I think not.  Indeed, almost everyone would object to a completely 
decentralizing response to education.  Imagine if some parents could choose to put their 
children in an all-white school, or one that taught explicitly white supremacist history.  
Even if there were no public funding going to these schools, most people would want the 
government to prohibit them.  That is, many reasonable people demand a centralizing 
response vis-à-vis the issue of segregated schooling (namely, we want to coercively 
could be defused by using school vouchers to let parents select schools for their children that better 
matched their values, which include: intelligent design, freedom of expression, book banning, 
multiculturalism, mandated integration vs. self-determination, sex education, homosexuality, and 
religion.  He concludes, “Indeed schooling driven by choice is the only education system that is truly 
consonant with liberty because it lets individuals—rather than government—make their own 
educational choices.  Imposing 'democracy' through government-run schooling, in contrast, is inherently
authoritarian … If public education were driven by free parental choice, it could escape the Balkanizing
battles that plague our current system, because individual parents could choose schools that comport 
with their values, and there would be no need to fight over public schools for which they must pay, but 
only the most politically powerful can control” (15-16).
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prohibit certain kinds of segregated schools).  But some reasonable people want a 
decentralizing response vis-à-vis the curriculum content (among other things), while 
others do not.  For those who do not, Gaus’ proposal of “dividing social life into different 
jurisdictions” would not be deemed appropriate for issues related to education.  And it 
seems clear that those who prefer centralizing responses are not necessarily unreasonable 
or authoritarian.263  
Additionally, some people object to the decentralizing response because 
sometimes the long-term effects of decentralized decision making can eventually become 
a public concern.  I now turn more directly to the issue of property rights.  While many 
people agree that some economic liberty is important and agree that collectivist economic
planning is undesirable (a position shared by high liberals and classical liberals alike), 
many people also have moral objections to the patterns of inequality that emerge over 
time in relatively free markets.  Even if every particular transaction is just, the resultant 
inequalities may reasonably be deemed unjust by some citizens.  For Nozick's historical 
entitlement theory of justice, of course, this objection is illegitimate – if all transactions 
are just at the micro level, then the distribution is therefore just at the macro level.  For 
many reasonable people, however, it is not.  The moral unacceptability of emergent large 
economic inequalities is deeply intuitive to some people.  Gaus recognizes this, and is 
thus conflicted about the appropriateness of private property rights as a justified solution 
to the problem of pluralism.  He reveals his ambivalence when he notes, 
Certainly the history of twentieth century philosophy and, indeed, politics,
reveals that the overwhelming majority of political philosophers, 
263 For an extended and thoughtful discussion that explicitly brings Rawlsian political liberalism to bear on 
the issue of school choice, see Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (New York: Oxford 
UP, 2000).
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economists, and citizens have held that anything approaching a laissez-
faire market system is unjustifiable to the disadvantaged.  On the other 
hand, I think ... we have compelling grounds for concluding that rules of 
private property are essential for living together in a peaceful and 
mutually beneficial way.  But there is a wide range of reasonable views 
about what those rules should be.  The rules of property are both the 
source of a mutually beneficial social life, and a source of social and 
moral disagreement.  Different property practices—different rules of the 
game—are endorsed by different reasonable persons.264   
Thus, when they are deliberating about and selecting principles of economic justice, Gaus
accepts that Members of the Public will consider the likely economic distributions 
corresponding to each proposed economic regime, and the least advantaged group will 
reasonably demand a distribution that treats them justly: “Many [Members of the Public] 
could not possibly evaluate and rank schemes of private ownership unless they know 
their distributive implications: for many members of the public these issues are tightly 
bound together.”265  In other words, for some people decentralized private decision 
making is not inherently problematic, but the long-terms effects of this decentralized 
economic regime may be problematic, and these effects may at some point trigger the 
need for centralized democratic decision making (e.g. for redistributive policies to correct
for inequality).266
264 Gerald Gaus, “On the ins and outs of public reason,” 18 October 2012, accessed 25 October 2012, 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/10/18/gerald-gaus/ins-outs-public-reason.
265 Gerald Gaus, “Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State,” Social Philosophy and Policy 27, 
no. 1 (January 2010): 20.
266 For an influential recent account documenting the data and trends of economic inequality, see Thomas 
Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
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Gaus may be correct that a presumption in favor of decentralized private decision 
making is a desirable strategy for achieving stability in the midst of deep pluralism.  Gaus
is right to criticize the deliberative democrats who fetishize the process of democratic 
deliberation and who deem it to be the optimal strategy for securing social cooperation 
across all domains of social life.  This totalizing democratic urge is indeed a recipe for 
sharpened conflict and unending instability, and it will likely be rejected by reasonable 
people for these reasons.  If we are considering practical questions of political stability, 
clearly the decentralizing response is often superior.  We all now see the wisdom in 
privatizing our religious views following the Reformation and the Wars of Religion.  Very
few people want to bring religious belief back under the umbrella of public democratic 
decision making.  With religious belief, “(association-wide) unanimity without (society-
wide) conformity” has been the clear route to stability.  But this is an easy case.  As 
Rawls correctly notes, liberty of conscience is one of our core considered convictions, 
and it commands a strong overlapping consensus in modern liberal democracies among 
religious and non-religions citizens alike.  However, in many other cases, the legitimacy 
of the decentralizing response is reasonably contested.  Internal to some reasonable 
peoples’ values is a concern with what other people do.  Not many people feel inclined to 
use state power to impose their religious worldview on their fellow citizens.  But many 
reasonable people do, in fact, feel inclined to impose their views about educational 
curriculum on their fellow citizens.  Or their views about health care.  Or their views 
about fairness when it comes to economic distributions.
Press, 2014).  For an explication and critique of the political philosophy underlying Piketty's analysis, 
see Kevin Vallier's five posts on the Bleeding Heart Libertarians blog (“Thomas Piketty's Problematic 
Political Philosophy” Parts I-V: “Normative Arguments,” “Inequality and Social Stability,” “Inequality 
and the Common Utility,” “Inequality and Transparency,” and “The Democratic Control Argument.”).  
For a related discussion of the moral issues surrounding economic inequality, see Will Wilkinson, 
“Thinking Clearly about Economic Inequality,” Policy Analysis no. 640 (June 2009).
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How we divide the public from the private (that is, which issues are decided 
through centralized political decision making and which issues are decided through 
decentralized private decision making) is a fundamental and unresolved debate within the
liberal tradition.  We disagree about when forced society-wide conformity is legitimate, 
and when it is oppressive.  We not only disagree, but we disagree about the means by 
which to overcome unresolved disagreements.  Decentralization is a widely agreed upon 
response to certain forms of pluralism (like religious pluralism), but for other issues 
(especially issues concerning economic liberty and economic equality), the privatization 
strategy must be recognized as nothing more than one partisan position among others.
As I have shown, the new classical liberal strand of political liberalism attempts to
show that strong property rights and limited government can be a non-sectarian and 
reasonable solution the problem of pluralism, since this solution follows the broadly 
liberal strategy of devolving power and privatizing decisions in order to avoid the 
conflicts inherent in collective decision making in the context of deep pluralism.  
However, I have argued that this solution is, indeed, controversial, since it is actually one 
partisan position in the conflict (among others) and not an obviously correct solution to 
the conflict.  It must be realized that thick economic liberty is a reasonable, although very
controversial (and reasonably rejectable) position.  
5. Nozick’s Changing Views on Pluralism and Property
It is now worth returning to the work of Robert Nozick from a new angle.  Nozick
argues, in part 3 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, that the privatization strategy is the only 
reasonable solution to pluralism, even in the case of economic justice.  Strong private 
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property rights are deemed to be uniquely reasonable.  However, Nozick later came to 
recognize this position as flawed, for reasons mirroring the thesis of this chapter: 
reasonable people disagree deeply about the nature of economic justice, and they 
furthermore reasonably disagree about how to resolve that disagreement.  Nozick finally 
came to accept this pluralism-all-the-way-down in his later essay “The Zigzag of 
Politics,” which encompasses a number of important insights about the nature and 
consequences of deep pluralism.  I will first lay out his argument for strong private 
property rights in Anarchy, State, and Utopia before going on to explain his turn-around 
in “The Zigzag of Politics.”
5.1. Pluralism and Property in Anarchy, State, and Utopia
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick famously defends a libertarian theory of 
justice that contains three principles of justice: justice in acquisition (basically Lockean 
labor-mixing and the Lockean proviso), transfer (basically informed consent as a 
sufficient condition for just transfers), and rectification (the correction of past 
injustices).267  This theory of justice (called the “historical entitlement theory”) entails a 
minimal state that basically only serves as a monopolistic protection agency for a given 
territory.  Nozick argues that this minimal state represented a utopia of sorts – or rather, a 
meta-utopia.  He explains, 
Utopia will consist of utopias, of many different and divergent 
communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different 
institutions.  Some kinds of communities will be more attractive to most 
than others; communities will wax and wane.  People will leave some for 
267 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 208.
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others or spend their whole lives in one.  Utopia is a framework for 
utopias, a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to 
pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the  good life in the ideal 
community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon 
others.  The utopian society is the society of utopianism … [U]topia is 
meta-utopia: the environment in which utopian experiments may be tried 
out; the environment in which people are free to do their own thing; the 
environment which must, to a great extent, be realized first if more 
particular utopian visions are to be realized.268  
In other words, a truly utopian society must be one that itself makes room for a large 
variety of private associations in which individual are free to try to build and live out 
their own utopian aspirations, and in which people are permitted to freely enter and exit 
the communities of others.  Only within the context of freely formed private associations 
can people try to create communities that fully realize and reflect their deepest ideals and 
interests.  Private associations can aspire to utopia, while the state should only be a meta-
utopian framework securing and protecting the freedom of association.269
Why should the state not aspire to embody utopia?  Here Nozick concurs (in some
sense at least) with Rawls: the fact of reasonable pluralism.  People have such diverse 
ideals and interests that no large-scale state could ever do justice to them all, and if it 
268 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 312.
269 This idea finds a loose parallel in Rawls, who insists that the well-ordered society is not a “community,”
since the well-ordered society “has no final ends and aims in the way that persons or associations do” 
(Political Liberalism, 41).  The state imposes no comprehensive conception of the good on its citizens, 
but only creates the conditions in which individuals (through private associations) develop and live out 
their own comprehensive set of values.  The difference, of course, is that for Rawls, this requires that 
the state impose and maintain a particular conception of economic justice.  For Nozick, on the other 
hand, the state takes no position in the debates about economic justice, and instead permits each 
community to embody whatever conception of economic justice it prefers.
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tried to, it would inevitably be seen as oppressive.  Nozick describes our situation of deep
pluralism: “[P]eople are different.  They differ in temperament, interests, intellectual 
ability, aspirations, natural bent, spiritual quests, and the kind of life they wish to lead.  
They diverge in the values they have and have different weightings of the values they 
share.”270  He offers as a trivial example, “They wish to live in different climates—some 
in mountains, plains, deserts, seashores, cities, towns.”271  Thus, “There is no reason to 
think that there is one community which will serve as ideal for all people and much 
reason to think that there is not.”272  He then illustrates his point in a memorable passage 
meant to highlight the deep diversity and pluralism of values between people: 
Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Merton, Yogi 
Berra, Allen Ginsburg, Harry Wolfson, Thoreau, Casey Stengel, The 
Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh Heffner, Socrates, 
Henry Ford, Lenny Bruce, Baba Ram Dass, Gandhi, Sir Edmund Hillary, 
Raymond Lubitz, Buddha, Frank Sinatra, Columbus, Freud, Norman 
Mailer, Ayn Rand, Baron Rothschild, Ted Williams, Thomas Edison, H.L. 
Mencken, Thomas Jefferson, Ralph Ellison, Bobby Fischer, Emma 
Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, you, and your parents.  Is there really one kind
of life which is best for each of these people?  Imagine all of them living 
in any utopia you’ve ever seen described in detail.  Try to describe the 
society which would be best for all of these persons to live in.273  
270 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 309-310.
271 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 310.
272 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 310.
273 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 310.
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If the state tries to itself embody and impose utopia, it will inevitably have to privilege 
the ideals and interests of certain citizens over others (Rawls would call this “the fact of 
oppression”274).  As Ralf Bader puts it, “Any institutional structure that is more extensive 
than the minimal state will fail to be neutral and will privilege certain views of utopia.”275
From here, though, Nozick draws an interesting conclusion.  Since the fact of 
pluralism seems to clearly characterize our situation, and since the state choosing sides 
seems to clearly lead to oppression, Nozick argues that the state must content itself with 
being a limited, libertarian state.  Thus, the ideal political arrangement consists in one 
political conception of justice regulating the practice of many conceptions of the good 
life.  The assumption is that reasonable people will agree about justice (the libertarian 
historical entitlement view), while reasonable people will disagree about the good life 
(thus they will agree to devolve decisions about the good life to private associations).  
This is structurally similar to the position developed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, 
where he argues that “justice as fairness” is the uniquely reasonable principle of justice 
for a society otherwise characterized by a pluralism of conceptions of the good life.276
How can Nozick claim that the libertarian conception of justice is uniquely 
preferable to alternative conceptions of justice?  He argues that the libertarian political 
framework is, in the words of Bader, the “maximal institutional structure that is in 
principle compatible with the complete satisfaction of the maximal non-arbitrary set of 
274 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36-37.
275 Ralf Bader, “The Framework for Utopia,” in The Cambridge Companion to Nozick's Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia (New York: Cambridge UP, 2011), 267.
276 Indeed, this structure – agreement about justice, disagreement about the good – is common to a great 
deal of political philosophy in the post-Reformation West.
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preferences that are in principle co-satisfiable.”277  To put it more simply, the libertarian 
minimal state is the only political structure that can accommodate all the diverse and 
conflicting conceptions of the good life that people might choose to pursue.  How, then, 
does Nozick respond to the egalitarian socialist who would say something like the 
following: “But your minimal state does not actually accommodate my ideals.  My ideals 
require a larger-than-minimal state that will constantly redistribute wealth so as to 
guarantee economic equality across society.  I thus experience the minimal state as 
oppressive. ”  In response to this objection, Nozick needs to invoke some kind of 
distinction between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” persons/beliefs (to use Rawlsian 
terminology).
To this end, Nozick distinguishes between three kinds of ideals: existentialist, 
missionary, and imperialistic.  He argues that existentialist and missionary ideals are 
reasonable, while imperialistic ideals are unreasonable.  What do these terms mean?  
Existentialists are unconcerned about how others live, as long as the existentialists are 
permitted to live out their own ideals in the private sphere.  They are indifferent toward 
the choices and beliefs of others.  Because of this, they have no interest in enlisting state 
power to force their views on others.  Missionaries, on the other hand, want everyone in 
society (perhaps everyone in the world) to share the missionaries’ particular ideals, but 
they are committed to spreading these ideals through nonviolent moral suasion.  While 
they care intensely about the choices and beliefs of others, the missionaries refuse to 
resort to coercion in their activities.  They will not, in other words, try to enlist state 
power to enforce their values.  Imperialists, however, share with the missionaries a 
concern with the activities of others, but unlike the missionaries they are willing to use 
277 Bader, “The Framework for Utopia,” 283.
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coercion to impose their ideals upon others.  However, this coercion is not permitted in a 
libertarian meta-utopia, since it involves the violation of Lockean rights.  Imperialists are 
permitted to form their own private association and peacefully practice their ideals 
together, but they are not permitted to use force to spread their message.  Bader notes, “it 
is perfectly acceptable for there to be an imperialistic community that has imperialistic 
ambitions but does not act upon them.”278  But this would clearly violate the very core of 
the imperialists’ worldview, which dictates that their ideals must be practiced by all, even 
if coercion is required to make it happen.  Indeed, if the imperialists formed a community
without resorting to imperialistic coercion, this would turn the imperialists into 
missionaries.
So Nozick recognizes that his libertarian meta-utopia will not accommodate the 
imperialists, but this does not bother him.  The existentialists and missionaries are 
“reasonable” citizens, while the imperialists are “unreasonable.”  And justice need not 
accommodate unreasonable demands.  Given the libertarian theory of justice, the 
complaints and frustrations of the imperialists are not a mark against the justice of the 
minimal state.  The minimal state is able to accommodate the most expansive set of 
conceptions of the good, as long as they are non-imperialistic.  This set of non-
imperialistic views to be accommodated can be thought of as “self-regarding first-order 
preferences,” and, as Bader puts it, “What makes the minimal state special is that its 
ideals are compatible with all self-regarding first-order preferences.”279  The minimal 
state allows everyone to live out their ideals, as long as those ideals do not require using 
278 Bader, “The Framework for Utopia,” 269.
279 Bader, “The Framework for Utopia,” 270.  This terminology is slightly confusing, since missionaries 
clearly are “other-regarding” in the sense that they care about the actions and beliefs of others and hope 
to convert them.  But they are “self-regarding” in the sense that they are not willing to use force against 
any other people or communities in their missionary projects.
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coercion on others.  Again, the minimal state permits everyone to pursue their own 
conception of the good within the context of their private association.  But, 
importantly,“other-regarding preferences and preferences regarding meta-associations are
not always satisfied,” because the libertarian framework “allows people to choose their 
ideal association, but it does not allow them to choose their meta-association.”280  The 
other-regarding preferences of the imperialist are not accommodated since coercion is 
ruled out (although the peaceful other-regarding preferences of the missionary are of 
course accommodated).  While non-libertarians are permitted to form their own socialist 
communes (with free exit rights for all members), they are not permitted to change the 
libertarian meta-utopian framework into a socialist state.
For Nozick, then, libertarianism is uniquely preferable to socialism because a 
libertarian state would permit the existence of voluntary socialist communities (with 
shared property, equal remuneration, and shared work) to exist within its borders, while a 
socialist state could not allow libertarian communities (with strong private property in 
capital assets and free exchange) to exist within its borders.  Brennan echoes this point 
that there is an “essential asymmetry between the capitalist and the socialist visions of 
utopia,” namely, “Capitalists allow socialism, but socialists forbid capitalism.  Capitalism
permits people to own property individually, but is also permits them to own it 
collectively.  In contrast, socialism forbids people from owning property individually, and
only allows them to own it collectively.”281  So while state socialism is ruled out as 
unjust, non-imperialistic (missionary or existentialist) voluntary socialism is perfectly 
acceptable.  
280 Bader, “The Framework for Utopia,” 270.
281 Brennan, Why Not Capitalism?, 95.
139
Nozick, however, recognizes why most socialists will find this proposal 
unacceptable: it is hard to build socialism on large scales without enlisting state coercion. 
Nozick argues that the Israeli kibbutzim provide a good example of what this “voluntary 
socialism” would look like in a libertarian meta-utopia.282  He notes that the kibbutzim 
example does not bode well for voluntary socialism, since less than ten percent of 
Ashkenazi Jews choose to join a kibbutz (the rest preferring less socialistic alternatives).  
Nozick concludes from this example, 
Surely this minority should everywhere be allowed to do this, joining 
together with other like-minded people to live according to their desires.  
(It is a virtue of a free system that it allows minority preferences to be 
satisfied, just as a free market caters also to minority tastes – for example, 
for recordings of Renaissance music or of chassidic songs.)  Furthermore, 
this minority may try to persuade the rest of us of the superior virtues of 
their ideal.  But that’s all.  They may not force the rest of us to live that 
way.  We can understand, though, why they might be tempted to do so.  In 
that setting most conducive to the free acceptance of socialist ideals, with 
the most attractive and respected socialist communities and the most 
receptive population, only nine percent (as a generous estimate) would 
choose to live that way.  The prospects, therefore, are dim for 
282 Another arguably real-world case of the Nozickian utopia is “charter cities,” which are cities within 
nations that operate according to their own legal rules and institutions, thus offering the citizens of those
nations more choices (and exit options), and generating competition between cities to best fulfill the 
desires of their potential inhabitants.  See Paul Roemer, “Why the World Needs Charter Cities,” TED, 
July 2009, accessed 10 March 2014, http://www.ted.com/talks/paul_romer?language=en. 
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interpersonal socialism’s coming anywhere voluntarily.  As Israel shows 
us, there won’t be enough volunteers.283  
Thus, Nozick recognizes that most socialists (and egalitarians generally) will reject the 
libertarian meta-utopia since it will prevent them from realizing their conception of 
justice.  But Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, does not recognize this objection as 
reasonable.284
Nozick's libertarian conception of justice can only be seen as uniquely reasonable 
if all imperialistic other-regarding preferences are deemed unreasonable.  Bader 
summarizes, “a situation in which everyone’s preferences are satisfied is in principle only
possible if we restrict our focus to self-regarding first-order preferences, that is, 
preferences about the association of which one is a member.”285  This requires, then, that 
“other-regarding preferences as well as preferences about meta-associations must be 
excluded since they are not in principle co-satisfiable, that is, these preferences are such 
283 Robert Nozick, Socratic Puzzles (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1997), 279.
284 A similar point is made by Gaus, who considers the complaint “We cannot have what we value if the 
others act on what they value, since our option will be insufficiently popular, so we must inhibit people 
from going over to our competitors” (The Order of Public Reason, 380).  Gaus discusses this in the 
context of the prevalence of hierarchical capitalist firms in capitalist societies.  Certain egalitarians 
would like to abolish (or radically restructure) the firm as it exists today in capitalistic countries.  
However, firms develop hierarchically because, in utilizing the division of labor, specialization, and 
differentially priced positions, they are able to make huge efficiency gains that benefits each of the 
firm's workers (and consumers) relative to feasible institutional alternatives.  (For the economic theory 
behind this position, see Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica 4, no. 16. [November 
1937]).  For Gaus, the demands of the egalitarian “cannot be honored in a free society,” since “they seek
to inhibit competing ways of life in the name of a rationally controversial evaluative standard” (The 
Order of Public Reason, 380).  This follows from a basic commitment: “people need not justify acting 
on their own evaluative standards; in contrast, projects and plans that can only succeed by limiting 
others from acting as they see fit require justification” (The Order of Public Reason, 381).  In a recent 
article entitled “The Egalitarian Species,” accessed 2 March 2013, 
http://www.gaus.biz/EgalitarianSpecies.pdf, Gaus seems more receptive to the egalitarian's protest, 
recognizing that our evolved moral sentiments of freedom, equality, and fairness “sit uneasily with the 
values on which the hierarchical firm rests” (29).
285 Bader, “The Framework for Utopia,” 271.
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that satisfaction of one of them precludes satisfaction of many others.”286  The libertarian 
meta-utopia is capable of accommodating all reasonable believers and beliefs – 
existentialist and missionary – but it frustrates, as Nozick thinks it should, those 
imperialists who would seek to use force to impose their ideals upon others.  So utopian 
communities come and go, but the libertarian meta-utopia remains in place.  Conceptions 
of the good are many and diverse, just as people are, but there is one and only one 
reasonable conception of justice.  But this view, Nozick came to realize, is subject to 
many of the same problems of political liberalism that I have reviewed above.
5.2. Pluralism and Property in “The Zigzag of Politics”
Nozick’s politics changed (somewhat) throughout his life, and much has been 
written about this.287  What I will focus on here is the way in which Nozick’s “meta-
politics” changed – that is, the way in which his views about the nature of politics 
changed.  The minimal state of Anarchy, State, and Utopia does not have much room for 
“politics,” in the colloquial sense of exercising political power through democratic 
mechanisms.  Indeed, it is not clear that Nozick’s libertarian meta-utopian minimal state 
features politics at all.  In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick argues that democratic 
collective rule conflicts with strong libertarian rights, because democratic institutions 
basically make everyone a “part-owner of each other person,” while libertarian rights 
imply complete self-ownership.288  Democracy legitimizes the coercive imposition of 
286 Bader, “The Framework for Utopia,” 271.
287 For a controversial and widely-read argument concerning Nozick's falling away from libertariansm, see 
Stephen Metcalf, “The Liberty Scam: Why even Robert Nozick, the Philosophical Father of 
Libertarianism, Gave up on the Movement he Inspired,” 20 June 2011, accessed 18 January 2013, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/the_dilettante/2011/06/the_liberty_scam.html. 
288 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 286.
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policies upon dissenters, which is impermissible according to the libertarian theory of 
justice.  In other words, in a democracy, a winning majority gets to push around the 
losing minority.  In a libertarian minimal state, no one gets to push anybody around.
But in his later essay “The Zigzag of Politics” (in The Examined Life), Nozick 
takes a very different tack.  In the opening paragraph of the article, Nozick criticizes 
some of the assumptions he made in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.  He writes that Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia
neglected the symbolic importance of an official political concern with 
issues or problems, as a way of marking their importance or urgency, and 
hence of expressing, intensifying, channeling, encouraging, and validating 
our private actions and concerns toward them.  Joint goals that the 
government ignores completely… tend to appear unworthy of our joint 
attention and hence to receive little.  There are some things we choose to 
do together through government in solemn marking of our human 
solidarity, served by the fact that we do them together in this official 
fashion and often also by the content of the action itself.289  
He goes on, “The complete absence of any symbolic public expression and marking of 
caring and solidarity would leave the rest of us bereft of a society validating human 
relatedness.”290  If we eliminated those things that we do jointly through the state, we 
might very well (for example) leave many people in desperately miserable situations, and
“this would leave the rest of us ashamed at our society.”291  The libertarian objector might
289 Nozick, The Examined Life, 287.
290 Nozick, The Examined Life, 289.
291 Nozick, The Examined Life, 289.
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urge us to stop identifying with this fictitious “society,” which would prevent us from 
feeling this sense of shame.  But, for Nozick, this disavowal of our social identity is 
unthinkable: “This cost is too great.”292
There is much that could be said about these statements.  But here I will focus on 
how Nozick’s comments in “The Zigzag of Politics” relate to his views about the 
libertarian meta-utopia in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.  To put it simply, by the time 
Nozick writes “The Zigzag of Politics,” he had dropped his uncompromising opposition 
to “imperialism.”  That is, Nozick came to believe that a just political system should not 
merely accommodate self-regarding first-order preferences, but it should also 
accommodate (some) other-regarding preferences as well as (some) preferences about the
political structure itself.  Bader inquires about “why [Nozick in Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia] privilege[s] the self-regarding preferences of non-imperialists over the other-
regarding preferences of imperialists,” and suggests that in Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
Nozick simply thought that “their inclusion [the preferences of the imperialists] would 
contravene the co-satisfiability criterion.”293  That is, almost all self-regarding first-order 
preferences can be jointly satisfied in individualized private associations, whereas this is 
not always the case with other-regarding preferences and preferences about the political 
structure, which often clash in a zero-sum fashion.  But in “The Zigzag of Politics,” 
Nozick definitively rejects this strict privileging of self-regarding first-order preferences: 
“There are many sides of ourselves that seek symbolic self-expression, and even if the 
personal side were to be given priority, there is no reason to grant it sole sway.”294
292 Nozick, The Examined Life, 289.
293 Bader, “The Framework for Utopia,” 272.
294 Nozick, The Examined Life, 287.
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So in “The Zigzag of Politics,” Nozick permits other-regarding preferences and 
preferences about the political structure to be part of politics.  But the Nozick of Anarchy,
State, and Utopia was right about one thing: if we want politics to accommodate these 
preferences, then we should expect some level of political turmoil to indefinitely 
characterize our political lives, since peoples' various views about political justice often 
clash in sharp ways.  This larger set of preferences cannot all be satisfied at once.  In 
“The Zigzag of Politics,” Nozick accepts this reality: “Let us suppose that there are 
multiple competing values that can be fostered, encouraged, and realized in the political 
realm ... Not all of these worthy goals can be pursued with full energy and means, and 
perhaps these goals are theoretically irreconcilable also, in that not all good things can be 
adjusted together into a harmonious package.”295  Clearly, once we let other-regarding 
preferences and preferences about the political structure into politics, things get messy.
295 Nozick, The Examined Life, 292.  Nozick lists some of the “multiple competing values” that he has in 
mind: “liberty, equality for previously unequal groups, communal solidarity, individuality, self-reliance, 
compassion, cultural flowering, national power, aiding extremely disadvantaged groups, righting past 
wrongs, charting bold new goals (space exploration, conquering disease), mitigating economic 
inequalities, the fullest education for all, eliminating discrimination and racism, protecting the 
powerless, privacy and autonomy for its citizens, aid to foreign countries, etc.” (The Examined Life, 
292).  Rawls briefly criticized this kind of intuitionistic pluralism in A Theory of Justice: “Now there is 
nothing intrinsically irrational about this intuitionist doctrine.  Indeed, it may be true.  We cannot take 
for granted that there must be a complete derivation of our judgments of social justice from 
recognizably ethical principles.  The intuitionist believes to the contrary that the complexity of the 
moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of 
competing principles.  He contends that attempts to go beyond these principles either reduce to 
triviality, as when it is said that social justice is to give every man his due, or else lead to falsehood and 
oversimplification, as when one settles everything by the principle of utility.  The only way therefore to 
dispute intuitionism is to set forth the recognizably ethical criteria that account for the weights which, in
our considered judgments, we think appropriate to give to the plurality of principles.  A refutation of 
intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of constructive criteria that are said not to exist” (34-35). My
argument in this and the previous chapter suggests that, when it comes to matters of economic justice 
(and possibly other domains of justice), Rawls failed to convincingly develop a “constructive criteria” 
that would help us weigh and prioritize competing values and claims.  As Rawls recognizes, in the 
absence of such a criterion, we are forced into the kind of intuitionistic balancing of plural and 
competing values that Nozick defends in “The Zigzag of Politics.”
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How, then, are we to choose from among this set of irreconcilable values and 
ideals which ones we want to strive for through “official joint action”?296  This is where 
the “zigzag” comes in.  Almost every political philosopher invariably wants society to 
implement her preferred conception of justice (including her preferred conception of 
economic justice) – whether it be Rawls’ “justice as fairness” or Nozick’s “historical 
entitlement theory.”  The voters, however, have other ideas.  Nozick notes, “The 
electorate wants the zigzag.  Sensible folk, they realize that no political position will 
adequately include all of the values and goals one wants pursued in the political realm, so
these will have to take turns.”297  While the partisan political philosopher bemoans the 
zigzag, Nozick insists, “The voters know what they are doing.”298  As time goes on, 
problems change, policies are successful or not, preferences change, etc., and with these 
changes, new values, and new prioritizations of values, become appropriate.
Nozick describes the point of view of the electorate: “Goals and programs have 
been pursued for some time by the party in power, and the electorate comes to think that’s
far enough, perhaps even too far.”299  When this time comes, “It’s now time to right the 
balance, to include other goals that have been, recently at least, neglected or given too 
low a priority, and it’s time to cut back on some of the newly instituted programs, to 
reform or curtail them.”300  Instead of holding up the “non-imperialists” as exemplars 
296 Nozick, The Examined Life, 298.
297 Nozick, The Examined Life, 295.
298 Nozick, The Examined Life, 292.  This respect for the voter expressed by Nozick here clashes with the 
skepticism many classical liberals have about voting in general.  See Caplan, The Myth of the Rational 
Voter; and Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance.
299 Nozick, The Examined Life, 294.
300 Nozick, The Examined Life, 294.
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(like he did in Anarchy, State, and Utopia), Nozick now holds up the “unfanatical” and 
“modest” citizen: 
we each should be unfanatical enough to admit that after some time it 
would be appropriate for society to shift to energetically pursuing goals 
other than the ones we currently most favor, and we should be modest 
enough to think that deciding when that time has come, and what the 
balance currently should be among worthy goals that cannot all be 
combined or pursued energetically together, is not something that should 
be decided by any one person alone, ourselves included.301  
Nozick concludes the essay memorably: “given a choice between permanently 
institutionalizing the particular content of any group of political principles thus far 
articulated… and the zigzag process of democratic politics, one where the electorate can 
have been presented with those same principles too among others, I’ll vote for the zigzag 
every time.”302
There is something profound in Nozick’s vote for the zigzag.  It represents Nozick
embracing an epistemic humility too often absent from political philosophy.  The political
philosopher often wants to be able to describe the nature of justice, after which her 
society can implement and institutionalize it (for an indefinite length of time).  After all, 
once we figure out the nature of justice, why wouldn't we implement it, once and for all? 
Nozick wanted to do this in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, and Rawls wanted to do this in A
Theory of Justice.  In both “justice as fairness” and the “historical entitlement theory,” 
there is a recognition that reasonable people disagree deeply and persistently about the 
301 Nozick, The Examined Life, 295.
302 Nozick, The Examined Life, 296.
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good life, but there is a resistance to the idea that reasonable people disagree deeply and 
persistently about justice itself.  In “The Zigzag of Politics,” Nozick finally puts this 
dogma behind him.303  For Nozick, the political philosopher cannot resolve the tragic 
pluralism of values that persists among even reasonable people, and any attempt to do so 
is illegitimate and dangerous.304
303 In this turn away from dogmatism, Nozick aligns himself (in some ways) with the pragmatist 
philosopher William James.  For James, the moral and political philosopher is not permitted to impose 
her favored set of values upon the moral confusion and pluralism of her community: “All one's 
slumbering revolutionary instincts waken at the thought of any single moralist wielding such powers of 
life and death.  Better chaos forever than an order based on any closet-philosopher's rule” (“The Moral 
Philosopher and the Moral Life,” in The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977], 623).  I develop the insights of pragmatist political theory for these 
problems of political liberalism in chapter V.  Loren Lomasky, paralleling Nozick, urges those with 
idiosyncratic views of justice to alter their political practice in light of reasonable pluralism.  See 
Lomasky's article, “Libertarianism as if (the other 99 Percent of) People Mattered,” Social Philosophy 
and Policy 15, no. 2 (Summer 1998).
304 Gerald Gaus also affirms the fact of deep pluralism about justice over against the typical political 
philosopher's dream of resolving it.  He insightfully (and humorously) notes, “In the last forty years, 
political philosophy has witnessed a plethora of visions of the just society—natural rights 
libertarianism, 'left' libertarianism, prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, egalitarianisms of a stunning 
variety, republicanism; theories of economic desert, welfare, need, and capabilities.  And, of course, the 
old standby, utilitarianism.  (We must not forget that many a hard-headed economist, insisting that he 
will have no truck with philosophical talk, proceeds to announce his allegiance to some form of social 
utility as the standard of justice.)  Political philosophers self-identify with their sects ('I’m an 
egalitarian.'  'Not me, I’m a libertarian.'  'Well, I’m a sufficientarian welfarist with prioritarian 
leanings!') Each of the dizzying variety of philosophical sects presents itself as possessing the truth 
about the just political organization and tells its adherents that the other sects either are recommending 
injustice, are not truly liberal, or have committed a heresy in, say, advocating resource egalitarianism 
over welfare egalitarianism, or left-libertarianism over orthodox rights libertarianism.  This 
understanding of political philosophy—as the theorist’s vision of the perfectly just society based upon 
her 'intuitions' or controversial 'theory' of justice—is facing a crisis of credibility.  Perhaps the original 
hope was that the systematic use of human reason would lead enquirers and citizens to converge on the 
truth about 'distributive justice' or 'the role of the state,' but any impartial observer must conclude what 
should have been obvious all along: as in so many matters, the free use of human reason leads to 
sustained disagreement and a proliferation of sects. This is not a mere episode on the way to consensus 
and enlightenment, but 'a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy.'  Such was the deep 
insight of the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth century, John Rawls.  Because the use of 
our reason on these matters is inherently controversial, political philosophy must, as he tells us, apply 
the principle of toleration to philosophy itself.  Liberalism’s founding insight was the recognition in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that controversial religious truths could not be the basis of coercive 
laws and public policies.  The task is now to apply this insight to philosophizing about justice itself.  
This is an extraordinarily difficult lesson for many.  Can it really be that I should not endeavor to ensure
that my society conforms to my 'knowledge' of justice?  (Compare: can it really be that my 'knowledge' 
of God’s will should not structure the social order?)” (“The Range of Justice”).  As I have argued in this 
chapter, neither Rawls nor Gaus succee entirely in this task of applying the principle of toleration to 
their own political philosophizing about justice.  I argue in chapter V that William James recognized 
this obligation and has some important insights about how it might be done.
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We often think that pluralism and disagreement about the good life is desirable 
because it allows for many experiments to take place, from which we can learn about 
which kinds of communities best enable flourishing and which ones do not.  In “The 
Zigzag of Politics,” Nozick expands this insight to cover justice as well.  Zigzagging vis-
à-vis justice is important and beneficial because the world is complicated, the world 
changes a lot (and quickly), people care about many diverse values (not all of which are 
compatible), and people often care as much about their other-regarding preferences as 
they do their self-regarding ones.  Debates about justice, like debates about the good life, 
generate deep – yet reasonable – disagreement.  And justice, like the good, should be 
periodically revisited, rethought, and revised.
6. Conclusion: Property and Deep Pluralism
At the heart of political liberalism lies the optimistic assumption that reasonable 
people will agree about the basic contours of justice.  In this chapter, I have tried to show 
that this assumption is unjustified, at least with regards to matters of economic justice.  
Rawls inspired a line of political liberal thought according to which reasonable 
individuals endorse certain political liberal premises and arrive at economic egalitarian 
conclusions.  I began with an external critique of political liberalism.  By exploring the 
core of the Rawls-Nozick debate, I have argued that reasonable individuals do not share 
the same premises when deliberating about economic justice.  In fact, reasonable people 
can hold radically different views about the nature of entitlement and ownership, which 
lead to radically different conceptions of economic justice.  I then moved on to an 
internal critique of political liberalism.  By exploring the contemporary debates between 
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high liberals and classical liberals within the political liberal tradition, I have argued that 
even those who share roughly the same basic assumptions can arrive at very different 
conclusions about economic justice.  In addition to the assumptions of public justification
and reasonable pluralism, Rawlsians need to add additional and controversial 
commitments about moral personhood and rely upon controversial empirical assumptions
about the effects of economic liberty on political equality in order to arrive at their 
egalitarian conclusions.  Reasonable people, who either accept or reject the basic 
premises of political liberalism, cannot be expected to arrive at the same basic views 
about economic justice.  This deeply troubles the political liberal project, which assumes 
the eventuality of rational consensus about all matters of basic justice.305
I have thus far argued at an ideal-theoretic level for the breakdown of a certain 
conception of liberal political theory.  This chapter has assumed that discussions of 
justice take place in idealized moral and epistemic conditions, and I have argued that 
even in these pristine conditions, consensus is not guaranteed.  In the next chapter I argue
for this same conclusion at a non-ideal-theoretic level.  In the next chapter, then, I analyze
real-world (non-ideal) deliberation about economic issues, focusing specifically on that 
forum in which much of our deliberation takes place today: the Internet.  I will argue that 
305 And a further problem that has not been mentioned yet: these deep disagreements about justice at the 
national level will surely be more intense when it comes to matters of global justice.  I have shown in 
this chapter that even within a single modern democratic society, unified by a shared political history 
and culture, the range of reasonable disagreement about economic justice is so large that an overlapping
consensus is not especially likely.  Given how much more pluralistic and diverse is the global 
community, what are responsible ways of crafting economic policy between countries, and how should 
multinational institutions be structured?  These important problems are ones that I hope to tackle in 
future research.  For some of the important voices in the debate about global justice, see John Rawls, 
The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001); Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: 
Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006); Charles R. 
Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979); Thomas Pogge, 
Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1989); Chandran Kukathas, “The Mirage of Global Justice,” 
Social Philosophy and Policy 23, no. 1 (January 2006); and Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global 
Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (March 2005).
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the Internet enables and fuels group polarization and political tribalism – that is, it creates
conditions in which our foundational disagreements about economic justice are solidified 
and entrenched.  In both the idealized deliberations of political philosophy and the non-
idealized deliberations online, we are deeply and indefinitely divided about basic matters 
of justice.  We have, I am claiming, both theoretical and empirical reasons to be skeptical 
about current iterations of political liberalism.
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CHAPTER IV
NON-IDEAL DELIBERATION ABOUT ECONOMIC ISSUES
1. Introduction: From Idealized Deliberation to Realistic Deliberation
In the previous two chapters, I have explored some of the ways in which the 
political liberal tradition fails to adequately resolve our reasonable disagreements about 
economic and distributive justice.  My central claim is that even if we restrict ourselves to
idealized “reasonable” people – people who lack any obvious epistemic or moral 
deficiencies – deliberating in an idealized space of reasons (where the “unforced force of 
the better argument” always wins306), we are not guaranteed to secure a consensus about 
the principles of economic and distributive justice that should guide questions about 
property rights, taxation, redistribution, regulation, inequality, etc.  This is because 
reasonable people can come to hold radically different views about these issues, in part 
because they can be committed to radically different premises (such as Robert Nozick's 
“self-ownership thesis” or John Rawls' “luck egalitarian thesis”), or basic agreed-upon 
concepts can be interpreted and interconnected in significantly different ways (as 
evidenced by the debate over the relationship between economic liberty and moral 
personhood that divides Samuel Freeman from John Tomasi, or the debate over the nature
of liberty and coercion that divides Gerald Gaus from Andrew Lister).  Even in ideal 
theory, then, where we restrict ourselves to idealized reasonable people, rational 
306 This phrase is associated with Jürgen Habermas.  He writes in the first chapter of The Inclusion of the 
Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo de Greiff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1998): “the communicative structure of rational discourse can ensure that all relevant contributions are 
heard and that the unforced force of the better argument alone determines the 'yes' or 'no' responses of 
the participants” (37).
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consensus is not a feasible goal on certain core matters of justice because of the wide 
plurality of reasonable views.
This chapter continues to explore the nature of our political disagreements about 
matters of economic and distributive justice, but through a different lens.  I have been 
arguing that the range of reasonable pluralism is much wider and deeper than has 
generally been appreciated in political philosophy, leading to the unlikelihood of 
consensus about principles of economic and distributive justice between reasonable 
people.  Here, then, I push this latter point further, by showing how much more difficult 
is the task of rational consensus about matters of basic justice (including but not limited 
to economic and distributive justice) when we move away from the idealized space of 
reasons populated by idealized reasonable people and into the actual, embodied, 
institutionalized spaces that structure our real-world reasoning and deliberation populated
by non-idealized people encumbered by cognitive biases, specifically focusing, in this 
chapter, on the virtual spaces of the Internet.
This shift in focus from ideal theory to non-ideal theory can be motivated by two 
different philosophical reasons, beyond the fact that a more realistic and empirical 
investigation is interesting and insightful in its own right.  The first point to mention is 
that the goal of public reason liberalism as developed and constructed in ideal theory does
generate actual demands on actual voters and political participants here and now in the 
non-ideal world.  For political liberals, individual citizens in the real world find 
themselves exercising politically-sanctioned coercion through their activities such as 
voting (that is, voting for particular policies or politicians who will exercise authority on 
their behalf) or by themselves participating in the political process (through lobbying or 
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themselves running for office).  Since this behavior imposes new (or changes the 
structure of the) obligations and entitlement of other citizens, such behavior stands in 
need of public justification.  In other words, actual individual citizens (here and now) are 
obligated to vote and politically participate on behalf of principles of justice which would
be acceptable to other reasonable people.307  Since political liberalism issues in these 
epistemic and moral requirements for actual, ordinary, politically active people, it is 
worthwhile asking whether these requirements can realistically be expected to guide the 
actions of ordinary citizens.  To what extent can we expect real people to deliberate about
public matters in “reasonable” ways, freeing themselves sufficiently from the moral and 
epistemic deficiencies and cognitive biases that are so common?
On another level, there have been serious philosophical criticisms of ideal theory 
as such, and these critiques take the form of both external and internal critiques.  Some 
external critics of political liberalism argue that ideal theory is unnecessary for the work 
of engaging in non-ideal real-world reform,308 while other critics argue that ideal theory 
functions as a pernicious rationalization of elements of the status quo,309 while still other 
critics argue that ideal theory is always already influenced by non-ideal assumptions, 
rendering it an incoherent category.310  On the other hand, some internal critics of political
307 For an argument on the moral obligation of voters to only vote if they are adequately informed, see 
Brennan, The Ethics of Voting.
308 See especially Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2009); but also William 
Galson, “Realism in Political Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory. 9, no. 4 (2010); Miller, 
Justice for Earthlings; David Schmidtz, “Idealism and Solipsism,” in Oxford Handbook of Distributive 
Justice, ed. Serena Olsaretti (New York: Oxford UP, forthcoming); Andrew Sabl, Hume's Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2012); and Judith Shklar, Faces of Injustice (New Haven: Yale UP, 1990).
309 See Charles Mills, “'Ideal Theory' as Ideology,” Hypatia 20, no. 3 (August 2005); and Onora O'Neill, 
“Abstraction, Idealization, and Ideology in Ethics,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 22 
(September 1987).
310 See Jacob Levy, “There's No Such Things as Ideal Theory,” 3 April 2014, accessed 2 June 2014, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2420125.
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liberalism agree with the basic motivation for ideal theory, but disagree with the exact 
nature of idealization that takes place in most ideal theorizing.  Gerald Gaus points out 
that the motivation for political liberalism is to work out a conception of justice to which 
all people can consent, thus ensuring that no one feels oppressed by being ruled by a 
government guided by principles that they reject.  But if the conception of justice is 
deemed acceptable only by highly idealized, almost unrecognizable phantoms behind the 
veil of ignorance, then many actual people might view the conception of justice as 
worthy of rejection.  That is, the motivation for political liberalism (that we live under 
principles of justice that we all affirm) seems to be in tension with the commitments of 
ideal theory (that we live under principles of justice selected by the handful of arguably 
“reasonable” people).  Because of this problematic tension, Gaus argues against extreme 
and controversial idealization and for a “significant but realistic level of idealization.”311  
For Gaus, this ensures that the worst moral and epistemic views have no say in the 
deliberation about justice, while also ensuring that those populating the space of reasons 
in ideal theory have a close connection to real people populating our actual society.  This 
less-idealized form of political philosophy requires us to have some sense of what we can
reasonably expect, morally and epistemically, from ordinary citizens, which requires an 
investigation into how people actually and usually deliberate and discuss matters of 
justice.
311 Gaus, The Order of Public Reasons, 276.  Gaus elaborates, “The philosophical tradition appealing to 
full rationality commences analysis with a highly idealized state, which is seen as providing guidance 
for real agents.  If we conclude that this is ultimately a futile exercise, we might work the other way 
around: begin with real agents and then see what degree of idealization of their reasoning makes sense” 
(244).  In opposition to this “full rationality,” Gaus defends “real rationality,” which “takes human 
cognitive limitations as central to understanding what a rational agent will believe and do” (244).  Also 
see Gerald Gaus' forthcoming book, The Tyranny of the Ideal (Princeton: Princeton UP, forthcoming).
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Each of these various concerns with and critiques of traditional ideal theory asks 
contemporary political philosophers to pay more attention to the actual ongoing practices 
of deliberation in their societies.  This should lead us to inquire into the nature of our 
current institutions and practices of political deliberation, and into the extent to which 
they are facilitating, or hindering, the production of reasonable citizens and publicly 
justified views and beliefs.  When we start thinking about current institutions and 
practices of political deliberation, what is immediately clear is how rapidly these 
institutions and practices are changing with the advent of the Internet and other new 
media of digital communication.  Instead of Walter Cronkite and the town square, we 
now share information and interact on Facebook, blogs, and comment sections.  In the 
twenty-first century, political philosophers who wish to reflect on democratic deliberation
and debate cannot ignore the role of the Internet in facilitating, structuring, and 
transforming the ways in which democratic deliberation and debate take place.  
Furthermore, as the world becomes increasingly globalized and interconnected, 
democratic politics will begin to transcend the bounds of the nation-state, and this 
emerging global democracy will be enabled, in part, by the new forms of digital 
communication and community that the Internet makes possible.  This is echoed by 
Nancy Fraser when she argues that we are transitioning from a “national communications
infrastructure” to a “deterritorialized cyberspace.”312  
But while the Internet is clearly changing the nature of democratic deliberation, 
not enough political philosophers have reflected on the promises and perils of our 
Internet-mediated deliberations about justice.  For these reasons, this chapter will address 
312 Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public 
Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World,” Transnationalizing the Public Sphere, ed. Kate Nash (Malden, 
MA: Polity Press, 2014): 26.  Also see Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in 
a Globalizing World (New York: Columbia UP, 2009).
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the question: how does this new digital world alter or transform the way in which our 
political disagreements play out?  
2. The Difficulties of Economic Justice: Moral Pluralism and Empirical Complexity
Instead of using the framework of ideal theory, in this chapter I turn toward the 
non-ideal world of actual political deliberation as it takes place between actual American 
citizens.  While I mostly look at the nature of deliberation about justice in general, I 
believe that there are some particular features of economic justice which make this 
investigation especially important and relevant in the context of the discussions in 
previous chapters of this dissertation.  What makes economic issues especially 
challenging is the extent to which they are characterized by both moral pluralism and 
empirical complexity.  Unlike other not-directly-economic political disagreements (such 
as cultural issues like same-sex marriage or abortion), which are almost entirely debates 
over normative commitments (or, as we usually say, values), disagreements about 
economic issues, in addition to the complex normative debates, also involve complicated 
and subtle debates about empirical questions (or, as we usually say, facts), such that even 
experts frequently disagree about the desirability of any given economic policy.  For 
example, evaluating the issue of abortion depends primarily on one's religious worldview,
and requires comprehension of only the most basic empirical matters.  Evaluating 
competing views about the merits of Keynesian stimulus, or competing views about 
monetary policy, requires some heavy-duty training in economics.  Many people are 
capable of developing a coherent set of values, which means that most people are 
competent to pass judgment on value-heavy cultural issues.  However, only the 
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exceptionally well-informed are capable of grasping the complex empirical issues 
underlying economic policies related to trade or healthcare.  
This problem highlights the difficulty of developing truly justified political 
beliefs, especially as they relate to questions of economic justice and economic policy.  
This problem, I will show, is in many ways made worse by the ways in which the Internet
has changed the ways we get informed and deliberate about political issues.  First, 
though, I will expand upon the nature and depth of this difficulty with developing 
justified political beliefs on issues related to economics.
Many political disagreements in the United States are now viewed as, more or 
less, stalemates that are not likely to be resolved by further deliberation.  The 
paradigmatic examples of stalemated political disagreements are often the “cultural” 
issues that have animated the “Culture War” in the United States, mostly revolving 
around issues such as abortion, gay marriage, and the role of religion in public life.  What
makes these disagreements so obviously intractable is that they are animated by 
disagreements, ultimately, about matters of religion and religious truth.  These topics are 
so difficult because discussions about religion and religious truth are themselves so 
difficult, being questions that are arguably, by their very nature, beyond the scope of 
reason itself.313
There are two important points to note about these cultural (and ultimately 
religious) disagreements, which will help distinguish them from the economic 
disagreements that are the focus of this dissertation.  The first important difference 
313 Although the intractability of these cultural issues is commonly recognized, the depth of our 
disagreements on these issues is disputed within political science.  See Morris Fiorina, Samuel Abrams, 
and Jeremy Pope. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 2010).
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between the cultural issues and economic issues is how they are dealt with in the tradition
of political liberalism.  One of the key features of political liberalism in the shared 
reasons tradition is that public deliberation about matters of basic justice must take place 
within the framework of “public reason.”  This entails the exclusion of non-public 
reasons from public deliberation about justice, and religious reasons are the paradigmatic 
case of non-shared reasons in conditions of pluralism.314  Since religious reasons are 
clearly reasons that cannot be accepted by non-religious people as a justification for 
coercively imposed policies, their deployment in public deliberation is regarded as 
oppressive and illegitimate.315  What is so striking, then, is that, from the point of view of 
shared reasons political liberalism, one side of the Culture War is straightforwardly 
unreasonable (namely, those religious citizens who hope to use religious reasons to 
justify and impose their views on abortion, gay marriage, etc.).
On the other hand, our wide-ranging disagreements about property rights often 
take place without resort to what are (obviously) non-public reasons (such as religious 
reasons).  Indeed, chapter III aimed to show that even between reasonable people, none 
of whom are drawing on religious reasons, reasonable disagreements about economic 
justice can be vast and deep (anything from libertarianism [or even anarchism] through 
314 See John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New 
York: Colombia UP, 1993).  Rawls' inclusion of the “proviso” in his account of public reason (according
to which deliberators may use private reasons as long as they follow them up with acceptable public 
reasons) does not change the fundamental exclusion of religious reasons from having their own 
justificatory force on matters of basic justice.  For a critical discussion of Rawls' later views on public 
reason, see David Reidy, “Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough,” Res Publica 6 
(2000).
315 This hostility toward the use of religious reasons in the public sphere is hotly debated even within the 
tradition of political liberalism.  See Audi and Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Sphere.  Kevin Vallier
argues that religious reasons should be allowed as “defensive” reasons, but not “offensive” reasons in 
deliberation about matters of basic justice.  That is, religious reasons should be able to defeat proposed 
policies, but they should not be able to justify new policies.  See Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and 
Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge, 2014).
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socialism is deemed reasonable).  These disagreements about economic justice are deep 
and persistent even in ideal circumstances, between idealized people, lacking any obvious
moral or epistemic deficiencies.  In other words, even if we assume away any false 
empirical beliefs, and even if we bracket away religious reasons, the wide range of 
reasonable pluralism about moral and philosophical commitments is enough to suggest 
that even indefinite and good faith deliberation will not result in consensus about matters 
of economic justice.  This chapter, then, looks at our political disagreements about 
economic justice without the idealizing assumption of perfectly reasonable deliberators, 
and I will show why we should expect even deeper and more persistent disagreement in 
the real world as compared with the ideal one.
The next thing to say about the difference between disagreements over cultural 
and economic issues is that the usual list of cultural issues have everything to do with 
moral and philosophical disagreements, and very little to do with empirical 
disagreements.  That is, those on opposite sides of debates about abortion or gay marriage
are not primarily debating about the relevant empirical facts and consequences of the 
various policies at issue.  For example, while debates about abortion do sometimes draw 
on scientific accounts about the timing and nature of fetal development and the 
emergence of sentience, these concerns are clearly secondary to questions about the 
metaphysics of personhood, theological and scriptural disputes, questions concerning our 
moral obligations to potential life, and questions about the relative moral and political 
priority of bodily autonomy against other concerns.  One always has the sense that the 
outcome of empirical side-debates will have little to no effect on the views of those 
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engaged in the more central moral and philosophical debates.  Thus, the core of these 
debates revolve around our religious and moral identities, not our empirical beliefs.
This contrasts sharply with questions about property rights and economic justice.  
When one considers the heated debates about these questions today, such as debates over 
health care legislation, Keynesian stimulus spending, welfare policies, and issues of 
taxation, regulation, and trade, it is immediately clear that these questions are clearly 
characterized by both moral pluralism and empirical complexity.  This is why some 
serious and complicated debates about economic issues can take place between people 
who share the same values or moral concerns (e.g. perhaps both interlocutors agree about 
the goal of universal health insurance coverage, but disagree sharply about the most 
efficient policies to achieve this shared goal).  Indeed, an important feature of economic 
debates is just how complicated they are on the empirical side.  While the cultural issues 
demand only that each interlocutor have a considered and coherent set of moral 
commitments, these economic issues require well-developed moral commitments in 
addition to a high degree of competence on empirical matters of economics.316  
We can ask two questions about the competence of most voters on matters of 
economics: (1) Are they adequately competent? And, if not, (2) can we expect them to 
become adequately competent so as to justifiably vote and advocate and act on behalf of 
those views (and thus take part in coercively yet legitimately imposing their views on 
others)?  Bryan Caplan demonstrates convincingly in his book The Myth of the Rational 
Voter that the voting public is systematically misinformed about basic economics (on the 
316 Ilya Somin echoes this point, noting that this set of economic issues, which requires both a high degree 
of “factual knowledge about public policies and their effects” as well as “a substantial degree of 
understanding of moral and philosophical arguments,” significantly “increases the knowledge burden 
that would be imposed on voters” – a burden, Somin thinks, that is far too unreasonable to impose on 
ordinary citizens (“Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance,” Critical Review 22, no. 2-3 
[2010]: 254).
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empirical side at least), in that the views of most voters systematically diverge from even 
areas of uncontroversial consensus in mainstream economics (e.g. the overall benefits of 
increasing international trade or liberalizing immigration policy).317  If most voters are 
inclined to be misinformed about basic matters of economics, how likely is it that they 
will be qualified to weigh in on more complicated empirical debates, debates which 
divide even professional economists?  We might call this “The Problem of Divided 
Experts.”  Many of the heated questions of property and economics listed above divide 
even professional economists who specialize in these areas.  One must wonder: when the 
experts are divided, how is it possible for non-experts to possibly evaluate or adjudicate 
such disagreements between the experts, given what we know about the epistetmic 
limitations and cognitive biases of non-experts?318  This is a serious problem for matters 
317 Caplan blames this problem of political ignorance on entrenched cognitive biases that are unlikely to be 
mitigated by any conceivable social policies, including reforms to education.  His solution, then, is to 
replace most political solutions with market solutions, since the latter create better incentives for people 
to seek out and act on good information.  For a similar argument, see Somin, “Deliberative Democracy 
and Political Ignorance,” and Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance. For philosophical critiques of
these kinds of arguments about political ignorance as a challenge to democratic ideals, see Gerald Gaus'
critical review of The Myth of the Rational Voter, “Is the Public Incompetent?”, Critical Review 20, no. 
3 (2008); and Robert Talisse, “Does Public Ignorance Defeat Deliberative Democracy?”, Critical 
Review 16, no. 4 (Fall 2004).  Caplan argues that the economic biases featured in public opinion are 
systematically biased in one direction – they are not randomly distributed so as to balance each other 
out on net.  This latter possibility (that economic biases cancel each other out on net) would hold out the
hope that even with a rationally ignorant population, if the ignorance led to biased beliefs distributed 
roughly evenly on both sides of any given issue, then through the “miracle of aggregation,” good 
policies would emerge.  For defenders of this view, see Wittman, The Myth of Democratic Failure; 
James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Doubleday, 2004); Allan Drazen, Political 
Economy in Macroeconomics (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000); Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, 
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Dani Rodrik, 
“Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature 34, no.1 (1996); Benjamin 
Page and Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and Gary Becker, “Toward a More General Theory of 
Regulation: Comment,” Journal of Law and Economics 19, no. 2 (1976).  For Caplan's response to 
Wittman's claims, see Caplan, “From Friedman to Wittman: The Transformation of Chicago Political 
Economy,” Econ Journal Watch 2, no. 1 (April 2005).
318 For a canonical overview about what we know about human cognitive biases, see Daniel Kahneman, 
Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).
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of property and economics (while it seems to be almost absent from those debates that 
characterize the Culture War).  
If political liberalism requires that individual citizens vote and advocate based on 
reasons that all others can accept, we should be deeply troubled by the fact that, for 
matters of justice related to property and economics, most citizens are obviously unable 
to achieve well-formed and justified beliefs on these matters.  In the following section, I 
will be tentatively arguing that the problem of citizens systematically failing to form 
justified political beliefs is being intensified by the increasingly prominent role of the 
internet in the consumption of political commentary and in political deliberation.  The 
challenges of moral pluralism and empirical complexity inherent in debates about 
economic justice are, in some important ways, worsened by the shift of our political lives 
and identities into the virtual spaces of the Internet.
3. Some Dangers of Online Deliberation: Moral Narrowing and Empirical 
Simplifying
The Internet revolution has been felt in almost all areas of social, economic, and 
political life.  One area that has been especially affected is the way that people 
communicate their political views, learn about political issues, and deliberate and debate 
about politics.  Indeed, many American citizens now experience much of their political 
deliberation and participation online.  As Michael Conover et al report, drawing on the 
Pew Internet and American Life Project, “six in ten U.S. internet users, nearly 44% of 
American adults, went online to get news or information about politics in 2008.  
Additionally, Americans are taking an active role in online political discourse, with 20% 
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of internet users contributing comments or questions about the political process to social 
networking sites, blogs or other online forum.”319  This phenomenon is relatively new, 
and has invited a great deal of speculation about how the Internet might change the nature
of politics, speculation about both the positive and negative effects of online political 
deliberation.
Much of the speculation about the Internet has been optimistic (occasionally 
bordering on the utopian), with talk about the “democratizing” effects of the Internet, and
with hope that the Internet will enable a more diverse and decentralized and productive 
speech environment.320  One source of hope is that online deliberate can help overcome 
the limitations of offline face-to-face deliberation, including helping to facilitate a 
319 Michael Conover et al., “Political Polarization on Twitter,” Center for Complex Networks and Systems 
Research, School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University, 2011, accessed 4 May 2014, 
http://truthy.indiana.edu/site_media/pdfs/conover_icwsm2011_polarization.pdf, 1.
320 For Internet deliberation “optimists” (or quasi-optimists), see Howard Rheingold, The Virtual 
Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); Yochai 
Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Mark Poster “CyberDemocracy: Internet and the Public Sphere,” 
1995, accessed 2 January 2012, http://www.hnet.uci.edu/mposter/writings/democ.html; John Perry 
Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” 1996, accessed 3 February 2014, 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html; Mary Thorseth, “Worldwide Deliberation and 
Public Use of Reason Online”; Mary Thorseth, “Worldwide Deliberation and Public Use of Reason 
Online,” Ethics and Information Technology 8 (2006); Antje Gimmler, “Deliberative Democracy, the 
Public Sphere and the Internet,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 27, no. 4 (July 2001); Nicholas John 
Munn, “The New Political Blogosphere,” Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture, and 
Policy 26, no. 1 (January 2012); and Deva Woodly, “New Competencies in Democratic 
Communication? Blogs, Agenda- Setting, and Political Participation,” Public Choice 134, no. 1 (2008). 
Rheingold was one of the earliest celebrators of the political implications of the Internet, describing the 
Internet as an “electronic agora” with “democratizing potential” (The Virtual Community, 298).  Barlow 
prophesied, “We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace” (“A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace”).  While some of the early optimism about the Internet had a libertarian 
streak, some of the more recent optimism has a leftist or even communist streak – see, for example, 
Femke Kaulingfreks and Ruud Kaulingfreks, “Open-Access Communism,” Business Ethics: A 
European Review 22, no. 4 (October 2013). One point that everyone (even the pessimists cited in 
footnote 325) agree about is the importance of Internet communication and deliberation for resisting 
authoritarian political regimes.  For an expression of this latter point, see Larry Diamond, “Liberation 
Technology,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 (July 2010).
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reduction in “resources needed to aggregate citizens, [the] costs imposed on participants, 
[the] limited minority participation, and threats that silence underrepresented voices.”321  
This vision of a decentralized and democratic public sphere is vindicated by some 
notable instances in which Internet-based communities have succeeded as watchdogs of 
the mainstream media, exposing errors or highlighting stories missed by mainstream 
media outlets.  Stuart Geiger recounts one of the “most frequently-mentioned events in 
the history of blogs” which illustrate this phenomenon, which took place in 2003.  
Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott stated that the we “wouldn't have had all 
these problems over the years” if the segregationist politician Strom Thurmond had been 
elected in 1948.  The comment was almost entirely ignored by mainstream media, but 
“bloggers picked up the story and kept generating outrage in the public sphere until mass 
media outlets had no choice but to report it about one week later,” and consequently “Lott
was forced to resign shortly thereafter, and the episode was only the first of many self-
proclaimed victories by the blogosphere over the mass media.322  Another oft-repeated 
contribution of the blogosphere was when bloggers quickly uncovering the inauthenticity 
of documents, presented by 60 Minutes in 2004, concerning President Bush's Air 
National Guard service.  One of the bloggers to uncover the hoax was Charles Johnson, 
who analogized the blogosphere to “open-source intelligence gathering,” and who said, 
“We've got a huge pool of highly motivated people who go out there and use the tools to 
321 Young Min Baek, Magdalena Wojcieszak, and Michael X. Delli Carpini. “Online versus face-to-face 
deliberation: Who? Why? What? With what effects?” New Media & Society 14, no. 3 (May 2012): 377.
322 Stuart Geiger, “Does Habermas Understand the Internet? The Algorithmic Construction of the 
Blogo/Public Sphere,” Gnovis 10, no. 1 (Fall 2009), accessed July 23 2014, 
http://gnovisjournal.org/2009/12/22/does-habermas-understand-internet-algorithmic-construction-
blogopublic-sphere/.  This event, and others, are recounted in Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big 
Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (New York: Penguin
Press, 2004).
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find stuff.  We've got an army of citizen journalists out there.”323  These events support 
the vision of the Internet as enabling a network of citizen-journalists to hold truth to 
power.
However, other speculation of the political effects of the Internet has been more 
pessimistic.  Pessimists point to some of the troubling implications of anonymous speech 
(namely how it might embolden hateful communities),324 the emergence of closed 
deliberative enclaves, and the possibility of deepening political polarization.325  Sarah 
Sobiera and Jeffrey Berry show how the Internet accelerates preexisting trends away 
from the moderating influences of mainstream media and toward a very new “political 
diet” among American citizens that contains a great deal of incivility and (what they call) 
“outrage politics.”  This “newly diffuse delivery of political information coupled with 
323 Howard Kurtz, “After Blogs Got Hits, CBS Got a Black Eye,” Washington Post, 20 September 2004, 
accessed 3 July 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34153-2004Sep19.html. 
324 The phenomenon of “cyber-bullying” illustrates one of the many serious problems accompanying the 
rise of the Internet.  See Ilene Berson, Michael Berson, and John Ferron, “Emerging Risks of Violence 
in the Digital Age: Lessons for Educators from an Online Study of Adolescent Girls in the United 
States,” Journal of School Violence 1, vol. 2 (2005).  However, while anonymous Internet speech 
enables incivility and unaccountability, as Poster points out it also means that “acts of discourse are not 
limited to one-way address and not constrained by the gender and ethnic traces inscribed in face-to-face 
communications” (“CyberDemocracy” 211).  So, as one would expect from a complex new technology, 
the Internet can be both empowering and disempowering to members of victimized and vulnerable 
groups (especially racial and sexual minorities).
325 For Internet deliberation “pessimists” (or quasi-pessimists), see Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007); Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2009); Natalie Jomini Stroud, Niche News: The Politics of News Choice (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2011); Eli Parisner, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2011); Zhang Qianshan, “The Internet's Negative Impact on the Development of 
Democracy,” Contemporary Chinese Thought 35, no. 2 (Winter 2003-2004); Richard Posner, “Bad 
News,” The New York Times, 31 July 2005, accessed 12 April 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/books/review/31POSNER.html?pagewanted=all; Alving 
Goldman, “The Social Epistemology of Blogging,” in Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, 
ed. Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert (New York: Cambridge UP, 2008); and Jürgen Habermas, 
“Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? 
The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research,” Communication Theory 16, no. 4 (2006).  
Another cause of pessimism concerns the “digital divide,” as well as the effects of media concentration. 
For an overview of these concerns, see Barney Warf, “Oligopolization of Global Media and 
Telecommunications and Its Implications for Democracy,” Ethics, Place And Environment 10, no. 1 
(March 2007).
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trends in audience data suggests that our political diet is increasingly composed of 
unvetted news and unedited opinion.”326  Furthermore, this injection of incivility and 
outrage into our political culture has serious negative effects on political institutions: 
“incivility in politics undermines faith in government and discourages political 
participation.”327  Their findings “suggest that exposure to uncivil political discourse in 
the media erodes political trust, engenders more negative assessments of political 
institutions and actors, decreases the perceived legitimacy of political figures, and 
triggers increased emotional response.”328  The pessimists point to these disturbing trends 
and patterns of online behavior and online news consumption to make arguments about 
the dangers of online deliberation for democratic institutions and ideals. 
These competing speculations are hard to evaluate, since social scientific research 
on the topic is only in its earliest stages.329  As more research comes in, more confident 
conclusions can be drawn.  In the following section, then, I will point out some of the 
most conspicuous changes to our political environment in light of the Internet revolution, 
but both the findings and implications are tentative.  I will explore some of the important 
effects of the displacement of “general-interest intermediaries” characteristic of 
traditional news media and the concomitant rise of the “deliberative enclaves” 
characteristic of the Internet.  Again, these discussions are necessarily tentative, and the 
phenomena of Internet deliberation is one that is far too complicated for anyone to be 
326 Sarah Sobiera and Jeffrey Berry, “From Incivility to Outrage: Political Discourse in Blogs, Talk Radio, 
and Cable News,” Political Communication 28 (2011), 21.
327 Sobiera and Berry, “From Incivility to Outrage,” 23.
328 Sobiera and Berry, “From Incivility to Outrage,” 23.
329 Seong-Jae Min echoes a sentiment expressed by many who study this issue: “the effects of online 
deliberation remain unclear to date” (“Online vs. Face-to-Face Deliberation: Effects on Civic 
Engagement,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 12 [2007]: 1369).
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either straightforwardly “for” or “against,” or unqualifiedly “optimistic” or “pessimistic.”
Furthermore, the new age of online communication is here to stay (and no doubt deepen 
and change in unpredictable ways in the future).  In any case, many of the problems 
identified by the Internet pessimists may not have clear solutions.  As Sunstein rightly 
notes, even in the absence of clear solutions, it is worthwhile to understand the problems 
we face.330
The main problems of interest here are the extent to which online deliberation 
results in (what we might call) moral narrowing and empirical simplifying.  As discussed 
above, two important features of our debates about economic and distributive justice are 
moral pluralism and empirical complexity.  As a result, we should be concerned about the
extent to which online deliberation enables or hinders participants from appreciating the 
full range of moral pluralism and empirical complexity that characterizes these important 
issues of justice.  The main argument that I will make is that the epistemically-closed 
communities of deliberation that too often arise on the Internet have as one negative 
effect a tendency for all sides to downplay the moral pluralism and empirical complexity 
of economic issues.  Thus, the Internet can help create communities of people who are 
like-minded not only in their values, but also in their empirical assumptions about the 
world, however uninformed or flawed these assumptions may be.  To this end, I turn to 
look at some of the findings and reflections about how the Internet effects the formation 
of political beliefs and the nature of political deliberation.
330 Sunstein writes, “For purposes of obtaining understanding, few things are more important than to 
separate the question of whether there is a problem from whether anything should be done about it.  
Dangers that cannot be alleviated continue to be dangers.  They do not go away if or because we cannot,
now or ever, think of decent solutions.  It is much easier to think clearly when we appreciate this fact” 
(Republic.com 2.0, 98).
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4. What We Know about Online Deliberation
The Internet, first and foremost, enables the personalized filtering of news 
consumption to a degree unheard of in the past.  With an overwhelming amount of 
Internet sites and blogs to choose from, and every possible viewpoint represented, 
everyone can consume exactly, and only, what they choose to consume.  Sunstein 
presents our situation: “Technology has greatly increased people's ability to 'filter' what 
they want to read, see, and hear.  With the aid of the Internet, you are able to design your 
own newspapers and magazines.  You can choose your own programming, with movies, 
game shows, sports, shopping, and news of your choice.  You mix and match.”331  The 
result: “You need not come across topics and views that you have not sought out.  
Without any difficulty, you are able to see exactly what you want to see, no more and no 
less.  You can easily find out what 'people like you' tent to like and dislike.  You avoid 
what they dislike.  You take a close look at what they like.”332  While people have always 
been filtering their news consumption to some extent, the Internet allows people to filter 
with incredible new power.  More than ever before, everyone with Internet access is able 
to live in “a communications universe of their own choosing.”333  This new power clearly 
has (and going forward will continue to have) profound consequences for the formation 
of political views and the nature of political deliberation.  Here, then, I will note a few of 
the main features and main findings related to how the Internet is transforming our 
politics.
331 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 1.
332 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 1.
333 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 3.
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The first important consequence of the Internet revolution and of personalized 
filtering is the rise of online “deliberative enclaves” and the relative downfall of offline 
“general-interest intermediaries” (and, to some significant extent, their online 
presences).334  General-interest intermediaries are those deliberative forums that have in 
the past (and to some extent still do) attract the attention of a large number of citizens, 
such as the major newspapers or news networks.  For Sunstein, general-interest 
intermediaries are important because they provide “something like a common framework 
for social experience,” which is not provided by the proliferation of online deliberative 
enclaves.335  Oftentimes the value of the general-interest intermediary is precisely its 
ability to provide a common framework for social experience.  Thus, a particular general-
interest intermediary in some sense gains in value the more people it attracts – a 
phenomenon that economists call “network externalities.”  Furthermore, while general-
interest intermediaries oftentimes provide the reader with “accidentally-acquired” 
information (which can help broaden the perspective of the reader), blogs and other 
334 In addition to the fact that deliberative enclaves better satisfy the preferences of most users compared to
general-interest intermediaries, it should also be noted that an important cause of this shift can be 
explained by the fact that free Internet commentary can often free-ride on the paid journalism featured 
in the mainstream media.  Richard Posner summarizes the problem: “How can the conventional news 
media hope to compete?  Especially when the competition is not entirely fair.  The bloggers are 
parasitical on the conventional media.  They copy the news and opinion generated by the conventional 
media, often at considerable expense, without picking up any of the tab.  The degree of parasitism is 
striking in the case of those blogs that provide their readers with links to newspaper articles.  The links 
enable the audience to read the articles without buying the newspaper.  The legitimate gripe of the 
conventional media is not that bloggers undermine the overall accuracy of news reporting, but that they 
are free riders who may in the long run undermine the ability of the conventional media to finance the 
very reporting on which bloggers depend” (“Bad News”).  This economic problem is very serious and 
worthy of discussion, but is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
335 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 48.  Those that lament the decline of “general-interest intermediaries” 
spend little time focusing on the systemic biases and limitations of most actually existing institutions of 
mainstream mass media.  For a well-known radical critique of mainstream media institutions, see Noam
Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).
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deliberative enclave typically provide “sought-for” information (which tends to reinforce 
preexisting beliefs).336  
The online world of perfect filtering allows individuals to eliminate, to a large 
extent, any contact with “accidentally-acquired” information at all.  By selecting which 
blogs to read and which sites to visit individuals are able to read and see only what they 
want to read and see.  And this largely is what people are doing.  People are migrating 
away from the general-interest intermediaries and joining deliberative enclaves that better
match their identities and preferences.  This mass migration into deliberative enclaves is 
largely a product of personal choice, since most people are generally averse to having 
their points of view seriously challenged, and instead prefer to insulate themselves in 
self-reassuring social and epistemic communities.337  Within these deliberative enclaves, 
336 Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell, “Self-Segregation or Deliberation?” 5.  Jürgen Habermas shares 
Sunstein's concern about the rise of deliberative enclaves and their effect on democratic politics.  He has
not written extensively about the topic (which is why I only mention his views in a footnote), but his 
brief comments on the issue have generated an entire cottage industry of commentary.  Here is 
Habermas' most oft-cited comment on the issue: “The Internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of
an egalitarian public of writers and readers.  However, computer-mediated communication in the web 
can claim unequivocal democratic merits only for a special context: It can undermine the censorship of 
authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress public opinion.  In the context of liberal regimes, 
the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms across the world tend instead to lead to the fragmentation 
of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics” (“Political 
Communication in Media Society,” 423).  For a critique of Habermas' views on the nature and effects of
Internet deliberation (using Habermas' own views about communication and democracy in order to 
critique him), see Geiger, “Does Habermas Understand the Internet?”  For a related discussion of how 
the Internet might be conceptualized as a Habermasian public sphere, see Lincoln Dahlberg, “The 
Habermasian Public Sphere Encounters Cyber-Reality,” The Public 8, no. 3 (2001); Douglas Kellner, 
“Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention,” in Perspectives on Habermas, 
ed. Lewis Hahn (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2000); Michael Froomkin, “Habermas@discourse.net: 
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace,” Harvard Law Review 116, no. 3 (January 2003); and Axel 
Bruns, “Habermas and/against the Internet,” Snurblog, 18 February 2007, accessed 8 March 2014, 
http://snurb.info/node/621.
337 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 51.  Importantly, though, the rise of deliberative enclaves and the 
narrowing of exposure to other views is also encouraged by the design of many of the major search 
engines, which customize searches to fit the assumed preferences of the individual user (sometimes 
called “recommender systems”).  This phenomenon is documented in Pariser's important book The 
Filter Bubble.  This kind of filtering tends to reinforce the preferences of the user, by only showing 
information that aligns with the user's past search and purchase histories.  This kind of filtering is used 
on Amazon.com, which may contribute to very politically polarized purchasing behavior (see Appendix 
F).  However, Yochai Benkler offers a more optimistic assessment.  He notes the ways in which filtering
can be beneficial in creating what he calls a “networked public sphere”: “Filtering, accreditation, 
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what we see is a “form of deliberation that occurs within more or less insulated groups, in
which like-minded people speak mostly to one another.”338
This is an important development.  The underlying trend that is being observed is 
ultimately a better matching up of “supply” and “demand” – that is, people can find news
and commentary and community that more closely mirrors their preferences.  Richard 
Posner observes, “the increase in competition in the news market that has been brought 
about by lower costs of communication (in the broadest sense) has resulted in more 
variety, more polarization, more sensationalism, more healthy skepticism and, in sum, a 
better matching of supply to demand.”339  But while the coordination of supply and 
demand is generally socially beneficial in other domains of our lives, Posner recognizes 
some of the downsides of this consumer-driven news model which characterizes 
contemporary online (and increasingly offline) news media: “increased competition has 
not produced a public more oriented toward public issues, more motivated and competent
to engage in genuine self-government, because these are not the goods that most people 
are seeking from the news media.”340 
In other words, the massive proliferation of deliberative enclaves gives people 
what they want much better than general-interest intermediaries can.  The question then 
synthesis, and salience are created through a system of peer review by information affinity groups, 
topical or interest based.  These groups filter the observations and opinions of an enormous range of 
people, and transmit those that pass local peer review to broader groups and ultimately to the polity 
more broadly, without recourse to market-based points of control over the information flow.  Intense 
interest and engagement by small groups that share common concerns, rather than lowest-common 
denominator interest in wide groups that are largely alienated from each other, is what draws attention 
to statements and makes them more visible.  This makes the emerging networked public sphere more 
responsive to intensely held concerns of a much wider swath of the population than the mass media 
were capable of seeing, and creates a communications process that is more resistant to corruption by 
money” (Benkler, The Wealth of Networks, 242).
338 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 77.
339 Posner, “Bad News.”
340 Posner, “Bad News.”
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becomes: What do people want?  Posner notes a commonsense, but false, assumption 
about what ordinary people want when they search out political information: “that people
consume news and opinion in order to become well informed about public issues.”341  If 
this idealistic assumption were true, and ordinary citizens regularly lived up to their civic 
responsibility to become adequately informed about important political issues, then 
“liberals would read conservative newspapers, and conservatives liberal newspapers, just 
as scientists test their hypotheses by confronting them with data that may refute them.  
But that is not how ordinary people (or, for that matter, scientists) approach political and 
social issues.”342  
The behavior of most ordinary people does not match the democratic deliberative 
ideal.  On the contrary.  Posner describes the basic motivations that feed into our 
ideologically over-narrow news consumption: 
The issues are too numerous, uncertain and complex, and the benefit to an 
individual of becoming well informed about them too slight, to invite 
sustained, disinterested attention.  Moreover, people don't like being in a 
state of doubt, so they look for information that will support rather than 
undermine their existing beliefs.  They're also uncomfortable seeing their 
beliefs challenged on issues that are bound up with their economic 
welfare, physical safety or religious and moral views.343  
Thus, what people actually seek is “entertainment, confirmation, reinforcement, 
emotional satisfaction,” and that is what they get online, because “a competitive market 
341 Posner, “Bad News.” 
342 Posner, “Bad News.” 
343 Posner, “Bad News.”
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supplies, no more, no less.”344   As a result, the benefits of the “new voices and more 
choices” speech environment enabled by the Internet comes, partially, at the cost of 
fueling normal human cognitive biases and allowing for the development of 
epistemically-closed deliberative virtual communities.345  If we see the producers of news 
and commentary as essentially responding to consumer demand, and recognize that most 
citizens have a low consumer demand for “hard truths” and a high demand for 
comfortable and confirming narratives, we will not be surprised by the proliferation of 
these epistemically-closed online communities.346  This explains the widespread 
344 Posner, “Bad News.”  Commenting on the phenomenon of “voter irrationality,” Somin notes that to the 
extent that people do seek out political information, “any such effort is likely to be motivated by 
considerations other than the desire to become a 'better' voter.  Some follow politics simply because 
they find it entertaining or because, like sports fans, they enjoy 'rooting' for their political 'team'” 
(“Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance,” 263).  Posner echoes the sports metaphor: “News 
coverage of a political campaign is oriented to a public that enjoys competitive sports, not to one that is 
civic-minded” (“Bad News”).  Also see Bryan Caplan, “Voter Ignorance vs. Voter Irrationality,” 
KYKLOS 54 (2001).
345 In 2010, there was a debate on the blogospere about the phenomenon of “epistemic closure” on the 
political right and left, kicked off by Julian Sanchez's post, “Epistemic Closure, Technology, and the 
End of Distance,” 7 April 2010, accessed 27 March 2014, 
http://www.juliansanchez.com/2010/04/07/epistemic-closure-technology-and-the-end-of-distance/.  One
of the main questions discussed and debated was whether the problem of episemic closure is more 
pervasive among conservatives or liberals.  See Jonathan Chait, “The Great Epistemic Closure Debate,” 
The New Republic, 9 April 2010, accessed 2 September 2014, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/jonathan-chait/the-great-epistemic-closure-debate; and Patricia 
Cohen, “'Epistemic Closure'? Those are Fighting Words,” The New York Times, 27 April 2010, accessed 
2 September 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/books/28conserv.html.  Chait echoes one of the
common points made in the discussion: “If technology is playing a role here, it's probably allowing for a
more totalistic alternative information cocoon.  Conservatives always had access to conservative 
opinion, but the rise of cable and the Internet allowed them to create news sources that totally replaced, 
rather than merely supplemented, the mainstream media” (“The Great Epistemic Closure Debate”).
346 Although Posner points out that these epistemic problems are aggravated by the blogosphere, he also 
speculates, optimistically, that most readers discount the truth-value of claims on the blogosphere more 
so than the traditional media: “[M]ost people are sensible enough to distrust communications in an 
unfiltered medium.  They know that anyone can create a blog at essentially zero cost, that most bloggers
are uncredentialed amateurs, that bloggers don’t employ fact checkers and don’t have editors and that a 
blogger can hide behind a pseudonym.  They know, in short, that until a blogger’s assertions are 
validated (as when the mainstream media acknowledge an error discovered by a blogger), there is no 
reason to repose confidence in what he says” (“Bad News”).  There is some plausibility to this claim, 
but as Goldman convincingly points out, “This is unrealistically sanguine.  People may vaguely know 
these things about blogs in general, but they may not be good at applying these precepts to the specific 
blogs that most appeal to them.  Precisely because what these blogs assert often confirms their own 
prior views or prejudices, they may repose excessive trust in them” (“The Social Epistemology of 
Blogging,” 8).
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phenomenon of “cyber-cascades” of misinformation that plagues these closed 
deliberative enclaves.  Since so many people now inhabit these epistemically-enfeebled 
online communities and thus are not exposed to serious and constructive engagement 
with other views and arguments, false stories are able to circulate unchecked, to the 
detriment of democratic deliberation.347
This tendency of individuals to consume news and commentary so as to satisfy 
preexisting views and biases is borne out in the available data.  Eric Lawrence, John 
Sides, and Henry Farrell analyzed the behavior of political blog readers, and their results 
clearly point to the emergence of closed deliberative enclaves: “About 94% of political 
blog readers consume only blogs from one side of the ideological spectrum.  The 
remaining 6% read blogs from both sides.  Few blog readers habitually seek out blogs 
from the other side of the ideological spectrum.”348  That is, in confirmation of Posner's 
assumptions about what people want to read, Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell conclude that 
blog readers overwhelmingly “read political blogs that provide ideological comfort.”349  
Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell refer to this pervasive phenomenon as “homophily,” which 
they define as “the tendency to associate with others who are similar to them.”350
347 See Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, chapter 3, where he documents a number of the more well-known and 
damaging “cyber-cascades” of recent years.
348 Eric Lawrence, John Sides, and Henry Farrell, “Self-Segregation or Deliberation? Blog Readership, 
Participation, and Polarization in American Politics” (Department of Political Science, George 
Washington University, 10 March 2009), accessed 18 July 2014, 
http://themonkeycage.org/blogpaper.pdf, 11.
349 Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell, “Self-Segregation or Deliberation?”, 12.
350 Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell, “Self-Segregation or Deliberation?”, 12.  The fact that these deliberative 
enclaves tend to be highly partisan can also be partially explained as a product of economic forces.  
Posner writes, “But suppose cost conditions change, enabling a newspaper to break even with many 
fewer readers than before.  Now the liberal newspaper has to worry that any temporizing of its message 
in an effort to attract moderates may cause it to lose its most liberal readers to a new, more liberal 
newspaper; for with small-scale entry into the market now economical, the incumbents no longer have a
secure base.  So the liberal newspaper will tend to become even more liberal and, by the same process, 
the conservative newspaper more conservative ... The current tendency to political polarization in news 
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The phenomenon of closed deliberative enclaves can also be illustrated by looking
at patterns of linking on political blogs and websites.  Lada Adamic and Natalie Glance 
studied patterns of online behavior during the 2004 United States presidential election, 
and concluded, “In our study we witnessed a divided blogosphere: liberals and 
conservatives linking primarily within their separate communities, with far fewer cross-
links exchanged between them.  This division extended into their discussions, with liberal
and conservative blogs focusing on different news articles, topics, and political 
figures.”351  Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell show that political bloggers are “much more 
likely to link to bloggers sharing their ideological orientation than to bloggers on the 
other side of the political spectrum.”352  Similar patterns of homophily exist on other 
social network sites, such as Twitter, which has become an important tool for political 
communication.  Michael Conover et al document the pattern of political polarization on 
Twitter, where “the retweet network exhibits a highly modular structure, segregating 
users into two homogeneous communities corresponding to the political left and right.”353
In an important confirmation of Sunstein's view of general-interest intermediaries, 
reporting is thus a consequence of changes not in underlying political opinions but in costs, specifically 
the falling costs of new entrants.  The rise of the conservative Fox News Channel caused CNN to shift 
to the left.  CNN was going to lose many of its conservative viewers to Fox anyway, so it made sense to 
increase its appeal to its remaining viewers by catering more assiduously to their political preferences” 
(“Bad News”).
351 Lada Adamic and Natalie Glance, “The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. Election: Divided They
Blog,” Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Link discovery (March 2005), 14.
352 Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell, “Self-Segregation or Deliberation?”, 12.  For a visualization of patterns of
partisan and cross-partisan linking on political blogs, see Appendix G.
353 Michael Conover et al., “Political Polarization on Twitter,” Center for Complex Networks and Systems 
Research, School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University, 2011, accessed 4 May 2014, 
http://truthy.indiana.edu/site_media/pdfs/conover_icwsm2011_polarization.pdf, 1.  Importantly, though,
while the retweet network is highly polarized, the “mention network” (where users are connected if they
are mentioned in someone else's post) is not: “In contrast, we find that the mention network does not 
exhibit this kind of political segregation, resulting in users being exposed to individuals and information
they would not have been likely to choose in advance” (“Political Polarization on Twitter,” 1).
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Ademic and Glance show that websites representing mainstream media outlets (cnn.com, 
washingtonpost.com, news.google.com, and nytimes.com) have a far higher degree of 
cross-ideological linking than any of the popular blogs and websites that we might think 
of as deliberative enclaves (such as nationalreview.com or salon.com).354  
As mentioned, though, the data on this topic are tentative and not altogether clear. 
Eszter Hargittai, Jason Gallo, and Matthew Kane analyzed trends of political activity 
online, and they show a more mixed picture.  They first note, “As expected, it is certainly 
the case that conservatives are more likely to connect to conservatives and liberals to 
liberal blogs.”355  Importantly, though, they did observe a meaningful amount of “cross-
ideological linkages.”356  They explain, “During the three weeks in our data set, we 
document over 50 links from conservatives to liberals and over 70 links from liberals to 
conservatives.  Put in another way, 12% of all outbound links from conservatives are sent
to liberal blogs while 16% of all outbound links from liberals point to conservative 
blogs.”357  Furthermore, when they analyzed these cross-ideological links, they 
discovered that “while many of the links are based on straw-man arguments, bloggers 
across the political spectrum also address each others’ writing substantively, both in 
agreement and disagreement.”358  They conclude that while the Internet does enable a 
354 Adamic and Glance, “The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. Election,” 14.  See Appendix H for a
visualization of this comparison.
355 Eszter Hargittai, Jason Gallo, and Matthew Kane, “Cross-ideological discussions among conservative 
and liberal bloggers,” Public Choice 134 (2008): 78.
356 Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane, “Cross-ideological discussions among conservative and liberal bloggers,” 
78.
357 Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane, “Cross-ideological discussions among conservative and liberal bloggers,” 
78.  
358 Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane, “Cross-ideological discussions among conservative and liberal bloggers,” 
67.
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high degree of “insularity,” it does not exhibit the kind of “compete isolation” that the 
Internet pessimists fear.359
Finally, some studies compare the effects of online deliberation with face-to-face 
deliberation, and the data are somewhat disconcerting.  Sunstein points to data that 
suggests that online deliberation – more so than face-to-face deliberation – encourages 
the phenomenon of “group polarization,” in which “after deliberation, people are likely to
move toward a more extreme point in the direction to which the group's members were 
originally inclined.”360  This phenomenon of online deliberation resulting in further 
entrenchment is even more pronounced when the topics of discussion are wrapped up in 
the deliberators' personal identities: “Group polarization will significantly increase if 
people think of themselves, antecedently or otherwise, as part of a group having a shared 
identity and a degree of solidarity.”361  Young Min Baek, Magdalena Wojcieszak, and 
Michael X. Delli Carpini compare face-to-face deliberation with online deliberation and 
conclude: “Relative to face-to-face deliberation, online deliberation … generates more 
negative emotions, and is less likely to result in consensus and political action.”362  
However, not all the data support this pessimistic view.363
359 Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane, “Cross-ideological discussions among conservative and liberal bloggers,” 
78.
360 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 60.
361 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 67.
362 Baek, Wojcieszak, and Carpini, “Online versus face-to-face deliberation,” 363. 
363 See Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Ideological Segregation Online and Offline,” Chicago 
Booth and NBER, 18 March 2011, accessed 23 September 2014, 
https://econresearch.uchicago.edu/sites/econresearch.uchicago.edu/files/echo_chambers.pdf.  They 
write, “We find that ideological segregation of online news consumption is low in absolute terms, 
higher than the segregation of most offline news consumption, and significantly lower than the 
segregation of face-to-face interactions with neighbors, co-workers, or family members.  We find no 
evidence that the Internet is becoming more segregated over time” (1).  Marcus Prior notes, 
“Measurement problems hold back research on partisan selective exposure and its consequences.  
Ideologically one-sided news exposure may be largely confined to a small, but highly involved and 
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In any case, we should not overlook the obvious benefits of the Internet in our 
political lives, even if most people do congregate in deliberative enclaves and do not 
deliberately seek out and constructively engage opposing ideas and arguments.364  On the 
positive side, these new deliberative enclaves empower people with ideologies or 
identifies generally not well represented in the mainstream media to come together across
great distances and deliberate together in important ways.  Of course, these groups may 
include progressive activists as well as dangerous extremists (or even terrorists).  In any 
event, though, the sheer number of deliberative enclaves (especially compared with the 
much smaller number of general-interest intermediaries, which are only able to serve 
their function if there is a small number of them) certainly creates a vast diversity of 
communities within which a great diversity of ideas can be developed and discussed.  
The best way to conceptualize this phenomenon is with the distinction between 
“first-order” diversity and “second-order” diversity.  As Sunstein notes, the Internet-
enabled phenomenon of the proliferation of deliberative enclaves helps increase “second-
order” diversity even as it threatens to weaken “first-order” diversity.  Second-order 
diversity refers to the increased number of distinct viewpoints and opinions that prevail 
across society.  As he puts it, this is “the kind of diversity that comes when society 
consists of many institutions and groups, some of which have little in the way of internal 
influential, segment of the population.  There is no firm evidence that partisan media are making 
ordinary Americans more partisan” (“Media and Political Polarization, Annual Review of Political 
Science 16 [2013]: 101).
364 Although this chapter has focused on the epistemic effects of online deliberation, we should not forget 
all of the non-epistemic (but still political) benefits of online deliberation.  Goldman lists three of these 
non-epistemic benefits: “One good is that 12 million people write rather than stare passively at a screen.
Another good is that people are allowed to blow off steam.  Still another good is that it enables the 
authorities to keep tabs on potential troublemakers” (“The Social Epistemology of Blogging,” 5).  Many
other such non-epistemic (both political and non-political) benefits could be listed.
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diversity.”365  Deliberative enclaves allow for the emergence of a great many distinct 
(although sometimes eccentric or extremist) political communities and identities that 
formerly would not have been able to coalesce.  However, if these deliberative enclaves 
do not foster constructive debate and discussion with members of other deliberative 
enclaves, then although there might be a large and heterogeneous diversity of different 
communities (an increase in “second-order” diversity), the members of each deliberative 
enclave will tend to be relatively more close-minded and homogeneous (a decline in 
“first-order” diversity).  This trade-off between “first-order” and “second-order” diversity
as deliberative enclaves come increasingly to displace general-interest intermediaries is 
complicated.   Adding up the individual and social costs and benefits of this new situation
is far beyond the reach of this chapter.
This discussion has brought up issues that have long concerned defenders of the 
democratic ideal.  Namely, if individuals have little incentive to develop justified political
beliefs, and many opportunities to shut themselves off from other perspectives and 
arguments, then how is genuine democratic debate – a key pillar of democratic legitimacy
– going to occur?  This problem, put more generally, is referred to as the “problem of 
political ignorance,” or “rational ignorance,” and it stands as a serious challenge, in non-
ideal theory, to the democratic ideal of rational self-government.  The worry about the 
problem of rational political ignorance is highlighted in many discussions of online 
deliberation, but it is helpful to discuss it on its own.  I turn to this topic now.
365 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 73.
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5. The Deliberative Ideal and the Challenge of Rational Ignorance
The early and tentative evidence of online deliberation suggests that the new, 
fragmented, filtered, and personalized speech environment of the Internet is encouraging 
political polarization and allowing participants to shut themselves off into deliberative 
enclaves where they are seldom exposed to the viewpoints of others.  While this 
phenomenon is correlated with greater levels of political participation, it is also correlated
with greater levels of political polarization and partisanship.  Of course some participants 
use the Internet to explore a wide variety of ideological viewpoints, but the research from
Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell suggests that most participants use the Internet to close 
themselves off from other viewpoints.  This phenomenon might be thought to exacerbate 
an already troubling problem endemic to modern democracies: the problem of rational 
political ignorance.  
Survey data suggests that most American voters lack even basic knowledge about 
the political system under which they live, and lack even basic knowledge about 
economics.  This is problematic for a number of reasons.  One important concern, from 
the point of view of political liberalism and democratic theory, is that voters are each 
partial authors of coercively enforced political policies that are imposed on everyone, 
even those who voted for different policies and politicians.  If those citizens who are 
(partially) responsible for enacting coercive policies on others are doing so on the basis of
beliefs which are morally or epistemically deficient (in serious ways), then those citizens 
are responsible for oppression.  That is, they are responsible for coercively imposing 
policies on others who have very good reasons to reject those policies.  The phenomenon 
of rational ignorance is a structural problem in all large modern democracies, and, 
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according to much of the data, it is being exacerbated by the Internet revolution and the 
network of epistemically-closed deliberative enclaves that it has spawned.  It is worth 
thinking about the nature of this problem and how we might respond to it.
Robert Talisse summarizes what he dubs the “Public Ignorance Objection” to 
deliberative democracy (and to the democratic ideal more generally) as follows: “(1) 
Deliberative democracy, in whatever form, expects citizens to be highly informed about 
basic political facts and emerging data related to complex policy questions.  (2) Citizens 
are in fact highly ignorant of even the most basic political facts. (3) Therefore, 
deliberative democracy is 'both unrealistic and, as a result, potentially dangerous.'”366  
According to the critics of deliberative democracy, individual citizens, recognizing (at 
some level) that their individual votes will make no difference to policy outcomes, lack 
strong incentives to develop justified political beliefs.  They are rationally ignorant, in 
that their ignorance is a rational response to the incentive structure they face in terms of 
the costs and benefits of acquiring (and maintaining over time) justified political beliefs.  
In response to this problem, many defenders of the ideal of deliberative 
democracy urge better civic education in schools.  Talisse notes that, in the face of facts 
about the level of political ignorance in society, the deliberative democrat will respond 
that “a high degree of belief ignorance indicates the extent to which fundamental 
democratic institutions, such as the media and education system, are failing.”367  
However, the problem of political ignorance is more challenging than this typical 
366 Talisse, “Does Public Ignorance Defeat Deliberative Democracy?” 457; the latter part of the quotation is
quoting from Ilya Somin, “Richard Posner's Democratic Pragmatism and the Problem of Public 
Ignorance,” Critical Review 16, no. 1 (2004): 8.
367 Talisse, “Does Public Ignorance Defeat Deliberative Democracy?” 459.  There are, of course, many 
other critiques of deliberative democracy.  For a critique of deliberative democracy that praises the role 
of online deliberation, see Jereon van den Hoven, “E-democracy, E-Contestation and the Monitorial 
Citizen,” Ethics and Information Technology 7 (2005).
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response seems to recognize.  Many of those who are worried about the problem of 
political ignorance suggest that the modern state, with all of its activities and 
responsibilities (from monetary policy to regulatory policy to foreign policy) is so vast 
and complicated that it is unreasonable to demand that ordinary citizens become 
sufficiently competent enough to be responsible political participants.  Somin argues, 
“Even if voters were significantly better informed and more rational than most are today, 
the vast size and complexity of modern government would prevent them from acquiring 
enough knowledge and sophistication to deliberate over more than a small fraction of the 
full range of issues currently decided by government.”368  Issues related to economics and
property are characterized by an especially high level of empirical complexity, which 
makes the political ignorance problem even more difficult.  How can we expect citizens 
who filter and personalize their media consumption and inhabit epistemically-closed 
deliberative enclaves to be competent enough about complicated issues of economics to 
act politically (through voting, activism, political office-holding, etc.) in a way that is 
sufficiently responsible and justifiable to their fellow citizens?
We are left asking a difficult question: how much can we reasonably expect of 
ordinary citizens, each of whom realizes that her own views, votes, and contributions will
most certainly make little to no positive difference in political outcomes?  Somin argues, 
“The rationality of political ignorance helps explain why ignorance has been so 
remarkably persistent over time, despite major increases in education levels and the 
availability of information.  Although the supply of political information has increased, 
the demand has not.”369  From this Somin concludes, “This situation undercuts claims that
368 Somin, “Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance,” 254.
369 Somin, “Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance,” 259-260.
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voter knowledge could increase to the levels demanded by deliberative democracy if only
the media and other institutions provided more and better information.”370  For those 
worried about the problem of political ignorance, then, the true problem lies in the fact 
that political ignorance is not a phenomenon ultimately produced by insufficient 
schooling, nor is it merely induced in the populace by manipulative corporate and state 
interests – although this phenomenon does, of course occur (but it seems to be parasitic 
off this underlying rational ignorance) – but rather such ignorance is entirely rational for 
each individual.371  
The demand by deliberative democrats that the majority of citizens must be 
sufficiently informed about political issues needs to be more fully spelled out.  How 
burdensome is this demand?  What is the appropriate level of competence required in 
order to be epistemically responsible in one's political activities?  It is unclear what the 
appropriate level is, and thus how burdensome the demand should be.  But, as discussed 
above, the issues surrounding matters of economics and property are especially 
complicated on the empirical side, and they thus pose a serious challenge to the 
deliberative democratic ideal of a citizenry capable of competently evaluating issues from
across the full range of justice.  Furthermore, this problem seems to be exacerbated by the
Internet revolution.  What, if anything, can be done about it?
370 Somin, “Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance,” 259-260.
371 Discussions of the “production” of ignorance now sometimes go under the moniker of “agnotology,” 
and this is an important topic.  However, the discussion here focuses on the challenge of rational 
ignorance, which would persist even in a society free from the manipulative production of ignorance by 
powerful interests.  For well-known discussions of the problem of produced ignorance, see David 
Michaels, Doubt is Their Product: How Industry's Assault on Science Threatens Your Health (London: 
Oxford UP, 2008); Chris Mooney, The Republican War on Science (New York: Basic Books, 2005); 
Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the 
Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010); also see
the anthology Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance, ed. Robert Proctor and Londa 
Schiebinger (Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 2008).
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6. Conclusion: Citizens vs. Consumers (and the Return of Foundational 
Disagreement)
Sunstein recognizes and appreciates the seriousness of the problem of political 
ignorance.  Most individual citizens are faced with incentives against becoming truly 
politically competent.  After all, no individual citizens will ever change the outcome of an
election with her vote, and very few individual citizens will effect positive political 
change through activism or office holding.372  Thus, for each individual citizen, the costs 
of serious and open-minded political education clearly outweigh the benefits.  This leads 
individual citizens to rationally under-educate themselves about political matters, which 
ultimately results in worse political outcomes for everybody (since most other citizens 
likewise rationally choose to under-educate themselves).  This is, Sunstein notes, a classic
“prisoner's dilemma” problem – what is rational on the individual level ends up being 
irrational in the aggregate.  Individual choices to seek out a narrow range of news 
consumption and minimal ideological exposure produce “negative externalities” in the 
form of bad political outcomes (and the harm that accompanies them).  
The classic response to negative externalities is some kind of state regulation, 
which Sunstein embraces as a feasible solution to the problem of political ignorance.  
Sunstein's argument that we should regulate and more consciously design our speech and 
deliberative environments is rooted in a set of particular philosophical commitments – 
commitments which are, I will show, subject to foundational yet reasonable 
disagreement.  Sunstein believes that since under-education about political matters 
produces negative externalities, we as citizens (through the state) should be permitted to 
372 Michael Huemer reminds us that, because of how complicated most political problems are, it is all too 
possible that any given well-meaning political reform will, at the end of the day, be a net harm.  Huemer
believes that this occurs more often than we realize, and he points out this possibility as a way to justify 
political inaction on deontological and utilitarian grounds.  See Huemer, “In Defense of Passivity.”
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regulate the activities of we as consumers (the choosers and consumers of political news 
and commentary).  Sunstein writes, “Often citizens attempt to promote their highest 
aspirations through democratic institutions.  If the result is to produce a communications 
market that is different from what individuals consumers would seek—if as citizens we 
produce a market, for example, that promotes exposure to serious issues and a range of 
shared experiences—freedom will be promoted, not undermined.”373  For Sunstein, one's 
role as a democratic citizen takes precedence over one's role as a private consumer, and 
for this reason, citizens are permitted to use democratic channels to impose constraints, 
regulations, nudges, etc., to their (and others') behavior as consumers (both online and 
offline) when these consumer behaviors lead to negative externalities.374  Sunstein 
suggests a series of possible legislative solutions to some of the epistemic problems of 
online deliberation.  For example, we might use of government subsidies “to assist high-
quality efforts in nonprofit, nongovernmental spaces on the Internet” where constructive 
political deliberation is encouraged.375  We also might encourage policies of “mutual 
linking,” in which “providers of material with a certain point of view might also provide 
links to sites with a very different point of view” in exchange for those latter sites linking 
to the former sites.376  Sunstein even suggests, in an article co-authored by Adrian 
373 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 120.
374 Sunstein argues that one of the best forms of regulation is nudging, which he also calls “libertarian 
paternalism,” which is explained and defended in Sunstein and Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions 
about Health, Wealth, and Happiness; and Cass Sunstein, “The Ethics of Nudging” (20 November 
2014), accessed 10 January 2015, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2526341.
375 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 202.
376 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 208.  Recognizing how difficult this would be to enforce, Sunstein suggests
that we encourage it as a voluntary practice.  Also see Todd Davies and Reid Chandler, “Online 
Deliberation Design: Choices, Criteria, and Evidence” (Symbolic Systems Program, Stanford 
University, 31 August 2011), accessed 18 June 2014, 
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1302/1302.5177.pdf.  Davies and Chandler discuss comparisons 
between different kinds of “online deliberation design” and how they effect the quality of deliberation.  
For a related discussion, see Sean Munson and Paul Resnick, “Presenting Diverse Political Opinions: 
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Vermeule, that the government should actively combat hateful, extremist, and conspiracy-
oriented discussions that take place on the Internet, suggesting that “the best response 
consists in cognitive infiltration of extremist groups” by government agents.377  He goes 
on, “Government agents (and their allies) might enter chat rooms, online social networks,
or even real-space groups and attempt to undermine percolating conspiracy theories by 
raising doubts about their factual premises, causal logic or implications for political 
action.”378  Sunstein sees this set of interventions as a response to normal human 
cognitive biases that, in certain environments, can have politically destructive effects.  
Regardless of the specifics of his policy recommendations, Sunstein's larger message is 
clear: citizens, through the government, can and should regulate and redesign their speech
environments so as to ensure more productive dialogue and debate.
However, the fundamental commitment to the priority of the citizen over the 
consumer is a contested and contestable view within political philosophy.  The range of 
control that a democratic majority can legitimately exercise over individual members of 
the political community is itself subject to a wide range of reasonable disagreement.  As 
Sunstein is aware, the individual qua consumer is protected by a set of rights, like the 
freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment, that limits the encroachment of 
democratic majorities (individuals qua citizens).  How, then, do we evaluate Sunstein's 
proposal to permit citizens to regulate themselves and others as consumers in order to 
create a more fruitful speech environment (online as well as offline)?
How and How Much” (School of Information, University of Michigan, 2010), accessed 14 March 2014,
http://www.smunson.com/portfolio/projects/aggdiversity/PresentingDiversePoliticalOpinions-chi10.pdf.
377 Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, “Conspiracy Theories” (University of Chicago Law School Law &
Economics Research Paper Series Paper No. 387, 15 January 2008), accessed 4 January 2015, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084585. 
378 Sunstein and Vermeule, “Conspiracy Theories,” 22.
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Sunstein frames the problem of political ignorance as a negative externalities 
problem.  That is, my political ignorance (fueled by a fragmented speech environment) 
contributes to bad political outcomes (because I vote and act politically without sufficient
knowledge), which ultimately harms others, who are subject to those bad policies.  Thus, 
those others who are harmed have a right to regulate my behavior, so as to ensure that the
harm I am able to inflict through the state is minimized.  This framing of the problem 
does, indeed, help Sunstein justify the right of citizens to regulate consumers in these 
cases.  But many of those worried about the problem of political ignorance have very 
different proposals for dealing with the problem.  Sunstein's framing of the problem only 
makes sense in a political context whereby the state has undertaken such a wide variety 
of activities and responsibilities such that ordinary citizens are unable to properly educate
themselves about all of the complexities of various relevant government policies.
In opposition to this line of argument, instead of calling for the regulation of the 
speech environment of consumers, Caplan and Somin argue for reducing the scope of 
overall government activity, thus reducing the complexity that citizens face, and thereby 
reducing the likelihood of citizens imposing harmful policies on their fellow citizens.  
These thinkers advocate transitioning many activities out of the democratic political 
sphere (populated by citizens with disincentives to educate themselves about the issues) 
and into the private economic sphere (populated by consumers with strong incentives to 
educate themselves about their choices).379  In the context of a more limited state, the 
379 I have noted two responses to the problem of political ignorance: Sunstein's argument for the regulation 
and better design of the speech environment in addition to further education of ordinary citizens, and 
the Caplan/Somin argument for decreasing the scope of government activity to reduce the complexity 
faced by citizens and relying more on market solutions.  There is a third, although less commonly 
defended, alternative solution to the problem of political ignorance: elite-driven democracy.  Instead of 
either empowering ordinary citizens or shifting their decisions into the economic sphere, the proponents
of elite-driven democracy argue that the important political decisions should be handed off to an elite 
class with minimal input from the epistemically deficient masses.  While the argument from Caplan and
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problem of political ignorance would be reduced, and the “negative externalities” of bad 
political outcomes would be diminished, because citizens would be more capable of 
educating themselves about the (now reduced number and complexity of) political issues,
and they would furthermore have fewer opportunities to inflict their uneducated views on
others in harmful ways (since the state is engaged in fewer activities).380  But, as Sustein 
would retort, these limitations on the power of the state also come with their own costs in 
that they prevent citizens from doing positive things with the use of state power,381 and 
more generally these limitations overly constrict the rights of citizens to exercise their 
democratic rights to self-determination.  Again, though, allowing citizens to do more 
things through the state makes the problem of political ignorance more extreme, and 
helps justify the regulation of the speech environment.
In the end, we confront two options in the face of the problem of political 
ignorance (a problem which preexists the Internet, but which seems to be further fueled 
by it).  First, there is the Sunstein option of prioritizing the citizen over the consumer, 
which helps to justify a large government and a regulated speech environment.  Second, 
Somin assumes that elites are also encumbered by epistemic deficiencies (such as those elaborated by 
Hayek) and thus that the state should be small, the defenders of elite-driven democracy are not 
necessarily committed to a small state and market solutions.  For a classic defense of elite-driven 
democracy, see Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [New York: Harper & Row, 
1950], chapter 22.  For a more contemporary defense, see Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and 
Democracy [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003], chapters 4 and 5.
380 See Somin, “Political Ignorance and Deliberative Democracy,” 269f, where he discusses the “localist 
alternative” to deliberative democracy.  Also see Mark Pennington, “Hayekian Political Economy and 
the Limits of Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 51, no. 4 (December 2003); and Caplan, The 
Myth of the Rational Voter, chapter 8.
381 Somin concedes this point, “The deliberative advantages of private institutions are far from the only 
considerations that should be weighed in determining the proper size and scope of government.  In 
many situations, they are also not the most important.  For example, it is possible that some public 
goods, such as national defense, a large-scale legal system, and pollution control over wide geographic 
areas can be provided only by government.  In such cases, the deliberative shortcomings of government 
might be an acceptable price to pay for the provision of essential services that the private sector is 
unlikely to produce on its own” (“Political Ignorance and Deliberative Democracy,” 274).
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there is the Caplan/Somin option of prioritizing the consumer over the citizen, which 
helps to justify a limited government and a more unregulated speech environment.  
Ultimately, this debate comes down to fundamental philosophical disagreements about 
rights vs. welfare, liberty vs. equality, private vs. public, etc.  These disagreements are 
deep and seemingly intractable, and, as I have tried to argue in the previous two chapters, 
we should not expect even idealized reasonable people to come to an agreement on them, 
let alone actual citizens who are encumbered with the full array of normal epistemic 
deficiencies and cognitive biases.  
The concerns I have expressed about the effects of the Internet on non-ideal 
deliberation further intensify the problem.  The debate between Sunstein and 
Caplan/Somin concerns clashing fundamental philosophical values, as well as extremely 
complicated empirical issues about the connection between speech regulation and 
political outcomes as well as the connection between the power of the state and the extent
of political ignorance.  As I have shown, online deliberation is not well suited to deal with
the challenge of moral pluralism and empirical complexity.  So with this debate we 
confront foundational disagreement (a problem for ideal deliberation) as well as the 
challenge of moral pluralism and empirical complexity (a problem for non-ideal 
deliberation, especially as it takes place online).
In this case, Sunstein and Caplan/Somin disagree deeply about the nature of 
freedom and coercion.  Here is how Sunstein defines the kind of freedom that the state 
should actively protect: “freedom properly understood consists not simply in the 
satisfaction of whatever preferences people have, but also in the chance to have 
preferences and beliefs formed under decent conditions—in the ability to have 
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preferences formed after exposure to a sufficient amount of information and also to an 
appropriately wide and diverse range of options.”382  This represents a prioritization of the
citizen over the consumer because freedom is defined as freedom over one's conditions, 
not merely freedom of choice within one's conditions.  That is, prioritizing the citizen 
reflects a commitment to freedom as control over the conditions which give rise to one's 
choice set, while the prioritization of the consumer reflects a commitment to freedom as 
freedom to choose within a given choice set.  How could someone reasonably reject 
Sunstein's conception of freedom?  Well, one feature of the conditions under which my 
choice set emerges is the choices of other people, so the right to control my conditions is 
necessarily also a right to have a say in the choices of other people.  What justifies this, 
and what are the limits to it?  What about the possibility that my interference with the 
choices of others (even when those choices modify my choice set) is a violation of their 
rights, and thus unjust?
Nozick reflects on the argument that “people have a right to a say in the decisions 
that importantly affect their lives.”383  He develops a provocative thought experiment that 
illustrates his point (and serves as a nice critique of Sunstein's position): 
If four men propose marriage to a woman, her decision about whom, if 
any of them, to marry importantly affects each of the live of those four 
persons, her own life, and the lives of any other persons wishing to marry 
one of these four men, and so on.  Would anyone propose, even limiting 
382 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 45.  And while Sunstein might be right that freedom properly understood 
requires adequate conditions for its expression, it is possible that the coupling of a large government 
with the regulated speech environment that he advocates will result in more harm than good – harm 
from bad policies generated by persistent political ignorance, as well as harm to those whose speech is 
regulated.
383 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 268.
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the group to include only the primary parties, that all five persons vote to 
decide whom she shall marry?  She has a right to decide what to do, and 
there is no right the other four have to a say in the decisions which 
importantly affect their lives that is being ignored here.  They have no 
right to a say in that decision.384 
This passage is a reductio ad absurdum of the argument (defended by Sunstein and many 
others) that people have a right to determine the conditions under which they make 
choices.  Nozick points out that such a right is apt to run up against a certain liberal 
conception of individual rights against interference.385  This is not to say that 
Nozick/Caplan/Somin are right and Sunstein is wrong about the nature of freedom and 
coercion.  It is only to point out that such a debate reflects a deep yet reasonable 
disagreement about matters of basic justice.  Neither Nozick nor Sunstein should assume 
that his position is uniquely reasonable (and thus is an appropriate and satisfying public 
justification for principles of justice).  In debates about the proper response to our 
troubled online speech environment, we are again brought face-to-face with foundational 
yet reasonable disagreements.
384 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 269.  If this thought experiment fails to adequately tap into your 
libertarian intuitions, Nozick offers another: “Suppose you own a station wagon or a bus and lend it to a
group of people for a year while you are out of the country.  During this year these people become quite 
dependent on your vehicle, integrating it into their lives.  When at the end of the year you return, as you 
said you would, and ask for your bus back, these people say that your decision once more to use the bus
yourself importantly affects their lives, and so they have a right to a say in determining what is to 
become of the bus.  Surely this claim is without merit” (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 269).
385 From a different tradition of political thought, Chantal Mouffe reflects on the ideals of liberalism and 
democracy, and points out “the ultimate contradictory nature of the two logics” (The Democratic 
Paradox, 45).  While liberalism embodies a commitment to universal individual rights (especially 
against state coercion), democracy embodies a particular collective right for a certain “people” to rule 
themselves (through state power).  This “constitutive paradox” at the heart of “liberal democracy” is 
reflected in debates between libertarians and classical liberals on the one hand and left-liberals and 
participatory democrats on the other (Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 45).
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In this chapter, as well as the previous two chapters, I have discussed many 
reasons why we should not expect a rational consensus around problems of economic and
distributive justice.  These questions are characterized by such a high degree of moral 
pluralism and epistemic complexity that rational consensus is not forthcoming in either 
ideal theory or non-ideal deliberation.  We are faced with a set of entrenched 
philosophical disagreements.  Having identified this problem, which has been 
unappreciated in much of political philosophy, in the next chapter I develop some ideas 
about how we might better orient ourselves toward these problems.  In doing so, I draw 
on the tradition of American pragmatism, which is especially interested in real-world 
problem solving.  While I offer no grand philosophical solutions to these problems, I do 
propose some (hopefully) fruitful and constructive ways of dealing with them in both 
theory and practice.
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CHAPTER V
DEEP PLURALISM AND PRAGMATIST POLITICS
1. Introduction: From Political Liberalism to Pragmatism
In this chapter, I bring the American pragmatist philosophical tradition to bear on 
some central problems that I have identified in the tradition of political liberalism.  
Political liberals assume that our disagreements about justice are constrained by a shared 
set of political values, but I have argued that our reasonable disagreements about justice 
are sometimes radically deep – as is the case with regard to matters of economic justice – 
and political philosophy must be responsive to this fact.  The recognition of these 
shortcomings of political liberalism is now taking hold among a number of different 
camps within contemporary political philosophy.  Similar lines of critique have been 
developed by so-called realists (like Raymond Geuss386 and Bernard Williams387), by 
modus vivendi liberals (like John Gray388 and David McCabe389), by agonist democrats 
(like Chantal Mouffe390 and Bonnie Honig391), and even by some working within (but 
pushing against the boundaries of) the framework of political liberalism (like Gerald 
386 See Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008).
387 See Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005).
388 See Gray, The Two Faces of Liberalism.
389 See David McCabe, Modus Vivendi Liberalism (New York: Cambridge UP, 2010).
390 See Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox.
391 See Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1993).
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Gaus392).393  Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that the political liberalism first 
articulated and defended by John Rawls in Political Liberalism is now in crisis.  
Many of these compelling critics of political liberalism, however, have struggled 
to articulate a positive response to this crisis.  Perhaps the nature of these criticisms 
forecloses the possibility of a detailed alternative.  If we maintain a commitment to 
consensus as a pillar of political legitimacy (which I believe we should), but we also 
recognize that reasonable people are unlikely to agree upon either a single principle or a 
bounded set of similar principles of justice on some important matters (like property 
rights and economic justice), then it is entirely unclear what kind of positive political 
project is possible.  Thus, these critics tend to gesture vaguely towards the necessity of 
political agonism (but what does that look like?), or the benefits of achieving stability 
(but how do we achieve it?), or the hope that we might coordinate on a sub-optimal but 
acceptable socio-political Nash equilibrium (but how do we do that, and what if we 
cannot?).
While our condition of deep pluralism might foreclose the possibility of rational 
consensus for all matters of justice, it is worth thinking through how we might best orient
ourselves to our especially deep and persistent disagreements, and to reflect on the role 
that political philosophy might play in this context.  To address this, in this chapter I turn 
to a philosophical tradition not yet addressed in this dissertation, and which is not often 
brought into discussions about the problems of analytic political philosophy: American 
pragmatism.  Does pragmatism offer strategies for helping us navigate not merely Rawls’ 
constrained and hypothetical “reasonable pluralism,” but instead our more familiar and 
392 See Gaus, The Order of Public Reason; and Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal.
393 For a helpful overview of this emerging critique of political liberalism, see Galston, “Realism in 
Political Theory.”
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unruly “deep pluralism”?394  Indeed, one would think so, given pragmatism’s overriding 
commitment to dealing constructively with actually existing problems and conditions, 
and its skepticism toward philosophical abstractions that take us away from and overly 
simplify our situation.  In this chapter, then, I look through some of the major strands of 
pragmatism for possible responses to the crisis of political liberalism.
The tradition of American pragmatism is long and rich, featuring a number of 
important thinkers, many of whom made important contributions to political theory and 
political philosophy.  Like all traditions, it is unified by a family resemblance of 
commitments, but nonetheless features important debates within itself over some of its 
core ideas.  In this chapter, I will focus on the ideas of John Dewey, Charles Sanders 
Peirce, and William James, with a brief discussion of Richard Rorty.395  By examining 
each of these key figures in the tradition, I tease apart different strands of pragmatist 
thought, some of which are helpful for dealing with the problems that I have identified in 
earlier chapters, some of which are not.
I first explore whether Dewey's contributions to democratic theory offer an 
adequate response to deep pluralism.  I start with Dewey because he is seemingly the best
candidate for thinking through problems of democratic deliberation and pluralism, since 
he dedicated so much of his writing to the theory and practice of democratic politics.  For
many philosophers, pragmatist political philosophy just is Dewey's democratic theory.  
394 The distinction between “reasonable pluralism” and “deep pluralism” is made by Colin Koopman in, 
among other places, his “Review of Ferguson Kennan's William James: Politics in the Pluriverse,” 
William James Studies 4 (2009).
395 Many other American pragmatists made important contributions to political philosophy, and even to 
questions of pluralism, such as Jane Addams, Mary Parket Follett, and, more recently, Cornel West.  For
a discussion of the many figures in the American philosophical tradition who discussed questions of 
pluralism and justice (and related matters), see Scott Pratt and Erin McKenna, American Philosophy: 
From Wounded Knee to the Present (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).
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However, I will argue that the Deweyan account does not help deal with the problems I 
have identified, since its key idea of “growth” is a controversial standard that excludes 
moral non-naturalists from democratic deliberation, and also because the Deweyan faith 
in deliberation to bring about consensus is unfounded in the context of deep pluralism.  
Dewey may be helpful for thinking through other political problems, such as democratic 
participation, but he does not help us deal with the problems generated by deep pluralism.
I then briefly turn to the recent articulation of democratic theory as inspired by the
work of Peirce.  This is another seemingly likely starting point for thinking through 
problems of democratic deliberation and pluralism, given recent contributions to Peircean
deliberative theory by Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse.396  However, while there are 
important insights in this tradition, I will argue that it does not help deal with the 
problems that I have identified and that I am concerned to address in this dissertation.  
The “epistemic perfectionism” of Peircean democracy does not get around the problems 
generated by deep yet reasonable moral pluralism (identified in chapters II and III).  Even
if all deliberators were free from epistemic deficiencies (such as those explored in chapter
IV), they might nonetheless be reasonably committed to radically different premises 
(such as Robert Nozick's “self-ownership thesis” or John Rawls' “luck egalitarian 
thesis”), or they might reasonably interpret shared political values in significantly 
different ways (featured in the debate over the relationship between economic liberty and 
moral personhood that divides Samuel Freeman from John Tomasi, or in the debate over 
the nature of liberty and coercion that divides Gerald Gaus from Andrew Lister).  Even in
ideal theory, then, where we restrict ourselves to epistemically idealized reasonable 
396 Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (Routledge: London, 2000); 
Robert Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2007).
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people, rational consensus is not a feasible goal on certain core matters of justice because 
of the wide plurality of reasonable views.
  I then propose that James offers a more promising (perhaps because more 
humble) response to the fractures of contemporary liberal political philosophy, and I 
develop an account of what a Jamesian political philosophy would look like, also 
borrowing elements from Rorty’s political thought.  James argues that, in the face of deep
yet reasonable pluralism, the political philosopher should attempt to create new ideals 
and values that might appeal to both sides of a conflict – enabling the creation of 
consensus where it was not previously possible.  This practice, which I refer to as 
Jamesian moral entrepreneurship, is on display by James himself in his article “The 
Moral Equivalent of War,” which will be analyzed below.  This is a difficult task without 
any guarantee of success, but it offers the best way for the political philosopher to 
respond to our deeply pluralistic world.  I also discuss additional possible contributions 
by the pragmatist political philosopher, including Rortyan moral entrepreneurship, moral
explication, and Jamesian partisanship.  This section aims to provide suggestions about 
how political philosophy might be constructively reoriented in contexts of deep yet 
reasonable disagreement, which I have shown characterize some of our most pressing 
political problems today.
I want to clarify the scope and aim of this chapter up front to avoid 
misunderstandings.  The turn (advocated in this chapter) from idealism to realism, from 
ideal theory to non-ideal problem-solving, from political liberalism to pragmatism, is not 
meant to convert all political liberals to pragmatists, or to function as a knock-down 
argument against idealistic and moralistic modes of doing political philosophy.  My goal 
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is much more humble.  I aim simply to offer a set of tools that may be helpful in thinking 
through what seem to be intractable deadlocks that have emerged within contemporary 
political liberalism itself.  Pragmatism is not offered as a wholesale replacement political 
philosophy to political liberalism, but as a particular response to a particular set of 
problems that are unresolved and possibly irresolvable within the political liberal 
paradigm.  Moralistic political philosophies (like political liberalism) are not wrong – 
they are just unproductive in those contexts where we disagree deeply and persistently 
about the relevant moral values.  The tools of political liberalism are powerful, and 
political liberals have helped to make explicit and systematize many of our deepest 
intuitions about justice.  It is possible that continued work within the political liberal 
paradigm (such as the work being done by philosophers like Gerald Gaus) will prove 
fruitful in some of these difficult debates.  But, given what I have shown in the opening 
chapters of this dissertation, I am skeptical that progress within the political liberal 
paradigm is forthcoming on some of these deadlocked issues, since it is clear that even 
adherents of political liberalism are capable of working up arguments that lead to sharply 
opposing conclusions.  
Political liberalism emerged as an attempt to help us forge a consensus about 
justice in conditions of reasonable pluralism.  For many onlookers, political liberalism 
has failed in important ways to live up to this promise, and the tradition of political 
liberalism now features a level of disagreement between political liberals that simply 
mirrors the disagreements we have in the real world of politics.  Political liberalism (and 
moralistic political philosophy more generally) is in crisis, and those of us who are 
frustrated by it are looking elsewhere for alternative tools and ideas.  I hope, in this 
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chapter, to make the case that Jamesian pragmatism is one possibly fruitful strategy (but 
undoubtedly not the only fruitful strategy) for dealing with some of the problems that 
political liberalism has proved itself unable to adequately handle.  Before making this 
positive case, I will first explain what my proposed view is not, by explaining some of the
problems and shortcomings of some other major pragmatist thinkers.
2. Deweyan Democracy and the Ideal of Growth
Dewey wrote on a wide array of topics, but through them all can be found the 
unifying concepts of “democracy” and “growth,” which are also deeply interconnected 
with each other.397  Drawing on Robert Talisse's 2001 essay “A Farewell to Deweyan 
Democracy,” I will discuss two areas of concern in Dewey's political philosophy: 
Dewey's problematic notion of “growth” (which I will discuss in this section), and 
Dewey’s problematic attachment to deliberative democracy (which I will discuss in the 
next section).
The first of Dewey's commitments to be explored is his commitment that the 
democratic state should both cultivate and reflect the democratic character and ethos of 
the citizenry.  Dewey insists that democracy is not about having the state serve as a 
neutral umpire vis-à-vis the interactions of citizens, nor is it about merely aggregating 
and fulfilling the preferences of citizens, but its goal is “the all around growth of every 
397 The concept of growth in Dewey is rich and complex.  The literature on how the notion of growth fits 
into Dewey's ethics and politics is vast.  For some of the more important commentary, see Melvin 
Rogers. The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the Ethos of Democracy (New York: 
Columbia UP, 2009); Judith Green, Deep Democracy: Community, Diversity, and Transformation 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); Judith Green, Pragmatism and Social Hope: Deepening 
Democracy in Global Contexts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Gregory Fernando 
Pappas, John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2008); Eric 
MacGilvray, Reconstructing Public Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004); and Matthew 
Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997).
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member of society.”398  Democratic individuals must be created, and political institutions 
must play a role in that process.  Dewey routinely links his idea of democracy to the ideas
of education and growth, since democratic institutions “are not means for obtaining 
something for individuals.  They are means of creating individuals.”399  The justification 
for democracy, then, is its ability to facilitate growth.  Growth provides the “criterion,”400 
“standard”401 or “supreme test”402 for democracy.  This justification is sufficient because, 
for Dewey, “growth itself is the only moral ‘end.’”403  Because democracy is a method for
furthering the growth of its citizens, Talisse writes, “Deweyans hold that to show that 
some public policy P is the best among available options for promoting growth is to 
provide a conclusive reason for enacting P.”404  The value of growth thus serves as the 
common currency for public deliberation.
The problem with this view of democracy is that it does not respect citizens 
whose ideals conflict with Dewey’s moral ideal of growth.  As Talisse puts it, “the 
Deweyan democratic ideal can be reasonably rejected; one can reject growth as an ideal 
yet not revoke one’s fitness for citizenship in a democratic society.”405  For Talisse, 
Dewey’s notion of growth is not “political,” in Rawls’ sense that it might serve as the 
398 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works (vol. 12), ed. J. A. Boydston 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1982), 186.
399 Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works (vol. 12), 191; emphasis in original.
400 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works (vol. 5), ed. J. A. Boydston 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1978), 431.
401 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works (vol. 9), ed. J. A. Boydston 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1980), 89.
402 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works (vol. 12), 186.
403 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works (vol. 12), 181.
404 Talisse, “A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy,” 514.
405 Talisse, “A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy,” 515.
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basis of an overlapping consensus between reasonable people, but it is rather a 
“comprehensive” view of morality and politics.406  Accordingly, the use of growth as a 
criterion for policy could be reasonably rejected (or “vetoed”) by citizens whose ideals 
conflict with the imperative of growth.  This line of critique is devastating to Deweyan 
democracy if it is found to be convincing.  At this point, then, we must ask the obvious 
question: which citizens, exactly, would find growth to be an unacceptable criterion?  
Could reasonable people really reject growth as the ultimate ideal?  Who would not want 
to “grow” in Dewey’s sense?
 First, let us examine more clearly what Dewey means by growth.  For Dewey, to 
grow is to be open to the transformative effects of experience.  To grow is to recognize 
that one’s moral and political values are merely summaries of past experience, and thus 
they should should be alterable if so required by changing conditions.  Indeed, the person 
who recognizes this feature of her moral and political values will be eager to experiment 
with different values in order to solve newly emergent problems when faced with 
changed conditions.  This account of growth is closely related to Dewey's discussions of 
“habits,” where he writes about how habits are formed and how they can be reformed and
transformed as conditions change.  The goal, then, should be for one's habits to remain 
406 In David Rondel, “Deweyan Democracy Defended,” Southwest Philosophy Review 28, no.1 (2012), 
Rondel argues that Dewey did not intend his totalizing conception of democracy to be imposed 
coercively through the state, but rather that it was meant to merely embody an ethical ideal.  As Rondel 
put it, Deweyan democracy is “aspirational not coercive” (201).  If this is the proper reading of Dewey, 
then it is possible that my Talissean critique of Dewey simply misses the mark.  But if this is so, then 
this admission comes at a cost – Dewey has no contribution to make to questions of justice (see Robert 
Talisse's response to Rondel, “Reply to Rondel,” Southwest Philosophy Review 28, no. 2 [2012]).  If 
Rondel's reading is correct, then my basic argument in this section stands – Dewey is of little help when
trying to work out problems of basic justice in the context of deep yet reasonable pluralism.  From a 
slightly different angle, Phil Mayo defends Dewey as advocating a “thin” and thereby “political” 
conception of the good instead of a “thick” and thereby “comprehensive” conception of the good, thus 
sidestepping Talisse's critique of Dewey (see Phil Mayo, “At What Price Pluralism?: A Reply to Robert 
Talisse” [paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American 
Philosophy, New York. March 2012]).  If this reading of Dewey is correct, then again it is not clear what
Dewey has to say about navigating deep pluralism.
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flexible and open to new experience, always capable of transformation to meet new 
problems.407  This all seems reasonable as a way to approach life and its problems.  
Importantly, however, Dewey does not seem to merely prescribe growth as a personal 
ideal (a private conception of the good life), but instead he insists upon it as a political 
ideal (a public conception of justice).  
A constant theme in Dewey’s moral and political writings is the need to apply the 
scientific method to the moral and political domains so as to facilitate growth.  For 
Dewey, one of the major obstacles to achieving growth is the age-old quest for certainty, 
whereby people look for fixed and unchanging values, leaving these people unable to 
intelligently deal with new conditions.  The Deweyan democrat must therefore relinquish 
the debilitating urge to “find something so fixed and certain as to provide a secure 
refuge.”408  When we relinquish the drive for fixity and certainty, we will see the moral 
realm as continuous with the other domains of inquiry.  For Dewey, the collapse of the 
traditional opposition between the unchanging “moral” domain and the ever-changing 
“physical” domain is a feature of the recent trends toward “secularization,” and our goal 
(as a culture) should be the “genuine universalization of the method – and spirit – of 
science as inquiry.”409  The Deweyan democrat will thus “subject the ‘morals’ underlying 
old institutional customs to scientific inquiry and criticism.”410  Dewey embraces the 
radicalism of his proposal, as he recognizes that extending the application of scientific 
407 For Dewey's most focused discussion of habits, see Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1922).  For a contemporary defense and extension of the ethical import of these 
Deweyan insights, see Mark Johnson, Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the 
Perspective of Cognitive Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); and Philip Kitcher, The
Ethical Project (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2011).
408 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), vii.
409 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, xxxiii.
410 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, xxiii.
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inquiry into the moral domain would result in “a new moral order.”411  Genuine 
democracy, then, requires that we “carry over into any inquiry into human and moral 
subjects the kind of method (the method of observation, theory as hypothesis, and 
experimental test) by which understanding of physical nature has been brought to its 
present pitch.”412
Which citizens, exactly, would find growth to be an unacceptable criterion?  Well, 
most generally, certain moral non-naturalists will reject the idea that growth is the only 
genuine moral end.  Included in this class of citizens will be most religious believers, but 
also many secular citizens as well.  For moral non-naturalists, our moral and political 
values are not merely summaries of past experience.  For these citizens, their values do 
not have normative force over them because they have been helpful in resolving 
problems in the past.  These values are not subject to empirical falsification.  They are 
rooted in some other source – perhaps revelation, reason, intuition, or tradition.  For the 
non-naturalist, the moral domain cannot be subjected to “experimentation” in the same 
way that the physical domain is.  Fundamental moral values (for the non-naturalist) 
cannot be tinkered with in a lab, and morality should not be approached with the attitude 
of an experimenter.  Talisse summarizes the problem: “the idea that we must resolve our 
social problems by appeal to ‘cooperative social experimentation’ would be rejected by 
those who reject naturalism in moral philosophy.  On some reasonable views, 
experimentation and scientific method are wholly irrelevant to a range of questions of 
social policy,” which include important issues of justice such as “the permissibility of 
capital punishment or progressive taxation,” which “are questions about what is required 
411 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, xxxix.
412 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, ix.
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by justice, and justice is not something that can be examined empirically, but must be 
investigated conceptually or in some other non-empirical way.”413  Thus, Talisse 
concludes, “many reasonable people will strongly reject any appeal to experimentation 
when it comes to fundamental matters of justice.”414  
Is Talisse right that among those who reject naturalism, and hence Deweyan 
“growth,” are a number of reasonable people whose views we must take seriously?  It 
seems clear that Dewey’s growth-centered democratic ideal will be deemed unacceptable 
by more than the religious fundamentalist – included in this group will be many 
reasonable secularists.  Let us take an example.  Many non-dogmatic religious believers, 
and many secularists as well, believe in the moral and political ideal of pacifism.  For 
these citizens, the ideal of pacifism is not subject to empirical falsification (in any 
straightforward sense).  For them, all human life has inherent dignity that cannot be 
violated.  This conviction, again, might come from a variety of sources, including 
revelation, reason, or intuition.  For some pacifists, no conceivable event in the world 
could overturn their commitment, including a military enemy as depraved as the Nazis.  
Is this view unreasonable?  So unreasonable that it merits exclusion from democratic 
deliberation?415  Dewey's commitment to growth furthermore seems to exclude 
413 Talisse, “A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy,” 518.
414 Talisse, “A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy,” 518.
415 Again, a background textual question here is whether or not Dewey's discussion of deliberation is aimed
at consensus about justice, or about something else.  I am assuming that it is, but this is contested by 
commentors like David Rondel in his article “Deweyan Democracy Defended.”  I discuss in footnote 
405 why this textual dispute does not effect the basic argument in this section.  Further, it is not clear in 
Dewey's texts what exactly he has in mind.  Rondel concedes, “Admittedly, Dewey could sometimes be 
vague about what a (real-world) commitment to his democratic ideal ultimately amounted to, about the 
kinds of laws, policies, and institutions that it required.  He had strikingly little of a precise nature to 
say, moreover, about the circumstances under which political coercion is legitimate” (“Deweyan 
Democracy Defended,” 200).  The concern that Dewey could “sometimes be vague” is undoubtedly 
true.  This is unfortunate for Dewey, especially since so much of analytic political philosophy today is 
concerned with just that - “the circumstances under which political coercion is legitimate.”
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conservative citizens who, Jonathan Haidt argues, draw on the moral foundation of 
“authority/subversion” and “sanctity/degradation,” both of which build in constraints 
against falsification and experimentation for certain core values (or “sacred” values).  
Thus Dewey, like the political liberals, needs to explain why he is justified in excluding 
some of the values of conservatives citizens from deliberations about justice, and why 
those conservative citizens should feel bound to the outcome of deliberations to which 
they have not been fully welcomed.
There are many citizens today who adhere to moral non-naturalism vis-à-vis 
matters of basic justice whom it would seem unwarranted to exclude.  Many people hold 
non-naturalist views about abortion, in the sense that no further “experimentation” would 
be capable of dislodging the views of reasonable members on either side.  For many pro-
lifers and pro-choicers, empirical issues about the timing and extent of “fetal pain” are 
beside the point (as would be the results of any other empirical experimentation) – the 
point of contention is rather a metaphysical one about personhood and autonomy.  Or 
consider the case of animal rights.  Certainly part of the issue involves empirical 
questions about animals' cognitive complexity and sentience.  But the normative 
questions about rights, welfare, obligations, etc., are not so clearly open to 
experimentation.  For some advocates of animal rights, experimentation with the 
normative concerns is entirely beside the point.416  For a final example, consider that 
debates about property often hinge on intuitions and beliefs about entitlement and 
fairness that are not necessarily open to experimentation.  Ultimately, it is clear that non-
naturalists can be reasonable citizens, and these citizens will experience Deweyan 
416 For a discussion of the depth of reasonable disagreement about issues of animal ethics and politics, see 
Alan Reynolds, “Animal Ethics and Politics Beyond the Social Contract,” Les Ateliers de l'éthique/The 
Ethics Forum 10, no. 1 (2015).
206
democracy as oppressive, since it does not respect ideals that are not subject to its 
demands for scientific inquiry.  This concern is serious, and provides a good reason to bid
Deweyan democracy farewell.  Deweyan growth does not accommodate deep pluralism.
3. Deweyan Democracy and the Ideal of Deliberation
Talisse identifies one of the core commitments of Deweyan democracy as the 
Transformative Thesis.  Deweyan deliberative democracy would have us identify a 
common problem, undergo a process of deliberation (or “inquiry”), within which the ex 
ante disagreements can be transformed into an ex post consensus.417  For Dewey, 
conflicting claims are discussed “out into the open” where “they can be discussed and 
judged in the light of more inclusive interests.”418  This process allows for the emergence 
of “values prized in common.”419  As Talisse puts it, political deliberation results in  
“transformed or revised preferences and enlarged social perspectives,” and lets citizens 
“engage in social processes of applying collective intelligence to shared problems and, in 
so doing, they grow.”420
417 A number of deliberative democratic theorists have taken up Dewey's work.  See Noelle McAfee, 
Democracy and the Political Unconscious (New York: Columbia UP, 2008); Zach Vanderveen, “John 
Dewey's Experimental Politics: Inquiry and Legitimacy,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 
47, no. 2 (2011); Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations: Essays for a Bold New World, 
ed. Shane Ralston (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013); James Fishkin, Democracy and 
Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1991); James Fishkin,
When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (New York: Oxford UP, 
2009); and John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (New 
York: Oxford UP, 2000).
418 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Later Works (vol. 11), ed. J. A. Boydston 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1987), 56.
419 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Later Works (vol. 13), ed. J. A. Boydston 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1988), 71; John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey: 
The Later Works (vol. 2), ed. J. A. Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1984), 328.
420 Talisse, “A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy,” 511.
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What is the problem with this model of politics?  First, it assumes a malleability 
of beliefs that is unwarranted.  Second, it assumes a shallowness of disagreement that is 
unwarranted.  These assumptions are related, but let us examine each in turn before 
drawing some conclusions about the flaws of Deweyan democracy.
On the first point, Dewey seems to assume that our moral and political beliefs 
become malleable and changeable in the context of deliberation, permitting the 
achievement of consensus.  Dewey in some ways anticipated this core commitment of 
more recent deliberative democracy theorists.  Dewey holds that all ideals and values are 
summaries of past experience, and that they are formed intersubjectively through 
experience with others.  Dewey’s assumption seems to be that since one’s beliefs are 
formed intersubjectively through experience, then they can be transformed 
intersubjectively through experience – most notably through the experience of democratic
deliberation.  This conclusion does not follow.  
People do obviously acquire their views through contingent experiences in social 
contexts.  But once people become attached to their ideals, they often hold onto them 
passionately – whether it be a religious belief or a secular commitment.  In other words, 
the contingency that marks the formation of our beliefs does not require the epistemically
responsible believer to hold them any less strongly.421  It is certainly possible that one can 
be fully cognizant of the contingency that marks the development of one’s beliefs without
those beliefs being at all malleable in the context of deliberation.  Our ideals sometimes 
become deeply interwoven into our identities, such that relinquishing them would seem 
421 Melvin Rogers seems to want to draw such an inference, arguing, “We must not assume that our starting
points exist at the level of phenomenological fact, untouched by the contingency that is part of its 
development” (“Dewey, Pluralism, and Democracy: A Response to Robert Talisse,” Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1 [Winter 2009]: 78).  For a similar argument, see Alison Kadlec, 
Dewey's Critical Pragmatism (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2007).
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tantamount to becoming a different person.422  Now, radical transformation of ideals and 
identities does invariably occur at punctuated and unpredictable points in our lives, but 
we should not expect it to frequently occur in the course of democratic deliberation.423 
This leads to Dewey’s second assumption: that deliberation in the right conditions
is capable of converting pluralism into consensus.  Deliberation is assumed to help 
foreground the “values prized in common” and bring about an “enlarged social 
perspective” such that disagreements can be overcome.  This view of deliberation shares 
with political liberalism the assumption that beneath our seemingly deep disagreement is 
a common core of values that can be uncovered or perhaps created by deliberation.  This 
optimistic view cannot be assumed, especially in cases of foundational disagreement, 
where interlocutors do not share a common normative framework, such as Dewey’s 
422 Jonathan Haidt documents how our moral, political, and religious views are rooted in our basic 
dispositions, attitudes, and personality traits, such as openness to experience, fear of the unknown, 
respect for authority, etc.  Even though these traits are produced through a complicated mixture of 
nature and nurture, it is unclear how changeable (or transformable) they are once they are formed (or 
how we might go about changing them even if they are changeable).  In any case, Haidt makes clear 
that reasoned deliberation is generally an unsuccessful strategy for changing the deeply held beliefs of 
others.  See Haidt, The Righteous Mind, part 2.  For a discussion of the possibility that political 
preferences are largely influenced by one's genes, see John Alford, Carolyn Funk, and John Hibbing, 
“Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?”, American Political Science Review 99, no. 2 
(May, 2005); and James Fowler and Christopher Dawes, “In Defense of Genopolitics,” American 
Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (May 2013).  For a discussion of how one's philosophical 
commitments are rooted in one's temperament, from the pragmatist tradition, see William James, “The 
Present Dilemma in Philosophy,” in The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977), where he defends the claim, “The history of philosophy is to a great
extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments” (363).  According to James, each person “trusts 
his temperament,” and “wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe
that does suit it” (364).  In “The Types of Philosophic Thinking,” in The Writings of William James, ed. 
John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), James similarly notes, “A philosophy
is the expression of a man's intimate character, and all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately
adopted reactions of human character upon it” (489).  All of these arguments undercut the Deweyan 
confidence that democratic deliberation is likely to transform conflicting beliefs and forge consensus.
423 These are largely empirical questions, which are discussed and debated within the literature on 
deliberative democracy.  Some theorists are optimistic about the likelihood of transformation-towards-
consensus occurring in the process of well-structured deliberation.  See Fishkin, Democracy and 
Deliberation; Fishkin, When the People Speak; and Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond.  
Others are more pessimistic about the likelihood of this transformation occurring through deliberation.  
See Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance; and Cass Sunstein,  “Deliberating Groups vs. 
Prediction Markets (or Hayek's Challenge to Habermas),” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 
3, no. 3 (2006).
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ethical naturalism.  There do not always exist “values prized in common,” and in many 
cases there exists a clash of incommensurable values.  
In reference to the critique developed in the prior section, we can anticipate the 
difficulties experienced in a deliberation between a moral naturalist and a moral non-
naturalist about matters of basic justice.  In some ways, this deliberation would have a 
hard time getting off the ground, because the naturalist and non-naturalist do not agree on
a basic framework with which to understand and solve the problem.  They very well may 
not even agree about the nature of the problem (or even that there is a problem).  Dewey 
does not anticipate these difficulties, because he seems unwilling to countenance the 
reasonableness of non-naturalistic views.  When disagreements are foundational, 
democratic deliberation often only sharpens the contrasting views and leads to further 
entrenchment.  Since we live in a political culture divided by foundational disagreements 
about justice, we (as political philosophers) should not assume that all ideals and values 
are malleable in the context of deliberation, such that transformation is a likely outcome 
(even though deliberation does, at times, result in such transformation).424 
424 Samuel Bagg identifies Dewey as a “realist” (in the way that this term is understood in contemporary 
political philosophy), and argues that Deweyan realism provides us with tools to navigate and overcome
foundational disagreements about justice by encouraging us to stop arguing about first principles and 
instead discuss how different proposals will predictably affect future practice.  He writes, “If we focus 
instead on our divergent views of the particular options – our predictions – then we need not turn 
immediately to such foundational tensions.  During the process of predictive theory construction, 
political theorists debate the consequences of various concrete options within a specific situation of 
judgment” (“Realism in a Deweyan Key: Political Theory as Prediction,” unpublished, 14).  While 
Bagg is right that discussions of predictions of particular policies might allow us to temporarily ignore 
“such foundational tensions,” he does not convincingly explain how these tensions will remain ignored. 
It seems obvious that when we start debating the relative merits of the different proposals (coupled with 
their predictions), we will find ourselves sooner or later (probably sooner) drawing on those 
controversial values that led us into the disagreement in the first place.  Bagg, then, commits the 
opposite error that Rawls does.  Rawls hopes to start with our political disagreement and abstract away 
to more general and shared principles (which is supposed to help us navigate those original 
disagreements in some way), while Bagg wants to start with our political disagreements and dig down 
into empirical prediction far enough that we forget about the principles that divided us.  Both are 
attempting to bracket and evade that which must be confronted head-on.  Again paralleling the political 
liberals, Bagg expresses what is clearly a kind of faith in the eventuality of consensus: “Inevitably, 
however, there will come a point in situations of judgment when, after we have brought all of our 
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In sum, the political philosopher should not assume that beliefs are inherently 
malleable, and should not assume that disagreements are shallow.  It is sometimes the 
case that deliberation does lead people to change their views and move toward consensus.
While these experiences of transformative consensus-formation should not be foreclosed 
by the political philosopher, they should certainly not be assumed.  To assume the 
malleability of beliefs and the shallowness of disagreement is to fail, like Rawls, to take 
seriously the pervasiveness of foundational disagreements that we experience vis-à-vis 
matters of basic justice.
Furthermore, a theory of democracy that relies on these assumptions can lead the 
theorist to draw some problematic conclusions.  If democratic deliberation really is 
capable of transforming our ex ante divergent ideals into ex post consensus, then one 
would be tempted to think that democratic deliberation ought to be the decision-
procedure in as many institutions and practices as possible.  Indeed, one might even be 
tempted to advocate democracy as a way of life, just as Dewey does.425  For Dewey, 
democratization must push beyond political institutions to encompass all human 
heuristics to bear on the problem, we will still disagree with one another.  Then we face a choice.  How 
ought we pursue this disagreement?  How can we, as political theorists, use our expertise in 
collaboration with democratic citizens to move forward in these situations of judgment?  Perhaps it will 
still be productive to return to thought experiments and intuition pumps; to appeal once again to ever 
more basic moral intuitions.  I suspect, and have argued in this paper, that it will be far better for us to 
set this discourse aside in favor of one that projects our historical and social inquiry into the future, 
building a cumulative knowledge base about the most important choices we face.  That, at least, is my 
prediction” (22).  With this concluding “prediction” we see the analogue of the “liberal faith” criticized 
in chapter II – what I might call the “pragmatist faith” (usually dubbed “hope” in the pragmatist 
tradition).  And we should be wary of the pragmatist faith in the same way (and for many of the same 
reasons) that we should be wary of the liberal faith.
425 Dewey insists that “we realize in thought and act that democracy is a personal way of individual life,” 
one that “signifies the possession and continual use of certain attitudes, forming personal character and 
determining desires and purpose in all the relations of life” (John Dewey, The Collected Works of John 
Dewey: The Later Works [vol. 14], ed. J. A. Boydston [Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1988], 
226; my italics).  This essay, “Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us,” is the clearest expression of 
Dewey's commitment that democracy should be thought of primarily as a way of life, not primarily as 
an institutional framework.
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associations.  This might be a desirable goal if democratic deliberation regularly 
generated action-guiding consensus.  However, Dewey's assumptions about the nature of 
disagreement and deliberation can be dangerous if they lead us to utilize the democratic 
decision-procedure in areas and dimensions of our lives where it will likely result in 
oppression.  
Gaus helps bring the core of the problem into view: “in the end, deliberative 
democrats acknowledge, we must cut off discussion and take a vote, but then the majority
is subjugating others to its judgment in the name of public reason—reason which is not 
shared by the dissenting minority.”426  Here we come face to face with the dark underside 
of participatory democracy.  Gaus condemns the overly optimistic view of deliberation 
shared by the participatory democrats that Dewey is associated with as likely to lead to 
“authoritarianism and oppression.”427  To repeat an important quotation cited above, Gaus
writes, 
Deliberative democracy supposes that our differences in evaluative 
standards are, as it were, only on the surface.  Once we reason together 
and talk things through, deliberative democrats hold that our value 
orderings will be transformed; the range of disagreement will so radically 
narrow that the problems of social commensuration will become fairly 
insignificant, if not vanish altogether … Once we accept that our 
disagreements are widespread and deep – that the range of possible value 
426 Gaus, “On Justifying the Moral Rights of the Moderns,” 118.
427 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 388.
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orderings is essentially unlimited – democratic procedures simply are not 
up to the task of collective commensuration.428  
For Gaus, the alternative to the democratization of all social activity is the establishment 
of private jurisdictional rights (such as free speech, free association, and private property)
that allow for divergent ideals to flourish in different jurisdictions.429
Just like there are market failures, there are systematic failures of democracy that 
should make us appreciate the need for limits to democratic control.  While participatory 
democrats point out that there are tensions between collective, political decision-making 
and decentralized, market-based decision-making, Gaus reminds us that the political 
decision-procedure is not always automatically preferable.  There are some domains of 
life where we are all best served by the interplay of voters, politicians, and lobbyists, and 
others where we are all best served by the interplay of consumers, employers, and 
workers (with minimal interference by the voter-politician-lobbyist triad).  The goal 
should not be the indefinite “democratization” of social and economic life (so much 
428 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 388.
429 Caplan develops a similar worry, in his criticism of what he calls “democratic fundamentalism” (The 
Myth of the Rational Voter, chapter 8).  Caplan warns that the political/democratic decision-procedure 
has predictable and systematic flaws that are not as dramatic in the private market-based decision 
procedure.  Ultimately, the problem (as Caplan sees it) is that democratic decisions do not generate 
quick negative feedback signals when they have harmful effects – which marks one of the advantages 
that markets have over politics.  Citizens advocate and vote with an eye toward promoting “seen” 
consequences, and are not directly punished for the “unseen” costs (e.g. protectionism, whereby trade 
barriers have the seen benefits of protecting some present jobs, but have unseen costs to all present and 
future consumers and many present and future workers).  On the other hand, in a competitive market 
(with all externalities internalized), all participants internalize all benefits and costs (both seen and 
unseen), and adjust actions accordingly, leading to more optimal results.  For some issues, the ballot box
is preferable to the marketplace, but not always.  Sunstein offers a similar critique in his article, 
“Deliberating Groups vs. Prediction Markets.”  Caplan offers his critique of democratic institutions in 
the context of a further argument in favor of market institutions, but for present purposes I focus only on
the negative argument, leaving to the side his defense of market institutions as a better alternative.
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touted in the work of Dewey430 and others431), but should instead be government and 
markets operating side-by-side in their separate (but sometimes overlapping) domains.  
We should seek to carefully balance the domains of the democratic public and the private
market – and not permit the former to overwhelm the latter.  For all of the 
aforementioned reasons, I join Talisse in bidding Deweyan democracy farewell.  
4. The Limits of Peircian Democratic Theory
Talisse uses his critique of Dewey as a setup for an account of democratic 
deliberation drawn from the pragmatism of Peirce.432  This Peircean democratic theory 
represents an important contemporary strand of pragmatist political philosophy, which I 
will only briefly address here.  When thinking through the problems of deep pluralism, I 
430 By not recognizing the dangers of indefinite democratization, Dewey commits himself to a problematic 
presumption in favor of collective decision making, and this translates into a commitment to socialist 
ownership and planning.  Dewey’s views on socialism come out most forcefully in Individualism: Old 
and New (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1999).  Dewey insists that liberals must be “prepared to go 
further and socialize the forces of production, now at hand” (91).  This is because liberal goals of 
equality and freedom can only be realized, Dewey thinks, by some significant degree of economic 
planning through the state.  We must “see that socialized economy is the means of free individual 
development as the end” (90).  Only a socialized, planned economy is capable of realizing Dewey's 
political hopes.  He imagines, “The problem of social control of industry and the use of governmental 
agencies for constructive social ends will become the avowed center of political struggle” (113).  He 
presents the “hopeful soul” as imagining “a permanent Economic Council” that “shall take upon itself a 
planned coordination of industrial development” (117).  This goal demands “a real application of the 
engineering mind to social life in its economic phase” (117).  That is, economic planning is possible if 
only we turn the “engineering mind” onto the task of engineering a just economy.  These claims bring 
quickly to mind Hayek's powerful critiques of the socialist view that economic forces can be studied 
and manipulated just like physical forces.  See Hayek's “The Use of Knowledge in Society.”
431 See, Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1991); Terry 
Hoy, The Political Philosophy of John Dewey: Toward a Constructive Renewal (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1998); and Kenneth Stikkers, “Dewey, Economic Democracy, and the Mondragon Cooperatives,” 
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3, no. 2 (2011).
432 Talisse's project of developing an account of deliberative democracy through Peirce is also undertaken 
by Cheryl Misak in her book Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation.  Talisse's 
“Peircean” influence comes mostly from Peirce's article “The Fixation of Belief,” in Classic American 
Philosophers, 2nd ed., ed. Max Fisch (New York: Fordham UP, 1996).
214
argue that we should bid farewell to both Deweyan democracy as well as Talisse's 
preferred Peircean alternative. 
As I have reviewed, Talisse argues that Deweyan democracy relies upon Dewey's 
controversial naturalistic metaphysics and his controversial ethical ideal of growth.  Since
both of these views are subject to reasonable pluralism (and are thus reasonably 
rejectable), they cannot serve as the justification for policy related to matters of basic 
justice without being oppressive.  The only way to get around this problem is to begin 
with thin norms and values (that are acceptable to all reasonable people) and then work 
up a thick(er) conception of justice.433  The problem that we face is that reasonable people
disagree on any number of issues concerning metaphysics, religion, and morality.  Which 
thin norms and values are sufficiently agreed-upon such that they can help generate an 
overlapping consensus around principles of justice?  Talisse turns to Peirce to argue that 
although we disagree about moral norms (as I have shown in different ways throughout 
this dissertation), all reasonable people agree about basic epistemic norms.  As Talisse 
puts it, “whereas there is a fact of reasonable pluralism concerning moral comprehensive 
doctrines, there is no corresponding pluralism with regard to our most basic epistemic 
commitments.”434  
The reason for this has to do with the very nature of holding a belief.  If I am 
committed to my belief being true, then I am also committed to the assumption that this 
belief is answerable to “the challenges of reason, evidence, and argument.”435  Even those
433 I argue in chapter II that this Rawlsian thin-to-thick strategy is unlikely to succeed in conditions of deep
yet reasonable pluralism without the philosopher smuggling in controversial premises.
434 Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, 55.
435 Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, 61.  Cheryl Misak articulates a similar point: “A belief,
in order to be a belief, is such that it is responsive to reasons and evidence.  That is a very part of what it
is to have a belief – a constitutive norm of beliefs is that a belief is something that one holds for 
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who disagree about particular issues agree about the basic distinction between good and 
bad ways to hold and defend a belief.  It is this basic and uncontroversial epistemic norm 
– the shared commitment to rational answerability – that is to be worked up to justify 
democratic norms and institutions that secure free and open discussion.  Talisse states the 
political upshot of his Peircean epistemic commitments as he sees them: 
… there are social and political requirements for proper inquiry: Inquirers 
need access to forums in which inquiry can be engaged; they need to be 
able to appeal to reliable sources of information and news; they need 
access to processes by which they can hold their representatives, and their 
government more generally, accountable; they need the freedom to engage
controversial ideas and to speak, write, and express themselves freely.  In 
short, proper inquiry can be practiced only within a democratic political 
order.436
In other words, the basic, thin, and uncontroversial norms of good belief-holding and 
reason-giving entail democratic institutions.  With this argument, Talisse hopes to give a 
firm philosophical foundation to democracy.
Talisse's Peircean philosophy of democracy is appealing in many ways, but it does
not help us address the problems of deep pluralism.  That is, even if we assume that all 
deliberators are following good epistemic norms, there is still no reason to assume that a 
consensus about matters of basic justice will emerge.  Although good Peircean 
reasons” (“Making Disagreement Matter,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18, no. 1 [2004]; 12; cited
in Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, 62; italics in original).  Misak again: “Wanting to get
the truth is something which cuts across whatever divides us from others … we are indeed hard pressed 
to find opponents in our moral and political lives who do not assert or believe or claim that their 
position is true, or best, or that which ought to be enforced” (Truth, Politics, Morality, 104; cited in 
Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, 68).
436 Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, 66; my italics.
216
deliberation may achieve convergence at the hypothetical end of inquiry for questions 
related to empirical disputes (such as those found in the natural sciences or positive 
economics), there can be no analogous assumption when it comes to questions related to 
normative issues.  To put it bluntly: the Rawls/Nozick debate (or the Tomasi/Freeman 
debate or the Gaus/Lister debate) will not be settled by imposing epistemic norms on the 
debate, since the interlocutors are all already following such norms.  Normative 
disagreement persists in even the most idealized epistemic conditions.  And it is this 
wide-ranging disagreement about normative issues that so troubles the political liberal 
project.  
Furthermore, Talisse is offering a defense of democracy, not a theory of justice.  
For some democratic theorists, this is all that is needed, since it is assumed that the 
principles of justice are to be worked out through democratic institutions.  This is partly 
unproblematic, but also partly contestable.  For liberals, democratic choices are 
constrained by a background set of individual rights that cannot be infringed, even if the 
majority would badly like to do so.  So while a theory of democracy helps us see the 
importance of open democratic discussion, it does not itself spell out all the rights-based 
limitations on democratic political authority.437  Those limitations need to be spelled out 
by a theory of justice.  Thus, Talisse's theory of democracy, while interesting and 
important in many ways, is tangential to our concerns here.
437 This concern is what motivates Nozick's critiques of democracy in chapter 9 of Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia.  For Nozick, the existence of strong individual rights calls into question the very legitimacy of 
democratic authority, the latter of which Nozick describes as a situation where “People are no longer 
under the thumb of one another.  Instead almost everybody is deciding about them, and they are 
deciding about almost everybody,” and thus “each person owns exactly one share in each right over 
every other person, including himself … [everyone is] a part-owner of each other person” (286-286).  
Also see Nozick's “Tale of the Slave,” pp. 290-292.  So on this view, even if free and open discussion 
about justice is a good, there is a further question about which conceptions of justice are permissible 
and which are impermissible even when selected by a democratic majority.
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5. Jamesian Pluralism and the Goal of Accommodation
Political philosophers today must accept not merely the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, but rather the fact of deep pluralism – in which our reasonable disagreements 
about justice are often foundational.  To get a better sense of how we might orient 
ourselves to this problem, I propose that we turn to a third pragmatist, William James.  I 
will show that James, unlike Dewey and Peirce, is keenly attuned to the problems of deep
pluralism, and has some important insights about how the political philosopher should 
operate in such a context.
James is not often referenced in discussions of political philosophy.  But in more 
recent years there has been a welcome increase of interest in James’ writings as they  
might relate to questions in political philosophy.438  Indeed, James himself wrote rather 
438 There is a growing body of literature in political philosophy that draws on the work of James.  For 
example, see George Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1990); Joshua Miller, Democratic Temperament: The Legacy of William James (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1997); Kennan Ferguson, William James: Politics in the Pluriverse 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007); William Connolly, Pluralism (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 
2005); Jonathan McKenzie, “Pragmatism, Pluralism, Politics: William James’s Tragic Sense of Life,” 
Theory & Event. Vol. 12, no. 1 (2009), Project Muse, accessed 28 March 2014; Alexander Livingston, 
“Excited Subjects: William James and the Politics of Radical Empiricism,” Theory & Event 15, no. 4 
(2012), Project Muse, accessed 2 January 2013; Alexander Livingston, Damn Great Empires! The 
Anarchist Vision of William James (forthcoming); Colin Koopman, “William James's Politics of 
Personal Freedom,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19, no. 2 (2005); Deborah Coon, “'One 
Moment in the World's Salvation': Anarchism and the Radicalization of William James,” The Journal of
American History 83, no. 1 (1996); Deborah Coon, Courtship with Anarchy: The Socio-Political 
Foundations of William James's Pragmatism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1988); Andrew Smith, 
“William James and the Politics of Moral Conflict,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 40, 
no 1 (2004); Richard Flathman, Pluralism and Liberal Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 
2005); Carol Hay, “Consonances between Liberalism and Pragmatism,” Transactions Of The Charles S.
Peirce Society 48, no. 2 (2012); William Caspary, “Agonism, Meliorism, and Conflict Resolution in 
William James’s Political Theory” (presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement 
of American Philosophy, Denver, CO, March 2014); David Rondel, “William James on Equality and the
Sacredness of Individuality” (unpublished); and James Kloppenberg, “Pragmatism: An Old Name for 
Some New Ways of Thinking?”, The Journal of American History 83, no. 1 (June 1996).  Trying to 
develop a political philosophy from the work of James is not such a straightforward task.  While 
broadly liberal and democratic themes are present throughout James' work, Livingston highlights the 
anarchistic features of James' thought (Damn Great Empires!), Goldman reminds us that James' work 
was enthusiastically embraced by fascists of his day (“Another Side of William James: On Radical 
Approaches to a 'Liberal' Philosopher,” William James Studies 8 [2012]), Goldberg argues that James 
was himself a proto-fascist (Liberal Fascism: The Secret History of the American Left, from Mussolini 
to the Politics of Meaning [New York: Broadway Books, 2007]), and James himself often wrote 
positively about socialism (“The Moral Equivalent of War,” in The Writings of William James, ed. John 
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little about politics.  He was an active participant in the Anti-Imperialist League, and 
wrote short philosophically-oriented pieces about contemporary issues such as “The 
Moral Equivalent of War,” but James did not write about political theory in a sustained 
way.439  Thus, I turn to James not so much to mine him for his particular political 
viewpoints, but rather to explore and develop his metaphilosophical commentary about 
the role of the philosopher in the face of deep pluralism, a topic about which James was 
very interested, and which is directly relevant to the problems identified and discussed in 
this dissertation.  In will focus my attention on two of James' articles in particular, “The 
Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” and “The Moral Equivalent of War.”  
Among the major pragmatists, James is arguably most attuned to the problems 
posed by deep value pluralism.  Early in “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 
James states clearly the problem that we face: “in spite of the presence of a large number 
of ideals in which human beings agree, there are a mass of others about which no general 
consensus obtains.”440  In other words, we look out and see foundational disagreements 
all over the place – disagreements that take place because of the clash of 
incommensurable values, where clashing adversaries do not stand on a sufficiently thick 
“common ground” that would be required to overcome the impasse.  This is precisely the 
problem that I have been dealing with in this dissertation, and this is precisely the 
problem that the tradition of political liberalism has failed to adequately address.  James, 
I believe, will be a better guide to this terrain.
J. McDermott [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977]).
439 Because of this, Cornel West is able to write, with some plausibility, “In regard to politics, James has 
nothing profound or even provocative to say” (The American Evasion of Philosophy [Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989] 60).
440 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 619.
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While James was writing about the role of the moral philosopher (in “The Moral 
Philosopher and the Moral Life”), his insights can be fruitfully applied to the political 
philosopher as well.  In other words, it is helpful to read James’ “The Moral Philosopher 
and the Moral Life” as a piece also about the political philosopher and the political life.  I
want to explore some undeveloped insights from James’ essay for the pragmatist political 
philosopher.  I will first try to distill these insights into three commitments: (1) the 
political philosopher must be a committed non-partisan vis-à-vis the main controversies 
of her day; (2) the political philosopher must accept actual demands (by actual persons) 
as prima facie legitimate; and (3) the presumption of the political philosopher must be to 
accommodate existing demands, not transform them.  After developing these ideas, I will 
show how they help provide a useful philosophical response to deep pluralism 
concerning matters of justice.
1. The moral and political philosopher finds herself in the midst of conflict and 
disagreement, and she must decide how to constructively navigate it.  James is vividly 
aware of the natural and immediate temptation to elevate one’s own ideals to the status of
the truest or most reasonable ideals in relation to all contenders.  James insists that this 
temptation must be resisted by the philosopher.  In the face of contending ideals, James 
writes, “the entire undertaking of the philosopher obliges him to seek an impartial test,” 
although selecting or constructing such an impartial test is quite difficult, for “how can he
pick out the person [or test] save by an act in which his own sympathies and 
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prepossessions are implied?”441  That is, how can the moral philosopher pick out an 
impartial criterion that is not merely a reflection of her own private preferences?  
If the philosopher's criterion is nothing more than a reflection of her preferences 
(in the sense that the criterion favors her own preferred conception of justice), then 
nothing constructive is being offered to our moral conflict – the philosopher is merely 
acting as a partisan and taking sides in the conflict.  To be clear, this side-taking 
partisanship is perfectly fine for the politician or political activist (indeed, partisan side-
taking is the very stuff of politics), but it is distinct from the role of the Jamesian 
philosopher.  These roles should not be confused, since philosophy at its best should help 
us deal constructively with ambiguous moral disagreement, not merely choose a side and 
declare it to be the truth.  
In sum, qua philosophers, we must not “simply proclaim our own ideals as the 
lawgiving ones.”442  The worst transgression for the Jamesian philosopher is to be a side-
taking partisan under the guise of being an impartial philosopher.  This advocacy-
disguised-as-philosophy is especially troubling, since it dresses up the philosopher’s 
personal preferences in the powerful language of truth and reason.  This temptation is so 
dangerous because this is so natural, and we (philosophers) so often do it without 
realizing it, and even do it while explicitly trying to avoid it.  Our own values are almost 
always felt to be uniquely true and reasonable because of the natural attachment we all 
have to our own ideals.  But the philosopher cannot be allowed to legislate her own ideals
upon everyone else (indeed, even philosophers recognize the unacceptability of this when
the philosopher doing the legislating is someone else).  James writes, “All one’s 
441 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 620.
442 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 620.
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slumbering revolutionary instincts waken at the thought of any single moralist wielding 
such powers of life and death.  Better chaos forever than an order based on any closet-
philosopher’s rule, even though he were the most enlightened possible member of the 
tribe.”443  Deep pluralism must be respected, even if doing so entails tolerating some level
of chaos.444  Philosophers should not try to “substitute the content of their clean-shaven 
systems for that exuberant mass of goods with which all human nature is in travail, and 
groaning to bring to the light of day.”445  We must find a way of respecting and 
accommodating this “exuberant mass of goods” which is featured so vividly in our 
contemporary moral and political discourse.
2. The moral and political philosopher must not privilege her own ideals over those of her
competitors because all competing ideals have, on James’ account, prima facie 
legitimacy.  For James, moral obligation can only ever be grounded in the actual demands
or claims of one’s peers.  He argues, “without a claim actually made by some concrete 
person there can be no obligation,” and “there is some obligation whenever there is a 
443 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 623.
444 Rawls exemplifies someone totally unwilling to tolerate any of this Jamesian chaos.  For example, 
Rawls explains how the processes of idealization and abstraction associated with constructing the 
original position (the particulars of which have generated much controversy) are motivated by the need 
to ensure a “definite” and “unanimous” consensus on the principles of justice, and by the need to 
remove any elements that might generate principles that are “vague” or “complicated”: “The restrictions
on particular information in the original position are, then, of fundamental importance.  Without them 
we would not be able to work out any definite theory of justice at all.  We would have to be content with
the vague formula stating that justice is what would be agreed to without being able to say much, if 
anything, about the substance of the agreement itself ... The veil of ignorance makes possible a 
unanimous choice of a particular conception of justice.  Without these limitations on knowledge the 
bargaining problem of the original position would be hopelessly complicated” (A Theory of Justice, 
121).  The Jamesian should be very wary of this insistence that we must necessarily arrive at a 
determinate conception of justice that could be expected to generate a rational consensus.  Instead of 
continuing to abstract away from our “non-shared” and “unreasonable” values in search of some 
reasonable core of shared values, we should be open to situations of irresolvable antagonism.
445 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 622-23.
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claim.”446  The Jamesian philosopher, to borrow a quotation from David Miller, must 
“treat pre-theoretical judgments of justice as somewhat akin to the raw data that might 
serve to ground a scientific theory.”447  Actual demands by actual people are the starting 
place for the Jamesian philosopher, and the ideal goal is to create conditions or propose 
new ideals such that as many of the actual demands as possible can be co-satisfied.  All 
demands are prime facie legitimate: “the demand may be anything under the sun.”448  
This importantly diverges from political liberalism.  For the political liberal, the 
normative starting place is the set of values and beliefs of a hypothetical “reasonable” 
deliberator who is morally and epistemologically idealized.  Even if no actual person in 
our actual society holds such idealized values or beliefs, what matters is that they would 
hold them if they were more reasonable.  James is, in some sense then, a political realist 
(as this position has come to be known in contemporary political philosophy), and this is 
a promising strategy for the problems we are concerned about here.  For James, grant 
prime facie normative authority to all demands.  Now, some actual demands will no 
doubt need to be overridden or constrained, but not because they are deemed 
“unreasonable” by the dictates some political philosopher.  Instead, certain demands will 
need to be excluded because our social world is limited and all ideals cannot be fully 
accommodated, and because other actual people are making counter-demands.  These 
overridden demands can be viewed as “unreasonable” only after the fact of being 
overridden by counter-demands, not because they fail to match up to some a priori 
446 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 617.
447 Miller, Justice for Earthlings, 30.
448 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 621.
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philosophical criterion of reasonableness.  For James, then, while some ideals will need 
to be excluded from consideration, full accommodation is the goal.449
3. James’ prescription for the moral and political philosopher, then, is simple, and more or
less follows from the commitments discussed above: “satisfy at all times as many 
demands as we can.”450  James acknowledges that in a perfectly ideal world all demands 
would be fulfilled at each and every moment.  But we do not live in such a world.  
Unfortunately, our world is a tragic world, where almost inevitably not all ideals can be 
accommodated and jointly realized.  Nonetheless, the goal is maximal inclusion, and the 
means to achieving this goal is for the Jamesian philosopher to try to develop new ideals 
that might gain a following by the members of opposing sides to some seemingly 
intractable disagreement.  What exactly this process looks like will be discussed in more 
detail below when I discuss “The Moral Equivalent of War.”  
449 Some claims are so clearly abhorrent that it may seem bizarre to consider them as obligation-generating 
at all, even prime facie.  But, of course, just because a claim is made does not mean that it should be 
respected in all cases, since other counter-claims can overrule it.  They are only prime facie legitimate, 
so they are capable of being overridden and justifiably constrained.  Thus, a Jamesian politics of “wide 
accommodation,” discussed in more detail below, will strive to accommodate as many views as 
possible, which will surely mean that most explicitly exclusionary views (e.g. those motivated by 
racism or sexism) will not be respected because of the many counter-claims that will emerge from those
who do or would suffer under the rule of those exclusionary views.  Some pragmatists disagree with 
this, and hope to reconstruct objective moral values that will enable us to criticize certain views as 
objectively wrong (regardless of intersubjective agreement).  Carol Hay, for example, writes, “I argue 
that pragmatists interested in social justice ought to be committed to certain objective, transcultural 
ethical ideals.  In particular, I argue that we need an objective moral account of what counts as harm and
flourishing for human beings.  This objective account of human harm and flourishing need not be 
problematic to pragmatists, I argue, because it can and should be rooted in certain very basic or 
fundamental commonalities of human experience.  Furthermore, I argue that proponents of this 
objective account can and should retain pragmatists’ commitment to epistemic fallibilism, which calls 
for an attitude of humility with respect to the possibility of our actually knowing what these ethical 
standards are with any certainty” (“Justice and Objectivity for Pragmatists: Cosmopolitanism in the 
Work of Martha Nussbaum and Jane Addams,” The Pluralist 7, no. 3 [Fall 2012]: 86).  My response to 
this kind of claim is that taking seriously a commitment to “epistemic fallibilism” makes the language 
of “objectivity” mostly inappropriate and unhelpful.  For more on this general set of topics, see Ruth 
Anna Putnam, “William James and Moral Objectivity,” William James Studies 1 (2006).
450 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 623.
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One anticipated objection should be addressed at this point about the three 
commitments outlined above.  One possible concern about James' position in “The Moral
Philosopher and the Moral Life” is that an attitude of accommodation towards the entire 
set of currently existing ideals represents a form of status quo bias and conservatism.  
This concern has some merit.  For James, the philosopher should attempt to propose 
solutions to problems in such a way that all (or almost all) relevant parties are satisfied 
with the outcome.  If all (or almost all) people agree with the proposal, its correctness is 
not a function of some controversial ideal, but is simply a matter of agreement.  James 
Buchanan (from the very different tradition of public choice theory) defends a position 
quite similar to that of James, and nicely explains this concern: 
[O]ur task is really . . . that of trying to find, locate, invent, schemes that 
can command unanimous or quasi-unanimous consent and propose them.  
Since persons disagree on so much, these schemes may be a very limited 
set, and this may suggest to you that few changes are possible.  Hence, the 
status quo is defended indirectly.  The status quo has no propriety at all 
save for its existence and it is all that exists.  The point I always emphasize
is that we start from here not from somewhere else.451 
Buchanan’s recognition of the possibly troubling status quo bias in his methodology 
mirrors James’ recognition that the political philosopher must, in some sense, be a 
“conservative.”452  For James, it is only “every now and then” that “some one is born with
451 James M. Buchanan, in Buchanan and Warren J. Samuels, “On Some Fundamental Issues in Political 
Economy: An Exchange of Correspondence,” Journal of Economic Issues 9, no. 1 (March 1975): 27n.  
452 For a discussion (and defense) of the affinities between conservatism and pragmatism, see Seth 
Vannatta, “Pragmatic Conservatism: A Defense,” Humanitas 25, no. 1-2 (2012); and his forthcoming 
book, Conservatism and Pragmatism: Intersections in Normative Methodology.  Unsurprisingly, many 
philosophers are critical of the affinity between pragmatism and conservatism.  Jonathan Culler offers a 
typical such argument (directed here mainly at Rorty, but the argument echoes arguments directed at the
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the right to be original.”453  The motivation for this Jamesian conservatism is not to 
discourage moral innovation, but it is merely a recognition that true moral revolutions are
extremely difficult, and require a special and uncommon convergence between an 
innovative philosopher and a widely shared dissatisfaction with current practices and an 
openness to something new among those parties to a disagreement.454  Barring these 
exceptional cases, the political philosopher should recognize that her values have no 
privileged place in the conversation.  Her values simply take their place alongside all the 
others, all equally imbued with a prime facie legitimacy.
James' defense of his political philosophical conservatism includes pointing out 
the unpleasantness of the alternative: the political philosopher as authoritarian legislator.  
Indeed, it is James' democratic, egalitarian, and anti-elitist commitments that lead him to 
classical pragmatists as well): “the humanities must make their way between, on the one hand, a 
traditional, foundationalist conception of their task and, on the other, the so-called ‘new pragmatism’ to 
which some critics of foundationalism have retreated.  If philosophy is not a foundationalist discipline, 
argues Richard Rorty, then it is simply engaged in a conversation; it tells stories, which succeed simply 
by their success.  Since there is no standard or reference point outside the system of one’s beliefs to 
appeal to, critical arguments and theoretical reflections can have no purchase on these beliefs or the 
practices informed by them.  Ironically, then, the claim that philosophers and theoreticians tell stories, 
which originates as a critique of ideology... becomes a way of protecting a dominant ideology and its 
professionally successful practitioners from the scrutiny of argument, by deeming that critique can have 
no leverage against ordinary beliefs, and that theoretical arguments have no consequences.  This 
pragmatism, whose complacency seems altogether appropriate to the Age of Reagan, subsists only by a 
theoretical argument of the kind it in principle opposes, as an ahistorical ‘preformism’: what one does 
must be based on one’s beliefs, but since there are no foundations outside the system of one’s beliefs, 
the only thing that could logically make one change a belief is something one already believes” 
(Framing the Sign: Criticism and Its lnstitutions [Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988] 
55; quoted in Richard Rorty, “Feminism and Pragmatism,” Philosophical Papers vol. 3: Truth and 
Progress [New York: Cambridge UP, 1998]: 212, 23n).  I address this concern, to some extent, below.
453 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 625.
454 Rorty expresses a similar sentiment about the difficulty and contingency of successful moral and 
political revolutions: “The difference between genius and fantasy is not the difference between 
impresses which lock on to something universal, some antecedent reality out there in the world or deep 
within the self, and whose which do not.  Rather, it is the difference between idiosyncrasies which just 
happen to catch on with other people – happen because of the contingencies of some historical situation,
some particular need which a given community happens to have at a given time” (Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity, 37).
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place the philosopher on par with everyone else.455  It is important, then, to distinguish 
between political philosophical conservatism (which requires the political philosopher to 
work towards accommodating the actual demands of actual people as they exist within 
the status quo) and political conservatism (which is the doctrine that the status quo is 
presumptively justified by reference to tradition).  Remember, the Jamesian political 
philosopher aims to accommodate the demands not only of those enjoying their place in 
the status quo, but also (and especially) those who are suffering under the status quo – 
indeed, their demands are entirely on par with everyone else.456  Thus, James' political 
455 Compare James' anti-elitist condemnation of the arrogance of the philosopher with the following 
passage from Adam Smith: “The man of system … is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is 
often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer
the smallest deviation from any part of it.  He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, 
without any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it.  He 
seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the 
hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board.  He does not consider that the pieces upon the 
chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but 
that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, 
altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it.  If those two 
principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily and 
harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful.  If they are opposite or different, the game 
will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder.”  He 
continues, “Some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and law, may no doubt
be necessary for directing the views of the statesman.  But to insist upon establishing, and upon 
establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition, every thing which that idea may seem to require, 
must often be the highest degree of arrogance.  It is to erect his own judgment into the supreme standard
of right and wrong.  It is to fancy himself the only wise and worthy man in the commonwealth, and that 
his fellow-citizens should accommodate themselves to him and not he to them” (The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments [New York: Penguin, 2010], 140).
456 James insists that we train ourselves to be vigilant in uncovering the ways in which we are blinded to 
the “personal poetry” of people different from ourselves (“On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” in
The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977], 
634).  This will help the political philosopher be aware of the voices of those suffering under the 
imperfect institutions of the status quo.  James lists the progressive movement toward the 
accommodation of more and more demands: “Following this path, society has shaken itself into one sort
of relative equilibrium after another by a series of social discoveries quite analogous to those of science.
Polyandry and polygamy and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill, judicial torture and arbitrary 
royal power have slowly succumbed to actually aroused complaints; and though some one's ideals are 
unquestionably the worse off for each improvement, yet a vastly greater total number of them find 
shelter in our civilized society than in the older savage ways” (“The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life,” 623).
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philosophical conservatism is unlikely to consistently (or often) support political 
conservatism.
6. The Goal of Politics: Accommodation or Transformation?
These three themes from “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” help 
highlight some of the important differences between James and Dewey.  The Jamesian 
philosopher is not equipped with a criterion like Deweyan “growth” that would give clear
guidance in navigating and resolving disagreement, and she does not assume that the 
conflicting ideals will be transformed by deliberation such that consensus is achieved.  
While transformation is always possible, and oftentimes highly desirable, James is 
committed in the first place to the accommodation of diverse ideals.  The fundamental 
contrast between Dewey and James might be best grasped by highlighting the distinction 
between transformation and accommodation.  Deweyan politics is about the 
transformation and reworking of each individual’s values and beliefs, and thus justice 
entails the growth of all individuals.  Indeed, this vision makes Dewey a “perfectionist” 
about justice – that is, justice requires the cultivation of the good of each citizen (their 
“flourishing” or “growth”).457  On the other hand, Jamesian politics is about the maximal 
inclusion of divergent values and beliefs, and thus justice entails the non-optimal and 
contestable compromise that accommodates (for some finite stretch of time) as many 
457 Talisse notes, “Deweyan democracy rejects the neutralism of contemporary democratic theory and 
adopts a kind of perfectionism.  To be clear, the perfectionism I attribute to Dewey is not the view that 
there is a fixed and static human nature to be perfected; rather it is the view that political institutions 
should aim to foster within citizens the attitudes and habits requisite for human flourishing” (“A 
Farewell to Deweyan Democracy,” 511).  On this point, also see Matthew Festenstein, “Pragmatism and
Liberalism: Interpreting Dewey’s Political Philosophy,” Res Publica 1, no 2 (1995); and Michael 
Eldridge, Transforming Experience: Dewey's Cultural Instrumentalism (Nashville: Vanderbilt UP, 
1998).  For a comprehensive argument about why we should reject perfectionism for questions of 
justice, see Quong, Liberalism without Perfection.  For a contemporary defense of perfectionism, see 
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (New York: Oxford UP, 1986).
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ideals as possible in our current social world.  This vision makes James a pluralist, and 
not a perfectionist, about justice.  A political philosophy committed to accommodation 
(without assuming transformation) will be generally amenable to the politics of modus 
vivendi (not political liberalism) and to an agonistic style of politics (not rational 
deliberativism).  To further draw out the difference between Dewey and James (on this 
point and more generally), I find it helpful to work with the distinction gestured at above 
between a politics of transformation and a politics of accommodation.  
Consider this distinction at a more general level.  Models of political deliberation 
and conceptions of justice need to balance two things: the need for consensus, and the 
value of diversity.  We face an immediate problem: while consensus is the goal, 
respecting diversity sets constraints and impediments to achieving that goal.  If we accept
all conceptions of the good and of justice as deserving of inclusion, then we will surely 
fail to achieve consensus, at least in conditions of even moderate pluralism (which hold 
in virtually all modern societies).  The disagreements will be far too vast to permit 
consensus.  We look around our society and see, for example, religious fundamentalists 
(who believe that the state should enforce the values of a particular religious tradition) 
and secularists (who believe that the state should enforce no religious values and should 
base its actions on strictly non-religious reasons).  We see racists (who believe that the 
state should privilege a particular racial group) and antiracists (who believe that the state 
should treat all citizens as equals).  On the face of it, no consensus is forthcoming 
between the religious fundamentalist and the secularist, the racist and the antiracist – their
views are directly in contradiction.  Accommodating one would require not 
accommodating the other.  If we are going to reach consensus (and thus achieve 
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legitimate authority), we need to constrain the range of views that are “taken seriously” – 
that is, we need to constrain the range of views that are taken into consideration when 
working out a conception of justice.458
The Rawlsian shorthand for the range-of-views-worth-taking-seriously is 
“reasonable pluralism.”  Regarding the cases I mentioned, the religious fundamentalist 
and the racist are clearly going to be deemed “unreasonable” by near-universal consensus
(even if we are unable to give a convincing non-circular account of “unreasonableness” – 
this term can be understood in a more straightforwardly emotivist way to simply mean 
“people we really don’t like”).459  Once we exclude these clearly unreasonable views 
from the deliberative picture (leaving us with the secularists and antiracists, among 
others), achieving consensus is much more likely.  But this exclusionary move is not just 
made on practical grounds—namely, that it happens to make consensus easier.  It is 
made on moral grounds—that is, if we fashion an account of justice that is 
458 The conviction that consensus is the foundation of political legitimacy is a cornerstone of liberal 
political thought, and is simply taken for granted here.  For a discussion of how and why consensus 
came to play this role, see chapter II.
459 Chantal Mouffe provides a nice real-world illustration of the point that even pluralistic liberals need to 
exclude certain views: “Let me give you an example of this: a few years ago during the Rushdie affair 
in Britain there was a small but vocal group of fundamentalist Muslims who argued that in the name of 
pluralism they should be given the right to kill Rushdie legally.  They were saying to the British state, 
'This is what our religion tells us to do, and if you are really pluralist, if you want to recognize all our 
differences, you should allow us to kill Rushdie and not go to jail.'  I remember that some liberals were 
in fact quite worried about this argument.  They were saying, 'They do have a point.  If we are pluralists,
we should take those demands into account.'  Of course, the British state did not allow them to do it, so 
the state was accused by those fundamentalist Muslims of not being liberal pluralists but liberal 
fundamentalists.  They were saying, 'The values that you impose are the values of liberalism; you are 
not really pluralists.'  Of course, in a sense they were right, but I think there is no way to escape this.  If 
you want a pluralist society in which there is going to be the possibility for people to express a form of 
dissensus, then you need to create some kind of consensus on the value of pluralism, of pluralism as an 
axiological principle.  This means that certain people who want to establish a theocratic kind of society 
are not going to be able to; their voice is not going to be accepted.  So in order to have a pluralist 
society, you cannot have total pluralism because total pluralism would mean that the enemies of 
pluralism are going to be able to destroy the basis of that society” (interview with Chantal Mouffe in 
Lynn Worsham and Gary A Olson, “Rethinking Political Community: Chantal Mouffe's Liberal 
Socialism,” Jacoline Journal 19, no. 2 [1999]: 174-175; accessed 2 January 2015, 
http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol19.2/worsham-rethinking.pdf.)
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enthusiastically embraced by the racist, it is very likely that we will have a bad account of
justice.460
The case of the racist and religious fundamentalist is relatively easy: most of us 
feel quite comfortable excluding them and their views from deliberations about justice.  
Part of our concern is that such views cannot even be framed in universalistic terms – 
they are straightforwardly arguing for the privileging of one group over all others, an 
argument that is certain to be unconvincing to all of those other groups who would be 
subordinated (and who would be motivated to make counter-claims).  However, if these 
obviously bad views (and others that are similarly bad) are the only ones that are 
excluded, then we may still be incapable of achieving consensus.  There will remain 
wide-ranging disagreements between a wide range of views, none of which is quite so 
obviously wrong.  Let us say that once we exclude (only) the obviously bad views, we 
have “wide reasonable pluralism.”  The disagreements that take place within the scope of 
wide reasonable pluralism, disagreements (for example) between non-fundamentalist (yet
still) religious citizens and atheists, libertarians and socialists, cultural traditionalists and 
feminists, etc., will still be hopelessly deep.  So, given this wide range of views, how is 
consensus possible?
There are two possible strategies for dealing with this condition of wide 
reasonable pluralism: accommodate all these views even if it means that our public 
agreement is thin (that is, privilege pluralism), or exclude more views (starting with the 
460 Critics of actually-existing practices of liberal tolerance accuse such practices of effectively doing just 
this: accommodating unjust institutions and practices, and foreclosing the possibility of radical 
transformation.  See Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006); and her debate with Rainer Forst in The Power of Tolerance: A 
Debate, ed. Luca Di Blasi and Christoph Holzhey (New York: Colombia UP, 2014).  One of the earlier 
and most well-know critiques of liberal tolerance along these lines is Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive 
Tolerance,” A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).
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ones that, although not obviously bad, seem at least somewhat bad) so that we can 
achieve deeper agreement (that is, use a more exclusionary notion of “reasonableness”).  
Many political liberals, for example, think that we can reasonably exclude libertarians 
and pro-lifers from deliberation.461  These views (libertarianism and pro-life) are not 
obviously bad in the same way that religious fundamentalism and racism are (although 
some may disagree), but they are still deemed unreasonable by many political liberals, 
who view them as at least somewhat bad (or bad enough).  Many political liberals thus 
insist that we exclude them (and other similarly “bad enough” groups and views) from 
deliberation.  Let us call the scope of this smaller set of views “narrow reasonable 
pluralism.”
The aforementioned options – privileging pluralism or privileging (a narrowed 
version of) reasonableness – represent different ways of approaching the basic goal of 
political deliberation (the goal of reaching consensus while respecting pluralism).  But 
both options present us with problems.  The more we care about respecting and 
accommodating the fullest range of reasonable pluralism, the more we fall prey to status 
quo bias.  That is, we may be bending justice around too many ideals and values (some of
which are arguably unreasonable), thus possibly diluting and corrupting justice (assuming
any kind of agreement can be reached at all).  On the other hand, the more views we 
exclude from deliberation, the more people there will be in society who will view the 
461 Rawls suggests, in a now-infamous footnote in Political Liberalism, that it is unreasonable to support 
prohibitions on abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy.  He writes, “Now I believe any reasonable 
balance of these three values [the due respect for human life, the ordered reproduction of political 
society over time, including the family in some form, and finally the equality of women as equal 
citizens] will give a woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during 
the first trimester” (243n32-244n32).  For an overview of the controversy surrounding this passage, see 
Henrik Friberg-Fernros, “Abortion and the Limits of Political Liberalism,” Public Reason 2, no. 1 
(2010).  Rawls also argues in Political Liberalism that libertarianism is not a member of the reasonable 
“family of liberal conceptions of justice” (262). For an elaborate defense of this latter point, see 
Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians.”  I argue against this latter feature of political liberalism in chapter III.
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resulting principles of justice as oppressive (because their ideals are not reflected in the 
principles of justice).  To put the point another way, the more ideals we exclude, the more
that the principles of justice lose motivational salience (that is, the less that excluded 
citizens are motivated to act on those principles, and the more that they are motivated to 
violate them), thus risking political instability.462  The more one cares about motivational 
salience, the more one is a political realist.  The more one downplays motivational 
salience when constructing a theory of justice (excluding more views and narrowing the 
set of reasonable disagreement), the more one is a political moralist.  Both horns of the 
dilemma lead us toward different sets of concerns and problems.
So again, should we attempt to accommodate the widest possible range of 
reasonable pluralism, or should we exclude more views so as to narrow the range of 
reasonable pluralism and make consensus easier to achieve?  Should justice 
accommodate wide reasonable pluralism and be more politically realist, or should justice 
accommodate narrow reasonable pluralism and be more politically moralistic?  These two
strategies identify different ways of conceiving of the role and purpose of political 
philosophy, which I will now further explore in the next section.  After sketching this 
typology, I will be in a good position to state more clearly the advantages of the Jamesian
metaphilosophy that I am advocating.
6.1. Liberalism as Wide Accommodation
One strand of liberalism hopes to accommodate a great many points of view (with
very few restrictions – only the obvious cases of, e.g., the religious fundamentalist and 
racist).  For these liberals, justice should accommodate wide reasonable pluralism.  
462 This point is developed in D’Agostino, Free Public Reason; especially 84f.
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Accommodation here means that the content of justice is pulled from the overlapping 
consensus of the actually existing widely reasonable moral commitments of the citizens 
of a particular political community.  These liberals accept that public consensus will be 
thin, sometimes extraordinarily thin, because of the large number of admissible points of 
view to be accommodated.  Indeed, this consensus may be so thin that justice (or, more 
likely, particular domains of justice) will remain a matter of foundational disagreement.  
This latter possibility would trigger the need for a modus vivendi, according to which we 
search for some form of authority that creates a stable balance of forces in the absence of 
an overlapping consensus.  This version of liberalism is strongly realist and arguably 
suffers from an objectionable status quo bias, because it accepts the reasonableness of a 
wide variety of views about justice, even some that might strike other citizens as unjust or
oppressive (such as, perhaps, traditional religious communities that celebrate patriarchal 
family structures).  This form of liberalism is defended in the works of William James 
and John Gray.
6.2. Liberalism as Constrained Accommodation
This strand of liberalism hopes to accommodate a more restricted set of views 
than the above-mentioned position.  Justice, on this view, should accommodate narrow 
reasonable pluralism.  Accommodation here means that the content of justice should be 
able to gain the approval of actually existing narrowly reasonable citizens of a particular 
political community.  These liberals are comfortable excluding views that are not 
obviously bad, but are arguably somewhat bad.  As discussed above, Rawls excludes 
libertarians and pro-lifers from deliberation because they are deemed unreasonable, but it 
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is not immediately clear what makes this move legitimate and not simply sectarian.  
Rawls argues that libertarians and pro-lifers fail to make arguments that contain a 
reasonable balancing of reasonable political values – but it is precisely these political 
values (and their proper balancing) that are being contested in debates about economic 
justice and abortion.  The seeming circularity and sectarian-ness of the definition of 
“reasonableness” employed here by Rawls and other political liberals is unsatisfying to 
many.  Instead of a modus vivendi, this position aims for a robust overlapping consensus 
of reasonable views around a determinate conception of justice (or bounded set of 
conceptions).  This form of liberalism is defended in the works of John Rawls, Samuel 
Freeman, and Jonathan Quong.
6.3. Liberalism as Transformation
This form of liberalism views pluralism (either deep or reasonable) as a starting-
point, but not a mere fact to be accommodated.  This view is often defended by those 
who identify with “deliberative democracy” (although, importantly, some deliberative 
democrats are more pluralistic and accommodationist than these defenders of 
transformationism).  Since each person’s commitments are intersubjectively formed, the 
hope is that intersubjective deliberation is capable of reforming/transforming these 
commitments into some kind of new consensus.  The content of justice should reflect 
what people would consent to after having their views transformed (and fused into 
consensus) by properly structured deliberation.  The chief concern here is that these 
thinkers tend to have over-optimistic views about the process of deliberation and the 
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likelihood of consensus being reached.  This form of liberalism is defended in the works 
of John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas.
By distinguishing the projects and contributions of James, Rawls, and Dewey in 
this way, we can more clearly see the underlying philosophical differences between their 
approaches, and thus better understand the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.  
As I have argued, Rawls’ commitment to accommodating narrow reasonable pluralism 
relies on a circular and sectarian notion of “reasonableness,” making his theory of justice 
highly controversial.  Dewey’s commitment to growth is unacceptably exclusionary 
towards many reasonable moral non-naturalists.  Furthermore, Dewey's commitment to 
deliberation as the primary decision-procedure for adjudicating disagreement is overly 
optimistic about the prospects for consensus, which in turn forecloses the possibility of 
relying instead on non-deliberative private and market solutions.  It is James who offers 
the more useful and appealing tools for thinking through our condition of deep pluralism, 
even with the acknowledged concerns about his approach.  I have thus far outlined some 
of the lessons that political philosophers can draw from James' “The Moral Philosopher 
and the Moral Life,” but more needs to be said about what exactly this looks like and how
it can be applied to the problems generated by deep pluralism about justice.  In what 
follows, then, I add further detail to this positive conception of political philosophy – a 
pragmatist political philosophy that takes seriously the constraints that deep pluralism 
ought to impose on the work of the political philosopher.
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7. Towards a Jamesian Political Philosophy
Plato argued that philosophers have such unique insight into the nature of justice 
that they, and only they, have the ability to properly rule the polis.463  This hubristic image
of the political philosopher has been moderated somewhat in modern and contemporary 
political philosophy, but the core conviction persists that the political philosopher has 
unique insight into the nature of justice.  Even the social contract thinkers, and their 
political liberal offspring, all of whom insist that justice is a matter of deliberation and 
consensus, feel compelled to engage in controversial moral idealization to ensure that the 
deliberators are “reasonable.”  This process of idealization often results in the political 
philosopher making controversial moral judgments, masked under the neutral-sounding 
language of “reason,” or supposedly pulled from “our considered convictions” or “our 
political traditions.”  Alas, it now seems clear that reason does not speak in one voice 
about matters of morality and justice, and “our” considered convictions and political 
traditions are much more heterogeneous and pluralistic and dynamic the closer we look at
them.  Thus, the history of political philosophy (up to the present day) is full of political 
partisanship masked in non-partisan and neutral language.  In this dissertation, I have 
attempted to show that many of the main strands of contemporary political philosophy 
are plagued by this problem.  The philosophy of James can help illuminate some of the 
features of a more realist, more honest, and more constructive form of political 
philosophy.
Here, then, I will bring together and describe some of the basic features of a 
Jamesian political philosophy.  First, and most obviously, the Jamesian political 
463 The most famous argument of behalf of philosophical elitism being, of course, Plato's defense of the 
rule of “philosopher-kings” in Book V of The Republic, trans. R.E. Allen (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006).
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philosopher should accept that there exists foundational disagreements about justice in 
modern democratic societies that are also reasonable disagreements.  In these contexts, 
appeals to reason, reasonableness, and truth are often not constructive.464  This is because 
foundational disagreements (such as those between the reasonable libertarian and the 
reasonable leftist over questions of economic justice) are situations in which the 
interlocutors simply do not share the relevant premises or values, and thus the resulting 
disagreements cannot be resolved through reasoned deliberation alone.  Reason alone 
cannot adjudicate these disputes, which is why they seem so hopelessly intractable.
Indeed, oftentimes debates about the proper decision-procedure for adjudicating 
these foundational disagreements are subject to their own deep disagreements.  The 
centralizing response of modern liberals and leftists (which requires that we all deliberate
about controversial issues and then vote for a policy to which we will all be subjected), 
and the decentralizing response of libertarians and classical liberals (which insists that we
devolve controversial issues to the private sphere so that everyone can make a separate 
choice that best aligns with her values and preferences), are both controversial 
464 As discussed above, “reasonableness” can legitimately be invoked to exclude views with clear moral or 
epistemic flaws (e.g. the racist or the climate change denier); that is, those views that should not be 
accommodated even in my conception of “wide reasonable pluralism.”  Importantly, James has us view 
especially abhorrent claims not failing some a priori criterion of “reasonable,” but as instead 
overridden by other counter-claims (e.g. counter-claims made by those who would be oppressed by 
sexist policies).  We can, then, reconstruct the term “unreasonable” along Jamesian lines, as those views
which are overridden by counter-claims (and we can reconstruct the term “reasonable” as those views 
that are not so overridden).  Some agonist philosophers, however, want to go further and dispose of the 
term “reasonable” altogether.  Mouffe writes, “But who decides what is and what is not ‘reasonable’? In
politics the very distinction between ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ is already the drawing of a 
frontier; it has a political character and is always the expression of a given hegemony” (The Return of 
the Political, 142-143).  I claim that it makes sense to retain the version of reasonableness reconstructed
along Jamesian lines, which meshes with James' insistence that some views need to be overridden for 
the sake of permitting the expression of other views.  In any case, the Jamesian political philosopher 
should never invoke “reasonableness” as a tool with which to sanctify her partisan views in the context 
of foundational disagreement – a move all too common in contemporary political philosophy.
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proposals.465  While they both purport to be neutral decision-procedures acceptable to all 
reasonable people, they both would bias the result of the procedure in their own favor.  In
the case of economic justice, a centralizing response enables the possibility of a sweeping
redistribution of property, while the decentralizing response secures the likelihood of an 
inegalitarian distribution of property.  And both procedures are justified by a set of 
premises that are highly controversial and reasonably rejectable.  The centralizing 
response assumes that economic liberties are not basic liberties, and thus that private 
property rights are (relative to basic liberties) easily overrideable.  One such argument for
this position is luck egalitarianism, which holds that no one deserves their holdings, 
therefore no one has pre-political entitlements to them.  The decentralizing response 
assumes that economic liberties are basic liberties, and thus that property rights are not 
easily overrideable.  One such argument for this position is the self-ownership thesis, 
which holds that regardless of desert, people are entitled to all the holdings that they 
acquire without violating the Lockean rights of others.  This kind of foundational 
465 Arguably James himself is tempted by this classical liberal response to deep pluralism in “On a Certain 
Blindness in Human Beings,” when he writes, “It [a recognition of deep pluralism] absolutely forbids us
to be forward in pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms of existence other than our own; and it 
commands us to tolerate, respect, and indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in 
their own ways, however unintelligible these may be to us.  Hands off: neither the whole of truth nor the
whole of good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of 
insight from the peculiar position in which he stands.  Even prisons and sick-rooms have their special 
revelations.  It is enough to ask of each of us that he should be faithful to his own opportunities and 
make the most of his own blessings, without presuming to regulate the rest of the vast field” (644-645). 
The injunction of “hands off” reflects the core classical liberal commitment to the presumption in favor 
of liberty. However, in “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” James insists that all claims 
generate obligations, including claims that make demands on others.  The egalitarian who demands a 
more equal distribution of wealth is making a “hands on” claim – namely, a claim on the (supposedly) 
unjustly held property of others.  In “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” James' argument 
implies that the claims of the egalitarian ought to be seen as prime facie on par with the claims of the 
classical liberal.  Thus, Jamesian political philosophy (as distilled from “The Moral Philosopher and the 
Moral Life”) does not “tilt” in one direction or the other as it does for Gerald Gaus, who claims that 
political liberalism has a “classical tilt” - that is, a bias in favor of classical liberal principles and 
institutions and against egalitarian and socialist ones.  See Gaus, “Coercion, Ownership, and the 
Redistributive State”; and Gaus, The Order of Public Reason.  For a critique of Gaus' insistence on 
political liberalism's “classical tilt,” see Lister, “Public Justification and the Limits of State Action.”
239
disagreement (about both principles and procedures) is simply not open to rational 
adjudication.
Second, and relatedly, the Jamesian political philosopher should do away with the 
assumption of the eventuality of rational consensus about matters of basic justice.  So 
much of political philosophy, past and present, is characterized by a conviction that 
consensus is guaranteed, as long as we are all reasonable and are deliberating in the right 
setting.  This assumption is unjustified.  As I have demonstrated in chapter III, on the 
important questions of economic justice, there is no reason to assume that consensus is 
possible, even among reasonable interlocutors.  Many other domains of justice are likely 
also subject to this kind of foundational disagreement.  Reasonable people can be 
committed to radically different values, assumptions, and premises on a whole range of 
important questions of justice.
Not only is the assumption of the eventuality of rational consensus unjustified, but
it has prevented political philosophers from addressing a host of important political 
questions surrounding how we might best navigate conditions of deep pluralism where 
consensus is not forthcoming.  Political philosophers have traditionally viewed modus 
vivendi arrangements as second-best compromises to be overcome by more harmonious 
arrangements secured by compete moral consensus.  Most political philosophers spend all
of their time describing the nature of their hoped-for harmonious overlapping consensus, 
and almost no time describing how to construct a desirable modus vivendi or how to 
incrementally nudge existing modus vivendi arrangements toward an overlapping 
consensus.466  Furthermore, why assume that a world characterized by shared values is a 
466 Rawls notes the transition between the modus vivendi following the Reformation and the overlapping 
consensus of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience and religious toleration, but he only 
vaguely speculates about how and why the transition came about.  First, “the principle of toleration 
came about as a modus vivendi following the Reformation: at first reluctantly, but nevertheless as 
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morally better world than a world characterized by a deep pluralism of values?  In the 
same way that political liberals assume that a deep pluralism about the good life is a fact 
to be accepted and accommodated (not just prudentially but for moral reasons), we 
should now be open to a much wider pluralism about both the good life and justice, one 
to be accommodated and not necessarily overcome, even if doing so confounds attempts 
to achieve consensus about hard and important questions of justice.  
Third, and more positively, the Jamesian political philosopher should reclaim the 
project of a “non-partisan political philosophy” from political liberals (who have 
generally failed to be truly non-partisan in their political philosophizing), while 
recognizing its limits.  Instead of using political philosophy to subtly take sides in debates
about justice, the Jamesian political philosopher should engage in the task of creatively 
suggesting new ideals (hitherto nonexistent) that might help overcome or improve such 
debates.467  We can think of this task as non-partisan moral entrepreneurship.  These new 
ideals, James insists, must be more inclusive than the old ideals, if they are to adequately 
defuse and overcome the political disagreement.  In a memorable line, James writes, 
providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil strife” (Political Liberalism, 
159).  Then, “It is possible for citizens first to appreciate the good those principles [liberty of conscience
and freedom of thought] accomplish both for themselves and those they care for, as well as society at 
large, and then to affirm them on this basis.  Should an incompatibility later be recognized between the 
principles of justice and their wider doctrines, then they might very well adjust or revise their doctrines 
rather than reject those principles” (Political Liberalism, 160).  Finally, “Perhaps the doctrine of free 
faith developed because it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe in the damnation of those with whom
we have, with trust and confidence, long and fruitfully cooperated in maintaining a just society” 
(Political Liberalism, xxv).  Rawls is here merely speculating (“it is possible,” “might very well,” 
“perhaps”), and he is otherwise entirely philosophically uninterested in the topic.  In my view, studying 
this (and other) successful transition(s) between modus vivendi arrangements and achievements of 
overlapping consensus is of philosophical interest because it may help us deal constructively with the 
current (and future) foundational disagreements that generate social strife and stand in the way of an 
overlapping consensus.
467 This strategy of moral inventiveness is similar to Rorty's argument that sometimes the “logical space 
may need to be expanded before justice can be envisaged, much less done,” so moral and political 
philosophers should work to “extend logical space” by “providing a new language” (“Feminism and 
Pragmatism,” Philosophical Papers vol. 3: Truth and Progress [New York: Cambridge UP, 1998]: 204).
Rorty rightly cites feminism as a paradigmatic case of this moral entrepreneurship.
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“Invent some manner of realizing your own ideals which will also satisfy the alien 
demands,—that and that only is the path of peace!”468  This vision remains quite abstract 
and unclear.  So what, concretely, does this look like?
For a demonstration of the power and limits of this Jamesian political philosophy, 
we can turn to James himself – namely, the arguments that he develops in his essay “The 
Moral Equivalent of War.”  James is here confronting a debate about justice that we, 
today, are all too familiar with: the waging of war.  In the article, James proposes the 
ideal of a war “against Nature” (a war for the benefit, not destruction, of humanity) which
might capture the imaginations of both pacifists and war hawks, thus dissolving the 
political conflict about war by bringing both sides together over a newly created ideal.469  
Before James proposed his newly invented ideal, war hawks wanted war, and pacifists 
wanted no war – a seemingly intractable disagreement.  As a partisan, James sides with 
the pacifists.  But as a political philosopher, James develops and offers up a new third 
ideal, the war against Nature, which might satisfy both sides and resolve the stand-off.  
What James is able to do is detect an unappreciated point of convergence beneath 
the passionate disagreement between war hawks and pacifists, namely, a mutual yearning 
for energetic collective action fueled by the “martial virtues.”470  James thus offers up a 
new ideal that taps into this shared desire and re-channels it into a new kind of activity.  
468 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 623.  Again, James writes that the philosopher 
“must vote always for the richer universe, for the good which seems most organizable, most fit to enter 
into complex combinations, most apt to be a member of a more inclusive whole” (626).  Colin 
Koopman gestures toward this pragmatist-inspired orientation of political philosophy when he writes:  
“We will need to offer concepts that help us make sense of where we have come from, who we are, and 
what we may yet do.  Philosophy in such a key may not always deliver judgments, but it may yet 
deliver explanations and understandings” (“Good Questions and Bad Answers in Talisse's A Pragmatist 
Philosophy of Democracy,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45. no. 1 [Winter 2009]: 63).
469 James, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” 669.
470 James, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” 668.
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He argues that “instead of military conscription” we should have “a conscription of the 
whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army 
enlisted against Nature.”471  That is, James hopes to exploit the gap between what the war
hawks are really committed to (the exercise of the martial virtues) and what the war 
hawks claim to be committed to (the waging of military war).  This gap is politically 
meaningful insofar as it enables the possibility of such people being receptive to new 
ideals that better satisfy their real commitments.472
This strategy of Jamesian ideal creation seems perfectly suited to the context of 
deep and persistent political disagreement.  It offers to create (the possibility for) 
consensus where consensus previously seemed impossible.  Instead of assuming 
consensus, like political liberalism does, it works to create consensus.473  It represents a 
kind of creative moral entrepreneurship that operates within the network of ideals and 
values that actual people hold while pushing, incrementally but meaningfully, beyond 
471 James, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” 669.
472 Even Rawls appreciates that “a certain looseness in our comprehensive views, as well as their not being 
fully comprehensive, may be particularly significant” (Political Liberalism, 159).  Rawls similarly notes
that all comprehensive doctrines contain “lots of slippage” which may enable views to shift and modify 
in productive ways (Political Liberalism, 160).  Rawls does not expound on how, exactly, this looseness
and these slippages might be exploited by the political philosopher.
473 This activity of creative invention marks an important distinction between Rawlsian political liberalism 
and Jamesian pragmatist political philosophy.  Only occasionally does Rawls explicitly recognize that 
constructive political philosophy requires something like creativity and inventiveness in the face of deep
disagreement about justice.  For example, Rawls writes, “The public political culture may be of two 
minds at a very deep level.  Indeed, this must be so with such an enduring controversy as that 
concerning the most appropriate understanding of liberty and equality.  This suggests that if we are to 
succeed in finding a basis for public agreement, we must find a way of organizing familiar ideas and 
principles into a conception of political justice that expresses those ideas and principles in a somewhat 
different way than before” (Political Liberalism, 9; my italics).  This process of creatively re-weaving 
and re-presenting our ideals in new and different ways is unfortunately not at all theorized in Rawls' 
work, even though he is, to some extent, doing just this.  It seems, perhaps, that Rawls and James are 
both being creative and inventive but at different registers.  Rawls wants to create a theory that will help
us assess the relative merits of competing ideals, while James wants to create and propose entirely new 
ideals.  Thus, the difference between Rawlsian political liberalism and Jamesian pragmatist political 
philosophy seems to concern the exact nature and place of creativity in political philosophy.  This point 
deserves further reflection.  I am indebted to Cheyney Ryan for helping to clarify this point.
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them.  In this way, Jamesian accommodationism steers between the recognized political 
philosophical sins of blind conservatism and unhinged radicalism.
James' moral entrepreneurship in “The Moral Equivalent of War” is a useful 
example of what a more engaged and pragmatist political philosophy might look like, but
it also clearly shows the limits of such an enterprise.  James' proposed ideal did help 
inspire the creation of national service organizations (such as the Civilian Conservation 
Corp of the Depression era), and in that way it partially succeeded.  But, importantly, it 
did not entirely succeed in turning war hawks against war.  Why not?  Because war 
hawks can be and often are inspired to advocate for war on the basis of other ideals than 
the cultivation of the “martial virtues” which James hoped to re-channel into his war 
against Nature.  For example, defenders of war were (and continue to be) also inspired by
a desire to defend and export the democratic ideal abroad, by a moral commitment to 
humanitarian intervention, by a desire for imperial expansion, and much more (although, 
admittedly, the independent goal of stirring up the martial virtues certainly held powerful 
sway in the era of Theodore Roosevelt).
To be successful, the invented ideal of the Jamesian political philosopher must 
genuinely satisfy the underlying values, goals, and desires of the conflicting parties even 
while re-channeling them into a new and more inclusive ideal.  The temptation is for the 
Jamesian political philosopher to oversimplify and homogenize the values, goals, and 
desires of the contending parties so as to illuminate supposed points of commonality 
where none may exists.  We should not deceive ourselves into thinking that what the war 
hawks really want is just the exercise of the martial virtues.  Such an assumption makes 
the job of the political philosopher too easy, and ultimately it does not take sufficiently 
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seriously the depth of our disagreements.  In many political disagreements the contending
parties are animated by a complex network of genuinely opposing and incommensurable 
(conscious and unconscious) values, goals, and desires, such that no invented third ideal 
is likely to be compelling to both parties.  And since Jamesian political philosophy is 
accommodationist, not transformationist, the invented third ideal must genuinely 
accommodate the existing set of values, goals, and desires featured in society, and not 
simply expect the full-scale transformation of these values, goals, and desires in the 
direction of consensus.
Returning to the topic addressed in chapter III, one might wonder what kind of 
Jamesian ideal might be created to resolve the impasse between Nozick and Rawls, or 
between Gaus and Freeman.  Unfortunately, I have no such ideal worked out, and I am 
unsure at the moment what such an ideal would look like.  In Free Market Fairness, John
Tomasi makes it his explicit goal to work out a conception of justice that pulls together 
Rawls and Hayek, social justice and free markets.  This attempt at reconciling competing 
views of economic justice is much appreciated, given that the topic has become so 
bitterly polarizing within both American political culture and the discipline of political 
philosophy.  However, the Tomasian hope for a compelling Rawls/Hayek synthesis which
ushers in a consensus on matters of economic justice seems completely over-optimistic.  
As I have shown in chapter III, Tomasi draws on assumptions and values that are clearly 
controversial and reasonably rejectable by partisans of both Rawls and Hayek.474  It 
474 In addition to what has been cited and discussed in chapter III, one gets a sense of how partisans of 
Nozick and Hayek might object to Tomasi's proposal by reading the contributors to the symposium on 
the lead essay by Tomasi (co-authored with Matt Zwolinski) “A Bleeding Heart History of 
Libertarianism,” Cato Unbound Symposium: “Where Next?: The Past, Present, and Future of Classical 
Liberalism” (April 2012), accessed 5 October 2014, http://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/april-
2012/where-next-past-present-future-classical-liberalism.  And one also gets a sense of how partisans of
Rawls and Cohen might object to Tomasi's proposal by reading the contributors to the symposium on 
Free Market Fairness in Critical Review 24, no. 3-4 (2014).
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seems clear to me that Tomasi failed to find a true core of shared convictions between the
competing parties to the dispute over economic justice, despite his best attempt, because 
perhaps no such minimal point of convergence exists.  Because of this, Tomasi's 
elaborated account of economic justice failed to convince many of those he hoped to 
convince.  Instead, he has proposed just another controversial conception of economic 
justice to compete with the Nozickean, Hayekian, Gausian, Rawlsian, Cohenite, etc., 
conceptions of economic justice.  Tomasi's new account of justice is an appreciated 
contribution, but since it ultimately just adds another distinct option to the menu of 
possibilities for conceptions of economic justice, it is a contribution which intensifies our 
disagreement about justice; it does not resolve it.475
In those cases of deep disagreement about justice where the Jamesian option of 
ideal creation seems fruitless, there is another strategy or orientation that might be 
constructive.  If the Jamesian political philosopher is unable to find any points of 
475 Another contemporary attempt to break through our polarized political impasse is represented by the 
“nudge” theorists who articulate a policy program based on “libertarian paternalism.”  These thinkers 
propose policies that, given well documented human cognitive biases, tinker with the “choice 
architecture” (such as default rules) for various decisions (especially those related to investing and 
health) so as to nudge boundedly rational choosers to make better choices.  These policies aim to be 
both libertarian (by not restricting choice – being “choice-preserving”) and paternalistic (by increasing 
the welfare of people, especially some of those most vulnerable to welfare-harming choices), thus 
drawing on some of the commitments of both right and left.  Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, the two 
most prominent nudge theorists, explicitly highlight the possibility of nudge policies gaining a 
bipartisan consensus.  They write, “With respect to government, we hope that the general approach 
might serve as a viable middle ground in our unnecessarily polarized society.  The twentieth century 
was pervaded by a great deal of artificial talk about the possibility of a 'Third Way.'  We are hopeful that
libertarian paternalism offers a real Third Way—one that can break through some of the least tractable 
debates in contemporary democracies” (Nudge, 255).  Again, however, it seems clear to me that while 
libertarian paternalism offers some important insights into human decision making and some helpful 
policy suggestions, it seems unlikely that, as a whole, the libertarian paternalist program will overcome 
our foundational disagreements about justice.  Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch, at the end of a 
compelling critique of libertarian paternalism, argue that Sunstein and Thaler's insistence that libertarian
paternalism can serve as bipartisan middle ground is “implausible.”  They explain, “[Sunstein and 
Thaler's] major policy proposals—school choice, cap and trade markets to limit pollution, and 
privatizing marriage and limiting legal recognition to domestic partnerships open to gays and lesbians—
have little connection to libertarian paternalism or nudges, and they are hardly middle ground.  There 
are many insights in Nudge for the nitty-gritty business of designing policies, but no path toward 
reconciling disagreements concerning major issues” (“Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge,” The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 18, no. 1 [March 2010]: 136).
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convergence between the contending parties, and thus there is no hope of winning over 
the partisans of both sides by tapping into their shared core of values, goals, and desires, 
then one might attempt to work on and modify the values, goals, and desires of one or 
both sides of some particular debate.  This task is most likely to succeed if its 
methodology is non-philosophical,476 in the vein of Rorty's advocacy of literature, poetry, 
and journalism taking over the task of social progress from the philosophers.477  Perhaps, 
that is, one should shift her energies away from philosophically debating the Nozickeans 
and towards writing literature about the difficulties of the lives of low-wage workers 
(such as Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, or, most recently, Barbara Ehrenreich's Nickel and 
Dimed: On (Not) Getting by in America).  Then, instead of being compelled to 
accommodate reasonable Nozickean intuitions, we could simply do away with them, thus
giving ourselves the easier job of accommodating a smaller and more homogeneous (and 
less libertarian) range of intuitions about justice.  (And, of course, partisans of Nozick or 
Hayek might similarly shift their attention away from philosophical argumentation with 
Rawlsians and Cohenites and toward more journalistic or imaginative and literary forms 
of persuasion, perhaps in the form of Hayek's The Road to Serfdom or Amity Shlaes' The 
476 Although it is not necessarily the case that the philosopher is unhelpful here.  One is quickly reminded 
of how many people (myself included) found their moral intuitions changed after reading Peter Singer's 
Animal Liberation (New York: HarperCollins, 1975), one of those rare works of philosophy capable of 
changing not only minds but also hearts.
477 Rorty argues that the task of transforming our moral intuitions so as to enlarge our moral communities 
“is a task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography, the journalist's report, the comic book, the 
docudrama, and, especially, the novel … [T]he novel, the movie, and the TV program have, gradually 
but steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the principle vehicles of moral change and 
progress” (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, xvi).  For a fuller account of what this process looks like 
for Rorty, see Christopher Voparil, Richard Rorty: Politics and Vision (Lanham, MA: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006), especially chapter 3, “The Politics of the Novel: Rorty on Democracy, Irony, and 
Moral Education.”  James largely shares Rorty's view on this.  James writes, “His books upon ethics, 
therefore, so far as they truly touch the moral life, must more and more ally themselves with a literature 
which is confessedly tentative and suggestive rather than dogmatic,—I mean with novels and dramas of 
the deeper sort, with sermons, with books on statecraft and philanthropy and social and economic 
reform” (“The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 626).
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Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression).  For another example, if James' 
“Moral Equivalent of War” does not convince the war hawks to give up on war (maybe 
because they care about exporting democracy in addition to the martial virtues), then 
perhaps energy should be shifted toward writing books like Kurt Vonnegut's 
Slaughterhouse-Five or Joseph Heller's Catch-22, or to making movies like Full Metal 
Jacket, which dramatize and make vivid the costs of war incurred by those who fight 
them.  
Alternatively, but in the same vein, we might attempt to modify competing sets of 
“imperialist” claims (in Nozick's sense of those demands that insist upon the state-backed
imposition of positive duties on others) into “existential” or “missionary” claims (in 
Nozick's sense of those demands that are either entirely private or limit themselves to 
non-coercive moral suasion to convince others to voluntarily self-impose new positive 
duties).478  This modification would defuse the conflict by turning a hostile political 
disagreement about justice into a debate within civil society about the best private 
conception of the good.
While no doubt society-wide shifts in moral intuitions do happen (one 
immediately thinks of the seismic shift in attitudes about homosexuality in the United 
States over the past decade), they are extremely difficult to consciously engineer, and 
their success is mostly unpredictable.  The best one can do on this front is to produce and 
make public various forms of intuition-targeting materials (literary, artistic, etc.), and 
hope for (to paraphrase Rorty) an “accidental coincidence” between one's non-shared 
478 See section 5.1. for a further discussion of the meaning of these terms and how they fit into Nozick's 
conception of justice.  The conversion of imperialist claims into the status of missionary or existential 
claims seems to be the goal of, e.g., political movements associated with gay rights and pro-choice 
(summarized in the slogans “If you don't like gay marriage / abortion, then don't get one!”).  In other 
words, the goal is to convert the claims (of social conservatives) upon public institutions (i.e. the law 
surrounding marriage or reproductive choice) into private ideals concerning the good life.
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convictions about justice and a broadly shared dissatisfaction among the public with the 
prevailing conception of justice.479  We can think of this Rortyan moral entrepreneurship 
as, sometimes, preceding and preparing the conditions for successful Jamesian moral 
entrepreneurship.  That is, Rortyan intuition-targeting might help to loosen up 
problematic and exclusionary moral intuitions (e.g. making war hawks skeptical about 
the value of waging war by highlighting the costs to those who fight them).  When these 
intuitions are weakened, then the Jamesian is more likely to be successful in winning 
over competing sides to new ideals.  Thus, while the Rortyan loosens moral intuitions, 
the Jamesian channels them into new (and hopefully more inclusive) ideals.
But there is, of course, no guarantee that the Jamesian and Rortyan strategies of 
moral entrepreneurship will succeed at all.  In the vision of political philosophy defended 
in this chapter, consensus, transformation, the social uptake of new ideals, etc., is never 
guaranteed.  Many people are committed to their moral and political ideals firmly and 
unflinchingly, and there is sometimes nothing that political philosophers or novelists can 
do about it.  In those cases, then, where it becomes clear that the task of inventing a more 
inclusive third ideal is not feasible for a certain moral or political disagreement (and 
where it is clear that the prevailing intuitions cannot be easily modified), the political 
philosopher can be constructive by setting aside the task of moral entrepreneurship and 
instead taking up the task of moral explication.  The goal of moral explication is simply 
to make explicit and systematic the full range of entailments and implications of holding 
certain views and values.  Moral explication will be framed in the following kinds of 
ways: “If you hold these values, then here are some (unappreciated or unexplored) 
implications for justice”; “Here are some (unappreciated or unexplored) reasons to 
479 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 37.
249
cherish these values”; “Here are the some (unappreciated or unexplored) undesirable 
characteristics of other competing values.”  And since the moral explicator has given up 
on converting or transforming the values or intuitions of her opponents, the audience for 
the moral explicator is (to paraphrase a political term) moral independents.  That is, the 
audience is those people who remain to some extent undecided in the political conflict, 
and are unaware of the full range of implications and entailments of each side's values 
and positions.  The moral explicator can provide this crucial knowledge, which may 
ultimately tip the scale of the conflict by converting independents into partisans.  This is 
an important task because there are many people who do not have clearly established 
views on every moral and political issue, and many of those people are not entirely aware
of how their basic moral intuitions and values might be further developed to inform their 
views on certain controversial issues (in perhaps surprising ways).
We could, in fact, helpfully read many contemporary political philosophers 
through the frame of moral explication.  For example, Rawls could be fruitfully 
understood as saying “If you are committed to the luck egalitarian thesis, then here are 
some perhaps surprising implications for how you might conceive of justice,” while 
Nozick could be fruitfully understood as saying “If you are committed to the self-
ownership thesis, then here are some perhaps surprising implications for how you might 
conceive of justice” – both of which are helpful contributions to an otherwise confused 
and unclear political debate.480  Too often in our public debates about matters of basic 
480 This point suggests that Rawls and Nozick are, in fact, doing moral explication in their philosophical 
work.  No doubt this is partly true: Rawls is explicating a certain set of moral intuitions that many 
people share, while Nozick is explicating a different set of moral intuitions that many other people 
share.  Arguably, most great Western political philosophy since John Stuart Mill has been at least partly 
an explication of the moral intuitions and values that took hold in Europe after the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment.  In every great work of political philosophy, there is clearly a combination of moral 
entrepreneurship and moral explication.  Oftentimes, however, political philosophers deceptively 
describe their moral entrepreneurship as moral explication (“All I am doing is making clear what you 
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justice, partisans do not make clear the set of values and commitments that they are 
drawing on for justification, nor do they make clear the implications of these values and 
commitments for other questions of justice (oftentimes, partisans are not cognizant about 
these issues themselves).  So the goal of moral explication is to identify moral and 
political values and their implications and entailments, and the political philosopher is 
well-suited for such a task. 
Ultimately, at the end of the day the non-partisan political philosopher steps 
outside of her role qua political philosopher and is invited to assume the partisan stance. 
While James insists that the moral and political philosopher remain committed to the 
ideal of non-partisanship, he is interested in the activity of the partisan and the activist as 
well.  While James asks the political philosopher to “invent” new ideals, James also urges
the partisan to always “vote” for the more inclusive ideal.  He writes, “There is but one 
unconditional commandment, which is that we should seek incessantly, with fear and 
trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good 
which we can see.”481  
It is worth reflecting on the metaphor of “voting.”  First, the idea of voting for 
ideals meshes with James' anti-elitist commitments in the essay – namely, that the 
philosopher has a vote, but so does everyone else.  Thus, the philosopher's vote is not 
authoritative or special, but merely worthy of equal weight and consideration vis-a-vis all
other votes.  Second, voting is an activity that happens within a fixed choice set.  One is 
choosing from an array of preexisting options.  So when the Jamesian partisan is forced 
already believe”).  In truth, great political philosophers like Rawls and Nozick are tapping into (and 
making more explicit) some set of widely shared moral intuitions while also trying to merge them with 
other more controversial moral intuitions and extend them to newly proposed ideas.  Thus, both moral 
explication and moral entrepreneurship are intermixed in many works of political philosophy.
481 James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 625-626.
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to take sides in a sedimented disagreement, she is a partisan for inclusivity (namely, for 
the values of democratic inclusion and liberal freedom – although how the values of 
liberal democracy are interpreted, and how we measure “inclusivity,” are all unclear and 
up for reasonable debate482).483  So we might think of “voting” as a first-order partisan 
stance in favor of inclusion, while “inventing” is a second-order detached stance that 
seeks to create new ideals capable of generating agreement between previously 
disagreeing parties.  It is the latter task that James is most interested in, and it is the task 
that, if successful, results not in one side beating the other side (which is the usual 
outcome of first-order partisan strife), but in the overcoming and elimination of the 
disagreement itself (with both sides coming together over a newly invented and proposed 
ideal).  
482 Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse rightly point out how James' commitment to pluralism frustrates his call 
to always vote for the “more inclusive order” since certain ideals can only be realized by suppressing 
other ideals – which side to vote for then?  They write, “certain kinds of ideals are such that to hold 
them is necessarily to judge certain other ideals to be immoral and thus unworthy of realization.  Not all
moral conflict is due to an overall lack of resources or a general inability to accommodate everyone. 
Some conflict is due to the fact that some moral commitments involve a rejection of other moral 
commitments” (“Three Problems for Jamesian Ethics,” William James Studies 6 [2011], accessed 12 
April 2014, williamjamesstudies.org/6.1/ta.pdf, 8).  This kind of zero-sum conflict, which may not 
permit the possibility of a more inclusive third ideal, or which may make it seem unclear what would 
count as more inclusive, seems especially likely in the context of foundational disagreements about 
matters of justice (some of which I have discussed in previous chapters).  Alas, “inclusivity” should be 
categorized along with many of the other master-concepts of Western politics (“liberty,” “equality,” 
“dignity,” “rights,” etc.) as unhelpfully thin and essentially contested.  Which is to say, these concepts 
cannot be deployed on their own in political arguments, since they are too abstract and devoid of 
content.  Instead, they need to be concretely interpreted and filled in by a series of further concepts 
which are themselves more controversial and partisan.
483 It is always important to remember that any partisan stance, no matter how “correct” is might seem at 
the time, might very well be viewed by future generations as morally “incorrect.”  Even the most well-
intentioned and well-informed people are liable to make serious misjudgments that are roundly 
condemned by most people at some point in the future.  Rorty seems to have a clearer sense of this 
point than James.  In his important essay “Honest Mistakes,” Rorty argues against “the idea that any 
honest and intelligent man will [necessarily] adopt positions of which future historians will approve,” 
citing the many morally and epistemically upstanding intellectuals who took stances in the Cold War 
that, in retrospect, seem deeply misguided (Philosophical Papers vol. 4: Philosophy as Cultural 
Politics [New York: Cambridge UP, 2007]: 57). This is not, of course, a reason (or excuse) to be 
apolitical, but it is a reason to be humble and fallibilistic about one's partisan views, and to be on guard 
against the all-too-human tendency to demonize one's opponents and dismiss their views.
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This second-order, non-partisan task of ideal-creation is difficult and limited.  The
Jamesian political philosopher cannot always save the day, at least not on our worst days. 
This is important to acknowledge.  In conditions of deep pluralism, I have shown that the 
political liberal tradition simply has nothing to offer us.  The political liberal philosopher 
sees the existence of foundational disagreements about justice and, incapable of accepting
the existence of deep yet reasonable disagreements about justice, simply proclaims one 
side as the winner (the “reasonable” side).  But this is not a helpful intervention – in our 
foundational disagreements about justice, what is most “reasonable” is often precisely 
what is in question.  The political liberal is rightly seen as an unhelpful partisan by those 
who disagree with her particular views and her narrow definition of “reasonableness.”  
The Jamesian political philosopher, on the other hand, avoids the deficiencies of the 
political liberal  philosopher while being able to offer some modest tools and suggestions 
for ways to helpfully intervene in such conditions.  But, again, perhaps the day cannot be 
saved.  Sometimes we are simply locked into a hopelessly polarized situation with no 
possibility of resolution, no matter how much additional deliberation might take place, no
matter how much Jamesian (and Rortyan) intervention is undertaken.  The Jamesian, at 
least, is able to recognize that these tragic situations are simply part of the human 
experience, and she is thereby saved from the illusion of a tragedy-free political life.484  
This is an invaluable insight for political philosophy.
484 For a helpful discussion of the role of the tragic in James' thinking, see William Gavin, William James 
in Focus: Willing to Believe (Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 2013); Smith, “William James and the Politics of
Moral Conflict”; and McKenzie, “Pragmatism, Pluralism, Politics.”  Also see Sidney Hook, 
“Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 33 (1959-1960).
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8. Conclusion
To sum up: in the midst of deep pluralism, then, the political philosopher has three
legitimate and constructive roles (and one legitimate and constructive attitude).  The first 
two roles reflect varieties of moral entrepreneurship, while the third role deals with 
moral explication.  First, the political philosopher can attempt to create more inclusive 
ideals which may be able to generate consensus and defuse strife.  This is a difficult task, 
and the success of one's efforts are never guaranteed.  Second, the political philosopher 
(or non-philosopher) can devote herself to more imaginative arguments and narratives 
that look more like literature, journalism, televisual media, etc., in attempting to target 
and loosen existing moral intuitions.  This task can help make the successful uptake of 
newly proposed ideals more likely.  Third, in conditions where moral entrepreneurship is 
unlikely to succeed (where the views and intuitions of partisans are thoroughly 
entrenched), the political philosopher can engage in moral explication aimed at informing
moral independents of the implications and entailments of the various values and ideals at
play.  When political philosophy fails (which, on my account, it often will), then the 
Jamesian partisan will side with and advocate for the more inclusive ideals.  Finally, the 
political philosopher shares with James an attitude that embodies a tragic vision of 
politics – a recognition and acceptance of the impossibility of a politics without loss, 
agonism, and failure.  This attitude protects the philosopher from the illusion that there 
must, somehow, always be a consensus about justice to be won from the pluralistic world 
in which we live.  We are afforded no such guarantees, and it is important to be 
reconciled to this truth.
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The failures of political liberalism reveal clearly the nature of our problem today: 
people have foundational yet reasonable disagreements about justice, and political 
philosophy must be responsive to this fact.  Much of mainstream political philosophy, 
inspired by the consensus-oriented Rawlsian-Habermasian tradition, has failed to give 
satisfying answers or even helpful suggestions for how we might productively overcome 
or live with the persistence of such foundational disagreements.  Pragmatism has much to
offer here, and I have argued that we should look to the insights of Jamesian pragmatism 
in particular for guidance.  While there has recently been a growing scholarship 
concerned with developing political insights out of Jamesian pragmatism, I believe that 
James' pragmatism can also make important contributions to the problems that have been 
identified within mainstream political philosophy, especially political liberalism.  Much 
more can and needs to be said about the details of a Jamesian political philosophy, but I 
hope that I have sketched out some of its main goals and tasks (as well as some of its 
main limitations).  This vision of a Jamesian pragmatist political philosophy should 
provide a compelling philosophical program for the many of us who are frustrated with 
political liberalism and looking for alternatives.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
One of the important contributions of this dissertation is to describe, in detail, how
reasonable people are likely to disagree deeply and indefinitely about principles of 
economic justice – principles which should guide our choices about significant political 
questions, such as those concerning taxation, redistribution, regulation of business and 
property rights, the nature of the property rights regime, labor market laws and 
regulations, the legal regime for intellectual property, etc.  Citizens of the United States 
today are likely to find this claim, at first glance, somewhat banal.  Living in a 
remarkably polarized society, everyone is aware of the intractability of our political 
disagreements, including those disagreements about matters of economic justice.  
However, most Americans view this polarization in a particular and problematic 
way.  That is, most Americans view political polarization as a symptom of one of our 
political tribes being in some important way unreasonable.  The tribes of left and right 
view each other with deep (and growing) suspicion, seeing each other increasingly less as
Adversaries and increasingly more as Enemies.485  Ignorance and bad intentions are 
485 The helpful distinction between Adversaries and Enemies is developed by, among other philosophers, 
Chantal Mouffe.  For Mouffe, Adversaries are political opponents who share a commitment to the broad
goals of democratic institutions and liberal freedom, but who disagree deeply about how these goals are 
to be achieved and how these values are to be interpreted.  Adversaries are “legitimate enemies,” who 
disagree about fundamental issues while maintaining a level of mutual respect and civic friendship and 
a mutual respect for basic rules of open debate and democratic process.  Enemies are those who are not 
to be argued with, but those to be beaten and marginalized from political life.  For Mouffe, agonistic 
politics requires “distinguishing between the categories of 'antagonism' (relations between enemies) and
'agonism' (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of 'conflictual consensus' providing a 
common symbolic space among opponents who are considered 'legitimate enemies.'  Contrary to the 
dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation.  Adversaries do fight—
even fiercely—but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately 
irreconcilable, are accepted as legitimate perspectives” (On the Political [New York: Routledge, 2005] 
52).  The clash of Enemies should be understood through the “Jacobin model in which you want to 
destroy the other in order to establish your point of view and then not allow the other the possibility of 
coming back democratically.  That's the struggle among enemies—the complete destruction of the 
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imputed to the opposing tribe,486 and each side comforts itself with the thought that if 
politics were stripped of unreasonable influences emanating from the other tribe (the 
capture of politics by Big Business, Big Labor, Big Money, Liberal Elites, Conservative 
Know-Nothings, etc), then divisiveness would be left behind and consensus would 
emerge.
This faith in the eventuality of rational consensus has been challenged in this 
dissertation on two fronts.  First, I have argued that even in idealized deliberative 
circumstances, reasonable people are able to disagree deeply about matters of economic 
other” (Worsham and Olson, “Rethinking Political Community,” 180-181).
486 There is reason to think that this mutual suspicion is dangerously on the rise.  Cass Sunstein refers to 
this kind of political antagonism as “partyism,” and he reports that we have reason to believe that 
partyism “now exceeds racial prejudice” (“'Partyism' Now Trumps Racism,” Bloomberg View, 22 
September 2014, accessed 8 January 2015, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-09-
22/partyism-now-trumps-racism).  For example, Sunstein reports, “In 1960, 5 percent of Republicans 
and 4 percent of Democrats said that they would feel 'displeased' if their son or daughter married 
outside their political party.  By 2010, those numbers had reached 49 percent and 33 percent.  
Republicans have been found to like Democrats less than they like people on welfare or gays and 
lesbians.  Democrats dislike Republicans more than they dislike big business” (Sunstein, “'Partyism' 
Now Trumps Racism”). Sunstein also discusses a study where the researchers “asked more than 1,000 
people to look at the resumes of several high-school seniors and say which ones should be awarded a 
scholarship.  Some of these resumes contained racial cues ('president of the African American Student 
Association') while others had political ones ('president of the Young Republicans').  Race mattered.  
African-American participants preferred the African-American candidates 73 percent to 27 percent.  
Whites showed a modest preference for African-American candidates, as well, though by a significantly
smaller margin. But partisanship made a much bigger difference.  Both Democrats and Republicans 
selected their in-party candidate about 80 percent of the time.  Even when a candidate from the 
opposing party had better credentials, most people chose the candidate from their own party.  With 
respect to race, in contrast, merit prevailed” (“'Partyism' Now Trumps Racism”).  This reflects a serious 
failure within contemporary political culture for partisans to appreciate the reasonableness of their 
opponents, and it highlights the willingness of partisans to increasingly view Adversaries as Enemies.  
Also see Cass Sunstein, “Partyism,” University of Chicago Legal Forum (14 December 2014), accessed
12 Janurary 2015, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2536084.  David Brooks comments, “Politics is obviously a 
passionate activity, in which moral values clash.  Debates over Obamacare, charter schools or whether 
the United States should intervene in Syria stir serious disagreement.  But these studies are measuring 
something different.  People’s essential worth is being measured by a political label: whether they 
should be hired, married, trusted or discriminated against.  The broad social phenomenon is that as 
personal life is being de-moralized, political life is being hyper-moralized.  People are less judgmental 
about different lifestyles, but they are more judgmental about policy labels” (“Partyism is Wrong,” The 
New York Times (27 October 2014), accessed 10 January 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/opinion/david-brooks-why-partyism-is-wrong.html?_r=0.  It is 
also deeply troubling that professional economists (who we would hope to be somewhat immune from 
the more irrational forms of tribalism) are becoming more politically polarized – see Scott Sumner, 
“Ideological Differences in Economics: Why Is the Left-Right Divide Widening?”, Econ Journal Watch
12, no. 1 (January 2015).
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justice, either by starting from different premises, or by starting with shared premises but 
developing them into different conclusions because of different interpretations of core 
concepts.  This is a significant point, as it clashes head-on with the Rawlsian-
Habermasian mainstream of political philosophy and with the tribalistic impulses of 
many American citizens.  There is a further problem, however.  The reasonableness of 
these deep disagreements about justice is not sufficiently appreciated by most people 
because of the ways in which we conduct much of our real-world political deliberation 
today, including the particular influences of the Internet.  The network of epistemically-
closed deliberative enclaves that has emerged on the Internet has made it increasingly 
difficult for many people to recognize and fully appreciate the reasonableness of their 
political opponents, a difficulty which fuels political tribalism and encourages us to see 
our political Adversaries as political Enemies.  This is a troubling development in 
American political life.
What is to be done about it?  How is this particular problem to be solved?  This is 
the kind of question that philosophers are expected to have very good answers to.  My 
answers will surely not satisfy everyone.  I do not know if there are any solutions to the 
problem of deep yet reasonable disagreements about economic justice.  We very well 
might be stuck in this particular political rut for a long time, and there might not be an 
easy way to get out of it.  One thing of which I am convinced is that political 
philosophers do us no good by simply taking sides in these debates and cheerleading for 
their political tribe by insisting that it is most “reasonable.”  If they care to help, they 
should take their cue from William James and dig deeply into the crevices and corners of 
our disagreements, and search for hitherto unappreciated nodes of convergence that might
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be made explicit and developed into new ideals or values that might help push us 
forward.  I have not worked out a Jamesian ideal that might help us overcome the 
particular disagreements we have about economic justice.  My sense is that this is a deep 
rut that we are likely to be in for a while.  But I hope that I have sketched out what a 
helpful contribution to this problem might look like.
I will conclude by reflecting on the general question of how we (citizens and 
philosophers) might think about politics if, despite the troubling interaction of our normal
cognitive biases with the structures of Internet deliberation, we recognized that our non-
shared views about justice (especially economic justice) are not uniquely reasonable, but 
merely one set of views within a much larger set of reasonable views.  That is, what if we
recognized and took seriously the fact that many of our political Adversaries (and even 
some of our perceived Enemies) are not in fact unreasonable, but actually just committed 
to different, though reasonable, assumptions and premises?  What if one were to realize 
this while also holding to the somewhat commonsense conviction (articulated by political
liberals) that it is impermissible to coercively impose one's views about justice upon 
others who reasonably object?  While political liberalism has generally asked liberal 
citizens to take those beliefs that generate foundational disagreement and transform them 
from public demands about justice into private ideals about the good life, this 
privatization strategy only works for a certain subset of disagreements, paradigmatically 
those disagreements about religious truth.  Beliefs about economic justice are structurally
different than religious beliefs – they are inherently public demands upon public 
institutions and shared practices.  If one wants to demand of the socialist that she must 
privatize her beliefs about economic justice (thus imposing a private burden on her to 
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philanthropically give away her wealth so as to approximate her preferred egalitarian 
distribution, or to start a commune ordered along socialistic lines), then one is actually 
already taking sides in the debate about economic justice in favor of libertarianism, and 
socialists are sure to reasonably object.  So if the privatization strategy does not work in 
this case, what are we to do?
The problem, as it has been described, lacks any clear solution.  If the goal is 
consensus about justice, but we recognize a wide range of intractable pluralism about 
matters of justice, then the goal cannot be achieved.  Two pseudo-solutions suggest 
themselves: (1) drop the goal of consensus, or (2) drop the respect for pluralism (or at 
least restrict and narrow the range of reasonable pluralism).  The former pseudo-solution 
is advocated by some defenders of modus vivendi liberalism and agonistic democracy.  
The latter pseudo-solution is advocated by some liberal perfectionists, communitarians, 
and misguided political liberals.  I call these pseudo-solutions because I am convinced 
that we have very good reasons to cherish both consensus and pluralism – namely, a strict
regulative ideal of full consensus (about principles, procedures, or constitutional 
essentials, etc.), and as wide a range of reasonable pluralism as we can countenance.  
While the preceding chapters might give one the impression of a thoroughgoing critique 
and rejection of liberalism in toto, I do not see this as the conclusion of my project.  The 
tradition of liberalism remains valuable not as a static set of answers to political 
questions, but instead it remains valuable as a set of debates in which we still find 
ourselves enmeshed.  The ideals of consensus and pluralism remain our ideals, even as 
we endlessly debate how these ideals are to be worked out for us here and now.
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While we all know (for the most part) what consensus looks like, we do not have 
a good sense of what “reasonableness” (and “reasonable pluralism”) looks like.  Drawing 
the boundary around the reasonable cannot be done a priori.  It is unclear and quite 
controversial who and what exactly count as reasonable.  I have not attempted to clearly 
define the necessary and sufficient conditions for what counts as a reasonable political 
belief in this dissertation because I am convinced that such a task is misguided.  But the 
very fact that we have (seemingly reasonable) disagreements about where to draw the 
boundaries between the reasonable and the unreasonable (which we might call “meta-
pluralism” - the phenomenon of reasonable pluralism about the nature of reasonable 
pluralism) should push us in the direction of being as inclusive as we can (so as to avoid 
coercing and oppressing citizens and communities that some other group of citizens has 
deemed unreasonable).  The messiness of the boundaries of the reasonable should not, 
however, convince us that we can go it alone without any conception of the reasonable.  
Virtually all of us recognize the utter undesirability of bending our shared conception of 
justice around the extremely hateful and ignorant views that are sadly all too common in 
our country and world today.  Ultimately, I urge political philosophers to stick with the 
ideals of consensus, pluralism, and reasonableness (reconstructed along Jamesian lines as
those views that are not overridden by counter-claims), even if this set of ideals presents 
frustrating and perhaps intractable problems when we try to actually work out the details 
of principles of justice.
So I ask again: how might we think about politics given the conclusions of this 
dissertation?  How do the socialist and libertarian (and everyone in between) engage each
other in political debate, if they cannot plausibly bracket their non-shared values about 
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economic justice without bracketing the conversation altogether?  How do the socialist 
and libertarian relate to the coercive state apparatus if they share the basic intuition 
prohibiting the imposition of any views on reasonable objectors?  Well, I certainly cannot
be saying that they should sit out of politics because they cannot convince their 
opponents of their views.  They must be allowed to advocate for, and (if they win out in 
the democratic arena) impose their views upon others, even though others will have loud 
and reasonable objections.  When we have deep yet reasonable disagreements about 
justice, we are forced into agonistic politics.  We need to mutually recognize the right of 
each other to violate the basic political liberal commitment against coercively imposing 
views over reasonable objections.  This mutual agreement is hopefully one between 
Adversaries, not Enemies.  That is, hopefully the mutual agreement is one where we 
agree to abide by the results of the democratic struggle when we lose, even as we keep 
preparing for the next political battle.
But there is an element of hope even here in the agonistic democratic framework.  
The principle of political non-violence is not absolute.  While we hope that foundational 
disagreements about justice can be dealt with through non-violent agonistic political 
debate and struggle within existing democratic institutions, there are undoubtedly cases 
where violent resistance is justified.  The problem, of course, is that in non-ideal 
conditions, different people (holding different conceptions of justice) will have different 
opinions about when violent resistance is justified (e.g. under capitalist institutions, the 
libertarian will see fewer injustices than the socialist, and thus the libertarian will see a 
much higher threshold for the justification of political violence).  In the same way that the
line between the reasonable and the unreasonable is deeply contested, the line between 
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justified and unjustified political violence is deeply contested.  Were African-Americans 
justified in resorting to occasional violence during the Jim Crow era?  What about now, 
under the “New Jim Crow” of racially-imbalanced mass incarceration?487  What about the
string of bombings in the early 1970s by the Weather Underground motivated in large 
part by a resistance to the Vietnam War, which many people then and now view as an 
unjust war?  For the pro-lifer who sees abortion as murder, when political deliberation 
fails, should violence be directed toward property or persons in an attempt to disrupt what
is seen to be a regime of mass slaughter?488  More generally, in the absence of an 
overlapping consensus about justice, when should we try to forge a peaceful modus 
vivendi with our opponents, and when should we take up arms?  When is accommodation
unacceptable, and revolution necessary?
This whole set of questions related to political strategy and action in the context of
non-ideal conditions is extremely difficult and but also extremely important.  My 
dissertation is positioned right at the borderline between ideal and non-ideal theory, since 
I am arguing that even in ideal moral and epistemic conditions, reason is not always able 
to adjudicate our disagreements about justice, thus forcing us to resort to non-rational 
forms of interaction.  Nonetheless, I have nothing especially interesting to say about this 
topic in the abstract, and I am very dubious about theories that claim to provide general 
487 See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, New 
York: The New Press, 2010.
488 For example, the very respectable journal First Things featured a widely-discussed and controversial 
symposium in November of 1996 entitled “The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of 
Politics” (which included contributions by prominent intellectuals such as Robert P. George and Robert 
Bork) which explored the fact that many pro-life Americans “can no longer give moral assent to the 
existing regime,” opening up questions about “possible responses to laws that cannot be obeyed by 
conscientious citizens—ranging from noncompliance to resistance to civil disobedience to morally 
justified revolution” (“Introduction,” accessed 8 March 2014, 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/11/001-the-end-of-democracy-the-judicial-usurpation-of-
politics).
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principles that give a criterion that can by applied to all possible cases.  But no doubt 
there are justified and unjustified acts of political violence, and we do not want to do 
away with such a distinction (since doing away with the distinction would essentially 
return us to the Hobbesian war of all against all).  But the line that separates these 
categories (like the line that separates the categories of the reasonable and the 
unreasonable) is so thoroughly contested and contestable that it must itself be the subject 
of democratic and agonistic political debate.  When Chantal Mouffe was asked “What 
forms of violence-real and symbolic-are acceptable?  Where do you draw the line?”, she 
responded, 
There's absolutely no way in which one could draw the line from an 
abstract point of view.  It's always a question of what's acceptable in which
circumstances and by whom.  I don't think that there is some answer that 
could be given for everybody and for all societies, even for liberal 
democratic societies.  It very much depends on which positions you take, 
which view of citizenship you are going to defend in the agonistic 
contestation among notions of citizenship, because obviously the answer 
to that is going to be different according to the circumstances.  Obviously, 
there are forms of violence which are perfectly justified in order to put an 
end to a dictatorship.  I'm very much worried about the ultra anti-violence 
movement because violence is not necessarily bad.  Violence in some 
cases might be absolutely necessary in order for a democratic society to 
emerge.  This is a line that we need to draw, but we need to draw it always 
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in different circumstances and there is no answer to where it should be 
drawn.489
The lines between Adversary and Enemy, between legitimate and illegitimate political 
violence, between reasonable and unreasonable political demands remain forever unclear 
and contested.  But they are lines that must be drawn.  We hope that our political contests 
remain between Adversaries, but there is no such guarantee.  We should not ignore the 
existence of real Enemies who stand in the way of justice even within modern non-ideal 
democratic regimes.
In any case, besides engaging in partisan agonistic political advocacy and action, 
there must be some further role for political philosophers, and this is where the Jamesian 
political philosopher comes in.  I recognize that my dissertation makes two somewhat 
different claims that seem to be in tension.  First, I insist that we look upon our political 
disagreements with open eyes, and accept the depth and persistence of those 
disagreements, and refuse to pretend that they are merely the products of mean-
spiritedness or ignorance, or that they are merely a temporary and transient phase soon to 
be exited into a bright future of consensus.  Second, I encourage political philosophers to 
search around for hitherto unrecognized or unappreciated or unarticulated points of 
convergence that might be drawn out into new ideals and which might help push us 
beyond some particular point of seemingly hopeless disagreement.  But it should be clear 
that one important implications of my first claim is that Jamesian solutions do not always 
(or maybe even often) exist for any given political disagreement.  But I hope to have 
developed some tools for thinking through this tragic condition, and I hope that I have 
shown what a positive contribution might look like.
489 Worsham and Olson, “Rethinking Political Community,” 188.
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APPENDIX B
ECONOMIC LIBERTY THROUGHOUT THE LIBERAL TRADITION
267
Libertarianism Classical liberalism “Neoclassical” Liberalism High liberalism Liberal Socialism
Representative 
theorists
Robert Nozick, 
Eric Mack, Ayn 
Rand, Murray 
Rothbard, Jan 
Narveson
F.A. Hayek*, Milton Friedman*, Adam 
Smith, David Hume, Richard Posner, 
Gary Becker*, Richard Epstein, Ludwig
von Mises*, Isaiah Berlin
John Tomasi, Gerald Gaus, 
Loren Lomasky, Jason 
Brennan, Will Wilkinson, 
David Schmidtz, Jacob Levy, 
Matt Zwolinski
John Rawls, Samuel Freeman, 
Martha Nussbaum, Samuel 
Arnold, Ronald Dworkin, Will 
Kymlicka, Jeremy Waldron
G.A. Cohen, John Roemer, Samuel 
Bowles, Herbet Gintis
Basic liberties EL upgraded 
above CL & PL 
(only EL as BL)
CL, PL, EL equally important (CL, PL, 
EL, as BL); also EL as precondition for 
CL and PL*
-Negative liberty protected, positive 
liberty rejected
CL, PL, EL equally important 
(CL, PL, EL, as BL)
-Positive liberty indirectly 
promoted
EL downgraded below CL & PL
(only CL & PL as BL; only thin 
EL as basic)
-Positive liberty guaranteed
EL potentially not protected liberties at 
all
Form of 
economic 
justice
Capitalism with 
unconstrained 
outcomes
Capitalism with constrained outcomes at
the bottom (via income subsidies, e.g. 
negative income tax)*
-Sufficientarianism
Capitalism with constrained 
outcomes at the bottom (via 
income subsidies, e.g. negative
income tax)
-Welfarism, sufficientarianism,
or prioritarianism
Capitalist or non-capitalist 
markets with constrained 
outcomes at the top (inheritance 
tax) and bottom (transfers)
-Egalitarianism
Designed egalitarian outcomes 
Scope of public 
justification
Rules of 
property 
acquisition and 
exchange are 
subject of justice
“Rules of just conduct” are subject of 
justice*
BS is subject of justice BS is subject of justice All (private) economic activity is 
subject of justice
Model of the 
self
Self-owner Humean anti-
rationalist model 
(Hayek, Smith, 
Hume)
Rational choice 
model* 
(Friedman, 
Posner, Becker)
Having highest order interest 
in developing two moral 
powers (conception of justice, 
conception of good)
-Focus on role of agency in 
moral personality
Having highest order interest in 
developing two moral powers 
(conception of justice, 
conception of good)
Communally-responsive
Mode of moral 
justification
Deontological Consequentialist* Deontological + contractarian Deontological + contractarian Deontological (?)
Key:
EL: Economic liberties = freedom of ownership and exchange [Tomasi: necessary condition for exercising 
moral agency]
CL: Civil liberties = freedom of conscience, association, expression [Rawls: necessary condition for 
developing a conception of the good]
PL: Political liberties = freedom to vote, run for office [Rawls: necessary condition for developing a 
conception of justice]
BL: Basic liberties = built into Rawls’ (lexically prioritized) first principle of justice; equally enjoyed, 
inalienable liberties
BS: Basic structure = “…the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together 
into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the 
division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time” (John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 10)
*: Indicates a subset of classical liberalism referred to as “neoliberalism.”
Definition: Capitalism: an economic regime that legally allows for private ownership of productive 
property (e.g. capital), as well as other forms of voluntarily-agreed upon forms of ownership (e.g. worker 
cooperatives)
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APPENDIX C
THE SPACE OF CAPITALIST PROPERTY
Source: Gerald Gaus, “The Idea and Ideal of Capitalism,” 6.
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APPENDIX D
BARRIERS TO PRODUCTIVE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP FOR THE POOR
Source: Fernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, 16.
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APPENDIX E
ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND POLITICAL/CIVIL RIGHTS
Note: “most free” refers to “most economically free countries” according to the Economic Freedom of the 
World index
Source: http://www.freetheworld.com/2008/EconomicFreedomoftheWorld2008.pdf 
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APPENDIX F
POLITICALLY POLARIZED PURCHASING BEHAVIOR ON 
AMAZON.COM
The arrows in the network map show which books were purchased together by the same user, from October 2008.
Source: Valdis Krebs, “New Political Patterns” (2008), accessed 14 January 2015, http://www.orgnet.com/divided.html.
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APPENDIX G
PATTERNS OF LINKING ON POLITICAL BLOGS
Kevin Drum summarizes: “The authors collected a sample of 40 political blogs, 20 from the right and 20 
from the left, and then plotted the links between them over a period of time. The top diagram shows all 
connections, the middle diagram includes only connections that have at least five reciprocal links, and the 
bottom diagram includes only connections that have at least 25 reciprocal links” 
(http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2005_03/005808.php)
Source: Lada Adamic and Natalie Glance, “The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. Election: Divided 
They Blog,” Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Link discovery (March 2005), 9.
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Source: Lada Adamic and Natalie Glance, “The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. Election: Divided 
They Blog,” Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Link discovery (March 2005), 4.
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